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ABSTRACT 
This thesis considers the law on confessions, illegally/improperly obtained evidence 
and entrapment tmder the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 
There is a detailed discussion of the case-law and the principles which underlie that 
case-law as well as a detailed discussion of the principles and policies which underlie 
the relevant statutory and common law provisions. There is also some discussion of 
some of the psychological aspects of false confessions and interrogation. There is 
some historical discussion of how the law has approached confessions, 
illegally/improperly obtained evidence and entrapment before the enactment of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 
A major theme of this thesis is to illustrate how changing judicial and public attitudes 
to the police and criminal investigations from the mid nineteenth century to the 
present day have influenced the content of the law on the three areas of criminal 
evidence under discussion, namely confessions, illegally/improperly obtained 
evidence and entrapment. 
In particular this thesis has attempted to illustrate how judicial responses to Sections 
76 2(a) and 76 2(b) and S. 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act have been 
influenced by changing public attitudes to the police, the integrity of their evidence to 
the criminal court and their role in the criminal justice system and society. 
In order to illustrate and highlight important points and arguments in the thesis, 
reference is occasionally made to the law and issues on identification evidence, 
accomplice evidence, forensic evidence as well as the law and issues on covert police 
operations to gather evidence not involving entrapment. However, no claim is made 
for comprehensive treatment of the law on identification evidence, accomplice 
evidence or forensic evidence, merely reference is made to those areas for the 
purposes of exposition on the main areas of study: 
Confessions, illegally/improperly obtained evidence and entrapment. 
The name of the publishers and place of publication for books and monographs 
quoted in the text is given in the bibliography. 
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CHAPTER I 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY TO 
PRESENT DAY ATTITUDES TOTHE POLICE, CONFESSIONS 
AND ILLEGALLYIIMPROPERLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 
Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to illustrate how the current law on Confessions and 
Improperly Obtained Evidence including evidence obtained by entrapment has been 
influenced by shifting judicial and public perceptions of the police and the crime 
problem in England and Wales. In order properly to appreciate these developments 
an overview of the history of judicial attitudes to confessions and improperly obtained 
evidence will be undertaken. This will also involve some consideration of how the 
police role in relation to the criminal justice system and society has evolved. 
The approach to the areas of the law of criminal evidence examined in this thesis is 
not therefore from a purely evidentiary viewpoint, a viewpoint which focuses purely 
on the rules and discretions governing the admissibility of particular kinds of 
evidence into the criminal trial. This is not to say that the evidentiary viewpoint is 
necessarily always incomplete with regard to evidentiary doctrines. The principles 
governing for example, the admissibility of similar fact evidence or the purposes of 
cross examination on the previous convictions of the accused under S. l. f(ii)-(iii) of 
the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 can be examined solely from the perspective of the 
judicial function at the criminal trial. Such issues can be viewed as "classic 
conundrums of the law of criminal evidence" (1) where the focus is purely on the 
principles at issue and the forensic process at trial. It is no doubt true that these areas 
of the law of criminal evidence can also be fruitfully explored from a different 
perspective than the purely evidentiary. An example of this is Dr. Munday's 
examination of the extent to which the assumptions underpinning the law on the cross 
examination of the accused on his previous convictions deviates from the research of 
psychologists on the strength of the link between dishonesty in the commercial sphere 
and dishonesty in the testimonial sphere. (2) However, this kind of approach is not 
necessary for a proper understanding of the principles at stake in the area of similar 
facts or cross examination under the 1898 Act. The principles which inform the law 
on similar fact evidence namely, the avoidance of undue prejudice to the accused 
against the desirability of the adduction of evidential material which can be very 
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useful to the trier of fact in determining the issues at trial, can be readily understood 
without necessarily having a knowledge of the history of the development of the law 
on similar fact evidence over the past hundred years. (3) The concerns which frame 
the law on sin-dlar fact evidence in the light of jury trial can be appreciated without 
regard to the history of that doctrine of the law of criminal evidence. 
However, in contrast the rules and principles governing the admissibility of 
confession evidence and illegally or improperly detained evidence cannot be 
satisfactorily understood solely from the purely evidentiary perspective. The rules 
and principles of the law of criminal evidence on confessions for example do of 
course govern the admissibility of that type of evidence to the criminal trial and to 
that extent it is possible to view S. 76 2(a) and (b) and S. 78 of 'Me Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 as purely evidentiary norms but to fully appreciate the 
significance of these provisions as well as their evolution a broader perspective than 
the evidentiary is required. As Professor Twining has observed on the defects of a 
purely evidentiary approach to confessions and illegally obtained evidence which 
focuses on the doctrines of admissibility, 
"... the phenomenon and problems are not primarily 
evidentiary - it is odd to see the principle of decent and fair treatment of suspects and others being treated mainly 
as an evidentiary principle. " (4) 
It will be a major concern of this thesis to illustrate how changing perceptions of the 
police in terms of their perceived integrity and the integrity of their evidence to the 
criminal court, and changing perceptions of their role in relation to the criminal 
justice system, has influenced the development of the law of confession and the law 
on illegally and unfairly obtained evidence. These two areas of the law of criminal 
evidence have historically received (5) very different treatment in the law of criminal 
evidence and continue to be treated differently under the new regime established by 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. For example, confessions are subject to two 
exclusionary rules in S. 76 2(a) and (b) whereas illegally obtained evidence is subject 
only to discretionary exclusion under S. 78. The concerns regarding the two areas of 
evidence are very different although there are some similarities as well. 'Me 
justification for examining them together is that both the law on confessions and the 
law on illegally obtained evidence have been influenced in a major way by 
perceptions of the police at a judicial and public level. It will be necessary therefore 
to trace the history of the police at least in broad outline so as to reveal the shifting 
ideological underpinnings of the existence of police power, which includes the power 
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to gather evidence in criminal investigations for use at trial, which have existed since 
the foundation of Sir Robert Peel's new metropolitan police in 1829. 
The Police in the 19th Century 
The Orizins of the Police 
It is clear from the work of historians of the police (Critchley, Reiner, Emsley (6)) 
that the new police came into existence after 1829 partly as a result of the concern of 
the ruling elites with the increased threat of public disorder in the early nineteenth 
century. There were no doubt other impulses behind the establishment of the new 
police. (7) 
The origins and initial purposes of the police lay not in the need for a crime detection 
and investigation organisation but rather in the need for a trained non military body 
committed to the maintenance of public order. The modem core role of the police as 
the state agency charged with special powers and duties to investigate crime and 
prepare cases for prosecution against offenders was not regarded as a central role of 
the police until towards the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The 1870s with the 
creation of the separate Criminal Investigation Department seems to have been the 
decade when the emphasis of the police role shifted towards detection and 
investigation of crime and away from the mere preventive patrolling of the streets. (8) 
If the police were not perceived to be intimately connected with criminal 
investigations for the production of evidence for use in criminal trials then it could be 
plausibly maintained that the police were merely "citizens in uniforms" maintaining 
the Queen's peace on a full time basis. 
Lustgarten comments that (9) 
"The single most important feature of the constitutional 
position of the police is that they have the status of 
constable. When organised police forces were established 
in the nineteenth century, they were grafted onto and 
clothed with the powers of the traditional office., " 
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"Me constitutional status of the police in the 19th Century 
In the nineteenth century the police were not perceived as a core state agency charged 
with detecting and investigating crime. The theory was, a police officer although 
holding the office of constable under the Crown, was an independent agent deriving 
his powers from the common law. (10) The ancient office of Constable was a 
creation of the common law and therefore the constable derived his powers from the 
common law. The theory was that the police had no powers greater than those of the 
ordinary citizen apart from a slightly wider power of arrest: a constable alone could 
arrest in cases of suspected felony or treason. (11) This view of the limitations of the 
constable's powers was based on the view, in the words of Lustgarten, 
" ... because in legal theory he was a sort of delegate of the community, the constable exercised common law 
powers only. " (12) 
Therefore it was plausible to maintain, as Sir James Fitzjames Stephen did amongst 
others (13), that the police officer was merely a citizen in uniform. This meant that 
the police merely performed as a full time occupation duties and exercised powers 
which the ordinary citizen had in any case. As Waldron comments, 
"It was simply that he did this for a living and was 
trained at it whereas the ordinary citizen had better 
things to do. " (14) 
The concept of the police as "citizens in uniform" was still potent enough to play a 
central part in the reports of both the 1929 and 1962 Royal Commissions on the 
Police. The 1929 Royal Conunission commented, 
"The police of this country have never been recognised 
either by law or traditions as a force distinct from the 
general body of citizens. Despite the imposition of many 
extraneous duties on the police by legislation and 
administrative action the principle remains that a policeman 
in the view of the common law is only a person paid to 
perform as a matter of duty, acts which if he were so 
minded he might have done voluntarily. " (15) 
The corollary of the police as "citizens in uniform" was that they had no greater 
powers than the ordinary citizen derived from the common law. Sir James Fitzjames 
Stephen commented that the police had no greater powers of questioning or evidence- 
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gathering than the private individual had. (16) 
The Development of the Police Investip-ative and Prosecutotial Roles in the mid 
to late Nineteenth Centu 
Until the early part of the nineteenth century the Justice of the Peace in his role as 
examining magistrate investigated crime, made arrests and questioned suspects. 
However, by 1848 when the Indictable Offences Act was passed this instigatory 
procedure of the magistrates had developed into a preliminary hearing and as Devlin 
notes, 
"The police took over the responsibility for the 
investigation, the magistrates retained the judicial role. " 
(17) 
However, the situation is rather more complicated than this statement allows. The 
above distinction and division by Devlin between the police and magistracy is not so 
clear cut given the continued involvement of the magistracy in the investigation of 
criminal offences in the form of their supervisory role in the granting of search and 
arrest warrants and in permitting extensions to the period of custodial detention and 
interrogation beyond thirty-six hours under PACE. (18) 
More to the point is that even if the police took over the responsibility for the 
investigation of offences later in the nineteenth century this should not be taken to 
mean that the police were then similar to the criminal investigative agency that the 
modem police are understood to be. Crucially that central investigative strategy of 
the modem police (19), namely the interrogation of suspects in police detention, was 
not accepted as legitimate practice even at the end of the nineteenth century. The 
modem criminal justice system may revolve around police interrogation, confession 
and the guilty plea, but in the nineteenth century there was a much less obvious 
connection between police investigations into crime and the verdict at the criminal 
trial. 
The nineteenth century prohibition on the police engaging in the questioning of 
arrested suspects, can be contrasted with the power of the modem police to arrest and 
detain for the purposes of interrogation. (20) 
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In his preface to Sir Howard Vincent's police code published in 1882, Hawkins J. 
(later Lord Brampton) addressed the police on their duties and commented, 
"Perhaps the best maxim for a constable to bear in mind 
with respect to an accused person is 'keep your eyes and 
your ears open and your mouth shud' By silent watch- 
fulness you will hear all you ought to hear. Never act 
unfairly to a prisoner by coaxing him by word or conduct 
to divulge anything. If you do you will assuredly be 
severely handled at trial and it is likely your evidence 
will be disbelieved. " (21) 
A modem commentator has noted of the nineteenth century police practice that, 
... suspects were not interrogated and constables were known to testify that the defendant had sought to make 
a statement 'but I knew my duty and bade him to be 
silent'. " (22) 
The nineteenth century dislike of the idea of police interrogation of suspects was 
partly linked to memories of the physical abuse of defendants to obtain confessions in 
the courts of the seventeenth century and earlier. As McConville et al explain, 
'I ... the memories of Star Chamber's practices of compulsion 
and torture for the purpose of obtaining confessions contested 
the notion of interrogation as an acceptable investigative 
strategy; the incongruity between police assertions that the 
suspect confessed in the privacy of the police station and the 
suspect's denial of this in the public realm of the courtroom 
continued to incite judicial suspicion of the private production 
of evidence. " (23) 
This judicial distaste about the police engaging in pre-trial questioning of the accused 
must be understood in an era when the accused could not even be cross-examined in 
court due to his incompetency as a witness in his own trial. This incompetency only 
ended in 1898 with the passage of the Criminal Evidence Act of that year. It is not 
difficult to find examples of judicial disapproval of police questioning of suspects in 
the law reports. In Rv Gavin and others (1885) Smith J. commented (24) 
"When a prisoner is in custody the police have no right to 
ask him questions" ... 
and the confession so obtained was ruled inadmissible. 
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In Ev Kni g-bt and 'Mayre (19051 Chanel I J. said, (25) 
"When he has taken anyone into custody ... he ought not to question the prisoner. " 
In Rv Crowe and Myerscough (1917) Sankey J. said, (26) 
"In my view if a police constable has determined to arrest a 
person or if a person is in fact in custody then he should 
ask no questions which will in any way tend to prove the 
guilt of the person in custody from his own mouth. " 
However, judicial disapproval of the police questioning of suspects reflected a more 
general concern in the nineteenth century to keep police powers in England to a 
minimum necessary for the job, a concern which was an important part of the 
ideological underpinning of police legitimacy at that time. Reiner points out that at 
the outset of the establishment of the police in London in 1829 they faced 
considerable public hostility. (27) Many at both ends of the spectrum of social status 
felt that a professional police force was alien to English traditions of civil liberties and 
necessarily inimical to individual rights and freedoms won through bitter social, 
religious and political conflict in the preceding centuries. The police as an institution 
had for Englishmen in the early nineteenth century connotations of continental 
despotism, especially French despotism. 
An important way of disarming this hostility to the police was to emphasize that 
police powers were kept to a minimum. Public suspicion of police power continued 
throughout most of the nineteenth century, witness for example the uproar in the press 
and in Parliament to the revelation at the trial at the Old Bailey that the police had 
entrapped the abortionist Titley in 1880. (228) The refusal to grant the police a power 
of interrogation must be understood against the great fear of the police as a potential 
weapon of despotism, as indeed some continental police forces were, notably the 
French and the Russian. Another aspect of this distrust of police power was that the 
courts were very careful to scrutinize the lawfulness of policies adopted by chief 
officers. (29) 
Sir Travers Humphreys, a High Court judge, commented on the changes he had 
experienced in his long career in practice as a barrister and judge in a speech at the 
Inns of Court in 1948, (30) 
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"Sixty years ago ... confessions to policemen were 
few 
and far between and those which were admitted in 
evidence after objection were rarer still. Today the 
reverse is the case. " 
Therefore, even in the late nineteenth century few confessions were obtained by the 
police, indeed the whole structure of criminal investigation to produce evidence for 
use in court was not unambiguously a police function. Until around 1870 the majority 
of criminal prosecutions were undertaken by private individuals or private 
associations and not the police. (3 1) These private individuals or associations would 
gather evidence about an offender and prosecute the case in the criminal courts. It 
was only after 1870 that the police undertook the majority of criminal prosecutions. 
Hay and Snyder remark, (32) 
" ... that by 1879 the private prosecutor often wore blue. " 
The explanation for this comment is that when the police did prosecute they did so in 
theory only as private individuals who happened to have infonnation about 
lawbreaking by the accused. Indeed, Emsley has commented, (33) 
"The English system of criminal prosecution and trials 
entered the twentieth century shot through with paradoxes 
the prosecution of a criminal offender was still perceived 
as the right of any individual but increasingly such 
prosecutions were being dominated by the professional 
police. " 
The main point here is that certainly before the 1870s the criminal courts were not 
dependent on the police to bring offenders before the court. Even if after 1870 the 
police began to dominate the process of collecting evidence and prosecuting criminals 
it is submitted that there was no mature view of the criminal courts and the police 
forming a system or process. 
Another point illustrating the difference between the nineteenth century police and the 
modem police is that it was only in 1869 that full time divisional detectives were 
established and only from 1877 that the C. I. D. was formed with 250 men. The view 
of the police as being concerned with the detection and investigation of offences was 
subordinate to the view of the police role as being concerned with public order 
maintenance and crime protection through regular foot patrols. Reiner pinpoints the 
1870s as a crucial tun-ling point in the police role, (34) 
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"By the late 1870s, the trend towards increasing specialisation 
and emphasis on detection was well entrenched, playing down 
the general role of the general practice uniform constable. " 
Public and official fear of crime in the last quarter of the nineteenth century even led 
to the toleration of the creation of a secret police force, the Special Branch, in 1887 to 
counter increasing political violence and subversion, especially from Irish 
revolutionaries. 
Public Attitudes to the Police in the 19th Centu. 
Reference has already been made to the immense hostility on the part of the public 
towards the establishment of the new police in 1829. This 'legitimacy' problem was 
only resolved towards the end of the nineteenth century. By the 1890s the English 
police began to be seen as part of the English genius and also as a symbol of national 
pride. This is so even if, as revisionist historians of the police such as Brogden note 
(35) that 'consent' to the police amongst the poor and marginalised has never been as 
unproblematic as the "official" histories of the English police such as that of C. Reith 
suggested. (36) 
Emsley in his social and political history of the English police, quotes various sources 
to illustrate the esteem in which the English police were held by the 1890s. Emsley 
comments, (37) 
"The Bobby was now firmly established as part of the 
British constitution. According to John Bums, a former 
Labour activist but by 1900 an Independent Radical M. P., 
the City of London and Tbe Metropolitan Police were 'the 
best police force in the world'. " 
It can be argued that part of the success in achieving widespread public acceptance of 
the police was due to skilful propaganda on the part of those who favoured the new 
police. As Reiner and Leigh note, (38) 
"Clearly central to the acceptance of the force by the 
majority of the public was the belief that the police were 
subordinate to the rule of law and that they lacked either 
legal powers or the coercive capacity to police other than 
by the consent of the populace. " 
9 
Hence a lack of a power to question suspects in custody. In order to secure legitimacy 
for the police a crucial element in the propaganda campaign was the concept of the 
caretaker or "citizen in uniform". This concept had a remarkably long shelf-life. It 
was mentioned with approval as late as 1973 in Sir Robert MaWs highly publicised 
Dimbleby Lecture. (39) 
Judicial Attitudes to Police Evidence in the Nineteenth Centu 
The judiciary, at least in the early part of the nýineteenth century, tended to share 
public scepticism about the dangers posed by the new police. J. D. Heydon has 
commented that (40), 
"T'he judges tended to distrust the early police as novelties, 
indeed they continued to do so throughout the nineteenth 
century. " 
The hostile attitude of the nineteenth century judiciary towards the practice of police 
interrogation of suspects was one manifestation of that distrust. Judicial dislike of 
interrogation by the police went beyond judicial exhortation to the police not to 
indulge in the practice so as to actually include the exclusion of confessions by 
suspects allegedly made to the police. Lord MacDermott noted in his address to the 
Bentham Club in 1968 with regard to the admissibility of answers put to questions to 
a suspect in custody, (41) 
"'Me attitude of the judges during the latter part of the 
nineteenth century seems to have veered towards excluding 
such answers in the exercise of their discretion. " 
It is important to make clear that the exclusion of confessions here was independent 
of the common law voluntariness rule which was established at the end of the 
eighteenth century: see Chapters 2 and 3 on the voluntariness rule. This judicial 
attitude to confessions obtained by the police from the questioning of suspects in 
custody had an effect on police attitudes to interrogation as an investigative strategy 
which lasted into the twentieth century, beyond the First World War. As the Royal 
Conunission on Criminal Procedure (198 1) noted, (42) 
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"The Royal Comn-lission on Police Power and Procedure in 
1929 said that the great majority of police forces followed 
Lord Brampton's advice as a matter of fundamental principle 
and concluded that it was desirable to avoid any questioning 
at all of persons actually in custody. " 
The sceptical comments of Cave J. about the authenticity of confessions obtained by 
the police from the private questioning of suspects is a further example of judicial 
distrust of the police in the nineteenth century. In Rv Thompson (1893) (43) Cave J., 
an experienced judge, commented that he always distrusts confessions allegedly made 
to the police by suspects: see Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
It is submitted that judicial attitudes to the police profoundly affected the 
development of the common law doctrine that improperly obtained or illegally 
obtained evidence is freely admissible at trial. In the mid to late nineteenth century 
the common law rule was laid down in decisions such as Rv Leatham (1861) and 
Jones v Owen (1870) , 
(44). Insulated from the police as an institution, the criminal 
judiciary in the nineteenth century could take the view that all that mattered with 
regard to evidence obtained illegally or improperly by the police was whether it was 
relevant to the facts in issue at the criminal trial. The judges were reluctant to admit 
confessions obtairied by the police because of a fear of manufactured evidence and a 
judicial dislike about the police engaging in pre-trial cross-examination of the 
accused. However, the reliability of improperly obtained real evidence, such as stolen 
goods obtained by an illegal search, is rarely at issue unless the defence claim is that 
the evidence was 'planted' by police, a relatively common defence to drugs charges in 
the modem courts. 
Distanced from the police as an institution because of a lack of a perceived unity to 
the criminal process the nineteenth century judiciary could admit illegally or 
improperly obtained evidence without concern for any potential damage to their own 
judicial integrity or the legitimacy or fairness of the criminal trial. In the case of 
Jones v Owen (1870) the judge dismissed completely any suggestion that because the 
evidence of illegal poaching had been discovered by an illegal search of the suspect 
by a police officer that this could affect the admissibility of the evidence. In the 
earlier case of Rv Leatham (18 6 1) Crompton J. commented, 
"It matters not how you get it, if you steal it even it would 
be admissible in evidence. " 
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As Professor Dennis points out (45) 
"The inspiration for this common law position came largely 
from civil cases where the court has traditionally conceived 
its function as that of doing justice between the parties 
according to the evidence the parties choose to present. From 
this standpoint it is immaterial how the parties came by this 
evidence. " 
The above judicial pronouncement by Crompton J. on-iits to make a distinction 
between evidence obtained by the illegality of the private citizen and evidence 
obtained by the illegality of the police officer. Reference has already been made in 
this thesis to the relative insulation of the criminal courts from the police in the 
nineteenth century, however that perhaps also underlies Crompton J. 's omission to 
distinguish between the police officer and the private citizen in obtaining evidence 
illegally is how the police were viewed in ideological terms in the nineteenth century. 
This was as "citizens in uniform" rather than as a core state agency that we understand 
the modem police to be. The significance of the constable or "citizen in w-ifform" is 
that judges in the nineteenth century could maintain that illegal or improper conduct 
of the police in gathering non confession evidence was irrelevant to the question of 
the fairness of the criminal trial and that therefore there was no good reason not to 
admit such evidence into trial. This view could be taken because evidence obtained 
illegally by the police constable was no different in status from evidence obtained by 
the illegality of a private citizen. If the police were "citizens in unifon-n" then for the 
criminal courts to have treated evidence obtained by the police in a manner differently 
from evidence obtained by a private citizen would have seemed illogical. 
'Mis observation helps to explain the significance of Zuckerman's insight that, (46) 
"Criminal judges last century may have been right to divorce 
admissibdity from illegality if they felt that the trial process 
was so detached from the police investigation as to be 
insulated from any illegalities that occurred in the police 
station. " 
Criminal judges in the nineteenth century obviously felt that they had no 
responsibility for the way in which non confession evidence presented before them by 
the police had been obtained. However, as referred to earlier, with regard to 
confession evidence the judiciary were very much concerned with how that evidence 
had been obtained. The main rule governing the admissibility of confessions was the 
common law 'voluntariness' rule. 
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This was not a rule formulated so as to control the actions of the police in the 
interrogation of suspects. The police force date from 1829 whereas the exclusionary 
rule had its origins in the late eighteenth century. Even if in the twentieth century pre 
PACE, the voluntariness rule could be interpreted so as providing some limits on 
police interrogation methods, i. e. no threats or inducements ought to be offered to the 
suspect by the police, the rule left entirely open whole areas regarding the limits of 
permissible police conduct in interrogation. For example, the idea of outlawing 
"oppression" in interrogation was not incorporated into the exclusionary rule until 
Callis v Gunn, in October 1963. (47) 
The Police in the Twentieth Century up to PACE 
Judicial and Official Attitudes to Interroeations and Confessions obtained throueh 
Questionine in the earlv 20th centurv 
Accompanying the increasing legitimacy of the English police in society came a 
changing judicial attitude toward the admissibility of confessions obtained by the 
police questioning of suspects, so that by 1914 Lord Sumner could comment that the 
trend of the judicial discretion was to admit rather than to exclude such confessions 
(48). Increasing public and judicial respect for the police must have played a part in 
this change in judicial attitudes towards the admissibility of confessions obtained by 
pre trial questioning. This trend for admitting confessions into evidence continued as 
the police entered the "Golden Age"- of their legitimacy in the 1940s and 1950s. 
However, the interrogation of suspects was still officially frowned upon in the early 
twentieth century. The 1929 Royal Commission on the Police reported that the 
questioning of suspects seemed to have been limited to the large city forces such as 
the Metropolitan Police but this practice was criticized by the 1929 Report, whose 
Commissioners wished for a blanket ban on police interrogation. (49) 
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The Growth of Police Power 
Apart from the voluntariness rule there was also as a check on police interrogations, 
the Judges' Rules. Tbese were first issued in 1906 and 1912 by the Kings Bench 
Division to the police. This perhaps illustrates that even in 1906 the view of the 
policeman as "citizen in uniform" could not be consistently maintained and that the 
police were sufficiently differentiated from citizens in their powers and duties so as to 
require additional guidance on what was and what was not acceptable practice 
towards suspects. Arguably the 1906 issue of the Judges' Rules was the first judicial 
recognition that the police were different from ordinary citizens. 
However, a close examination of the original Judges' Rules of 1912 reveals that they 
offer very little in the way of regulation of the detention and questioning of suspects 
by the police. The Judges' Rules of 1912 are limited to such matters as when the 
caution should be administered to the suspect and the terms of the caution. 
Contemporaneously with the issue of the Judges' Rules came regulations to the police 
from the Home Office on the conduct of identification parades. 'Mese regulations 
followed the Beck case (1907) (50), a notorious case of miscarriage of justice based 
on repeatedly unreliable identification evidence. This again suggests that whatever 
the official rhetoric, the police were regarded as performing special duties requiring 
special guidance. The holding of identification parades is a classic example of a 
power and procedure which is a police function separate from what the ordinary 
citizen is capable of performing. 
There was therefore a contradiction in official discourse in both claiming the police as 
citizens in unifonn and issuing guidance to the police on the correct exercise of their 
special powers. 
However, the view of the police as "citizens in uniform" was still potent enough to 
play a central part in the 1929 and 1962 Royal Commissions on the Pofice (5 1). Yet 
as Reiner and Leigh point out that in fact if not in theory the ideology of the 
policeman or "citizen in uniform" was vitiated in 1929 let alone in 1962 (52), 
by the accretion of power based on bureaucratic 
organisation, technology and training and it has been 
undern-fined since by a steady accretion of formal powers. " 
As Lustgarten points out, special statutory powers denied to the general public had 
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begun to be created after organised police forces had gained some degree of public 
acceptance. This process started with the Metropolitan Police Act in 1839 which 
granted policemen wider powers of search and arrest in particular circumstances. (53) 
The process continued throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth 
century with, for example, the passage of The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 which 
created special powers for the police to stop and search for illegal substances. 
Lustgarten comments that, (54) 
" ... the logical culmination has been reached in the 1984 Act with its wide powers for constables throughout the 
country to arrest, search, seize property, and conduct intimate 
body searches. Legally speaking, the constable is indeed now 
'a man apart' from other citizens. " 
It should be pointed out that it is possible to exaggerate the potency of the constable 
as //citizen in uniform" in the pre PACE era. The concept of policemen as "citizens in 
uniform" was attacked as inaccurate by Professor Goodhart in his dissent to the 1962 
Royal Commission. Goodhart's point was that the police were given extra powers to 
fulfil their duties to investigate crime and that to say a constable was a "citizen in 
uniform" was to obscure this important social fact. (55) However, as will be seen 
later in this chapter, the myth of the constable as "citizen in uniform" was only finally 
laid to rest by the R. C. C. P. Report in 198 1. 
Contrasted with the official maintenance of the "citizen in uniform" concept came an 
increase in and toleration of use by the police of the interrogation of suspects. 
The 1964 change to the Judges' Rules seems to have been the first official 
authorization of the practice of police questioning of suspects already in their custody 
but it is clear that the 1964 change merely recognised what was already widespread 
police practice: see Chapter 2 of this thesis and the comments of J. C. Smith in the 
1960 Criminal Law Review reported in Chapter 2. 
The reasons for the growth of interrogation in the police armoury against crime are 
complex. An obvious factor in the growth in the use of interrogation was the removal 
of official disapproval with interrogation as a practice. This was manifested first of 
all in increasing judicial willingness to accept confessions into evidence obtained 
through interrogation, see for example the decision in Rv May (1952), (56). Secondly 
it was manifested in the express authorization given to the questioning of suspects in 
custody by Rule I of the 1964 revised Judges' Rules. 
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This change in official attitudes towards custodial interrogation may itself have been 
driven by fears of rising crime and a desire not to hamper police efforts in 
investigating crime. Certainly by 1968 Lord MacDermott (57) commented that undue 
attachment by the law to the suspects' privilege against self-incrimination was 
hampering the police in their fight against rising crime rates. The growth in the use of 
interrogation post Second World War does match a considerable growth in the crime 
rates, especially since the mid 1950s. By 1957 over half a million crimes were 
committed in Britain annually and as one commentator notes, (58) 
/I the shortage of police manpower to cope with this 
crisis in crime was a serious cause for concem in 
WUtehall. " 
However, worse was to come for in the post war period the great increase in the crime 
rate occurred from the late 1950s. By 1960 the crime figure was over seven hundred 
thousand crimes annually, which represented a considerable growth from the 1955 
figure of over four hundred thousand. Traditionally the English police have been 
portrayed as "low in numbers", this was an important element in the traditional 
English police model. In 1938 the ratio of police to population was 1: 689 which as 
Reiner points out, (59) 
// - would have put England and Wales relatively low on the international scale ... thus England and Wales seem to have been comparatively thinly policed before the Second 
World War. " 
This was fine in a society of the 1930s that can be characterized as relatively "crime 
free". However., the great growth in crime referred to from the late 1950s was not Z-: ) 
matched by a corresponding increase in the number of police officers and although by 
1962 the ratio of police to public had improved to 1: 581 the figure was still 
comparatively low in comparison to other industrial countries such as France or 
Germany. 
In the light of a rapidly rising crime rate from the late 1950s and official concern 
about police effectiveness but no significant resources to increase substantially police 
manpower, it would not be surprising if the police started to have heavy recourse to 
the interrogation of suspects as a response to this crisis. One important feature of 
custodial interrogation of criminal suspects as an investigative method is that it can 
produce good results in the shape of confessions as evidence and general criminal 
intelligence efficiently involving only a few hours of a detective's time and involving 
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as few as one or two detectives. 
It may be the case that the heavy reliance on interrogation manifest by the time of the 
1981 Royal Commission made good sense from an efficient employment of 
manpower resources perspective. It can also be pointed out that heavy Teliance on 
interrogation as a crime fighting tool appears to be the case in some other advanced 
liberal democracies, Japan and the U. S. A. being notable examples of counuies where 
interrogation by police is heavily utilized. (60) However, whaher police 
interrogation is utilized in a particular country is going to be crucially determined by 
the form of criminal procedure adopted there. It may be that in certain countries 
interrogation of suspects is primarily a judicial rather than a police function, as in 
India. By virtue of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 police evidence of anything said 
during interrogation, by the suspect before the suspect was taken before the 
magistrate, is inadmissible evidence. (61) Given the high evidential value of 
confessions in many jurisdictions it is not surprising that police forces worldwide 
view interrogation as a quick and cheap route to conviction. 
In England serious resourcing needs may in addition have driven the trend towards 
interrogation as the central investigative strategy. Sir Robert Mark has Commented 
that in the post Second World War era, (62) 
"Criminal intelligence and targeting criminals were both 
born from the refusal of successive governments, Conservative 
and Labour, to allow the police adequate resources to fulfil 
their primary function of prevention. " 
The interrogation of suspects as routine may well have followed ft's post war 
development in the increased use of intelligence and informers to combat cirime. The 
crucial point here is that informer intelligence used to identify criminals may not be 
admissible evidence as proof of guilt, i. e. the word of an informer may be 
inadmissible as hearsay evidence. However, a confession obtained from the targeted 
crinlinal through interrogation may well secure a conviction either through a guilty 
plea or guilty verdict. Sir John May has conu-nented on this phenomenon in his 
Report on The Guildford Four case (63), 
"Where the police feel certain that they have indeed 
arrested the right people perhaps on the basis of what 
is regarded as reliable inteWgence but have little or no 
admissible evidence to prove their guilt, there may be 
a strong temptation to persuade those persons to confess. " 
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The growth of subjectivist doctrines in the criminal law post Second World War may 
have also stimulated the drive towards reliance on interrogation as a useful means of 
providing clear evidence of a subjective mental element required in many offences, 
e. g. offences under The Offences Against the Persons Act 1861 as interpreted in Rv 
Cunningham (1957) (64). Section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 is also 
significant in this regard. (65) T'he adversarial system itself with rules of evidence 
erecting relatively high evidentiary barriers to conviction may also induce a reliance 
on confession evidence by the police. Damaska has commented on the adversary 
system, that, (66) 
" ... there is a greater divergence between what the 
police actually know and what can be introduced as 
evidence at trial ... " 
than in inquisitorial systems of trial. Strict exclusionary rules prohibiting hearsay or 
the adduction of previous convictions save in "exceptional" circumstances are good 
examples of how the police may have good grounds to believe in the guilt of an 
individual but lack the admissible evidence to prove it. Recourse to interrogation to 
obtain a confession may therefore be the only way to close that gap. Moreover, if 
it ... most detective work is not detection but the transformation of an incident into a case and an 
individual into a defendant by the collection, 
categorization and presentation of evidence ... " 
then " ... interrogation is an especially important site for the legalization of accounts ... " (67) 
through e. g. the use of legal closure questions which invite the suspect to provide 
information but actually force information into a legally significant category in the 
hope that the suspect adopts it. 
At the present the interrogation of suspects is still viewed as the central investigative 
strategy of the police. Confessions obtained through interrogation are seen as vital to 
the efficient worldng of the modem criminal justice system. Zander has commented 
that, (68) 
" ... the criminal justice system would grind to a halt if 
confessions could not be utilised by the prosecution. " 
The Chief Inspector of Constabulary, Sir John Woodcock, has less dramatically than 
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Zander referred to confessions as "a vital tool of justice". (69) 
Pre PACE studies estimated that the proportion of suspects interrogated by the police 
who made admissions was over 60% (Softley and Irving, both studies in 1980) (70). 
Since PACE was introduced there seems to have been a small decline in the 
percentage of suspects who make confessions but the figure is still high; Moston and 
StephensoiYs study in 1992 (71) found a rate of 59%. It should be noted that very 
many of these suspects plead guilty at trial, over 90% according to some studies. 
McConville and Baldwin in their research for the RCCP in 1981 found that for 
contested cases confession evidence assumes a vital role in only about 20% of all 
cases heard in the Crown Court. (72) However, the true significance of confession 
evidence in the criminal process can only be appreciated when it is realised that the 
making of a confession is very often a prelude to a guilty plea. It is the inherent 
dispositive nature of a confession that makes that form of evidence so attractive to the 
police; this important observation should lead to an awareness of the crucial 
significance of the police power to detain and interrogate suspects now found in S. 37 
of PACE. As Dixon has written, (73) 
"From a legalistic perspective, the central purpose of police 
powers to detain for questioning is the collection of evidence 
for potential use in court. A more socially realistic 
perspective suggests that the division between investigative 
and judicial functions is too neat. Criminal justice systems 
which depend on very high rates of guilty pleas for their 
effective functioning have transferred the crucial site of 
determination from the court to the police station. When 
cases are effectively determined by a confession then a 
power to detain and question is more in practice if not in 
law than an investigative power. " 
McConville and Baldwin in 1981 (74) found that over 90% of defendants who made 
written confessions to the police in Birmingham and 76% in London plead guilty at 
trial. In McConville's study for the RCCJ of those who confessed during custodial 
interrogation where the outcome of the case is known, 93.6% pleaded guilty. (75) 
Therefore there can be little doubt about the close correspondence between confession 
evidence and conviction. This fact is unlikely to be lost on police officers, lawyers 
and defendants. 
It should be pointed out that the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act have made the obtaining of confessions more difficult than under the Judges' 
Rules. This has led, according to the police service, to a decreased reliance on 
interrogation in recent years fuelled as well by public concern over the role of 
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unreliable confession evidence in major miscarriage of justice cases between 1989- 
1992. (76) As one of the Chief Constables interviewed by Reiner commented4 (77) 
"PACE ... has made us far more professional in our 
approach. We have to work harder to get other evidence 
rather than relying simply on what we can get the defendant 
to confess to. " 
However, as noted earlier, some studies show that the confession rate from suspects 
remains remarkably similar to the pre PACE era. 
It is of course, in the best interest of the police to portray themselves as having 
changed in their approach to investigation and hence to have become more 
"professional". (78) Yet although the police are now more careful in the conduct of 
criminal investigations than the crude conviction-by-confession strategy of the pre 
PACE era, interrogation still occupies a central place in police investigative strategy 
and the criminal justice system remains dependent on the police power to interrogate 
so as to precipitate guilty pleas and guilty verdicts through confessions. 
Public Attitudes to the Police up to the 1970s and the Reality of Policin 
It has already been noted that it is only from 1963 that the voluntariness exclusionary 
rule incorporated the notion of outlawing oppressive methods of interrogation. This is 
possibly linked to the unjustified esteem in which the police were held by the courts 
and the public at least until the 1960s. Even then as Emsley comments, (79, ) 
" ... disquiet about aspects of police behaviour in the 1960s 
remained muted. " 
The point is that if the police were to be generally trusted to behave with propriety 
towards suspects then there would have seemed no pressing need for a rule outlawing 
oppressive methods of interrogation. That the police did sometimes pre 1960s behave 
with brutality towards suspects is attested to by no less a figure than Sir Robeirt Mark, 
former Metropolitan Police Commissioner, in his autobiography "In the Office of 
Constable". his account of policing in 1940s Manchester. Mark writes, for example, 
(80) 
20 
"Before and immediately after the War, there was a willing- 
ness by the police to use violence against the hardened 
criminal which I believe now holds rare indeed. " 
Brogden in his oral history of policing in Liverpool in the inter-war years corroborates 
the view of a willingness by the police to use violence at that time, 
"There is some evidence that the history of policing in England 
and Wales contains much more resort to the stick and fist than 
is recognized in the orthodox accounts. The stick in partic-ulaT 
backed up by the practical invisibility of the night beat was a 
useful devise to save on unpaid overtime ... The policeman 
would employ a good deal of violence on his beat to avoid the, 
need for tiresome court appearances ... A degree of violence 
might also be sufficient to control certain types of behaviour 
for which conviction was difficult or unlikely. " 
Brogden makes an authoritative statement on the issue of police violence in his study, 
(81) 
"Rank-and-file police officers in the inter-war years were 
no angels in the way they exercised authority on behalf 
of a smug urban middle class over the people relegated 
to the bottom of the social pile. " 
Further corroboration of this analysis is provided by another oral history of'policing in 
England and Wales, Weinberger's study of English police in the period 1930S - 1960s. 
The advantage of Weinberger's study over Brogden's is that it does not seek to limit Z-- - 
its inquiry to a particular city but seeks to give a rather more general impression of 
police behaviour and attitudes over a wider time span than Brogden's study. 
Weinberger comments, 
"The two main ways of getting evidence illegally were 
violence or fabrication. Both were routinely used and 
openly admitted to by its respondents ... Strong arm 
methods were the norm whether for softening up the 
prisoner, for gaining confessions or for exacting revenge. " 
Weinberger conunents ftuther, 
"Once in the station and despite the philosophy of the 
police service that'if you hit a prisoner you should do it 
outside the station' violence could become an integral 
part of the means to gain confessions. " 
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The police were able to utilize and cover up such behaviour which would likely be 
exposed today, because as Weinberger notes, (82) 
"The period probably brought to a peak the broad coverage 
and reach of the police authority in this country - an 
authority that is increasingly coming under challenge today, -" 
With a high level of authority comes respect and deference from those under that 
authority and also crucially high credibility with the judicial authorities in any dispute 
between police and citizen or to police behaviour. Ibe police were able to maintain 
their general public image of unimpeachable integrity because when the police 
stooped to the use of unreasonable violence it was generally restricted to the most 
powerless and socially marginal groups in society who tend to lack a public- voice, or 
who until fairly recently have tended to be deferential to those in authority, including 
the police. ]Fhose low status socio-econornic groups therefore, often in the pre 1970s 
era, lacked the ability or the will to bring the issue of police violence or corruption to 
public notice. The use of excessive force against hardened criminals cotdd likewise 
be engaged in with a certain amount of impunity given the secrecy of the police 
station and the lack of personal credibility of those making a complaint. 
It is important to point out that although the recent spate of miscarriages of justice, 
1989 - 1992, has brought to public attention the problems of police abuse ef suspects 
and the fabrication of evidence, these same concerns also informed public concern 
about the police especially in the 1970s but also in the 1960s, although not in so 
dramatic a fashion as the post 1989 era. The fabrication of evidence ifomed the 
background of the notorious Detective Challenor affair in the early 1960s and the 
issue of the mistreatment of suspects was the concern behind the Sheffield 
"rhinowhip" inquiry which also occurred in the early 1960s. (83) How-ever, these 
cases were treated by informed opinion as "exceptional" scandals and the. general 
untarnished reputation of the police persisted until the early 1970s. For c-xarnple, the 
C. L. R. C. in 1972 commented that the Sheffield and Challenor cases were the result of 
a small number of "black sheep" in the police force and that such incidents weTe a rare 
occurrence. (84) 
However, from the early 1970s the problem of police deviance began to be perceived 
as a much deeper institutional problem. Reiner in a 1989 article commented on this 
phenomenon, (85) 
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"During the early 1970s concern and controversy about 
policing increased over a variety of issues, notably police 
powers and the treatment of suspects, the handling of 
disorder as well as the flurry of corruption revelations 
signalling the "fall of Scotland Yard". All of these issues 
were of course present even in the 'consensus' period (1950s, 
1960s). But now the critical theme among journalists and 
academics became the systematic sources of police deviance 
and threats to civil liberties as a function of police organisation 
and the nature of policing transcending the individualistic 
"one bad apple" approach. " 
The Confait case concerning the wrongful imprisomnent of three youths for 
manslaughter based on their false confessions and the Fisher Report of 1977 on the 
case crystallized civil liberties concerns about the police treatment of suspects: see on 
this Reiner (86). 
It is important to note this public perception of systematic police deviance in the 
1970s, for the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 can be viewed from one 
perspective as a concerted legislative attempt to restore public confidence in the 
proper exercise of police powers such as stop and search and interrogation. The need 
for public confidence to be restored in the proper exercise of police powers was 
dramatically highlighted by the serious disorder which affected several larger English 
cities in the summer of 198 1. These riots have been characterized by Brogden as 
"anti-police riots" (87) and while social and economic factors were obviously an 
ingredient in the outbreak of disorder, a crucial spark was the excessive use of stop 
and search powers, especially in Brixton during the Metropolitan Police operation 
"Swamp 81". The Scan-nan Inquiry Report clearly saw policing mistakes as a crucial 
factor sparking the disorders. (88) The riots higWighted the crucial connection 
between the maintenance of civil order and the proper exercise of police powers 
concerning the investigation of crime. 
Judicial Attitudes to Police Evidence in the Twentieth Century before PACE 
The revised Judges' Rules of 1964 did offer more detailed regulation of the 
interrogation of suspects than the earlier versions of the Rules, but still far less than 
that provided for by PACE and the Codes of Practice. Lord Scannan remarked in Rv 
Sang 
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"The Judges' Rules are not a judicial control of police 
interrogation but notice that if certain steps are not taken 
certain evidence otherwise admissible may be excluded at 
trial. " (89) 
There was a judicial discretion recognized at common law, Rv Voisin (1918) (90) to 
exclude a confession obtained in breach of the Judges' Rules but it was rarely 
exercised. Judges at common law would very often admit a confession obtained by 
deliberate breach of the Judges' Rules. Judicial suspicions of the police which existed 
throughout the nineteenth century and which sometimes led to the exclusion of 
confession evidence merely because the police questioned a suspect in custody, seem 
to have evaporated by the time of the 1929 Royal Commission on the Police. The 
only sanction for breach of the Judges' Rules given that exclusion of a confession 
rarely occurred (see Pattenden's remark "Since 1945 non-observance of the Rules has 
in most reported cases been condoned" (91)) was a judicial rebuke to the police for 
violating the Rules. In Rv Mills and Lemon (1947) the Lord Chief Justice said, 
"T'he sooner the Bristol police study, learn and abide by 
the Judges' Rules the better. " (92) 
This suggests that at least with regard to the tenns of the Judges' Rules the judiciary 
were not entirely unconcerned at trial with how the police conducted investigations. 
However, as has been noted, this concern rarely translated into discretionary 
exclusion of confessions obtained in breach of the Judges' Rules. 
There remained one more discretionary power to exclude evidence obtained in an 
improper manner by the police. Ms was the rarely exercised "fairness to the 
accused" discretion first recognized in Kuruma yR (1955) (93) by Lord Chief Justice 
Goddard. However, this discretion was tightly circumscribed so as to only exclude 
evidence obtained after the commission of the offence from the suspect and by 
analogy with the privilege against self-incrimination: see Rv Sang (1979). 
There were only two instances of this common law discretion being exercised at 
appellate level, Rv Pa3Me (1963) (94) and Rv Court (1962) (95), although we cannot 
know of the true figure of first instance uses of this discretion since these cases would 
not come to appeal and therefore public notice. 
Given the habitual non-exercise of the discretion to exclude confessions obtained in 
breach of the Judges' Rules and the limitations of the "fairness to the accused" 
discretion, the only effective legal control of police methods in interrogation was the 
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voluntariness rule. The test in the modem form was enunciated by Lord Sumner in 
Ibrahim v The King (1914) (96). To be admissible, confessions however convincing, 
must have been voluntary in the sense that the prosecution must prove beyond 
reasonable doubt, 
"That it has not been obtained from him by fear of 
prejudice or hope of advantage exercised or held out 
by a person in authority. " 
The concept of "oppression" was added by a dicta in Callis v Gunn (1963), (97) and 
only confirmed in 1972 in Rv Prager (98). 
With regard to the main part of the exclusionary rule, namely 'threats' and 
'inducements' the courts became overly concerned with the technicalities of the 
voluntariness formula. This persisted until the House of Lords' decision in , 
DPP v 
Ping Lin (1976) (99) which relaxed the technicalities of the rule. 'Me technicalities 
of the rule meant that in certain cases the exclusion of a confession where its 
reliability was not in doubt, but it was excluded because a "form of words" had been 
used by the interrogator prior to the confession being made by the suspect. The 
rigours of the voluntariness rule at common law led one judge, Winn L. J. in Rv 
Northam to comment, 
"The criminal classes are only too well aware of their 
position of virtual immunity in the hands of the police. " 
(100) 
Yet given that the Judges' Rules on contemporaneous note taking and access to legal 
advice were often abrogated by the police and not supported by an exclusionary 
remedy by use of the discretion of the judge, the suspect was often at a structural 
disadvantage in claiming that his confession was "involuntary" for the judge often had 
no independent record of the interrogation nor an independent witness to it in order to 
decide properly on whether a threat or inducement had been made. 
The suspect was often unable to claim the protection of the voluntariness rule 
precisely because the judiciary were comphcit in the usual non observance of the 
Judges' Rules by the police. In court it was often merely the police account of what 
transpired at interrogation against the suspect's account of what transpired at 
interrogation, i. e. on the question of whether any threat or inducement had been made 
by the police or whether the police had behaved oppressively. Given the esteem and 
trust in which the police and their evidence was held by judges, magistrates and juries 
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at least before the 1970s then the suspect stood little chance of successfully 
contradicting a perjured police account of the interrogation if the police were in a 
particular case prepared to commit pedury. The CLRC in their Eleventh Report in 
1972 recognized that, (101) 
"... if the accused alleges that the evidence against him is 
perjured he is not likely to be believed, moreover the mere 
making of the allegation by the accused in giving evidence 
enables the prosecution to elicit damaging facts relating to his 
previous record. " 
(On this point see Chapter 4 of Us thesis) 
It has to be recognized that up to the 1970s the police were accepted as much more 
credible witnesses than most defendants. ) who tended to 
be drawn from low status 
socio-economic groups. Box and Russell have drawn attention to the 
"discreditability" of most of those who allege mistreatment at the hands of the police. 
(102) The police could allege at court a variety of reasons, e. g. revenge against the 
police or mental instability as to why the accused 'made up' his allegations of police 
misbehaviour in the interrogation. The court., in the absence of independent evidence 
would normally accept the police account. The main obstacle to exposing police 
deviance is the conflict of evidence between police and suspect over what did actually 
occur. 'Me suspect is at a structural disadvantage because of the legitimacy accorded 
to the police account of events due to the fact that they are the police, the visible 
symbols of lawful authority. Reiner points out that police treatment of low status 
socio-economic groups was "regularly characterised by abuse of powers, excessive 
force and corruption" but that nonetheless until relatively recently the English police 
were able to preserve their benign image in the eyes of the established opinion 
making classes. (103) 
From a certain perspective it was perfectly natural for trial judges and magistrates to 
place great trust in the evidence of policemen in the pre PACE era. In a liberal 
democratic state it is normally possible to make the reasonable assumption that 
officers of the state will undertake their duties competently and honestly. The courts 
should be able to act on the assumption that the police have done their job properly. 
However, it is certainly possible to argue that the English police, certainly in the 
1970s, often took advantage of the trust placed in them to give peýured evidence. 
They were able to do this because of the cloak of secrecy surrounding the police 
station and the interrogation process. Blind faith in the integrity of law enforcement 
officers in a liberal democratic state is therefore a dangerous substitute for the open 
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and reliable exercise of police powers. This is especially so when the police force in 
England have a particular mandate in an adversarial system to construct cases against 
suspects. This mandate is reinforced by a powerful police culture which views the 
conviction of people believed to be criminals by the police as the central police task. 
This contrasts with a view of the police role as investigating directly the truth of the 
suspect's actual involvement in criminal activity. As Sir Henry Fisher (104) pointed 
out, the police do not see it as their duty to follow up lines of inquiry which will 
exonerate the suspect. In the Confait case the police attempted to negative an alibi 
rather than to analyze the case in the light of countervailing evidence. 
The creation of the Crown Prosecution Service in 1985 may have had a tempering 
effect in this regard on the police since the police no longer bear the responsibility of 
prosecuting cases in court. McConville and Baldwin commented in 198 1, 
"It is the responsibility for prosecution that requires 
the police to present the strongest possible case and to 
ignore doubts they may entertain. " (105) 
A. A. S. Zuckerman notes that due to the attitude of the courts with reeard to breaches 
of the Judges' Rules, the result was, 
" ... that the courts forwent adequate supervision of 
interrogation and by and large left suspects to the mercy 
of the police. " (106) 
The lack of proper regulation of the police-suspect encounter before PACE in terms 
of a lack of statutory rules and the non-exercise of the discretion to exclude evidence 
can in part be attributed to the ideological underpinning of police legitimacy and how 
the criminal courts viewed the potice in tenns of the integrity of their evidence and 
the relationship of the police to the court system. 
It is now well established that by the 1950s the police enjoyed almost universal public 
esteem and support. As Reiner points out, (107) 
" ... by the 1950s the police 
had become not merely accepted 
but lionized by the broad spectrum of opinion. In no other 
country has the police force been so much a symbol of 
national pride. " 
if the police were to be trusted to behave fairly towards suspects then there vvas no 
need for detailed regulation of the police-suspect encounter in the police station. 
27 
Similarly, if police evidence was to be trusted then there was no pressing need to 
exclude confession evidence which had not been properly documented and 
authenticated, as required by the Judges' Rules. Police non-observance of the Judges' 
Rules or access to legal advice for the suspect would similarly not call into question 
the fairness of the interrogation for the police could be trusted to behave fairly and the 
confession could consequently be admitted into evidence. This position began to 
change somewhat in the 1970s, when some trial judges did exclude confession 
evidence which had been obtained in breach of the provision on a suspect's access to 
legal advice (see Chapter 5 on these examples) but there is little evidence of this pre 
the 1970s. Indeed in 1967 in Rv Northarn Winn L. J. commented that the English 
police, 
11 ... are now to be trusted in almost every single case, to behave with complete fairness towards those who come 
into their hands or from whom they are seeking information. " 
(108) 
The reality seems to have been different. Paul Condon, the current Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner,, described the police service he joined in 1967 as., 
" ... 
fairly brutal, poorly trained and poorly educated 
despite its rosy image. " (109) 
The 'rosy image' was one shared by many judges. Indeed at one time the 'rosy image' 
was shared even by many defence counsel. Sir Derek Hodgson, the High Court judge 
who tried the P. C. Blakelock murder trial commented. ) 
"When I started at the bar in the 1940s, it simply didn't 
enter one's head that confessions might be unreliable. 
As defence counsel we didn't think of going into how 
they might have been obtained. " (110) 
This perceived integrity of the police was well entrenched by the 1950s, although in 
the pre World War Two years the situation was not so clear cut. For example, H. 
Montgomery Hyde in his biography of Sir Norman Birkett (111) commented, 
"In the summer of 1928 there occurred a sensational official 
enquiry into methods used by the English Metropolitan 
police in interrogating private individuals. For some time 
there had been complaints that officers from Scotland Yard 
were employing 'third degree' tactics and these complaints 
came to a head in the Savidge Inquiry. " 
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PACE and its aftermath 
'Me Emergence of PACE 
As referred to before in this thesis, the myth of the constable as 'citizen in uniform' 
was only finally laid to rest by the RCCP in 198 1. It was not a harn-fless myth 
thoug14 for the concept of constable as 'citizen in uniform' must be taken into account 
in considering the reasons for the lack of detailed and enforced regulation of 
interrogations before PACE. As Dixon has written, 
"The ideology of constables as'citizens in uniform'has 
been important both as a legitimating device and as an 
impediment to proper consideration of the nature of 
police powers. " (1121) 
The constable as 'citizen in uniform' myth concealed the true nature of the growth of 
police power, pre PACE, and the consequential problem of regulating that power. 
One method of regulating the increase of police powers is through the discretionary 
exclusion of evidence obtained by a misuse of those powers. As Dixon points out, the 
willingness of the judiciary to exclude evidence from the criminal trial is a crucial 
way of controlling police power. (113) 
"Police powers can be increased by judicial inaction as well 
as action. If judges consistently refuse to exclude evidence 
obtained in some unlawful way then that practice has a 
judicial imprimatur, which is hard to distinguish from 
authorization. While it is true to say that the practice is not 
fully legalized in the sense that it may found a civil claim, 
this possibility is usually not significant. " 
The RCCP noted, 
" ... the notion of the police officer as the citizen 
in blue 
who is paid to do things that all citizens should do contains 
an element of truth. But it is far from reality. Society expects, 
indeed it places a duty upon the police to detect and investigate 
crimes and if appropriate to bring detected offenders before 
the courts. Any rules to regulate investigation must be so 
framed that they enable the police to discharge their duty but 
ensure that the rights of the suspect are properly protected. " (114) 
As Reiner and Leigh note, (115) 
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"The RCCP and PACE constitute a significant watershed 
consolidating and clarifying the changes in formal powers 
and concrete practice which had built up since the Second 
World War, separating the police officer from the ordinary 
citizen. The new settlement is based on a new ideological 
rationale. " 
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act which grew out of the RCCP report is 
therefore built upon a new ideological rationale for the police. PACE was an attempt 
to balance the tension between police effectiveness and individual liberty. One 
crucial feature of PACE was its institutionalization of a system of detention for 
questioning by the police. This was balanced by the introduction of greater 
protections for the suspect, especially access to free legal advice put on a statutory 
footing. 
It is now recognized that the police do have powers significantly different from the 
citizen, and this is rightly so given the special responsibility upon the police to 
investigate and detect crime. Although the constitutional form of the independent 
constable remains, the police are in effect the official state agency for the 
investigation of crime. 
Not only did the RCCP recognise that the police were fundamentally different in 
powers from the citizen but the RCCP report must be viewed against the breakdown 
in the public concerns about the integrity of the police which occurred from the late 
1960s and increased in the 1970s. As Reiner and Leigh note, (116) 
"The broad background for understanding the emergence 
of PACE is the increasingly fraught and controversy- 
ridden political and social context of policing since the 
late 1950s but especially since the early 1970s. " 
Reiner has commented on this situation, (117) 
"During the 1970s the elements making for the legitin-lization 
of the police in Britain became unravelled and reversed. 
The series of revelations of police deviance, both in the sense 
of corruption and other violations of the rule of law undern-dned 
the image of the police as professional symbols of legal 
authority. " 
To take one example of this change in public attitudes to the police and their integrity, 
the issue of "verballing" rarely heard of before the late 1960s, became a major issue in 
many criminal trials in the 1970s, i. e. the police would allege and the defendant would 
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deny the existence of an oral confession allegedly made by the defendant to the police 
during the pre trial police interrogation: on this issue see Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
The "verballing" problem clearly informed the RCCPs report (118) and the 
subsequent PACE scheme for tape-recording of confessions in the interrogation room 
and authentication scheme for confessions made to the police elsewhere. 
Public Attitudes to the Police post PACE and perceptions of the Unity of the Criminal 
Process 
17here has not only been a shift in official perceptions of the police role since the 
RCCP report of 1981 but the public has a tendency in the present era to view police 
misconduct in criminal investigations as having a bearing upon the reputation of the 
criminal justice system as a whole. If judicial attitudes to illegally obtained evidence 
and improperly obtained confessions must be publicly acceptable, in order to secure 
public confidence in the criminal justice system, then how judges react to evidence 
obtained improperly or illegally by the police should take account of changed public 
attitudes. 
Zuckerman pointed out in 1987 that, (119) 
"'Me investigative process is now seen as part of the 
administration of justice. " 
It is arguable that Section 78 of PACE is a manifestation of that perceived linkage 
between the investigation stage and the trial stage with its explicit direction to the trial 
judge to consider how evidence has been obtained as a factor in deciding whether to 
exclude improperly obtained evidence in his discretion. 
As evidence of popular attitudes linking the police investigation with the legitimacy 
of the criminal trial system it is possible to point to public anger and criticism of 
miscarriages of justice cases being directed at the criminal justice system as a whole 
rather than anger being directed solely at the police. This is so despite the fact that 
the main reason for many of the miscarriages of justice 1989-1992 has been as a result 
of police misconduct in the investigations into the offences rather than due to any 
inherent defect in the trial system itself. The former Lord Chancellor Lord Hailsham 
has commented on this phenomenon, (120) 
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it... convictions have been overturned as unsafe or 
unsatisfactory years after sentence has been pronounced 
and in some cases served and previous appeals rejected. 
Much of this has unjustly rubbed off on the judiciary, who 
can after all only decide cases on the evidence which is 
put before them. " 
Hailsham comments further, 
"It is impossible to exaggerate the seriousness of the savage 
blow which this series of cases has dealt to public confidence. 
Much of this is misplaced and is directed either to the persons 
or functions of the judiciary who presided over the original 
trials or were parties to the dismissal of the original appeals. 
No system of justice is foolproof against fabricated or even 
unreliable evidence and the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal 
in criminal cases is not a rehearing of the original case. " (121) 
In March 1991 the 'Times' columnist Bernard Levin in a diatribe aLyainst some of the 
judiciary in that newspaper, following the release of the Birmingham Six, called upon 
Lord Chief Justice Lane and Lord Bridge to resign immediately as they were unfit for 
judicial office. Lord Bridge had been the original trial judge at Lancaster in 1975 and 
Lord Lane as Lord Chief Justice had rejected a previous appeal against conviction by 
the six men in 1988. (122) It is true that the judges were not responsible for the 
perjury of police officers or the withholding of evidence by prosecutors or the 
dishonesty of Home Office forensic scientists, nonetheless judicial intransigence at 
appeal level certainly greatly prolonged the miscarriages of justice which occurred at 
the original trial. This judicial intransigence was epitomized by the comment of Lord 
Lane on January 28th 1988 in dismissing the appeals of the Birmingham Six: 
"The longer this hearing has gone on, the more convinced this 
court has become that the verdict of the jury was correct. " (123) 
Therefore, whether it was fair or not, the judiciary in the public perception are 
implicated in the serious miscarriage of justice cases which have traumatised the 
criminal justice system in recent years. In an article, Sir Stephen Sedley referred to 
the loss of public confidence the judiciary has suffered over the miscarriage of justice 
cases, 
"It is a remarkable fact that a judiciary which has taken 
a public battering in recent years over miscarriages of 
criminal justice has in the same period earned large public 
approbation for its willingness to prevent and correct 
abuses of governmental power. " (124) 
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'Me judiciary have therefore good reason to insist on proper procedures for 
investigation being followed by the police. This is because miscarriages of justice 
based on errors and misconduct in the investigatory stage have a profound impact on 
public confidence in the whole criminal justice system, including the judiciary. As 
Professor Griffiths points out, (125) 
"Public criticism of judges has increased over the last 
two decades, fuelled especially by the discovery of major 
miscarriages of justice, often inadequately investigated by 
the courts. " 
Professor Birch has commented upon the impact of the miscarriage of justice cases 
upon the judiciary's view of their role in relation to pre-trial police impropriety, in 
discussing the case of Rv Sang (1979). In Rv Sang it was stated that the judge is 
not concerned with how evidence is obtained (save with regard to confessions and an 
extremely limited discretion for other evidence) only with the use of evidence at trial 
by the prosecution. Birch comments, (126) 
"Changes in the way in which the criminal justice system is 
viewed, and in how it views itself, means that suclýan 
abdication of interest in the background of a case is 
unacceptable today. Public interest in miscarriages of 
justice and the high profile awarded to cases in which pre- 
trial misconduct has led to unjustified and lengthy 
imprisonment must have played an important part in the courts' 
changed perception of their role, which now clearly extends 
to voicing a view on the illegal or improper way in which 
evidence was obtained and includes the assumption of broad 
powers to control the pre-trial stage by monitoring, for example 
disclosure and delay and abuse of power in bringing cases to 
court. Much of this activity ... would 
have seemed excessive 
and improper twenty years ago but it is now regarded as 
necessary to command public respect for the criminal trial 
and to avoid the impression that the courts are colluding in 
impropriety. " 
Professor Dennis has commented that the outcome of the Guildford Four Appeal in 
October 1989 (127) 
" ... traumatised the criminal 
justice system. It raised major 
questions concerning police investigative methods, the trust- 
worthiness of police evidence, the role ... of the Court of Appeal. " 
rMe whole criminal justice system, not solely the police, were implicated in the 
scandal. The impact of the scandal was Unked in part to the extreme gravity of the 
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offences for which the Guildford Four were convicted wrongfully and the extremely 
long time they had spent wrongly in imprisonment, fifteen years each. 
A decline in public confidence in either the police or the judiciary is not likely to be in 
the long term public interest. Therefore the judiciary have another good reason to 
insist on proper procedures being followed in the investigation of offences. 
Reiner and Leigh noted in 1994 that (128) 
"The public standing of the police is now at its lowest ebb 
since they came to be established in their modern form in 
the first half of the nineteenth century. " 
This distrust of the police may not only be confined to the general public. P. S. 
Atiyah has commented that (129) 
"The legal professions have grown very distrustful of the 
police. " 
This is linked, according to Atiyah to the long string of miscarriages of justice. 
However, public lack of confidence in the police may also be linked to a perception of 
a failure of the police to protect them from crime and criminals. 
Judicial Attitudes to Police Evidence in the i)ost PACE era 
There is a quid pro quo for the enhancement and clarification of police powers to 
investigate crime that PACE represents and that is that the police should observe the 
procedures for investigation which have been laid down in the same statute which 
gives them their clarified and enhanced powers. This is not necessarily to advocate a 
disciplinary approach to evidence obtained in breach of those procedures (the 
disciplinary approach has been consistently denied by the criminal courts pre PACE 
and post PACE: see Chapter 7), rather it is to recognise that admission of evidence 
obtained in deliberate or significant violation of proper procedures can so upset the 
fairness or legitimacy of the criminal trial itself so as to justify the exclusion of such 
evidence in certain circumstances. 
Zuckerman has written of "the institutional reliance" (130) that the prosecuting 
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authorities and the judiciary place on the police. As Zuckerman points out, 
"The trial is an examination of the police investigation, 
it is not itself an investigation of the crime. " (131) 
Given this institutional reliance on the police by the criminal courts the judiciary can 
hardly disclaim interest in how the police gather evidence. The criminal trial is 
sufficiently linked in public perception with the police investigations so as to demand 
judicial concern as to whether the police followed proper procedures in gathering 
evidence. 
The creation of the Crown Prosecution Service, a separate state agency for the 
prosecution of offenders in 1985 does not affect the fact that it is the police who 
construct cases for prosecution, the CPS role being limited mainly to a 'filtering'role 
against weak cases or cases not in the public interest to prosecute. 
The criminal justice system relies on police investigations in another important way 
apart from the role the police have in assembling evidence for use in contested 
criminal trials, and that is the overwhelming reliance on the police to produce guilty 
pleas through obtaining confessions in interrogation; the characteristic feature of the 
English criminal justice system is not public adjudication of responsibility but public 
proclamation of guilt. (132) 
The reliance of the prosecuting and judicial authorities on the police for the effective 
and efficient disposition of criminal cases is a major feature of the modem criminal 
justice system in England and Wales. 
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act and Section 78 in particular, is arguably 
statutory recognition that in the present day criminal investigations involving the 
collection of evidence and the criminal trial are fundamentally linked so that there is a 
judicial duty to ensure consistent procedural fairness throughout the process, as an 
individual moves in status from suspect to defendant. 
In the era of PACE a judicial view has indeed developed that police investigations 
into crime and the criminal court form a continuum of due process so that unfairness 
in the police investigative stage can have an adverse impact on the fairness of the 
criminal trial. Court of Appeal cases such as Rv Keenan, Rv Wals Rv Canale 
discussed in Chapter 4 and Rv Quinn, Rv Nathaniel discussed in Chapter 7 (133) can 
all be interpreted as disclosing a view of the criminal process where significant 
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unfairness in the police investigation can impact on the fairness of the criminal trial 
with consequences for the admissibility of evidence obtained in an 'unfair' mariner by 
the police. . 
As a consequence of this view confession evidence (R v Keenan. Rv Wals Rv 
Canale) identification evidence (R v Quinn and even highly reliable D. N. A. evidence 
(R v Nathaniel) has been held by the Court of Appeal to have been wrongly admitted 
by trial judges because they failed to take properly into account procedural unfairness 
by the police. Section 78 with its statutory language making the concept of the 
"fairness of the proceedings" as the criteria governing the exercise of the judicial 
discretion to exclude evidence has been the device used to reflect this judicial change 
in attitude towards the admissibility of unfairly obtained confession and non 
confession evidence. 
A good example of the change in judicial attitudes post PACE is the response to 
"significant and substantial" breaches of the verballing provisions of PACE by the 
police. The senior judiciary in decisions such as Rv Keenan and Rv Canale has 
shown clear appreciation that the word of the police as to the existence of a 
confession made in interrogation is no longer judicially acceptable: on this see 
Chapter 4. 
In Rv Elson, the Court of Appeal commented, (134) 
"The PACE Act 1984 (s. 66) Codes of Practice were there to 
protect the individual against the might of the state. The 
individual was at a great disadvantage when arrested by the 
police and that was so whether or not the police behaved 
with the utmost propriety. " 
The judiciary have become aware of the need to regulate the police-suspect encounter 
through, in appropriate circumstances the discretionary exclusion of evidence. 17his 
change is to be seen in various judicial decisions and remarks such as those by 
Hodgson J. in Rv Samuel and Rv Ke Lord Lane in Rv Canale and Saville J. in 
Rv WalýN to the effect that significant breach or deliberate breach of important 
provisions in PACE has a tendency to upset the "balance of fairness" between suspect 
and the police established by PACE and that evidence so obtained might have to be 
excluded from the criminal trial as a result. 
'Mere has been a discernible change of judicial attitudes towards exclusion of 
evidence from the position at common law and under the Judges' Rules so much so 
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that Lord Chief Justice Bingham commented extra judicially in 1990 whilst a Lord 
Justice of Appeal (135) 
"It may be that the pendulum has swung too far towards 
exclusion upon breaches being shown, without adequate 
consideration of the effect on the fairness of the proceedings, 
which the Act requires. " 
The cases of Rv Samuel, Rv Keenan Rv Canale Rv Walsh quoted above are all 
confession cases but there seems to be an increased willingness to exclude evidence in 
non confession cases where proper procedures for investigating offences have not 
been followed: see Matto v DPP Rv Sharpe Rv Nathaniel and Rv Smurthwaite for 
important examples of this trend. (136) It may be argued however, that with regard 
to Matto v DPP and Rv Sharpe, two cases concerning the exclusion of breathalyzer 
evidence under S. 78, the approach of the courts is consistent with a judicial 
willingness to interpret the Road Traffic Act on the obtaining of samples of drink 
driving very strictly even in the pre PACE era, e. g. see Morris v Beardmore. (137) 
However, Matto v DPP and Rv Sharpe are also consistent with cases such as Rv 
Nathaniel which view police non-compliance with proper procedures generally as a 
relevant factor under the section 78 discretion. 
In particular there has been a greater willingness to exclude identification evidence 
where the police have breached Code D of PACE and the defendant is prejudiced as a 
result. Lord Taylor C. J. commented in Rv Qumin, a case involving evidence from an 
identification parade conducted by the police, (138) 
"We wish to emphasise that where a detailed regime is laid 
down in a statutory code, it is not for the police ... to 
substitute their own procedure and their own rules for that 
which is laid down. -" 
In Rv Nagah (139) identification evidence was held to have been wrongly admitted 
because of a deliberate flouting of Code D by the police in order to guarantee a 
positive identification by the witness of the suspect through the use of "confrontation" 
as a procedure for identification instead of a properly conducted identification. parade, 
as the defendant was entitled to under Code D. This approach of the courts 
represents a strengthening of judicial attitudes to police breach of proper procedures 
for identification parades than in the pre PACE era (140) and a much greater 
willingness to exclude identification evidence in discretion because of that breach of 
procedures than was manifest in the pre PACE era. Pre PACE the situation was 
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summed up by Jackson, who commented, (14 1) 
"Identification evidence has occasionally been excluded 
on the basis that proper procedures laid down for identity 
parades and the showing of police photographs have not 
been complied with. " 
However, there are a number of judicial dicta and the problematic case of Rv 
Chalkley (142) to suggest that judicial attitudes to the exclusion of non confession 
evidence under S. 78 are not as homogenous as the preceding discussion might have 
suggested. These dicta and Rv Chalkley seek to suggest that S. 78 merely re-states 
the common law position and therefore would deny that Section 78 is based on a new 
ideological rationale for the exclusion of non confession evidence. In Rv Mason 
Watkins L. J. said that Section 78 did no more than re-state the power which judges 
had at common law before PACE. (143) In Rv Christou Lord Taylor C. J. 
commented., (144) 
"T'he learned judge held that the discretion under S. 78 may 
be wider than the common law discretion identified in 
Rv Sang the latter relating solely to evidence obtained 
from the defendant after the offence is completed, the 
statutory discretion not being so restricted. However, he 
held that the criteria of unfairness are the same whether 
the trial judge is exercising his discretion at common law 
or under the statute. We agree. What is unfair cannot 
sensibly be subject to different standards depending on 
the source of the discretion to use it. " 
It is important to note that S. 82(3) of PACE expressly preserves the common law 
discretion. 
In Rv Chalkley, the Court of Appeal clearly held that Section 78 did not enlarge the 
common law. 'Me court said that the inclusion in Section 78 of the words "the 
circumstances in which the evidence was obtained" did not mean that the court could 
exclude the evidence as a means of expressing disapproval of the way in which it had 
been obtained. Auld L. J. then stated the common law discretion as being the test 
under S. 78 (145) 
"Save in the case of admissions and confessions and generally 
as to evidence obtained from the accused after the commission 
of the offence there is no discretion to exclude evidence unless 
its quality was or might have been affected by the way in which 
it was obtained. " 
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However, as Dennis persuasively argues (146) there are good grounds for believing 
that Rv Chalkley is not merely an odd decision but is actually per incunam as it 
expressly failed to take into account such binding authorities as Rv Smurthwaite 
(1994) which clearly can be seen as interpreting the Section 78 more widely than the 
common law discretion. In particular the use of entrapment by the police is a 
relevant factor under the S. 78 discretion, although this was expressly denied as being 
relevant to the common law discretion by the House of Lords in Rv Sang (1979): see 
Chapters 8 and 9. 
Despite the small stream of judicial opinion going the other way, increased judicial 
willingness to exclude evidence when proper procedures for the investigation of 
offences have not been followed is arguably indicative of a changed perception of the 
police role and the consequent need to regulate the exercise of police powers. The 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act recognized that the police must be given 
considerably greater powers than the citizen in order to perform the important duties 
society places upon the police, but an important corollary of this is that the police 
must conform to proper procedures laid down by Parliament for the investigation of 
offences. Indeed to do so is in the best interests of the police themselves for as Dixon 
points out (147), 
"A central tenet of the police claim to legitimacy is 
their subordination to law. Police work is presented as being 
the application of an objective set of laws. " 
There is perhaps another good reason as to why the judiciary should insist that the 
police comply with proper procedures for investigating offences. The detection and 
solution of the vast majority of crime depends on information supplied to the police 
by the pubic. ý[be RCCJ conunented that, (148) 
"In the majority of investigations the police rely heavily 
on the public and in particular on victims, to notify them 
of crimes that have been committed and to provide the 
information necessary to identify the offender. Research 
indicates that between 80% - 90% of offences are brought 
to the notice of the police by victims, bystanders or other 
members of the public. " 
The consequence of this is that good police-community relations are vital to effective 
law enforcement. A serious deterioration in police-community relations may have an 
effect on the quantity and quality of information received from the public by the 
police about crime. One important way of maintaining public confidence in the 
police is to ensure that police powers are exercised in a fair and proper manner and 
39 
that evidence gathered is as reliable as possible. The judiciary have a vital role here 
in their ability to exclude improperly obtained confessions and improperly obtained 
non confession evidence from the criminal trial. Such measures may not only have a 
salutary effect on police behaviour but are also potentially capable of restoring and 
maintaining public confidence in the criminal justice system, such public confidence 
that is vital to the proper function of that system. 
The Si2niricance of the European Convention on Human Ri2hts and the Human 
Rii! hts Act of 1998 
It is proposed now to consider the effect of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and The Human Rights Act of 1998 on the possibility of the exclusion of 
improperly obtained evidence in criminal proceedings. The Human Rights Act 1998 
incorporates directly into English law the E. C. H. R. Until it comes into force, in 
October 2000, the European Convention will still be relevant. 
However, as Dennis points out the Human Rights Act 1998 (149) 
it ... will have a profound impact on the creation, interpretation and application of legislation and case 
law through the whole of English law and the law of 
evidence is no exception. Indeed, the law of criminal 
procedure and evidence is expected to be one of the 
most significant areas of contention as the implications 
of the Convention and Article 6 in particular are 
considered. " 
Article 6 is the "fair trial" provision of the E. C. H. R. 
It is likely that judicial decisions under PACE excluding evidence where there has 
been "significant and substantial" breach of fair procedures for investigations 
established by PACE will be held to be in accordance with the Convention, especially 
Article 6; as Dennis comments, of the Convention rights, 
"It is impossible to predict their precise impact on the 
current law. ) not 
least because in many cases the courts 
are likely to say that the relevant English law encapsulates 
Convention law. This is particularly so in relation to 
instances where the exclusionary discretion under Section 
78 of PACE is used to safeguard the fairness of the 
proceedings. It will be surprising if previous judicial 
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implementations of notions of fairness, whether as part 
of the common law's 'right to a fair trial' or pursuant to the 
statutory discretion, are held not to coincide in most cases 
with the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention. " 
However, areas of the law beyond the scope of this thesis, such as S. 34 of Ibe 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 may be much more vulnerable to 
challenge tmder the new Hwnan Rights Act. 
Once the Human Rights Act comes into force it will be no longer necessary for parties 
to seek redress in Strasbourg under the E. C. H. R. However, for the time being the 
E. C. H. R. itself has relevance to English law. For discussion on how the Convention 
affects the issue of improperly obtained evidence and entrapment see the discussion in 
Chapter 8 of this thesis, but after the decision in Rv Khan House of Lords (15 1) the 
Convention has relevance to the exercise of the trial judge's discretion under Section 
78 of PACE. At trial in Rv Khan the trial judge had accepted that the aural 
surveillance of a conversation between Khan and three others, in which he had 
admitted his involvement in the illegal importation of heroin, was at least arguably in 
breach of his right of privacy under Article 8 of the Convention. However, the trial 
judge had gone on to say that neither this nor anything else in the case required him to 
exclude the evidence under S. 78 of PACE. 
The House of Lords held that the fact of the apparent breach of the Convention was 
something which might be relevant to the exercise of the judge's discretion under 
Section 78. Lord Nolan commented, (152) 
"If the behaviour of the police in the particular case amounts 
to an apparent or probable breach of some relevant law or 
convention, common sense dictates that this is a consideration 
which may be taken into account for what it is worth. Its 
significance, however, will normally be determined not so 
much by its apparent unlawfulness or irregularity as upon 
its effect, taken as a whole, upon the fairness or unfairness of 
the proceedings. " 
Tberefore an apparent breach of a Convention right is a factor which a judge might 
take into account in the exercise of the exclusionary discretion but that there is no 
duty to take it into account. 
In conclusion it can be argued that the incorporation of the E. C. H. R. in The Human 
Rights Act is a welcome development and is likely to lead to a continuation, even a 
strengthening of the trend of judicial decisions to exclude evidence which has been 
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obtained through significant and substantial breaches of important provisions of 
PACE, Section 78 being the appropriate mechanism for exclusion. 
A Note on the Constitutional Position of the Police and Criminal Investii! ation 
Given that there is an institutional reliance by the criminal courts on the police to 
conduct criminal investigations and to assemble evidence for use at trial, it is 
therefore important to have an understanding of the constitutional position of the 
police in regard to their duty to undertake criminal investigations. Although the 
Crown Prosecution Service was set up in 1985 to take away the responsibility of 
prosecution from the police, as The Glidewell Report makes clear, the CPS are still 
dependent on the police to assemble the case file, 
"T'he new service found itself occupying a position between 
the police and the Courts. The police continued to be 
responsible for deciding on the charge and preparing the 
case file. The CPS had a new role, that of reviewing cases 
passed to it after the police had charged a defendant in 
order to decide whether the evidence justified the charge. " 
(153) 
The Crown Prosecution Service does not direct the police in their criminal 
investigations although they can ask for more evidence in a particular case. Given 
that there is no judicial or CPS direction or oversight of criminal investigations by the 
police it is important to identify the constraints that do operate on the police in their 
conduct of criminal investigations. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act and The 
Codes of Practice represent a strictly controlled legislative scheme for criminal 
investigations once they have begun, but what is to stop the police from refusing to 
investigate a crime at all? Exactly what duties do the police have in regard to 
undertaking criminal investigations? The starting point is Professor Leigh's 
observation, 
"Police discretion, like executive discretion generally, must 
operate wid-iin the constitutional limitations imposed by 
statute and the courts. " (154) 
The crucial issue is how much discretion the police have in deciding whether to 
commence a criminal investigation or not. There exists no statute imposing general 
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duties of law enforcement upon the police. However, the common law is not silent on 
the matter. The leading authorities are "Ibe Blackburn Cases", starting with Rv 
Metrovolitan Police Commissioner ex Parte Blackburn (1968). (155) In this case the 
Commissioner had decided for the time being not to prosecute gaming clubs for 
breaches of the Gaming Acts in the absence of special circumstances. The court held 
that this was a breach of a legal duty owed to the general public and potentially 
enforceable in an appropriate form of proceedings against the Commissioner. The 
Court of Appeal held, 
"... it was the duty of the Commissioner, as also of Chief 
Constables to enforce the law, and though chief officers 
of police had discretions, (e. g. whether to prosecute in a 
particular case, or over administrative matters), yet the 
Court would interfere in respect of a policy decision 
amounting to a failure of duty to enforce the law of the 
land. " (156) 
Lord Deming M. R. commented that, 
" ... there are some policy decisions with which I think the courts in a case can, if necessary, interfere. Suppose 
a Chief Constable were to issue a directive to his men 
that no person should be prosecuted for stealing any goods 
less than E1OO in value. I should have thought that the 
court could countermand it. He would be failing in his 
duty to enforce the law. " (157) 
As Leigh conu-nents, the decision in the case, 
1'... clearly assumes, in my submission rightly, that the 
police cannot properly refuse to enforce a criminal offence 
at all. It is more defensible to draw a distinction between 
individual cases than between classes of offences. " (158) 
Further guidance was given by the Court of Appeal in Rv Metropolitan Police 
Conunissioner ex. 12arte Blackburn (No. 3) (1973) (159). According to Leigh the case 
establishes the following relevant principles: (160) 
The courts will not interfere with the Chief Officer of Police unless he in 
substance abdicates Ms responsibility over law enforcement. 
The Chief Officer can so abdicate his responsibility by refusing to exercise a 
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discretion vested in him by, for example, refusing to enforce a law at an or by 
adopting policies which in substance ensure non-compliance. 
Therefore, while the police enjoy considerable discretion with regard to individual 
criminal investigations: whether to investigate at all, whether to caution or charge or 
take no ftuther action, and if to charge, the nature of the charge, the courts will 
interfere if the police decide at the policy level not to enforce a particular law or 
decide not to investigate particular classes of offender. 
G. Robertson is cynical about the reach of the Blackburn doctrine (161), 
"The law - or at least the judges who enforce it - will not 
call upon police chiefs to answer for very much. They 
will only interfere if satisfied that there has been an 
abdication of responsibility; in effect a determined 
refusal to enforce the law. " 
and 
"To say that the police are answerable to the law alone means 
that they are not answerable to anyone in the way they choose 
to enforce the law. " (162) 
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CHAPTER 2 
CONFESSIONS: AN HISTORICAL OVERVEEW OF THE ISSUES 
In this chapter it is proposed to examine confession law in England to show how it 
has developed from being exclusively concerned with the 'creditworthiness' issue to 
the modem state of the law which is influenced by considerations of the 
creditworthiness of confessions, the authenticity of confessions and legitimacy in the 
obtaining of confessions. (1) 
The Creditworthiness of Confessions 
The traditional concern of the law of confessions was as noted, creditworthiness. 
More specifical-ly the issue was that a confession obtained from a suspect under 
certain circumstances was so inherently unreliable that a rule of law was justified to 
exclude a confession where those particular circumstances existed. The old 
'voluntariness' rule singled out 'inducements', 'threats' and much later (2) 'oppression' 
as circumstances wh-ich should trigger the automatic exclusionary rule. Lord Sumner 
in Ibrahim vR (1914) said that 'logically' the fact of a threat of inducement preceding 
a confession should go to the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility but that, 
"... from the danger of receiving such evidence judges have 
thought it better to reject it for the due administration of justice. " 
(3) 
It should be noted however, that although creditworthiness was the rationale of the 
voluntariness rule an involuntary confession remained inadmissible in law even if 
palpably true. The rule has been understood from a judicial perspective and by 
academic commentators (4) in terms of securing the creditworthiness of confessions. 
This view dates back to the old case of Rv Warickshall, where the judges 
commented, 
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"'A confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope 
or the torture of fear comes in so questionable a shape when 
it is to be considered as evidence of guilt that no credit 
ought to be given to it, and therefore it is rejected. " 
(per Nares J and Eyre B) (5) 
Lord Reid in the case of Harz (1967) (6) suggested that along with a concern for 
creditworthiness, the privilege against self incrimination lay behind the rule and Lord 
Diplock in Rv Sang (1980) (7) went further and claimed that the nemo debet prodere 
se ipsum principle was the sole justification for the voluntariness rule. Yet these 
isolated dicta arose extremely late in the history of a doctrine which had been 
understood for nearly two hundred years as solely involving considerations of credit. 
This concern still shapes the law of confessions although no longer in the guise of the 
/voluntariness' rule, see section 76 2(b) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act for 
modem recognition of the creditworthiness of confessions problem. It is a truism 
that generally people do not confess to something they did not do in the absence of 
physical mistreatment or psychological abuse. On the other hand, modem 
psychological research has established that sometimes certain people confess to things 
they have not done even in the absence of physical mistreatment or psychological 
abuse: see Chapter 3. To understand this we have to realize that custodial 
interrogation is in itself 'inherently coercive' (8) as was recognised as long ago as 
1966 by the Supreme Court in America in Miranda v Arizona. If in this context an 
inducement is offered or a mild threat made then the potential for a false confession to 
emerge is sufficiently serious to justify an exclusionary rule. As Lord Reid said in 
Harz on the cases where an inducement has been held to render a confession 
inadmissible: 
"It is true that many of the so called inducements have been 
so vague that no reasonable man would have been influenced 
by them, but one must remember that not all accused are 
reasonable men or women, they may be very ignorant and 
terrified by the predicament in which they find themselves. 
So it may have been right to err on the safe side. " (9) 
The voluntariness rule was heavily criticized in the CLRC 1 1th Report and the RCCP 
1981 Report as being overly concerned with whether a particular fonn of words, (i. e. 
a threat/inducement) preceded a confession and that more attention should be paid to 
whether the words or conduct of the police actually posed a threat to confession 
reliability. Hence the new test formulated in S. 76 2(b). Yet whatever the defects of 
the voluntariness rule as a prophylactic against confession unreliability it has to be 
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remembered that this was the only issue which the law of confessions was concerned 
with seriously prior to the enactment of PACE in 1984. The issue of the reliability of 
a confession involved an issue of admissibility in another separate way from the 
/ voluntariness' issue. At common law there exists one other power to exclude a 
confession, which is part of the general discretion to exclude evidence whose 
prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. This discretion was exercised to 
exclude a confession in Rv Stewart (1972) (10) in circumstances described by the 
trial judge as 'very exceptional'. In this case the suspect had a mental age of a five 
year old child and a mental condition known as 'echolalia' in addition; patently no 
trust could be placed at all in his confession although it might have caused great 
prejudice against the defendant if the jury considered the confession. This discretion 
is retained by S. 82(3) of PACE. Whether a confession is reliable or not has 
traditionally been treated as a matter for the jury and apart from the limited reliability 
filter of S. 76 2(b) the reliability of a confession is still a jury issue. It is only when a 
confession is patently unreliable should the judge exercise his discretion to exclude a 
confession as more prejudicial than probative. To do otherwise would be to usurp the 
function of the jury as assessors of the credibility of evidence. The other main issue 
in the modem law of confessions, (apart from legitimacy') is the authenticity of a 
confession. 
The Authenticity of Confessions 
This is the issue of whether the confession was actuallv made and if made, what its 
exact terms were. Mirfleld, in his monograph on "Confessions" characterized this 
issue as the 'confession issue' and commented, 
"... it arises whenever the defence denies that a confession 
attributed to the accused by the prosecution was made by 
him. " ( 11) 
The problem this issue posed the courts in the pre-PACE era is explained by Mirfield, 
"When a policeman states that the accused made an 
incriminating statement, the accused's words being such 
and such, and the accused denies this, how can we be 
confident about who is to be believed. " (12) 
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The traditional approach of the law here was that questions as to whether the 
confession was in fact made went to its 'weight' before the jury and not its 
admissibility, see Ajodha v The State (1982) (13). As Mirfield points out, only at the 
extreme margin where no confession could possibly have been made, would the law 
intervene to rule out an alleged confession on the grounds that it was not actually 
made - see the case of (14) Rv Roberts (1953). Before PACE there was also the 
requirement in the Judges' Rules that any confession to the police be 
contemporaneously recorded. In Rule IH it was stated, 
"Any questions put and answers given relating to the offence 
must be contemporaneously recorded in full and the record 
signed by that person or if he refuses by the interrogating 
officer. " 
There existed a discretionary power to exclude a confession for breach of the Rules, 
see Rv Voisin (1918), which first recognised this discretion (15) 
Yet confession evidence was rarely excluded for breach, even deliberate breach of an 
important provision such as access to legal advice let alone a less important provision 
such as contemporaneous recording of an interview with a suspect. In effect then the 
question of the making of the confession was treated as a matter going to the weight 
of the confession not to its admissibility. 
To fully understand this approach of the law to the authenticity issue we must take 
into account the high esteem in which the police were held by the judiciary and public 
at least until the start of the 1970s. The point is this: if the police were to be 
generally trusted, then questions about the alleged fabrication of confessions by the 
police (the 'verbafling' issue) could be satisfactorily treated as a matter going to the 
weight of an alleged confession and not its admissibility. The alleged fabrication of 
confession by the police was not seen (pre 1970's) as such an intractable problem as to 
require a policy of discretionary exclusion of non recorded confessions. We can 
usefully contrast the problem of inducements and threats during custodial 
interrogation, with the authenticity problem. 
With regard to threats or inducements made by the police in interrogation, a 
confession obtained in such circumstances presents such problems in terms of 
reliability (i. e. what was the operative cause of the confession, the inducement or 
conscience? ) that the law adopted a general rule of exclusion. No such policy was 
needed with regard to the issue of whether the police fabricated the confession. The 
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police were to be trusted not to give perjured evidence about an alleged confession 
even in the absence of a contemporaneous and signed note of the confession as 
required by the Judges' Rules. 
An example of typical judicial attitudes to the police in the pre-PACE era is the 
comment of Winn L. J. in Rv Northam (1967) who said that the police were, 
" ... to be trusted in almost every single case to behave 
with complete fairness towards those who came into their 
hands 
... " 
In the light of events which occurred only a few years later, such as the known mis- 
treatment by the police of the Guildford Four and the Birmingham Six (16) this 
comment of Winn L. J. seems complacent in the extreme. Moreover, what also 
happened after Winn L. J. made the above comment was that the specific issue of 
police fabrication of confessions became a highly charged political issue between 
critics of the police and those who downplayed the extent of police deviance. Cox in 
"Civil Liberties in Britain" in 1975 commented that, 
"The quality of police evidence became increasingly 
suspect in the 1960s. " (17) 
Cox drew out the serious implications for civil liberties of this fact, 
"The quality of police evidence and its honesty is crucial 
because most people who are convicted are convicted by it. 
Much of this evidence relates to how an accused was 
detained, what was found on or near him and what he said 
under interrogation. It is the abuse of police power in these 
circumstances - arrest, search and questioning - that has 
created the most intractable police/civil liberty problem 
in recent years. " (18) 
More specifically on the problem of police fabricating confessions, Cox continued, 
"The lack of supervision of police questioning makes it 
impossible to tell whether the frequent conflict of evidence 
between what the police officers say took place during 
interrogation is more accurate than the accused's version. 
The police have traditionally relied on their superior 
credibility as honest men and women; but by 1970 
this was sufficiently in doubt for a prominent judge - 
Mr. Justice McKenna to warn of the dangers publicly. " (19) 
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Cox then quotes McKenna J., who said to the Annual Conference of Justice in 1970, 
"If (the police) agree to tell an untrue story, they know each 
will be available to confmn the other's evidence - at the 
trial, and that the only written record will be their notebooks, 
each book telling the same story in identical words. They 
know that they will go into the witness box as men of good 
characters, likely to be believed. " 
It has to be pointed out that the law of criminal evidence facilitated somewhat the 
ability of the police to secure convictions on verballed confession evidence. For 
example, in Ry Mallinson (20) the prosecution case was dependent largely on alleged 
oral confessions. The defendant appealed against his conviction of possessing drugs 
with intent to supply on the grounds that the conviction was unsafe because it had 
been secured on alleged oral confessions. 'nie Court of Appeal held that there was 
it... no principle to be gathered from the authorities of 
universal or general application that a conviction 
wholly or mainly resting on evidence of an oral confession 
could never be safe or satisfactory. It must in every case 
be a question to be decided on the particular facts. " 
However, a rule of evidence requiring a confession to be corroborated before it could 
sustain a conviction or a rule of evidence requiring a confession to the police to be 
tape recorded before it could be admitted into evidence would in the former case 
reduce and in the latter case eliminate the possibility of 'verballing'by the police. The 
authentication scheme for confessions introduced by PACE is a major improvement 
on the old principles of receiving confession evidence from the police exemplified by 
Rv Mallinson which no doubt encouraged the police to attempt to attribute to the 
defendant a confession he never made. Fabricated confession evidence appears to 
have played an important role in at least two of the notorious miscarriages of justice 
cases of the 1989-1992 period. In the Birmingham Six case four of the six men 
admitted at trial signing written confessions but alleged that this was only because of 
the brutality of the police interrogation. However, two of the six, Hill and Hunter, 
were alleged to have made oral admissions to the police. At trial they denied making 
the admissions and alleged that the police had fabricated them. In Rv McIlkenny 
(1991) (21) the Court of Appeal quashed the convictions of all the Birmingham Six. 
No direct comment was passed by the Court of Appeal on the allegations of police 
fabrication of confessions by HiU and Hunter. In the Tottenham Three case, reported 
as Rv Silcott, Rv Braithwaite, Rv Raghip (22), Silcott made no written or signed 
confession during lengthy interrogations but he was alleged to have made some 
incriminating oral remarks, remarks which he denied having made. 
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In December 1991 the Court of Appeal quashed the convictions of all three men. In 
regard to the specific evidence against Silcott, ESDA tests showed that the Silcott 
interview notes had been altered. Since Silcott's alleged statements constituted the 
only prosecution evidence against him the court took the view that his conviction 
could not stand. Perhaps the single most recurring theme of all the revelations of 
miscarriages of justice is the presence of the excessively coercive interrogation of 
vulnerable suspects, however the separate problem of fabrication of confession 
evidence made an appearance in at least two of the cases. 
This issue of alleged 'verballing' became so charged that the RCCP noted in 198 1, 
"The frequency of challenges to the police record of 
interview is said to make it essential to have some sort 
of independently validated record in order, in the eves of 
others to prevent the police from fabricating confe; sions 
or in the eyes of others to prevent those who have in fact 
made admissions subsequently retracting them. " (23) 
It is important to state that tl-lis was not only a one way issue with concern solely 
emanating from civil liberties lobbies towards police behaviour but also that the 
police resented unjustified attacks on their integrity by unfounded allegations at trial 
of 'verballing. It is well established that the police are sensitive on this point. In 
1961 in the Criminal Law Review, reference was made to a Police Federation 
memorandum to the 1962 Royal Commission on the Police. 'Me editorial in The 
Criminal Law Review noted as follows, 
"One of the matters to which the Federation drew attention 
was the frequency with which defending counsel and 
solicitors make 'false allegations against the police of 
brutality, perjury and corruptioW. Policemen apparently 
feel strongly about unjustified attacks on their integrity. " (24) 
R. N. Gooderson in his 1970 article "Tbe Interrogation of Suspects" noted that 
" ... the police are sensitive about their public 
image and 
the damaging effect of allegations of what has taken place 
when they were interviewing a suspect. " (25) 
How much more sensitive are the police about such allegations at the present time 
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given the police corruption scandals and miscarriages of justice due to police deceit 
and brutality which have come to light since 1970? 
One good reason for the police to be sensitive about their public image is their 
dependence on public co-operation for the notification and solution of crime. As the 
RCCJ (1993) noted, 
"The proportion of crimes solved by the police without 
help of any kind from members of the public is 
negligible. " (26) 
The maintenance of law and order is critically dependent on public goodwill. 
The documentation procedure for interrogations and confessions established by PACE 
and The Codes was a direct result of the increasingly acrimonious public debate 
between the police and their critics over the verballing problem in the 1970s. With 
regard to verbal confessions, research quoted in the RCCP Report (1981) pointed to 
the fact that nearly all challenges to confession evidence were on the accuracy of the 
alleged confession with only 2% challenged on their alleged voluntariness (with 
written statements the position was reversed, fewer than 10% being challenged for 
accuracy, whereas nearly 40% were attacked on their alleged voluntariness). (27) 
The concerns in the 1970s over verballing, wWch fed into the RCCP Report and 
subsequently into PACE, have obviously influenced judicial attitudes to police 
breaches of the anti-verballing provisions of PACE. For example, in the case of Rv 
Hunt Stevn L. J. commented with regard to Code C, 
"The background to those provisions was of course a 
public perception and a legislative intention that the evil 
of police officers falsely attributing incriminating statements 
to persons in custody should be stamped out. " (28) 
In Keenan Hodgson J. gave a fuller and more balanced account of the purposes of 
Code C: 
"... these Code provisions are designed to make it 
difficult for a detained person to make unfounded allegations 
against the police which might otherwise appear credible. 
Second, it provides safeguards against the police inaccurately 
recording or inventing the words used in questioning a 
detained person ... the provisions are designed to make it 
very much more difficult for a defendant to make unfounded 
allegations that he has been 'verballed' which appear 
credible. " (29) 
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Hodgson J. rightly points out that protection of the police as well as of the suspect is 
an aim of Code C. 
Appeal cases such as Rv Delaney Rv Keena and Rv Canale (30) illustrate that the 
judiciary are no longer prepared to accept the police version of what transpired at 
interrogation as there are mechanisms for the independent validation of the 
interrogation process. 
We have here in the authenticity issue, a clear example of how public perception of 
the police has influenced the law of confessions both in terms of the legislative 
scheme for recording set up in PACE and judicial attitudes to breach of that scheme 
through the exclusion of confession evidence or through the quashing of convictions 
because trial judges failed to properly take into account breach of the recording 
provisions by the police. 
Moreover, police concern for their own public image was also one major impetus for 
the reforms in recording interrogations established by PACE. 
P Mirfield commented in "Confessions" that, 
"It is remarkable that English law has for so long left the 
problem of the accuracy of the record largely alone. It seems 
almost perverse that the Act introduces an exclusionary rule 
to ensure that a confession actually made is reliable but 
eschews use of the same technique to ensure that a confession 
attributed to the accused was actually made. " (3 1) 
Mr. Mirfield could not have predicted in 1985 that the English judiciary would police 
the verballing provisions of PACE by use of S. 78 as a discretionary remedy for 
breach of those provisions. Indeed in Delaney Lord Lane said that since the court was 
deprived of a record of interrogation by the police the prosecution could not satisfy 
the burden of proof under S. 76 2(b) to show that the confession was not obtained due 
to unreliability inducing police methods and therefore the confession should have 
been excluded as a matter of law. The defence alleged that the police downplayed the 
seriousness of a serious sexual offence to the suspect person of very low IQ. Lord 
Lane said he could not properly adjudicate on the S. 76 2(b) issue in the absence of an 
independent record of the interrogation. (32) The question of the record of the 
interrogation is not only relevant to the discretion to exclude under S. 78 but also has 
64 
relevance to the issue of law under S. 76 2(b). This is a dramatic change from the 
common law position. 
The Le2itimacy of Confessions 
The third issue that has moulded the modem law of confessions is what can loosely be 
termed'due process' concerns. This is a much more characteristically modem concem 
than either the 'creditworthiness' issue or the 'authenticity' issue. The 'due process' 
concem can be stated as follows: 
"How should the law of confessions respond to the fact that 
the suspect is interrogated in the detention of the police, and 
also to the fact that the police are a state agency? " 
Herbert Packer in his seminal American work "The Limits of the Criminal Sanction" 
(1968) refers to due process as a value system which views, 
" ... efficiency in the suppression of crime as subordinate to the protection of the individual in his confrontation 
with the State. " (33) 
That confrontation with the State begins, according to Packer. with the arrest of the 
suspect by the police and ends with the verdict at trial. 
It might be argued that the law of confessions can help to ensure that the 'citizen as 
suspect' is treated by the police in a manner acceptable to a civilized society through 
the use of exclusionary rules and discretions to exclude a confession obtained in 
breach of minimwn standards of behaviour set for the police in their treatment of 
suspects in custody. Both the CLRC (1972) and the RCCP (1981) recognised this 
basic point as justly impinging on the law of confessions. (34) 
This 'due process' strand in confession law is a modem one due to the simple fact that 
the permissibility of police interrogation of a suspect in custody in England was not 
fully conceded at an official level for at least 130 years after the founding of the new 
police in 1829 (see Rule I of the revised Judges' Rules of 1964). 
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This is not to say that the police could not legitimately question suspects before arrest 
nor does it imply that confessions voluntarily made to the police by a suspect in 
custody were not admissible. 
The official line, at least until the revised Judges' Rules of 1964 was that the 
interrogation of suspects in custody was not a legitimate police practice. Yet it is only 
when police interrogation of a suspect in custody is accepted as legitimate can the 
'due process' questions of how the suspect is to be treated in interrogation and the 
law's response to that, be sensibly asked. 
If police interrogation of suspects is not accepted as legitimate then establishing the 
limits of fair interrogative practices is a redundant issue. 
The permissibility of police interrogation of a person in custody was an open question 
at least when Lord Sumner spoke in Ibrahim as his Lordship recognised in that case. 
ýFhe Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure in 1929 said that 
interrogation of persons in custody was hn-iited to the Metropolitan Police and a few 
other city forces but that, 
"The great majority of police forces to judge by the evidence 
before us follow Lord Brampton's advice at least to the 
fundamental principle governing their actions. " (35) 
(on Lord Brampton's advice see the previous chapter) 
The 1929 Commission concluded that, "It is desirable to avoid any questioning at all 
of persons in Custody"' (36) - this is justified in the Report by reference to the 
privilege against self-incrimination of the suspect and the need to protect it. (37) 
Custodial interrogation is inconsistent with respect for the privilege against self- 
incrimination of the accused according to the 1929 Commissioners. If however., the 
privilege against self-incrimination is seen as merely a privilege against compelled 
self-incriminatory speech then there is not necessarily a conflict between interrogation 
and the nemo debet prodere se ipsum principle, for there is always the option of 
remaining silent in the face of lawful and legitimate police interrogation. 
The uncertainty about the legitimacy of police interrogation of suspects in custody 
continued into the early 1960s - witness the comments of Professor J. C. Smith thatq 
"There is one quite fundamental question concerning 
the Judges' Rules to which there appears to be no clear 
answer. Do the Rules forbid the Pohce to question 
persons in custody or do they merely advise them that 
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if they do question such persons, the answers may be 
inadmissible in evidence. " (38) 
However, by 1972 the CLRC reported the view, 
" ... that the police should be able to question suspects in 
custody is now generally thought to be necessary for the 
due administration of the law. " (39) 
The position prior to the 1960s seems to have been that though the status of police 
interrogation of suspects was uncertain in law it was in fact practiced by the police to 
the point where Professor Smith in 1960 recognised that whatever the official 
position, 
"... it would not be surprising if Dr. Glanville Williams' 
view that the Rules are habitually disregarded is correct" (40) 
and that "... it would seem almost inevitable that the rule prohibiting 
questioning generally should go by the board. " (4 1) 
We know also what the general approach of the courts was to non observance of the 
Judges' Rules in terms of the exclusion of confession evidence. Rule I of the revised 
Judges' Rules of 1964 established the legitimacy of the interrogation of suspects in 
custody. Although it was not until the House of Lords' decision in Holgate- 
Mohammed v Duke (42) closely followed by S. 37 of PACE that detention for the 
purpose of questioning was given the sanction of the law. Section 37(2) of PACE 
states that, 
" ... the person arrested shall be released either on bail or 
without bail, unless the custody officer has reasonable 
grounds for believing that his detention without being 
charged is necessary to secure or preserve evidence relating 
to an offence for which he is under arrest or to obtain such 
evidence by questioning him. " 
With the gradual acceptance of the legitimacy of police interrogation arose the 
question of "What are the rights and how best to safeguard the rights of a suspect who 
is being questioned? " Indeed, not only was police interrogation increasingly seen as 
legitimate but it became to be officially recognised. as a necessity - thus the RCCP 
commented, 
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"'Me evidence submitted to us all leads us to the conclusion 
that there can be no adequate substitute for police questioning 
in the investigation and ultimately in the prosecution of 
crime. " (43) 
If police interrogation was officially viewed as a necessity then the question of how 
best to safeguard the rights of suspects in custody became a political imperative. 
Hence the RCCP (198 1) notion of a 'fundamental balance' between the interests of the 
community in the suppression of crimes and the interests of suspects. 
Of course the Judges' Rules attempted to provide some regulation of the police- 
suspect encounter in interrogation but it is important to remember that the 1912 Rules 
were not clear on whether interrogation was permissible. Also, the Rules were 
originally requested by the police to clear up ambiguities about the proper course of 
conduct in relation to persons in custody and the admissibility of statements made by 
suspects. A. T. Lawrence J. in Voisin (1918) commented, 
"In 1912 the Judges at the request of the Home 
Secretary, drew up some rules as guides for police 
officers. These rules have not the force of law, they 
are administrative directions. ) the observance of which the police authorities should enforce on their subordinates 
as tending to the fair administration of justice. It is 
important that they should do so, for statements obtained 
from prisoners contrary to the spirit of these rules may be 
rejected as evidence by the Judge presiding at the trial. " 
(44) 
As has been noted, this discretion was rarely exercised in the accused's favour. The 
RCCP (1981) said that the Judges' Rules, 
it... represented a first conscious effort within the pre-trial 
procedure to set out a considered balance between the need 
to protect the rights of the individual suspect and the need 
to give the police sufficient powers to carry out their task. " 
(45) 
However, we need to treat this statement with caution. Firstly, the Rules were issued 
for the guidance of the police rather than explicitly as a safeguard for suspects. 
Secondly, to say that the Rules were 'a conscious effort to set out the rights of the 
individual suspect' is an empty claim for the only meaningful way those 'rights' could 
be protected was through the discretionary exclusion of confessions where there was a 
breach of those rights, but this rarely happened. 
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The central due process notion of authoritatively setting out the rights of a suspect in 
police custody was only finally achieved in the RCCP Report of 198 1. Of course the 
CLRC in 1972 had made a nod towards the notion of decent and fair treatment of 
suspects in police custody and the role of the law of evidence in that regard. The 
CLRC said, 
"Even the most cogent evidence may be rejected because 
of the way in which it was obtained ... a suggested reason (besides possible unreliability) why a confession is 
inadmissible unless proved to have been voluntary is the 
need to discourage the use of improper means to obtain 
confessions ... It is admittedly questionable whether the 
object mentioned should be secured by restricting the 
admissibility of evidence rather than by disciplining 
those responsible, but we do not think that we can leave 
this object out of account and we have had regard to it in 
our recommendations about the admissibility of evidence 
in confessions. " (46) 
The CLRC continued, 
"We do not think it would be right or acceptable to public 
opinion to make any exception to inadmissibility where 
there has been oppression. " (47) 
However, the CLRC made no comprehensive attempt to reconcile the social need for 
the police to interrogate suspects with the social need for the rights of suspects to be 
stated with certainty and authority. 
A sim-ilarity the RCCP Report shares with the CLRC I Ith Report is on the need for a 
rule of inadmissibility for confessions obtained by oppressive police methods. Again 
this is not justified by concerns about reliability but reflects modem due process 
concerns: 
"... in order to mark the seriousness of any breach of the 
rule prohibiting violence, threats of violence, torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment and society's abhorrence 
of such conduct, non-compliance with this prohibition 
should lead to the automatic exclusion of evidence so 
obtained. " (48) 
The provision which emerged from this concern, namely S. 76 2(a), can be best 
understood as a provision enforcing due process concerns. The section is not justified 
by reference to reliability for the provision says that where there is oppression. 
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"... the court shall not allow the confession to be given in 
evidence against him except in so far as the prosecution 
proves to the court beyond reasonable doubt that the 
confession (notwithstanding that it may be true) was not 
obtained as aforesaid. " 
Moreover if a concern for reliability is behind the oppression head it is hard to see 
why a separate reliability test is provided for in S. 76 2(b) PACE. 
It is important to remember that the concept of 'oppression' was only incorporated as 
part of the exclusionary rule by Parker C. J. in Callis v Gunn (1964). This was a fairly 
late development in the long history of the exclusionary rule and it is by no means 
clear that 'oppression' was understood originally as being directed towards ensuring 
that the suspect was treated in a civilized manner by his interrogators. In Rv 
Priestley (1965) and Rv Prager (1972), (49) the courts seem to suggest that it is a 
concem with the suspect's privilege against self-incrimination which lies behind the 
ban on oppression in interrogation. Reference is made in those cases to oppressive 
questioning overbearing the suspect's will and leading him to speak when otherwise 
he would have remained silent. Of course the privilege against self-incrimination is 
part of the concept of 'due process' as commonly understood but the real objections to 
'oppressive' methods of interrogation are independent of the privilege against self- 
incrimination and have to do with basic standards of decency in the treatment of 
suspects which any civilized society should aspire to. The RCCP stated that the 
suspect had other rights apart from the right not to be subject to oppression, 
" ... the right not to be 
held incommunicado, the right to 
legal advice, the right to be fairly interviewed and to be 
properly cared for. " (50) 
In illustrating the contrast between pre and post PACE approaches of the judiciary to 
the notion of suspects' rights, perhaps the right to legal advice is the most dramatic 
example. The Judges' Rules contained a provision for the obtaining of legal advice by 
suspects: the Preamble to the Judges' Rules stated that the Rules do not affect the 
principle that, 
... every person at any stage of an 
investigation should be 
able to communicate and to consult privately with a 
solicitor. " (5 1) 
However, access was routinely denied and the alleged 'right' was rarely supported by 
a judicial discretion to exclude, as pointed out by Baldwin and McConville, who 
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commented in 1979, 
"It is clear then that even in principle the 'right' of access 
to a solicitor during police interrogation is far from absolute: 
it is qualified by the provisions as to unreasonable delay 
or hindrance and the courts have shown themselves 
reluctant to exclude evidence merely because it has been 
obtained in breach of the Rules. " (52) 
Yet since the introduction of PACE we have had the judicial pronouncement in the 
Court of Appeal that the right to legal advice is "one of the most important and 
fundamental rights of a citizen" per Hodgson J. in Rv Samuel (1988). Where there is 
a causal relationship between wrongful denial of the S. 58 right and a confession then 
exclusion under S. 78 is a strong possibility (unless the suspect is already aware of his 
rights - see Rv Alladice and Rv Dunford). Lord Lane in Alladice suggested that 
where the police in bad faith deny access to legal advice exclusion of a confession 
would be easy even in the absence of a causal connection. 
"If the police have acted in bad faith the court will have 
little difficulty in ruling any confession inadmissible 
under S. 78 if not under S. 76. " (53) 
Under the old law even deliberate breach of access to legal advice was rarely treated 
as affecting the admissibility of a confession under the discretion to exclude evidence 
obtained in violation of the Judges' Rules. The denial of legal advice to the suspect 
under the old law ordy went usually to the weight of the confession before the jury. 
However, the right to legal advice is now viewed as an essential part of the procedural 
protections for the suspect which was the quid pro quo for the increased and clarified 
police powers in PACE. As Professor Leigh has pointed out, the power of prolonged 
detention for questioning which PACE bestowed upon the police was cruciaUy 
dependent on promises being made in Parliament during the debates on the PACE Bill 
to improve the legal aid scheme for free legal advice in the police station. (54). 
In conclusion, it can be seen how the English law of confessions has evolved into its 
present complex state where questions of the authenticity of a confession, its 
reliability and the legitimacy of its obtaining are all issues which go to the 
admissibility of confession evidence either in the form of an exclusionary rule S. 76 
2(a) or S. 76 2(b) or in the form, of the exclusionary discretion S. 78. This complexity 
has recently received high judicial recognition by Ralph Gibson L. J. who commented 
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"The rules relating to the questioning of suspects and to 
the admissibility and faimess of evidence of admissions 
have reached a degree of much complication which can give 
rise to difficulties for those entrusted with the direction of 
criminal trials. " (55). 
In the following chapters it is proposed to consider in depth each of the framing 
concerns behind modem English confession law: 
legitimacy (56) (57). 
authenticity, reliability and 
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(57) it is important to distinguish confessions to the police or other parties pre-trial 
from a plea of guilty at trial, such a plea of guilty being a confession of fact. 
Confessions to the police or a third party pre-trial are not conclusive of guilt, 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE CREDITWORTHINESS OF CONFESSIONS; 
THE CONTEXT OF POLICE INTERROGATION 
Introduction 
This chapter will examine the context of police interrogation as a backdrop to the 
issue of the creditworthiness of confessions, then there will be a discussion of the 
reasons why suspects might make false confessions and a typology of false 
confessions. There will then be a discussion of the meaning and interpretation of 
Section 76 2(b) of PACE. The next section will look at possible underlying theories 
of exclusion under Section 76 2(b). The last section will look at the admissibility of 
psychiatric and psychological evidence under Section 76 2(b). 
The context of potice interro2ation 
The Benthamite response to the problem of the creditworthiness of confession 
evidence would be to view the issue as always going to the weight that the court 
attached to the evidence rather than as the position in English law has been, to see the 
issue as going in certain circumstances to the admissibility of the evidence. The 
Benthan-lite would see no reason to accord confession evidence any different status 
from any other piece of relevant evidence. 'ne basic test of relevancy that Bentham 
constructed as a condition of the admissibility of evidence would seldom be an issue, 
for a statement by the accused implicating himself in the offence with which he is 
charged is without doubt relevant to the case against him. Wigmore wrote, 
"The policy then should be to receive all wel-l-proved 
confessions in evidence and to leave them to the jury, 
subject to all discrediting circumstances, to receive such 
weight as may seem proper. " (1) 
Wigmore seems here to make an exception with regard to admissibility for 
confessions which are not "well proved", i. e. not authentic in the sense of not having 
been made at all. The issue of "authenticity" is a separate issue to which this thesis 
will return in Chapter 4. 
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Ile issue of the creditworthiness of confession evidence provides a good example of 
the deficiencies of the Benthamite approach to the law of evidence. The Benthamite 
theory ignores as a question going to the admissibility of confession evidence, the 
complex psychological and sociological processes which produce confession 
evidence from interrogation. However, the law should respond to this problem in 
terms of the admissibility of confessions to further the goal of safeguarding the 
innocent against conviction. It is extremely doubtful whether this goal can be 
adequately realised by an approach which allows for the free admissibility of 
confessions. Furthermore, the Benthamite perspective ignores the requirements of the 
political morality of our society which insists that in certain circumstances the state 
should not rely on apparently reliable and relevant evidence to secure a conviction of 
guilt. This point will be developed in the chapter on the legitimacy (2) of confessions, 
but a fairly obvious example would be a confession obtained by torture. No civilized 
system of justice should allow a conviction on this kind of evidence. For the 
Benthamite, how evidence is produced or elicited is a matter of weight of the 
evidence before the trier of fact. 
It is the context of police interrogation of suspects in order to procure a confession 
that is the background to the provision of Section 76 2(b) in the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984. As Wolchover and Heaton Armstrong comment in their 
monograph "Confession Evidence". (3) 
"Most confessions are adduced as the product of 
questioning rather than as spontaneous utterances 
provoked by the pronouncement of suspicion or arrest. 
The study of confession evidence as a psychological 
phenomena is necessarily integral therefore with that 
of the dynamics of interrogation: it is impossible to 
study confessions in isolation of the process of 
obtaining them. " 
This process of police interrogation and certain dubious police tactics in interrogation 
presents a potential threat to the reliability of confessions. The Criminal Law 
Revision Committee in 1972 commented, 
"Persons who are subjected to threat, inducements or 
oppression may confess falsely; juries are particularly 
apt to attach weight to such a confession even though 
the evidence of the threat, inducement or oppression is 
before them; consequently they must be prevented 
from knowing of the confession. " (4) 
78 
The reasons why suspects might make false confessions and a typology of false 
confessions 
Research has illustrated (see for example "The Case for the Prosecution" by M. 
McConville, A. Sanders and R. Leng (5)) that the police view interrogation as being 
primarily aimed at securing a confession of guilt through questioning rather than 
being an open ended inquiry into the truth of the suspect' s involvement in the alleged 
crime. As J. Baldwin comments, police interrogation "is concerned with future rather 
than past events" (6) i. e. that police interrogation is used by the police as a means of 
obtaining evidence for use in court rather than establishing the actual involvement of 
the suspect in the alleged crime. Given that this is how the police view interrogation 
and the vulnerabilities of certain suspects (for an account of the important concept of 
interrogative suggestibility, see G. Gudjonsson "The Psychology of Interrogations, 
Confessions and Testimony" (7)) the possibilities of a false confession emerging from 
the police-suspect interaction in interrogation is not an insignificant one. A 
potentially dangerous combination of overbearing police officers, overly confident in 
the suspect's guilt and frightened, confused and perhaps mentally ill-handicapped 
suspects, explains why the interrogation of suspects can present a major threat to the 
reliability of confession evidence. Barry Irving (8) has commented that, 
"Interrogation ... is a two-way process in which the 
participants swap information. The interrogator lets the 
suspect know what he wants to find out when he is 
dissatisfied with answers, where he requires extra 
detail, when he wants to understand connections between 
statements, what he believes or disbelieves and what his 
attitudes to the information are. " 
This process can lead the suggestible suspect to adopt the police account of events. 
Of Arn-istrong's confession it has been said " ... if Armstrong sang 
like a canary it was 
a song the police had taught him" (9). Armstrong, as one of the Guildford Four, 
served fifteen years in prison on the basis of his false confession. 
The importance of the psychological research undertaken by Gudjonsson, Mackeith 
and others is that the police do not have to engage in violence or threats of violence 
nor use inducements for a false confession to emerge from interrogation and this is so 
even if the suspect is not mentally ill nor mentally handicapped or in other ways 
mentally deficient. Mere psychological manipulation in itself by the police, such as 
playing on a suspect's low self-esteem can be enough to elicit a false confession to a 
very serious offence from a normal person in police custody. Gudjonsson and 
Mackeith (10) in a research article. "A Proven Case of False Confession: 
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Psychological aspects of the Coerced-Comphant type", draw attention to a recent 
English case where a 17 year old youth falsely confessed to two murders of old ladies 
who had also been sexually assaulted. The confessions took place during police 
interrogation of the youth whilst he was not legally represented. The youth was of 
average intelligence and he suffered from no mental iUness and his personality was 
not obviously abnormal. (A coerced-compliant confession means one where the 
suspect does not confess freely and voluntarily but rather confesses for some 
immediate instrumental gain such as to escape police pressure or police authority. ) 
This confession was subsequently by chance proved to be false. Another individual 
confessed to the crime and was convicted for it. The youth had spent 11 months on 
remand though for the crime. The false confession appears to have resulted from 
excessive psychological manipulation and verbal pressure of a young man who was at 
the time distressed and susceptible to interrogative pressure. Guqjonsson and 
MacKeith comment, 
"The youth's self-esteem was clearly manipulated, 
particularly by the senior detective who played on his 
alleged failures with girls. The most serious confession 
(i. e. the murders) followed immediately upon this kind 
of manipulation. " (11) 
Excessive psychological manipulation of a normal suspect in the context of police 
detention and interrogation is therefore capable of eliciting a false confession. 
Threats of violence or the use of inducements do not present the only threat to 
confession reliability with the interrogation of norinal suspects. 
Section 76 2(b) of PACE can be viewed as a direct response to the particular threat to 
the reliability of confessions posed by certain police tactics in the interrogation room. 
Of course threats to the reliability of a confession can derive solely from the suspect 
himself without the need for any police misconduct or manipulation. A false 
confession may emerge from normal police interrogation where no dubious tactics 
have been used; the confession may still be false because of a specific vulnerability 
of the suspect who is particularly suggestible or under the influence of drink or drugs 
or who is mentally ill. There is also the concept of a "voluntary" false confession, 
which is now well known to psychologists. Gudjonsson comments (12) 
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"Voluntary false confessions are offered by individuals 
without any external pressure from the police. 
Commonly these individuals go voluntarily to the 
police station and inform the police that they have 
committed the crime in question. " 
The question then arises as to why does S. 76 2(b) limit the judicial enquiry into the 
reliability of the confession to those cases where there is a causal link between the 
potentially unreliable confession and "anything said or done" by the police which is 
conducive to unreliability? The reason for the limitations of S. 76 2(b) is because of 
the degree of danger to the reliability of confession evidence obtained by certain 
police tactics in interrogation. Confessions so obtained suffer from systemic defects 
in terms of their reliability. In contrast with confessions made spontaneously to the 
police or confessions given voluntarily or confessions given under nonnal interview 
conditions there is no such systemic danger of unreliability, and therefore there is no 
justification for a rule of exclusion where there is a possibility that such confessions 
are false. 
There is some truth in the old common law assumption that in the absence of threats 
or inducements no one of sound mind would confess unless they were guilty of the 
offence, see Rv Lambe (1791) (13) and Rv Warickshall (1783) for old common law 
authorities on the great probative worth of confessions based upon the common sense 
observation that a person is not likely to confess to something they have not done. 
Of course that old common law assumption is in need of some corrective analysis in 
the light of recent psychological research and the history of false confessions in 
England. A voluntary false confession is always a possibility and there are plenty of 
examples of the genre, e. g. the many false confessions to the Lindbergh baby 
kidnapping case in the 1930s in the USA. (14) 
In England the Home Office Forensic Scientist Professor Keith Simpson wrote in his 
autobiography that voluntary false confessions, 
"... are a well known phenomenon in well publicized 
murder cases,, the motive doubtless being to provide a 
little colour in an otherwise dull life. In a case of 
mine in Hertfordshire in 1956 no fewer than three 
notoriety seekers had 'confessed' before I had time to 
reach the police station only thirty miles from London; 
and I had set out immediately I was called. " (15) 
These people who make false voluntary confessions may not always be mentally ill or 
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suffering from a severe personality disorder. For example, a person may make a 
false voluntary confession to the police in order to protect somebody else, e. g. a close 
relative, from conviction for the crime. Gudjonsson has commented that with regard 
to juveniles, confessing to protect someone else from criminal responsibility may be 
common. (16) 
There is also a possibility of a false confession emerging from normal police 
interrogation and detention, this could be so even where the suspect is not mentally ill 
nor suffering from a personality disorder. Guqjonsson comments, (17), 
"False confessions are not confined to the mentally 
handicapped or the mentally ill. The view that 
apparently normal individuals would never seriously 
incriminate themselves when interrogated by the 
police is totally wrong and this should be recognised by 
the judiciary. " 
Custodial interrogation is in itself inherently coercive and this may be inherently too 
much pressure for certain vulnerable suspects who confess falsely because of the mere 
fact of interrogation. The Stevan Kiszko case providing an example of this 
phenomenon. Kiszko confessed to the murder of a young girl because he was 
frightened of the police and wished to go home to his mother. There was no 
suggestion of improper pressure by the police although crucially he was not 
interviewed in the presence of a legal advisor. He was mentally backward. His 
conviction was quashed by the Court of Appeal in 1992 after evidence showed he 
could not be the killer. However, it is argued here that the discretionary powers of the 
judge are adequate to deal with the problem of unreliable confessions which arise 
from those defects which lie within the suspect solely, such as psychological 
vulnerabilities rather than from the use of unethical interrogation techniques by the 
police. 
A full taxonomy of the different kinds of false confession is provided by G. 
Gudjonsson in "The Psychology of Confessions, Interrogation and Testimony" (18) 
but the three main types are the aforementioned voluntary and coerced-compliant 
false confessions and the coerced-internalized false confessions. With the coerced- 
compliant false confession the suspect confesses for a perceived immediate 
instrumental gain, such as release from police custody and "the perceived immediate 
gains outweigh the perceived and uncertain long-term consequences ... suspects 
naively believe that somehow the truth will come out later, or that their solicitor will 
be able to rectify their false confession. " (19) 
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The coerced-internalized false confessor comes to believe during police interrogation, 
even if this belief is later lost, that they have committed the crime in question. Such a 
confession is linked to a "memory distrust syndrome" where the suspect distrusts his 
own memory and is also linked to high trust in the police and the honesty of their 
account of events. 
Section 76 2(b) of The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
Section 76 2(b) was enacted in order to replace the old voluntariness rule of the 
common law and although it is not proposed now to give a history of that rule (on this 
see Chapter 2 of this thesis) a few points are worth noting at this stage of the 
discussion. First of all the voluntariness, rule recognized that confessions made under 
certain circumstances are so systemically unreliable that an exclusionary rule was 
justified to rule out a confession whenever those circumstances existed. 'Mose 
circumstances were the impact on a suspect of certain methods of questioning which 
were such as to render his confession "involuntary" and therefore suspect in terms of 
creditworthiness. Those methods were those which employed threats and 
inducements, and, at a later stage of the development of the rule, "oppression". 
Section 76 2(b) of PACE was a clean break from the common law but S. 76 2(b) 
follows the voluntariness rule to the extent that the demarcation between admissible 
and inadmissible confessions is defined by focusing on certain undesirable, 
unrefiability inducing methods of interrogation. To this extent both the common law 
and S. 76 2(b) incorporate important psychological insights about the reliability of 
confessions made under certain conditions and are in that way superior to the 
Benthamite approach, which would see such circumstances as going to the weight of 
the confession only. 
The second point to make is that the voluntariness rule was arbitrary to the extent that 
it only took regard of inducements, threats and "oppression" in the context of 
interrogation as bringing into operation the exclusionary rule. Section 76 2(b) in 
contrast focuses on, 
... anything said or 
done which was likely in the 
circumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable 
any confession which might be made by him in 
consequence thereof. " 
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This is more satisfactory in that it acknowledges that in the inherently coercive nature 
of custodial interrogation other police tactics apart from inducements or threats or 
If oppression" could affect the reliability of confession evidence. For example, an 
unlawful denial of legal advice to a person of low IQ could well lead to an unreliable 
confession being made: see the case of Rv McGovern (1991). which concerned the 
unlawful denial of legal advice and the operation of S. 76 2(b). (20) 
The third point to make about the voluntariness rule is that it had ossified to the extent 
that even the mildest threat or inducement could lead to the confession being ruled 
inadmissible. In contrast, S. 76 2(b) brings the issue of unreliability inducing police 
tactics to the fore by asking whether any confession which the accused made was 
likely to be unreliable. 
The focus now is on the potential of the interrogation methods to affect the reliability 
of confessional evidence, not as before on whether a particular form of words had 
been used by the police in questioning the suspect. It is therefore not the case that the 
making of inducements prior to the suspect making a confession, will necessarily lead 
to a confession being excluded under S. 76 2(b). The section requires the trial judge to 
determine whether the inducement was in the circumstances existing at the time such 
as was likely to render any confession made unreliable. Therefore, not all 
inducements will fall foul of S. 76 2(b) since not all inducements are likely to have an 
effect on the reliability of the suspect's confession. As the CLRC in 1972 explained, 
"If the threat was to charge the suspect's wife jointly with 
him, the judge might think that a confession even of a 
serious offence would be likely to be unreliable. If there 
was a promise to release the accused on bail to visit a sick 
member of his family, the judge might think that this 
would be unlikely to render a confession of a serious 
offence unreliable but likely to do so in the case of a minor 
offence. " (21) 
Section 76 2(b) is modelled on a proposal made by the CLRC in 1972 although the 
S. 76 2(b) test is wider than the CLRC test, in that S. 76 2(b) refers to anything said or 
done, whereas the CLRC limited the test to threats or inducements. 
A contrast can then be made between the type of police method in interrogation which 
brings S. 76 2(a) into operation and the type of police tactic which brings S. 76 2(b) 
into operation. S. 76 2(a) is directed at absolutely prohibited interrogative techniques 
such as violence or the threat of violence. These are the core prohibited practices. 
S. 76 2(b) is directed at another range of tactics such as the use of inducements, the 
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playing down of the seriousness of a serious offence etc. The use of these tactics in 
interrogation by the police does not necessarily render a confession made following 
their use inadmissible. However, there is a possibility that in the circumstances of the 
case their use may lead a trial judge to rule the confession inadmissible under S. 76 
2(b). 1herefore the police must be careful in their use of inducements whereas in 
contrast the police must never use violence or the threat of it in interrogation. Section 
76 2(a) and S. 76 2(b) therefore differ in the strength of their injunction to the police 
about certain interrogative methods. However, the reference in S. 76 2(b) to "any 
confession" prevents S. 76 2(b) from being a straightforward test on the effect of 
interrogation methods on the reliability of the confession at issue. It is proposed to 
analyse in detail later in this thesis the reasons for this phraseology in S. 76 2(b) 
which focuses attention on a hypothetical confession rather than the actual confession 
made. 
It needs to be emphasized that Section 76 2(b) is not a straightforward test on the 
reliability of a confession. The section requires a causal relationship between 
"anything said or done" by the police or others and the confession before the 
exclusionary rule operates. Thus, for example, a confession made perfectly 
voluntarily by a mentally ill individual which is in fact false, would not fall within the 
operation of S. 76 2(b). Perhaps the prejudicial effect probative value discretion or the 
Section 78 discretion could be used to rule such a confession inadmissible but it is not 
within the language nor the purpose of S. 76 2(b) to operate in such circumstances. 
The case of Rv Brine (1992) (22) is an example of where the Court of Appeal said 
S. 78 should have been used to rule an unreliable confession inadmissible. In Rv 
Brine S. 76 2(b) was held inapplicable because the predisposition to stress the accused 
suffered when interrogated was something internal to him and not "anything said or 
done" to him for the purposes of S. 76 2(b). The judgement in Rv Mackenzie (23) 
provides a further safety net for confessions made by mentafly handicapped suspects 
which are unconvincing in their reliability. This is a common law test independent of 
S. 76 2(b) and requires the trial judge to withdraw the case from the jury where a 
confession forins the substantial part of the prosecution case and that confession is an 
unconvincing one made by a mentally handicapped person. 
Before a detailed consideration of S. 76 2(b) is attempted it is proposed to analyse the 
particular threat to the creditworthiness of confessions by police interrogation 
methods. At the outset it is important to note the following; the great importance of 
confession evidence to the English Criminal Justice System determines to a large 
degree the kind of interrogative approach to suspects that the police will take. 
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If confessions mattered much less to the Criminal Justice System then it is likely that 
the various pressures put on suspects to confess by the police would be reduced. 
However, the police are put under strong pressures by the criminal justice system to 
secure confessions (for various administrative and proof reasons) and this in tum 
translates into strong pressures being put on suspects to confess in police 
interrogation. The context of the "admissibility of evidence" also generates pressure 
on police to obtain confessions. Ibe point is that not all information about an offence 
in the hands of the police is admissible in evidence. 
The police themselves value confessions as being a 'quick route' to a conviction. This 
view has been strengthened by a judiciary, who in the past as Michael Mansfield Q. C. 
points out, "have commonly told juries that they could have no better form of 
evidence" (24) than a confession. American research on the effect of a confession on 
juries suggests that they are more influenced by a confession than by an eye witness's 
identification. Kassin and Wrightsman comment, g 
"Our research leads to the conclusion that juries are 
heavily influenced by the presence of a confession as 
part of the prosecutor's evidence. " (25) 
This fact is likely to be part of the knowledge of police culture. Moreover, many 
confessions lead to a guilty plea obviating the need for the police to attend court as 
witnesses or to gather other evidence for use by the prosecution. Much police time is 
potentially saved by obtaining a confession. This is likely to increase the desire of the 
police to obtain an early confession through interrogation, thereby increasing the 
pressures on the reliability of confession evidence obtained through interrogation as 
well as raising the possibility of undue pressure being placed on suspects, pressure 
which might be "oppressive". It is vital in order to understand the significance of 
S. 76 2(a) and S. 76 2(b) of PACE to appreciate the role of confession evidence in our 
criminal justice system. 
This is to reflect an important point made by Professor Twining (26) in 1978, who 
urged for an integrated analysis of confessions, analysing the role of confessions in 
the criminal process as a whole, 
"... because of the concentration on the exclusionary rules, 
nearly all of the existing literature on confession treats 
retracted confessions as the norm; yet retracted confessions 
surely represent only a small minority of confessions. 
Typically neither the scholarly literature nor public debate 
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gives a balanced and realistic total view of the role of 
confessions in the criminal process; for example, the 
significance of confessions as an important stage en route 
to a guilty plea. Evidence scholarship has failed to give a 
systematic account of confessions in criminal process as 
phenomena. As a result, it provides no clear answers to 
such questions as who confesses to whom about what 
under what conditions. ) in what form and with what results? Yet it is difficult to see how one can hope to make sensible 
and informed judgements about the issues of policy relating 
to confessions and interrogation without at least tentative 
working answers to such questions. " 
Twfi-iing offers this as a useful example of the deficiencies of most Evidence 
Scholarship at that time, namely that the literature by focusing on the rules of 
evidence neglected among other issues the systematic study of fact-firiding 
institutions and processes. Confessions cannot be properly understood unless their 
overall role in the criminal justice system is grasped. It is often and rightly assumed 
that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive. At a basic level, no one can enjoy 
the prospect of being questioned against their will in alien surroundings. However, it 
is important to recognise that the intensity of the psychologically coercive pressures 
imposed on suspects by custodial interrogation is not a fixed invariable. Wbilst all 
custodial interrogation is "inherently coercive" the intensity of the psychological 
coercion must be a function in part of the importance of the strategy of interrogation 
and hence confessions to the police in a particular country. This importance is in part 
derived from the demands of the criminal justice system itself. 
Given that the criminal justice system imposes these pressures on the reliability of 
confessions it is important that the system provides some mechanism of quality 
control to filter out those methods of police interrogation which tend to threaten the 
reliability of confessions in the long run. Section 76 2(b) can be understood in this 
way: as an attempt to provide a quality control on confessions obtained by police 
interrogation, a method of obtaining evidence which is required by the system itself. 
It is unlikely that forensic science evidence could provide an alternative to reliance on 
confession evidence as a source of proof, as C. Walker has recently written. (27) 
"Given that forensic science evidence is available in only 
1: 200 cases and that resources do not stretch to its analysis 
and use in all possible cases, the hope that science may 
provide an antidote to the police construction of criminality 
especially through interrogation, seems forlorn. 
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The requirements of a criminal law dominated by subjectivist mens rea proof issues 
also makes confessions indispensable to the criminal justice system. As the Scottish 
jurist Dickson recognised as long ago as 1887, 
"... the peculiar value of confessional evidence lies in its 
furnishing the best proof of the intention which constitutes 
the essence of most crimes. " (28) 
It may also sometimes be the case that the obtaining of a confession may be the only 
way of proving an offence. A good historical example of that situation is the 
conviction in March 1950 of the atomic scientist Klaus Fuchs for treachery. Fuchs 
received a fourteen year sentence from the Lord Chief Justice Lord Goddard. 
Goddard's biographer comments of the Fuchs case, (29) 
"He had made a full confession. Without it there could 
have been no prosecution for the security services could not 
lay hands on a single witness to the crimes committed. " 
Studies from the United States show that confession evidence is the only evidence 
available in about 30% of prosecutions for child sexual abuse. It may also be the case 
that alternative techniques for investigating offences present their own problems for 
the criminal justice system. Kent Greenawalt criticizes the simplistic notion that 
"increasing reliance on confessions would replace more reliable less intrusive 
techniques of criminal investigation". Greenawalt comments, (30) 
"In some cases alternative techniques simply cannot 
suffice. Moreover, some typical kinds of proof such as 
eye witness identification may often be less reliable 
than admissions. Also some 'alternative' techniques such 
as informers and electronic surveillance may be even more 
intrusive on individual liberty than pressures to answer 
questions. Still the argument remains that in systems 
relying heavily on confessions there is a tendency to 
overbear suspects rather than establish guilt by independent 
means. " 
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The Interpretation of Section 76 2(b) and possible underlying theories of 
exclusion under Section 76 2(b) 
As the cases of Rv Goldenberg (198 8) (3 1) and Rv Crampton (199 1) make clear, the 
focus of S. 76 2(b) is on police methods of interrogation which are likely to have an 
adverse effect on the reliability of confession evidence so obtained. The section does 
not apply where the defect, i. e. the threat to the reliability of the confession lies solely 
within the suspect. Thus in Goldenberg and Crampton the police engaged in the 
interrogation of drug addicts in the stages of withdrawal. There were suggestions by 
the defence that they may have confessed in order to get bail so as to obtain supplies 
of their drug. The purpose of S. 76 2(b) is not to rule inadmissible confessions made 
whilst the suspect was experiencing the abnormal stress and pressure which is an 
inevitable part of custodial police interrogation. 
In Rv Crampton it was held that it was doubtful whether the mere holding of an 
interview when the appellant was withdrawing from drugs was "something done" 
within the meaning of Section 76 2(b) of PACE. In Rv Goldenberg it was held that 
the words "said or done" in Section 76 2(b) did not extend so as to include anything 
said or done by the person making the confession; the reasoning of the court was that 
by use of the preceding words "in consequence" in the subsection it was clear that a 
causal link between what was said or done and the subsequent confession had to be 
shown. Accordingly "'anything said or done" applied only to something external to 
the person making the confession and as was stated by the Court of Appeal "no 
reliance was placed at the trial on anything said or done by the police"', therefore the 
confession was admissible. Moreover in Rv Crampton the Court of Appeal held that 
there was no reason for the judge to have excluded the confession in the exercise of 
his discretion under S. 78 of PACE. In Rv Goldenberg the trial judge had ruled 
against a submission that the confession's prejudicial effect outweighed its probative 
value. The Court of Appeal was "also satisfied that the judge was right to rule against 
the submission that the prejudicial effect of this evidence outweighed its probative 
value". 
The decisions in Goldenberg and Crampton have attracted some adverse academic 
criticism. Professor Birch comments that the approach of the Court of Appeal in Rv 
Goldenberig 
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it... produces the odd result that where D. is given a drug 
by a police doctor prior to confessing, the test for 
admissibility will be different from where the drug is 
self-administered. " (32) 
In the first case, where the police doctor gives the drug, S. 76 2(b) will apply; in the 
second case where the drug is self-administered S. 78 will apply. It is not an "'odd 
result" if one considers the rationale for S. 76 2(b). The focus is, to repeat, on 
unreliability inducing police methods of interrogation and where the police administer 
a drug to a suspect prior to interrogating him then this is precisely the kind of 
situation S. 76 2(b) is designed to deal with. Where the police merely interview 
someone in accordance with the Codes of Practice and that person happens to be in 
the stages of withdrawal from drugs then it is strongly arguable that S. 76 2(b) is not 
applicable in this situation. Holding an interview in accordance with the Codes of 
Practice cannot be, consistently with the rest of the PACE Act, a practice which is 
covered by S. 76 2(b). The PACE Act legitimates police interrogation so long as it is 
in accordance with the Codes of Practice; it would be inconsistent, if holding an 
interrogation in compliance with those Codes was to be rendered nugatory by the 
exclusion of a confession under the S. 76 2(b) rule of law. Of course a judge always 
has the discretion to rule out a confession if its probative value is outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect. Tl-ýs is so even if the Codes of Practice have been fully complied 
with. However, this is an exceptional measure for a judge to take and in the case 
which is often quoted to support the existence of this discretion for confessions, Rv 
Stewart (1972) the facts of the case were described by Mr. Recorder Hawser as "very 
exceptional". 'Mere is a considerable difference in scope between saying that a 
confession from an interview with a drug addict in compliance with the Codes is 
covered by the S. 76 2(b) rule of law and saying that the same confession might be 
ruled inadmissible by use of the probative value prejudicial effect discretion. 
It was expressly denied by the Court of Appeal in Rv Crampton that the mere 
holding of an interview at a time when the appellant is withdrawing from the 
symptoms of heroin addiction is something which is done within the meaning of 
Section 76(2). Yet still it might be argued that interrogating people who are 
withdrawing from drugs is "something done" to the vulnerable suspect. It can be 
argued that interrogating people who are obviously in a drug withdrawal state is likely 
in the long term to lead to many unreliable confessions being made from those kinds 
of suspects and that, therefore the police should be deterred by S. 76 2(b) from 
engaging in such a practice. However, as Stuart-Smith in Rv Crampton pointed outý 
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"Ibe mere fact that someone is withdrawing, and may have 
a motive for making a confession, does not mean the 
confession is necessarily Lmreliable. " (33) 
report of a Home Office medical working group has commented, 
"Many confessions given in withdrawal states are reliable.. " 
and conunented also that 
... symptoms and signs of mild opiate withdrawal may be 
no barrier to interview whereas severe withdrawal may 
render an addict unfit to be interviewed. " (34) 
This medical opinion seems to be in accord with judicial doctrine on the subject. In R 
v Rennie (1982) Lord Lane L. J. commented that a reliable confession is often made 
for a variety of motives, including remorse and a desire to terminate the interrogation 
early. Lord Lane C. J. commented in'Rennie, 
"Very few confessions are inspired solely by remorse. 
Often the motives are mixed and include a hope that an 
early admission may lead to an earlier release ... if it 
were the law that the mere presence of such a motive ... led inexorably to the exclusion of a confession, nearly 
every confession would be rendered inadmissible. " (35) 
Interestingly, this dictum seems to find some support in empirical research by I 
Gudjonsson and Bownes into "The Reasons why Suspects Confess during Custodial 
Interrogation: data from Northern Ireland". (36) They conclude after a survey of 
offenders who confessed, that most suspects confess due to more than one single 
facilitative factor, 
"The three facilitative factors, External Pressure (such 
as police persuasion and fear of confinement), Internal 
Pressure (an internal need to tell the police about their 
criminal deed) and proof (the perception of proof where 
the subject believes there is no point in denying the 
allegation as the police will eventually prove his involve- 
ment) were in varying degrees endorsed by all subjects 
which indicates that suspects confess to the police for a 
variety of reasons rather than for any one reason. 
However, for any given suspect one group of factors is 
likely to predominate. " 
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It is however, the suspect's perception of the proof that the police have against him 
which is the most potent cause of the making of confessions. It is for this reason that 
the police may be tempted to lie as in Rv Mason about the state of the evidence 
against the suspect. Indeed, in the notorious case of Rv Heron (37) the police lied to 
Heron about him being seen at the scene of the crime by alleged witnesses. It was 
this factor amongst others that persuaded the trial judge that the interrogation of 
Heron had been "oppressive" and that his confession was therefore inadmissible under 
S. 76 2(a). Gudjonsson has recently documented another dramatic effect of the police 
lying to a suspect about the state of the evidence against him and that is that a 
vulnerable suspect may actually come to believe he has committed an offence. In an 
article entitled "How eagerness to please can result in a false confession", Gudjonsson 
documents (38) an English case where a vulnerable twenty-five year old man who 
was described as someone "who could easily be made to say anything to get away 
from the situation he could not handle", confessed during police interviewing to 
having started a series of fires. The interesting feature of the case is that the 
confession "had the hallmarks of a coerced-internalized false confession". This is a 
false confession where the suspect actually comes to believe the police account that 
the suspect committed the alleged offence. Gudjonsson comments that, 
"T'he case illustrates the process whereby such confessions 
can in certain circumstances occur quite easily with 
psychologically vulnerable individuals. The suspect's 
salient vulnerabilities were: his eagerness to please the 
investigating officers; firm trust in the police and great 
respect for them; lack of confidence in his memory of 
events, and high suggestibility. " 
A crucial feature of the case was that police officers lied to the suspect about alleged 
witnesses seeing him at the scene of the crime. This had an impact in persuading the 
suspect that he must have cornn-litted the offences even though he could not clearly 
remember doing so. Gudjonsson comments, 
"Mr. Jq the suspect, told the author that when he arrived at 
the police station he went into the kitchen area and was 
interviewed there by the police officers; this interview was 
not tape-recorded. The police wanted him to make a 
statement and claiming that they had witnesses to say that 
they had seen him set fire to a caravan. In fact no such 
witnesses existed. 'Me police officers seemed very sure 
of Mr. Js guilt and kept telling him that he had done it on 
drink and that they were there to help him. They said that 
it was not a very serious offence and once he had owned up 
to it he could go home. Mr. J. claims that after a while he 
began to believe the police officers, thinking that he must 
have conm-iitted those offences even though he could not 
remember having done so. " 
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A dangerous consequence of police lies in police interrogation is hereby illustrated. 
Lying by the police is particularly insidious because as the visible symbols of lawful 
authority and as agents of the law, they are presumed to be honest and truth-telling 
individuals. Vulnerable individuals may well take at face value anything the police 
tell them; this fact could well lead to the production of false confessions, as the case 
mentioned above by GudJonsson illustrates. It can be argued that many suspects who 
make a confession may have various motives for doing so, yet it is not clear that 
solely because there may be another explanation for the confession as well as guilt 
that the jury should not be allowed to assess the confession and decide for themselves 
what reason or reasons for the confession the suspect had. A too broad interpretation 
of S. 76 2(b) which only requires the police to interview with propriety a vulnerable 
suspect before the section applies, would take too many confessions away from the 
deliberations of the jury and would be contrary to the intention of Parliament in 
passing S. 76 2(b) (on this point see the chapter on "Reform of the law of confessions" 
Chapter 6). 
If the desire to secure an early release from police custody was induced by something 
said by the police then of course S. 76 2(b) could well apply to rule out any subsequent 
confession as a matter of law. However, where the police do not induce the desire to 
go home early but the desire still exists within the suspect, then S. 76 2(b) has no 
applicability. It should be remembered that the basic doctrine of the law of criminal 
evidence is that the assessment of the credibility of evidence is normally for the jury. 
In Rv Mackenzie Lord Chief Justice Taylor commented, 
"The question whether the circumstances raise doubts as 
to the reliability of any confession is a question of fact. 
It would therefore normally be a matter for the jury to 
decide. " (39) 
Of course, individual vulnerabilities of the suspect can be taken into account in 
deciding the S. 76 2(b) question but it requires also some behaviour from the police 
which is beyond the "mere holding of an interview" with a suspect in accordance with 
the Codes of Practice. In Rv McGovern (1990) even though the actual confession to 
a very serious crime, murder., was admitted by the defence to be true, the Court of 
Appeal excluded the confession under S. 76 2(b), which illustrates very dramatically 
that the focus of the subsection is not on the truth of the actual confession but on the 
reliability of a hypothetical confession obtained by certain unreliability inducing 
police tactics. 'Me facts of ,Rv 
McGovern reveal a mix of suspect vulnerability and 
police misconduct. Both these factors were taken into account by the Court of Appeal 
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in excluding the confession. The suspect was six months pregnant at the time of the 
interrogation, she was of limited intelligence (IQ of 73) and was very emotionally 
distressed at the time of the interrogation. 
The police had wrongfully denied the suspect legal advice, a right she should have 
had under S. 58 of PACE. Farquharson L. J. in the Court of Appeal held, 
"This court is clearly of the view that even if the confession 
given at the first interview was true, as it was later admitted 
to be, it was made in consequence of her being denied 
access to a solicitor and is for that reason in the circumstances 
likely to be unreliable ... We think that if a solicitor had been 
present at the time this mentally backward and emotionally 
upset young woman was being questioned, the interview 
would have been halted on the very basis that her responses 
would be unreliable. " (40) 
Farquharson L. J. made it clear that, 
"... the fact that the confession was in substance true is 
expressly excluded by the Act as being a relevant factor. " (41) 
A combination of individual vulnerabilities and police misconduct can bring S. 76 2(b) 
into play even where the actual confession is true but individual vulnerabilities of a 
suspect does not in itself bring S. 76 2(b) into play, that is clear from Rv Goldenberg 
and Rv Crampton. The focus is not on the objective reliability of the confession, 
rather it is on the conduct of any police officer or another person to whom the 
confession was made. This is not to say that the police officers need to be in "bad 
faith", by what they say or do to the suspect, indeed in Rv Delaney the officers were 
acting in good faith, yet the Court of Appeal said that S. 76 2(b) should have been 
used by the trial judge to exclude a confession where there might have been an 
inducement offered to a suspect of very low I. Q. However, a 'mere interview' held in 
full accordance with PACE and the Codes of Practice is not enough to bring S. 76 2(b) 
into play. Indeed if it did it would introduce a contradiction into the PACE scheme, 
for then perfectly proper police behaviour in interrogation would lead to 
inadmissibility as a matter of law for certain confessions. The discretionary exclusion 
of those same confessions is an altogether different matter, since no contradiction is 
present in arguing that although police behaviour conformed with PACE a confession 
is as a matter of discretion too unreliable to go before a jury. 
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However, the use of a case by case exclusionary discretion for confessions obtained 
by unreliability-inducing interrogation methods would run the risk of allowing into 
the trial too many false confessions because judges as fallible beings would make 
mistakes as to the reliability of a particular confession. 
This perhaps helps to explain why the focus in S. 76 2(b) is on "any confession" and 
that a confession can be excluded "notwithstanding it may be true". This urges the 
judge to be ultra cautious before admitting a confession that may have been obtained 
by unreliability-inducing police methods, hence the judge's focus should be not on 
this actual confession but 'any' confession the suspect may have made as a result of 
those dubious police methods, 'any confession' being a much more stringent test than 
focusing on the actual confession. Perhaps the reason for the hypothetical language is 
that judges are likely to admit fewer false confessions by mistake by applying the 
hypothetical test rather than by focusing on the actual confession and its reliability. 
The main point though, is that only an exclusionary rule of law is capable of 
safeguarding the criminal trial from a type of evidence which has deep flaws in terms 
of its general reliability. Confessions obtained by the use of strong inducements or 
threats or excessive psychological manipulation are likely to be I-ligh-ly unreliable. 
It might be asserted though that the danger to confession reliability posed by certain 
police methods should in principle be one for the jury to assess. However, this is a 
misguided argument. Indeed Professor Birch refers to the danger of the jury not being 
able to properly assess the weight of a confession obtained by dubious police 
methods, 
"Section 76 merits a separate existence because it is 
declaratory of the effects of a particularly common and 
dangerous form of unreliability resulting from things 
said or done in the interrogation process. Common 
because there is always a risk that defendants under 
interrogation might make unreliable statements in order 
to halt the process and dangerous because juries are 
believed to put too much faith in confessions obtained 
under interrogation. " (42) 
(It must be remembered that confessions obtained through interrogation are one of the 
most recurring forms of evidence that appear before the criminal court: so the risks 
inherent in this type of evidence are magnified. ) Professor Birch comments that S. 76 
2(b) reflects these observations, 
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"Thus it is provided that any suspicion of unreliability 
of this nature must lead to exclusion. The strength of 
the fear behind the provision can be seen from the fact 
that the section does not even concern itself with actual 
unreliabidity: the question to be put is a hypothetical 
one concerning the reliability of any confession made 
in those circumstances. " (43) 
It can then be argued that the language of S. 76 2(b) represents sound policy, that is, a 
wish to be ultra cautious with this kind of evidence which is systemically unreliable 
and liable to carry undue weight with the jury if admitted. The problem for this 
interpretation of S. 76 2(b) is that where there is no risk of the actual confession being 
unreliable the confession may still be excluded. 
For example, in Rv McGovern (1990) the defence admitted the confession was true 
yet the Court of Appeal still quashed the conviction because the trial judge had failed 
to apply Section 76 2(b) properly. It is hard to square this decision with the view that 
sees S. 76 2(b) as being an exercise in caution by focusing attention on a hypothetical 
rather than the actual confession. 
A rival interpretation of the underlyin2 theorv of exclusion under Section 76 2(b) 
There is. ) 
however, a rival interpretation of the purposes of S. 76 2(b). A. A. S. 
Zuckennan puts it as follows, 
"It may be said that the legislature was using the 
hypothetical form in order to create a normative test 
rather than a factual one. According to this view the 
aim of the hypothetical phraseology is to encourage 
the court to concentrate its attention on the propriety of 
the standards of interrogation rather than on their effect 
on the particular accused. Thus the judge has to pass 
an evaluative judgement on whether the methods 
adopted by the police are likely in the long run of cases 
to have an adverse effect on the reliability of confession. " 
(44) 
on this view S. 76 2(b) has a deterrent rationale: it aims to influence police behaviour 
in terms of their interrogation tactics by ruling inadmissible any confession, 
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notwithstanding the actual confession may be true, that may have been made as a 
result of unreliability inducing police methods. If the police wish to have confessions 
admitted in evidence then they must on this theory, pay attention to the 
methods/techniques they use in obtaining confessions. 
An example of police tactics which it is desirable to deter is where the police offer 
strong inducements to suspects to make confessions. In Rv Phillim (1987) the Court 
of Appeal considered that when the police told the appellant that if he confessed other 
offences would be "taken into consideration" then the trial judge should have 
excluded the confession under S. 76 2(b). 
It should be noted however, that if the suspect asks the police what will happen if he 
confesses then the police can legitimately inform him that for example other offences 
may be taken into consideration or that for example the police will not oppose bail. 
(This represents a change from common law, where such infon-nation given to the 
suspect by the police might have been considered an inducement and therefore any 
confession subsequently made would have been inadmissible - this was so even where 
the suspect requested the infon-nation from the police. ) This situation is provided for 
by Paragraph 11.3 Code C: 
"No police officer shall indicate except in answer to a 
direct question, what action will be taken on the part of 
the police if the person being interviewed answers questions, 
makes a statement or refuses to do either, then the officer 
may inform the person what action the police propose to 
take in that event provided that action is itself proper and 
warranted. " 
If this is the sequence of events rather than the police prompting the suspect to 
confess by informing him of what will happen if he does not confess, then it is likely 
that S. 76 2(b) has no apphcability. 'Me sequence of events is crucial here and it may 
be that trial judges will insist on a tape recording of the interrogation to resolve any 
conflict between the police version of the sequence of events and the suspect's version 
of the sequence of events. 
There is however, a more straightforward explanation for the hypothetical 
phraseology of S. 76 2(b). Professor C. Tapper has recently stated (45) 
"The legislature realised that simple reference to the 
likelihood of unrehability was likely to be unsatisfactory, ) 
since that would have the contingent disadvantage of forcing 
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the judge to make a preliminary decision on the very issue 
that the jury would have to decide at a later stage. In an 
effort to avoid this consequence the unlikelihood of 
unreliability was insulated from the confession in issue by 
reference to a hypothetical confession made by that accused 
person in those very circumstances, the distinction fortified 
by reference to the possibility of the real confession being 
true despite the hypothetical one being false. 
It is hard to believe that this artifice has had the slightest 
effect on the course of trials, and that judges are studiously 
averting their gaze from the confession before them, and 
instead concentrating on what nýdght have been said falsely, 
however much they believe this one to be true. " 
Tapper's main point is that the decision as to the reliability of the confession has 
traditionally rested with the jury. It would be inconvenient then if at the admissibility 
stage the judge had to decide on precisely the same issue, hence the phraseology of 
S. 76 2(b) which is not focused on the actual confession, rather on a hypothetical one. 
This may or may not explain the phraseology of S. 76 2(b) but what cannot be 
accepted without question is Tapper's remark that the language of S. 76 2(b) has not 
had an effect on the course of trials and that trial judges will focus on the reliability of 
the actual confession and not the reliability of the hypothetical one. In Rv Kenny 
(1994) (46) the trial judge admitted a confession made by a mentally handicapped 
individual who had not been interviewed in the presence of any appropriate adult 
contrary to Code of Practice C. Para. 11.14. The trial judge ruled that despite the 
breach of the Code he was sure beyond reasonable doubt that the admissions were 
reliable and admitted them into evidence. The Court of Appeal quashed the 
conviction on the grounds that the trial judge had not addressed his mind to the right 
question. He considered whether the confession was or was not reliable. What he 
should have done was to consider whether in the circumstances the confession, true 
or not, ) was obtained 
in consequence of anything done which was likely to render any 
confession unreliable, the burden being on the prosecution to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that it was not so obtained. 
If trial judges are, as Tapper suggests, focusing on the actual confession rather than 
the hypothetical confession then, as Rv Kenny illustrates, they are likely to have their 
decisions overturned on appeal. Rv Cox (1991), provides another illustration of 
where a trial judge considered the actual reliability of the confession, admitted the 
confession and then had his decision overturned by the Court of Appeal on the ground 
that it is not actual but potential unreliability that S. 76 2(b) is concerned with. 
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The deterrence/disciplinary theory of excluding evidence is normally associated with 
ensuring that the police comply with standards of behaviour set out in a constitution 
or a code of practice, or to ensure that the police respect private rights (such as the 
right to be free from unlawful search and seizure) by excluding evidence obtained in 
violation of such rights. However, there is no reason why the technique of deterring 
the police through exclusion of evidence should not be attempted to ensure the goal of 
confession reliability. The theory seeks to improve the long term reliability of 
confessions by attempting to influence police behaviour through the exclusion of 
confession evidence. 
Yale Kamisar, writing in the 1960s in the U. S. A. drew attention to two reliability 
standards, one standard focused on the reliability of the actual confession made in the 
light of police tactics; the second standard focuses on a separate issue, the effect of 
police tactics on general confession reliability. Kamisar wrote, 
"First, taking into account the personal characteristics of 
the defendant and his particular powers of resistance, 
did the police methods create too substantial a danger of 
falsity? Second, without regard to the particular defendant, 
are the interrogation methods utilized in this case sufficiently 
likely to cause a significant number of innocent persons to 
falsely confess, that the police should not be permitted to 
proceed in this manner. " (47) 
This second reliability standard asks the question - what is the likelihood objectively 
considered that the interrogation methods employed in this case create a substantial 
risk that a person subjected to them will falsely confess - whether or not this particular 
defendant did? This "deterrent-reliability" interpretation of S. 76 2(b) would certainly 
explain the focus on the hypothetical confession that the suspect may have made 
rather than the actual confession that he did make in that section of PACE. It can also 
explain why a confession should be excluded even if, as in Rv McGove the actual 
confession is true. This is because it is better that a conviction is sacrificed in order to 
deter the police from employing such reliability threatening tactics in the future. Of 
course such a theory raises a host of difficult questions about the technique of using 
the law of evidence to deter the police. For example, "do the police pay attention or 
are they even aware of court decisions? " "Is not acquittal of the guilty, as in 
McGovern too high a price to pay for such a speculative exercise as deterrence? " 
Ilese questions are difficult ones, to which we wiU return later in this thesis. 
However, P. Mirfield has directly questioned the deterrent efficiency of S. 76 2(b) of 
PACE: 
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"Particular decisions under the rule would seem unlikely 
to discourage police practices having a tendency to produce 
unreliable confessions. Such decisions would be specific, 
fact related and available to the police at best only through 
the law reports. Scepticism about deterrent effects seems 
justified here. " (48) 
However, it may be that Mirfield is overstating the case against the deterrent effect of 
S. 76 2(b). It is true that some cases using S. 76 2(b) to rule confessions inadmissible 
have been very specific and fact related, for example in Rv McGovern great stress 
was laid on the fact that the girl was mentally ill and actually physically ill at the time 
of her interrogation; she had been vomiting in her cell as well as being six months 
pregnant. No general lessons for the police about wrongful denial of access to legal 
advice for the suspect could be learnt from Rv McGovern. Tlie case turned on its 
particular facts as much as the denial of legal advice. It may be possible to be more 
optimistic about the deterrent effect of exclusionary rules in confession cases where 
the rules are not "fact related" as in S. 76 2(b) but are clear and general as in, for 
example, the rule on inadmissibility for confessions introduced in the U. S. A. by 
Miranda v Arizona (1966). In that case Warren C. J. laid down precisely and clearly 
what measures the police should take before commencing interrogation, including 
informing the suspect of this privilege against self-incrimination and his right to 
counsel. However, it may be that S. 76 2(b) can also send out effective messages to 
the police about the need to avoid certain interrogative practices. The fact that 
McGovern was "specific and fact related" does not mean that all cases will be so. 
S. 76 2(b) is also applicable to more general techniques that the police are often 
tempted to employ to obtain confessions. There are types of tactics such as offering 
strong inducements to confess or threats to charge or involve members of the suspect's 
family, which need to be deterred as being unconducive to the long term reliability of 
confessions. S. 76 2(b) can be used to send strong signals to the police that these types 
of psychological tactics are likely to result in a confession being excluded. Unlike 
unlawful searches, interrogation is virtually always engaged in with a view to future 
court proceedings and hence interrogation, unlike the exercise of search powers, is 
likely to be more responsive to the deterrent effect of exclusionary rules. 
Oaks (49) who, in his research into the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule on the 
exercise of illegal search and seizures, commented that his great scepticism about the 
deterrent effect of the illegal search and seizure rule, Mapp v Ohio, did not 
necessarily apply to the deterrent'efficiency of exclusionary rules in the context of 
police interrogation and confessions. Police behaviour in interrogation may be open 
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to more influence because the purpose of interrogation is usually to obtain confession 
evidence for use in court. This contrasts with the great variety of reasons why the 
police may conduct a search and seizure operation, reasons which may have nothing 
to do with securing evidence for use in court but may involve a desire to harass 
known criminals or to confiscate certain kinds of contraband or other illegal material. 
However, the deterrent effect of exclusionary rules in the context of the interrogation 
of suspects may be substantially weakened by the phenomenon of the guilty plea 
following a confession in the police station. As this is a major feature of the English 
Criminal Justice System it will inevitably be the case that most interrogations will not 
be reviewable by the courts and hence some policemen may reason that they can risk 
flouting the exclusionary rules in order to obtain a confession. Peter Lawrie in his 
study of Scotland Yard in 1970, commented on this situation, 
of ... a guilty plea pulls down the curtain on all past transactions. There can be no complaints about the arresting officer's 
behaviour and no haggling over the Judges' Rules. " (50) 
Section 76 2(b) does have an application to the particular unusual case where certain 
police tactics threaten the reliability of a confession because of specific vulnerabilities 
in the suspect, but S. 76 2(b) also applies to the general case where, for example, the 
police have offered a powerful incentive to a suspect to confess. If S. 76 2(b) is 
applied correctly by the courts as in Rv Phillips (1987) then the police will be likely 
to receive the general message that the improper use of inducements invites the 
exclusion of a confession. There is a final interpretation of S. 76 2(b) that has to be 
considered, that put forward by A. Stein in an unpublished Ph. D thesis. (51) Stein 
defines it thus, that S. 76 2(b), 
" ... distributes the risks of error surrounding confessions ... the principle of risk-distributive equality requires the courts 
to enforce the general standards of interrogation with rigorous 
consistency irrespective of the effect that a particular non- 
compliance with one of the standards might have had on the 
reliability of a particular confession, elicited from a particular 
suspect. If a confession has been obtained improperly, it 
should be excluded because the non-compliance with the 
standards would unjustifiably aggravate the risks of error 
borne by the defendant if this confession is admitted. " 
on this view, given that certain methods of police interrogation carry great dangers of 
inducing unreliable confessions it would be unfair to allow a confession to be 
admitted in a particular case where those "outlawed" methods were used. The risk of 
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a wrongful conviction by allowing a confession to be admitted, which had been 
obtained by the disapproved of methods, should not be bome by the defendant. 
The risk that his confession is false, even if only sfight, is not a risk he should be 
expected to bear. This is because of his right to equality with the way other suspects 
and their confessions are treated by the courts. 
However, this theory, although it can explain why the focus is not on the actual 
confession rather than the hypothetical confession, it cannot explain the situation 
where there is no risk at all of the actual confession being false and yet S. 76 2(b) can 
still rule it inadmissible - see Rv McGovern on. this important point, where the 
defence conceded that the confession was true, yet the Court of Appeal still invoked 
S. 76 2(b) to quash the conviction. It is by no means clear why "risk distribution" 
principles insist that the confession in McGovern should have been excluded - since 
there was no risk of error. If the point of risk-distribution principles of exclusion is to 
protect an accused person from the judge making a mistake as to whether to admit the 
evidence as reliable, then why insist on exclusion where there is no risk of the 
confession being unreliable, as in Rv McGovern? 
It would seem then that the most plausible interpretation of S. 76 2(b) is the 
deterrence-reliability principle which seeks to influence police interrogation tactics by 
excluding confessions where unreliability-inducing tactics have been used to obtain 
the confession, and this goal is unaffected by whether the actual confession before the 
judge is true, possibly true, or false. 
The Admissibility of Psychological and Psychiatric Evidence on the Section 76 
2(b) issue 
There have been interesting developments concerning the admissibility of 
psychological and psychiatric evidence under Section 76 2(b) of PACE which 
illustrates that the judiciary are well aware of the potential for police interrogation to 
produce unreliable confessions from vulnerable suspects. Indeed it is important to be 
aware of the impact of psychological research upon the judiciary's changi g 
perceptions of police interrogation and its potential for producing false confessions. 
Gudjonsson and Haward commentý (52) 
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"In recent years a significant contribution has been made by 
psychological expertise in detennining the psychological 
vulnerabilities and interrogative circunistances which render 
a confession potentially invalid. " 
This research has impacted upon the judiciary. As Sigurdsson and GudJonsson 
commented in 1996: 
"During the past decade there has been increased 
recognition among the judiciary that wrong convictions 
may result from false confession and psychological 
vulnerability. Corre, a solicitor and a stipendiary 
magistrate, argues that much of the change in recognition 
among the judiciary is due to important psychological 
work in this area during the past decade. " (53) 
In the case of John Roberts jailed in 1983 for the murder of Daniel Sands (The Times, 
Friday March 20th, 1998) the conviction was overturned after psychometric tests 
showed Roberts was vulnerable to making false confessions and had been denied 
proper access to a solicitor during his interviews. In judgement Lord Justice Henry 
commented, 
"Medical science and the law have moved a long way 
since 1982. We hope that the safeguards now in place 
will prevent others becoming victims of similar mis- 
carriages of justice. " (54) 
Lord Justice Henry also said the situation had been changed by the development of 
psychometric tests which the medical profession and latterly the courts, accepted as 
capable of providing a measure of suggestibility. 
As Gudjonsson and Haward commený " .. of ftindamental significance" (55) with 
regard to the increased receptive attitude of the courts towards psychological evidence 
in confession cases was the case of Raghip. This case was reported as Rv Silcott and 
others (56) and concerned the conviction for murder of three males for the brutal 
murder of P. C. Blakelock during the Tottenham riots of 1985. In Raghip's appeal the 
psychological evidence consisted of demonstrating Raghip's borderline I. Q. (full scale 
I. Q. of 74) and his abnormal personality traits (high suggestibility and compliance) 
which were considered to undermine the reliability of his confession to the police. 
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The judges My accepted the psychological findings and Raghip's conviction was 
quashed. In Raghip the Court of Appeal held that the circumstances to be considered 
by a trial judge when hearing submissions under Section 76 2(b) of PACE as to the 
admissibility of a confession include the mental condition of the defendant at the time 
the confession was made and that the decision is to be taken on medical evidence 
rather than the trial judge's assessment of the defendant in interview. The accused's 
mental state during the relevant interview is "one of the circumstances existing at the 
time" which Section 76 2(b) of PACE requires to be taken into account in deciding on 
the reliability of any confession that the accused might have made in consequence of 
anything said or done. 
The rule in Rv Turner (57) stated by Lawton L. J. has been an impediment to the 
reception of psychological and psychiatric evidence: 
"An expert's opinion is admissible to furnish the court with 
scientific information which is likely to be outside the 
experience and knowledge of a judge or jury. If on the 
proven facts a judge or jury can form their own conclusions 
without help, then the opinion of an expert is unnecessary. " 
However, with regard to confessions the courts seem to be moving away from the 
straitjacket imposed by Rv Turner. Yet caution is needed bere, as Mirfield points out 
(58) 
" ... it is clear from Rv Heaton (59) that where the accused's 
general I. Q. is in the dull/normal range, even though the 
expert will say that the accused is very suggestible, it will 
be extremely difficult to persuade a court that either the 
judge or the jury will find the expert's evidence helpful 
enough for it to be ruled admissible. " 
However, just because a defendant's I. Q. is not below an arbitrary cut off point as 
defined in Rv Masih (60), then Rv Raghip established that psychological evidence 
will be admissible if the accused's I. Q. is in the borderline mental defective range. R 
v Ward (61) follows Rv Raghilp in enlarging the scope for the admissibility of 
psychiatric or psychological evidence in relation to the truthfulness of a confession: 
" ... the expert evidence of a psychiatrist or psychologist 
may properly be admitted if it is to the effect that a 
defendant is suffering from a condition not properly 
described as mental illness,, but from a personality disorder 
so severe as to properly be categorised as mental disorder. " 
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Another caveat should be made here. Although the mental state of the defendant at 
the time when the confession was made is clearly an important factor in establishing a 
risk that any confession may be unreliable under Section 76 2(b) that mental condition 
can only vitiate a confession if something has been said or done by the police to bring 
that condition into play. Cases such as Rv Goldenberg and Rv Crampton make it 
clear that mere vulnerability in the suspect and complete propriety by the police in 
interviewing will not bring Section 76 2(b) into play. The "thing done" which will 
usually bring Section 76 2(b) into play in the context of psychological or psychiatric 
vulnerabilities of the suspect will be the failure to secure the attendance of an 
appropriate adult as required by Code C 11.4: e. g. see Rv Everett (62) Wrongful 
denial of legal advice as in Rv McGovern may also bring Section 76 2(b) into play. 
However, where Section 76 2(b) does come into play the criminal courts have shown 
an increased understanding of the importance of psychological and psychiatric 
expertise in allowing the judge to come to a proper understanding of the dangers in 
confessions from certain vulnerable suspects. 
105 
Footnotes to Chapter 3 
The Creditworthiness of Confessions 
Wigmore on Evidence, Volume IIL p. 306. Chadbourn Revision 1970. 
For an accoLmt of Bentham's views on evidence see W. Twining, "'I"heories of 
Evidence: Bentham and Wigmore" 1985 at pp. 19-108. 
(2) See Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
(3) D. Wolchover and A. Heaton Armstrong "Confession Evidence" 1996, p. 65. 
(4) Criminal Law Revision Committee. 1 1th Report. 1972, p. 35 at paragraph 55. 
(5) A McConville, A. Sanders, R. Leng, "Ile Case for the Prosecution" 1991, 
Chapter 4 pp. 56-79, see especially at p. 76: "Whereas suspects are generally 
keen to proclaim their innocence and endeavour to furnish evidence in support 
of their claim, these attempts are routinely rebuffed by the police. For the 
interviewing officer the suspect is presumptively guilty and the purpose of the 
interview is to produce a confession. Lines of defence raised by the suspect 
are irrelevant red-hen-ings to be ignored or argued away. To show interest in 
the story which the suspect wishes to present is to demonstrate weakness of 
resolve in the battle of wills with the suspect. To permit material which 
contradicts guilt into the interview is to build weakness into the case and is the 
antithesis of constructing a case for the prosecution. " 
(6) J. Baldwin, "Police Interview Techniques: Establishing Truth or Proof? " 
(1993) Vol. 33. The British Journal of Criminology, p. 325 at pp. 350-351: 
"Interrogations are conducted with an eye to the possibility of any subsequent 
trial. In that sense their importance is concemed as much with what might be 
claimed later in court as with the circumstances of what happened in the 
original incident. " 
(7) G. Gudjonsson "The Psychology of Interrogations, Confessions and 
Testimony" 1992, Chapters 6 and 7, pp. 101-163. The basic idea of the 
concept of interrogative suggestibility is that certain people have a 
psychological make-up conducive to the uncritical acceptance of suggestions 
made to them by the police. Gudjonsson defines interrogative suggestibility 
as, " ... the extent to which, within a closed social 
interaction, people come to 
accept messages communicated during formal questioning, as the result of 
which their subsequent behavioural. response is affected", at p. 115 of "The 
Psychology of Interrogations, Confessions and Testimony", 1992. 
Other pertinent psychological vulnerabilities to the emergence of a false 
confession apart from suggestibility are: 
(1) learning disabilities 
(2) compliance 
(3) confabulation 
(4) acquiescence 
(5) anxiety states 
(6) major mental illnesses such as schizophrenia and severe depression 
(7) drug and alcohol intoxication and withdrawal states. 
(8) Barry Irving, quoted in Ronan Bennett "Double Jeopardy: The Retrial of the 
Guildford Four" 1993, at p. 45. 
106 
(9) Alastair Logan on Annstrong quoted in Ronan Bennett, "Double Jeopardy: 
Ile Retrial of the Guildford Four" 1993 at p. 45. 
(10) G. Gudjonsson, J. MacKeith, "A Proven case of False Confession: 
Psychological Aspects of the Coerced-Compliant Type", (1990) Vol. 30 
Journal of Science, Medicine and the Law, p. 329. 
1) ibid at P. 334. 
(12) G. Gudjonsson, "The Psychology of Interrogations, Confessions and 
Testimony" 1992, at p. 226 and also see pp. 226-227 for an account of the 
various reasons why an individual might make such a confession. Gudjonsson 
comments, "It is now known how often voluntary false confessions occur or 
how easily they are recognized by police officers". 
(13) Rv Lambe (1791) 2 Leach C. C. 552 (per Grose J. ) 
(14) See on the Lindbergh baby case S. A Kassin and L. S. Wrightsman 
"Confession Evidence" in "The Psychology of Evidence and Trial Procedure" 
edited by S. A Kassin and L. S. Wrightsman 1985, p. 67 at p. 76. 
(15) Professor Keith Simpson "Forty Years of Murder: An Autobiography" 1980, 
at p. 208. 
(16) G. Gudjonsson, "The Psychology of Interrogations, Confessions and 
Testimony" 1992 at p. 227. For further case studies of false confessions 
although drawn from the Dutch legal system see "Anchored Narratives: The 
Psychology of Criminal Evidence" 1993, by W. Wagenaar, P. J. Van Koppen 
and H. Crombaag at pp. 99-110. 
(17) G. Gudjonsson "The Psychology of Interrogations, Confessions and 
Testimony" 1992 at p... -, - '259. 227 and 
G. Guqjonsson "The Psychology of Interrogations, Confessions and 
Testimony" 1992 at pp. 226-228. 
ibid at p. 2'91-8. 
(20) Rv McGovem (1991) 92 Cr. App. R. 228. 
(21) Criminal Law Revision Committee Eleventh Report 1972, at paragraph 65 at 
pp. 43-44. 
(22) Rv Brine [ 1992] Crim. L. R. 12'. gl.. 
(23) Rv Mackenzie (1993) 96 Cr. App. R. 98. 
(24) Michael Mansfield Q. C. "Presumed Guilty" 1993 at p. 94. 
(25) S. Kassin and L. Wrightsman "Confessions in the Courtroom" 1993 at p. 140. 
The authors comment at p. 3: "Mock jurors are more influenced by testimony 
about a confession than by an eye-witness's identification". 
(26) W. Twining "Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays" 1990 at p. 3. 
(27) C. Walker, "Forensic Evidence and Terrorist Cases" [ 1995] Cambridge Law 
Journal, P-69. 
107 
(28) Dickson, quoted in David Griffiths "Confessions", Scottish Criminal Law and 
Practice Series 1994, p. 128. 
(29) Fenton Bresler, "Lord Goddard" 1977 at p. 202. 
(30) Kent Greenawalt, "Perspectives on the Right to Silence", p. 235 at p. 264 in 
"Crime, Criminology and Public Policy" edited by Roger Hood, 1974. 
(31) Rv Goldenberg (1989) 88 Cr. App. R. 285. 
Rv Crampton (1991) 92 Cr. App. R. 369. 
(32) D. Birch, "The PACE Hots Up, Confessions and Confusions under the 1984 
Act" [ 1989] Criminal Law Review 95 at p. 113. 
(33) Rv Crampton (1991) 92 Cr. App. R. 369 at p. 374. 
(34) Report of a Medical Working Group, "Substance Misuse, Detainees in Police 
Custody: Guidelines for Clinical Management", Department of Health 1994, 
H. M. S. O. pp. 12-13. 
(35) Rv Rennie [1982] 1 All ER 385. In this case a possible motive for the 
confession was to protect members of his family from police inquiry but as 
Lord Lane commented, "Even if it were the fact that the appellant had decided 
to admit his guilt because he hoped that if he did so the police would cease 
their enquiries into the part played by his mother., it does not follow that the 
confession should have been excluded". 
If the police had expressly held out the promise that they would not investigate 
the suspect's mother if he confessed then the confession would likely to be 
excluded under the old common law and also under Section 76.2(b) of PACE. 
However, as Lord Lane commented, "In some cases the hope may be self- 
generated. If so it is irrelevant even if it provides the dominant motive for 
making the confession. In such a case the confession will not have been 
obtained by anything said or done by a person in authority ... There are 
few 
prisoners who are being firmly but fairly questioned in a police station to 
whom it does not occur that they might be able to bring both their 
interrogation and their detention to an earlier end by confession". 
(36) G. Gudjonsson, 1. Bownes, "The Reasons why suspects confess during 
custodial interrogation: data from Northern Ireland", 1992, Vol. 32, Medicine, 
Science and the Law, p. 204. 
See also: "Police Interviewing and Psychological Vulnerabilities: Predicting 
the Likelihood of a Confession", Gudjonsson, Pearce, Clare and Rutter. 
Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 8 pp. 1-21,1998: 
"The paper is concerned with examining the differences between people who 
confess and those who deny offences during a police interview. Suspects were 
more likely to confess if they reported having consumed an illicit (non- 
prescribed) drug in the previous 24 hour period and less likely to confess when 
interviewed in the presence of a legal advisor or if they had experience of 
prison or custodial remand. In this study younger suspects were also more 
likely to confess. Further examination reveals that nearly 60% of those that 
confessed were aged 25 years or under compared with more than 50% of the 
deniers who were aged over 25 years. Tbe results suggest that the odds of a 
suspect making a confession are more than three times greater if the suspect 
has reported using an illicit drug within the 24 hour period prior to arrest 
compared with a suspect who claimed he or she had not taken such a 
substance. According to this model the odds of a suspect not making a 
confession are four times greater for a suspect who has a legal adviser present 
compared with a suspect who does not have a legal adviser in the interview. 
108 
'Ibe model also predicts that a suspect with experience of prison or custodial 
remand has twice the odds of not making a confession compared with the 
suspect who has no such experience. 'Ibe model suggests that what needs to 
be considered is experience of custody on remand or following conviction 
rather than convictions per se. It may be that the application of "custodial 
experience" to other studies would resolve the conflicting reports of the effects 
of conviction on confession. In the majority of cases, personal experience of a 
period of incarceration will serve to reinforce the long term consequences of 
making a confession especially in serious cases". 
(37) Rv Heron, 22nd November 1993, The Times. 
(38) G. Gudjonsson. "I'll help you boys as much as I can: how eagerness to 
please can result in a false confession" (1993) The Journal of Forensic 
Psychiatry, Vol. 6, No.. 2. p. 333. 
(39) Rv Mackenzie (1993) 96 Cr. App. R. p. 98 at p. 108. 
(40) Rv McGovem (1991) 92 Cr. App. R. p. 228 at p. 233. 
ibid. 
(42) D. Birch "The PACE Hots Up... " [ 1989] Criminal Law Review, p. 95 at p. 111. 
(43) ibid, at p. I 11. 
(44) A. A. S. Zuckerman "The Principles of Criminal Evidence" 1989 at p. p. 336- 
337. 
(45) C. Tapper, "Trends and Techniques in the Law of Evidence", in "Criminal 
Justice and Human Rights" edited by Peter Birks, Oxford 1995, p. 13 at p. 33. 
(46) RvKemy[1994]Crim. L. R. 284. 
Rv Cox [ 1991 ] Crim. L. R. 276. 
(47) Yale Kamisar, "What is an Involuntary Confession", (1963) Vol. 17, Rutgers 
Law Review, p. 728 at p. 755. 
(48) P. Mirfield, "Ibe Future of the Law of Confessions" [ 1984] Criminal Law 
Review, pp. 70-71. 
(49) D. Oaks, "Studying the exclusionary rule in search and seizure" (1970) 37, 
The University of Chicago Law Review, 665. 
The reference for Mapp v Ohio is 367 US 643 (1961). 
(50) P. Lawrie, "Scotland Yard: A Study of the Metropolitan Police" 1970, p. 219. 
(51) A. Stein, "The Law of Evidence and the Problem of Risk-Distribution", Ph. D. 
University of London 1990. 
(52) G. Gudjonsson and L. Haward "Forensic Psychology: A Guide to Practice" 
1998 at p. 176. 
(53) J. Sigurdsson and G. Gudjonsson "The Psychological Characteristics of 'False 
Confessors': A Study among Icelandic Prison Inmates and Juvenile 
Offenders" (1996) Vol. 20 Personality and Individual Differences, p. 321 at 
p. 321. 
109 
(54) I'he Times, Friday March 20th 1998. 
(55) G. Gudjonsson and L. Haward "Forensic Psychology: A Guide to Practice" 
1998 at p. 170. 
(56) Rv Silcott and others (1991), The Independent, 6 December 1992. 
(57) Rv Tumer [1975] Q. B. 834 at 841 C. A. 
(58) P. Mirfield "Silence, Confessions and Improperly Obtained Evidence" 1997 at 
p. 302. 
(59) Rv Heaton [1993] Crim. L. R. 593. 
(60) Rv Masih [1986] Crim. L. R. 395. The accused had a borderline I. Q. of 72 and 
was therefore a borderline mental defective. Had his I. Q. score been four 
points lower he would have been classed as mentally defective and expert 
evidence would have been admissible. 
(61) Rv Ward [1993] 1 WLR 619at690. 
(62) Rv Everett [1988] Crim. LR. 826. 
110 
CHAPTER 4 
THE AUTHENTICITY OF CONFESSIONS 
Introduction 
This chapter will look at the authenticity of confessions issue. There will be a brief 
outline of what the issue involves, followed by a history of the issue up to PACE. 
Then there will be a discussion of the PACE recording regime itself and the response 
of the courts to police breach of that scheme. This will be followed by a discussion of 
how the authenticity issue has impacted on the prosecution duty to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that a confession has not been obtained in a way proscribed by 
Section 76 2(b) of PACE. Then there will be a discussion of the consequences of the 
tape recording requirement. This will lead on to a discussion of the lacunae in the 
current regime, namely off the record interactions between suspect and the police and 
informal confessions. 
It is ironical that for so long the law of criminal evidence attended to the 
creditworthiness of confessions in the shape of the voluntariness rule (although the 
voluntariness rule was far from being a complete test on the creditworthiness 
question, focusing as it did merely on certain methods of obtaining confessions) but 
largely ignored the question of the authenticity of the confession as raising an 
admissibility issue. The irony is as follows, authenticity is the most fundamental of 
all the issues surrounding confession evidence. It is fundamental because questions of 
the creditworthiness or the legitimacy of confessions do not become pertinent unless 
it is assumed that the confession was in fact made. As David Griffiths has put it in a 
study of the law of confessions in Scotland (1) 
"Unless the issue of 'verballing', actual or perceived, is 
tackled there is probably little point in worrying about 
issues such as fairness or corroboration. " 
English law has approached this problem in the past by the judge assw-ning that the 
confession was made and then detennining the question of the confession's 
voluntariness as an issue of admissibility. It was for the jury to determine the issue of 
whether in fact the confession was made or not, an issue of fact like any other fact the 
jury was entrusted to determine. Only at the extreme margin would the issue of 
whether the confession was made become a question of the admissibility of the 
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confession as Mirfield makes clear by reference to the unusual case of Rv Roberts 
(1953) (2) where because the defendant was shown to be mute he could not have 
made his alleged oral confession. The orthodox view is, as Mirfield points out, that 
the 
... prosecution need not do more than adduce pfima facie evidence of the making of the confession... " (3) 
for it to be admitted to trial on that issue. Lord Bridge in the Privy Council case of 
Ajodha v The State (1982) (4) referred to the situation where the defence is an 
absolute denial of the prosecution evidence of a confession, 
"In this situation no issue as to voluntariness can arise 
and hence no question of admissibility falls for the judge's 
decision. The issue of fact whether or not the statement 
was made by the accused is purely for the jury. " 
The aim here will be for defence counsel to convince the jury or justices that the 
prosecution witnesses, usually the police, have made up the story of the confession. 
The History of the Authenticitv Issue up to PACE 
It must not be assumed from the above that the issue of the authenticity of confession 
evidence has not been a serious source of concem to commentators and jurists at 
different periods of English legal history. Reference has been made earlier to the 
politically charged accusations and denials of "verballing" by the police in the 1970s, 
a debate which informed much of the RCCP's determination to provide a system of 
documentation of the suspect's period in police custody. Yet concern with the issue of 
authenticity of confessions can be found at much earlier periods of history than the 
1970s. There was concern over this issue at the very time that the exclusionary rule 
was being fonnulated and promulgated in the late eighteenth century. Wigmore in 
"Wigmore on Evidence" sets himself to explain why jurists have exhibited such 
widely differing opinions on the evidential value of confessions. He resolves the 
puzzle by pointing to the distinction between the issue of the authenticity of a 
confession and the issue of the confession as evidence in itself. This explains why, 
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"On the one hand we find writers and judges of wide 
experience affmning the slender value of confessions 
and urging the greatest caution in their use ... on the 
other hand, we find persons of equal authority offering, 
in equally positive and unqualified language, that 
confessions are the highest kind of evidence. " (5) 
As Wigmore points out, this conflict over the value of confessional evidence even 
manifested itself in the opinions of the same jurist, for example Sir William Scott in 
Williams v Williams (1798) said, 
"T'he court must remember that confession is a species of 
evidence which though not inadmissible, is regarded with 
great distrust. " 
Sir William said in contrast, in the case of Mortimer v Mortimer (1820 
I need not observe that confession generally ranks 
high, or I should say highest, in the scale of evidence. " 
According to Wigmore the writers who doubted the evidential value of confessions 
ff ... were thinking not of the confession as evidence of the act, but of the testimony to the alleged confession. " (6) 
As Erle J. stated in Rv Baldry (1852), 
"I am of opinion that when a confession is well proved 
it is the best evidence that can be produced. " 
This concern with the authenticity of confession was linked to the kind of witness 
relied upon to testify to a confession in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, as Wigmore pointed out, these witnesses to alleged confessions often were, 
"Paid informers, treacherous associates, angry victims 
and over-zealous officers of the law - these are the persons 
through whom an alleged confession is oftenest 
presented. " (7) 
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Wigmore himself must have been sufficiently impressed by the problem of the 
authenticity of the confession to make lack of authenticity a bar on the free 
admissibility of confession evidence. 
"The policy then should be to receive all well-proved 
confessions in evidence and to leave them to the jury, 
subject to all discrediting circumstances, to receive 
such weight as may seem proper. " 
The Scottish jurist Dickson was also alert to the great dangers of inauthentic 
confessions when he wrote in 1887 that, 
"Evidence of oral admissions is also easily fabricated, 
and the chance of detecting its untruth is small; for when 
all a witness speaks to is an independent statement his 
falsehood is almost beyond the reach of cross-examination 
and is seldom contradictory to the proved circumstances 
attending the crime. " (8) 
For the modem context the point can also be made that when it is a policeman who 
attests to the making of an alleged confession the problem of assessing his evidence is 
particularly acute since the mantle of legitimacy his office gives him makes the 
reliability of his testimony of the confession difficult for the jury to assess correctly. 
Police testimony is normally assumed to be truthful in a liberal democratic state, 
given the general assumption that officers of the state will perfoml their duties 
competently and honestly. This is what makes police perjury particularly dangerous 
and difficult to detect. In the Canadian context, Mr. Justice Morand in his Report on 
Metropolitan Toronto Police Practices, has remarked on the phenomenon of general 
trust in the reliability of police testimony and the reasons for that trust, 
"To a very large extent in criminal cases ... the proof of 
the facts depends upon evidence given by the police. 
There is a natural tendency among judges as among the 
public generally, to accept the sworn testimony of a 
police officer particularly when it contradicts the words 
of a person whose credibility is suspect by the very 
reason of his involvement with the law. " (9) 
However, it is not clear that a concern with the authenticity of confessions actually 
influenced the development and application of the exclusionary "voluntariness" rule 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, although Wigmore ambiguously 
remarks, 
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"Tbe moral is that the proper course lies, not in 
distorting the legitimate principles of confession law 
but in exacting more in the way of quantity and 
quality of the testimony by which alleged confessions 
are presented. " (10) 
However, a plausible case can be made out for arguing that in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century a confession was excluded in a reported case partly because of a 
distrust of police evidence of the alleged confession of the accused. In Ibrahim v R. 
Lord Sumner entered into a discussion of the conflicting authorities on the 
admissibility of confessions obtained by questioning of suspects in police custody. 
Lord Sumner remarked, 
"Cave J. in Rv Male (1893) rejected a statement made 
by a prisoner in custody to a constable who had cross- 
examined him, saying merely that the police have no 
right to manufacture evidence ... " (11) 
This interpretation of Rv Male suggests that distrust of police evidence of the 
confession may have played a part in the decision. In Rv Male Cave J. excluded a 
confession obtained by questioning a person in custody on the ground of the tý 
impermissibility of this course of conduct per se, for as Cave J. said of the policeman 
who has a prisoner in custody, 
"Under these circumstances, a policeman should keep his 
mouth shut and his ears open. " (12) 
This reflected a general judicial and official dislike of the practice of police 
questioning of those in their custody at the time. It must be remembered that it was 
not until 1898 that a defendant was made competent to give evidence on his own 
behalf. Therefore,, some nineteenth century judges may have taken the view that since 
no questioning of the accused was allowed at trial then this prohibition should extend 
to pre trial police questioning of a suspect in custody. Certainly the remarks of Cave 
J. in Rv Male 
' 
imply this connection between the prohibition on cross examination of 
the accused at trial and disallowing any cross examination of the suspect before trial 
by the police. Cave J. commented, 
"The law does not allow the judge or the jury to put 
questions in open court to prisoners; and it would be 
monstrous if the law permitted a police officer to go 
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without anyone being present to see how the matter 
was conducted and put a prisoner through an examination 
and then produce the effects of that examination against 
him. " 
However, it is possible that Lord Sunmer was right and that a fear of police 
manufactured evidence of a confession might have played a part in Cave J. 's 
approach. This analysis is supported by the remarks of Cave J. in the 1893 case of R 
v Thompson (13). Cave J. said obiter 
"I would add that for my part I always suspect these 
confessions, which are supposed to be the offspring 
of penitence and remorse, and which nevertheless 
are repudiated by the prisoner at the trial. It is 
remarkable that it is of very rare occurrence for 
evidence of a confession to be given when the proof 
of the prisoner's guilt is otherwise clear and satisfactory; 
but when it is not clear and satisfactory the prisoner 
is not infrequently alleged to have been seized with the 
desire born of penitence and remorse to supplement it 
with a confession, a desire which vanishes as soon as 
he appears in a court of justice. " 
That case was actually decided on the basis that it was not proved satisfactorily that 
the confession was voluntary but this remark of Cave J. is some evidence of a judicial 
unease with police evidence of the making of confessions, the same unease which was 
to reappear nearly a hundred years later in the post PACE cases Rv Keenan (1989), R 
v Canale (1991) and similar cases. There is not much evidence of judicial distrust of 
police evidence of the making of a confession in the period between the end of the 
nineteenth century and the modem judicial scepticism about police evidence of 
confessions in the post PACE cases quoted above. One reason for this is that 
questions as to the authenticity of a confession were treated as questions going to the 
weight of the alleged confession before the jury. The authenticity of a confession was 
not considered to be a judicial issue at all. 
There is however, a decision of the Court of Appeal quashing a conviction in 
December 1973 which manifests a distrust of the police evidence of the making of a 
confession, Rv Pattinson. (14) The judgement was given by Lawton L. J. The 
accused was charged with robbery. The case for the prosecution substantially rested 
on an alleged oral confession by P. Two police officers who were supervising him 
whilst he was shaving gave evidence of a disjointed statement containing admissions 
and lasting about twenty minutes. They had made no note at the time but made a note 
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purporting to record the statement about one and a half hours later. As Lawton L. J. 
commented, 
"It was a remarkable feat of memory on the part of these 
two police officers to have got down that disjointed 
statement. " (15) 
Moreover there was very little other evidence against the accused. 
"In these very unusual circumstances luck seems to have 
been on the side of the prosecution because they were 
suddenly presented with evidence, which if true and 
reliable, accounted to a confession of guilt. " (16) 
Lawton L. J. then commented, 
"T'his is not the first time in the history of the administration 
of justice in this country that police officers have arrested 
a man and then shortly before he was due to appear in 
court he has of his own volition supplied the evidence which 
was singularly lacking against him until that moment. " 
The judgement then quotes the remarks of Cave J. in Rv Thompson about the 
possibility of police fabricating an oral confession in order to provide the prosecution 
with some evidence to prosecute the case, having referred to the comment of Cave J., 
Lawton L. J. in Rv Pattinson, remarks "that is tl-iis case". The conviction is quashed 
with Lawton L. J. remarking 
" ... this court is gravely concerned about the state of the 
evidence in this case ... we do not like this kind of evidence. " 
Rv Pattinson is significant in cautioning against any glib assertions that post war and 
pre PACE the senior judiciary would not countenance the possibility of deliberate 
police manufacture of evidence and perjury. Rv Pattinson shows a Court of Appeal 
pre PACE alert to the possibility of manufactured police evidence. Lawton L. J. it will 
be remembered, was a member of the CLRC who in 1972 recommended the taping of 
police interrogations as an experimental measure to combat police manufacturing of 
confession evidence. 
1 17 
There are also the significant remarks of Lawton L. J. in the 1975 case of Rv Turner 
(17) where reference is made in the judgement to the practice of defence counsel 
challenging the credibility of the police witnesses giving evidence about oral 
confessions. Lawton L. J. comments that this. ) 
it ... almost always happens in this class of case at the Central Criminal Court but not so commonly on circuit. " 
Lawton L. J. then comments that this evidence by the police of alleged oral admissions 
is "usually" true but 
it ", if the evidence of such oral admissions is untrue 
as regrettably it sometimes is, defendants are unjustly 
and unfairly put at risk. In our judgement something 
should be done and as quickly as possible to make 
evidence about oral statements difficult either to 
challenge or to concoct. " 
Tbis comment clearly has a resonance in the light of Hodgson J. 's comments in Rv 
Keenan that the recording provisions of PACE are there to protect the suspect from 
having oral confessions falsely attributed to him and also protects the police from 
unjustified allegations of manufacturing confession evidence and that therefore the 
recording provisions of PACE need to be supported by the likely exclusion of a 
confession where the police have significantly breached the recording provisions. 
The above analysis does not suggest that unease about the authenticity of extra 
judicial confessions actually influenced the "voluntariness" exclusionary rule or 
generated a policy of exclusion in itself, rather it is argued that this unease may have 
played a part in fom-ling that strand of judicial decisions in the late nineteenth century 
which tended to exclude confessions obtained by the police from the questioning of 
persons in custody. This judicial strand was, as is known from Lord Sumner's 
judgement in Ibrahim, opposed by another line of decisions which admitted 
confessions obtained by police questioning of those in their custody - as Lord Sumner 
said, 
"The English Law is still unsettled, strange as it may seem, 
since the point is one that constantly occurs in criminal 
trials. Many judges, in their discretion, exclude such 
evidence., for they fear that nothing less than the exclusion 
of all such statements can prevent improper questioning 
of prisoners by removing the inducement to resort to it. (18) 
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It may also be that a fear of police manufacturing of confession evidence bolstered 
this prejudice against the admissibihty of confessions obtained by police questioning 
of those in their custody. 
However, the orthodox view, as stated by Lord Bridge in Aiodha v State (1982) was 
that the question of the authenticity of a confession went to the weight of the evidence 
with the jury. The jury was assumed to be competent to assess accurately the weight 
to be given to the confession in the light of doubts about its authenticity. A contrast 
can be made with the problem of assessing a confession which may have been 
obtained by a threat or inducement. In this situation the jury were not trusted to carry 
out the "weighting" exercise correctly. As the Criminal Law Revision Comn-tittee 
(1972) pointed out, 
"... that although in most cases the jury would be able to 
assess the weight to be given to an induced confession, there 
is still the danger that, in a case where the strength of the 
evidence on either side is about evenlv balanced, the immediate 
effect on the jury of evidence of a corifession, might be too 
great to be undone, even with the help of the summing up, by 
the evidence of the way in which the confession was obtained. "(19) 
For much of the twentieth century the weighting process for the jury of the issue of 
the authenticity of the confession was fairly unproblematic. The police were 
generally trusted not to fabricate evidence and if a police witness testified that an 
accused had made a confession then that was stron2 if not conclusive evidence that a 
confession had been made, the main issue for the jury being the question of the 
creditworthiness of the confession. Whether jury trust in police evidence was 
sometimes misplaced is a separate question. Some corroboration for this view of jury 
trust in the veracity of police witnesses is provided by Lord Denning in the debates in 
1984 in the House of Lords on the PACE Bill. Lord Denning commented in the 
debate, 
"When I was a young man and I cross-examined a policeman 
and suggested that he was wrong I would lose my case. The 
jury had confidence in the police as we all had, and trusted them. 
How different it is now! Counsel taunt the police all the time; 
they suggest they are framing up the case against them. 
They appeal to the jury making allegations, particularly 
against the police, all the time, destroying the confidence 
of our people in the police. " (20) 
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Whether or not Lord Denning's comments are exaggerated about the contrast between 
the days of his youth and the present day, his Lordship does attest to a considerable 
change in public attitudes to the integrity of the police and hence jury approaches to 
police evidence. Further evidence of this shift, although again of an anecdotal nature, 
is to be found in the remarks of the experienced commentator and practitioner James 
Morton. Morton comments, 
"It should be remembered that until the 1970s evidence given 
by the police to magistrates and juries was almost invariably 
accepted without question. 'Me concept of the fabrication 
of evidence by investigating officers was simply not accepted 
by the courts. " (2 1) 
TI-iis is perhaps something of an exaggeration, for in 1963 Glanville Williams in "The 
Proof of Guilt" commented, 
"Whereas magistrates tend to believe the police officers 
who appear before them regularly and who are generally 
found to speak the truth and perhaps never caught out in a 
lie, though regularly alleged to be lying by defendants who 
are pleading guilty, a jury is readily influenced against 
the police and is slow to convict on police evidence alone. " (22) 
Moreover, Morton's claim that pre 1970's "the concept of the fabrication of evidence 
by investigating officers was simply not accepted by the courts" has to be set against 
official recognition of the practice of police verballing in both the 1929 and 1962 
Royal Commissions on the police. The 1962 Royal Conunission commented at 
paragraph 369, 
"There was a body of evidence, too substantial to disregard, 
which in effect accused the police of stooping to the use of 
undesirable means of obtaining statements and of occasionally 
giving perjured evidence in a court of law ... The National Council for Civil Liberties gave a few examples of cases in 
which the courts had refused to convict, apparently because 
the police evidence was disbelieved or because it was based 
on confessions which were held not to have been voluntary. " (23) 
The 1962 Commission concluded, 
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"Practices of this kind., if they exist (and evidence about 
them is difficult to obtain and substantiate) must be 
unhesitatingly condemned. " (24) 
lbe CLRC in 1972 referred to paragraph 369 of the 1962 Report quoted above and 
commented,, 
"... there is a widespread impression not only among criminals 
that in tough areas a police officer who is certain that he has 
got the right man will invent some oral admission to clinch 
the case. " (25) 
However, despite the occasional siren voices of concern, the general view pre the 
1970s was that the vast majority of police officers did not give perjured evidence. 
Sir Frederick Lawton (26) has written on the subject of fabrication of evidence by the 
police pre 1960s: 
"In a letter to the Times 24 March 199 1, Montague Martin, 
a retired solicitor who had practiced before the metropolitan 
stipendiary magistrates seemed to be suggesting that police 
brutality and the fabrication of evidence had been common 
in the London area and that the magistrates there had been 
indifferent to it. When I practiced before those magistrates 
as a barrister between 1935 and 19611 was often instructed 
that the police had "put on the verbals" and even that my 
client had been assaulted after arrest. My experience was 
usually the same as that of Mr. Martin - rejection of my 
client's evidence. " 
Ibese comments from an extremely experienced former senior judge are most 
revealing. 
Sir Frederick Lawton has also written in a letter to the Times that, 
it ... when I started 
in practice in 1935 ... police evidence then and for some years afterwards, was seldom challenged 
and when it was juries usually accepted it. " (27) 
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The consequence of this was that questions about the authenticity of confessions 
could, it was assumed, be satisfactorily treated as a matter going to the weight of an 
alleged confession and not its admissibility. The jury could assess the weight of the 
alleged confession evidence in the light of the general belief that police officers were 
to be believed. Juries were similarly trusted to assess the weight of the testimony of 
other witnesses such as accomplices, co-defendants etc., subject to the help of the 
judge in terms of corroboration warnings and judicial cautions. 
However, when the veracity of police evidence of alleged confessions became a 
politically charged issue then the "weighting" process became much more problematic 
for it could no longer be assumed that police witnesses were telling the truth. From 
the early 1970s onward the issue of police fabrication of evidence, specifically 
confessions, entered public consciousness as part of the general problem of police 
corruption at that time. 
As the research evidence to the RCCP (198 1) made clear, many criminal trials in the 
1970s became centred upon the "authenticity of the confession" issue with 
unfortunate consequences for the use of court time, the public image of the pohce and 
the potential for the wrongful conviction of the innocent on 'verballed' confessions. 
There was also some scope for the guilty to escape conviction by persuading a jury 
that they were 'verballed'by the police when in fact they had made a confession: 
"The frequency of challenges to the police record of 
interview is said to make it essential to have some sort of 
independently validated record in order in the eyes of some 
to prevent the police from fabricating confessions or damaging 
statements or in the eyes of others, to prevent those who have 
in fact made admission subsequently retracting them. " 
As the RCCP noted, 
"Nearly all challenges to verbal statements were on their 
accuracy, only 2% of them being challenged on their alleged 
voluntariness. With written statements the position was 
reversed, fewer than 10% being challenged for accuracy 
whereas 40% were attacked on their alleged voluntariness. " (28) 
Later in this chapter reference will be made to the revolution that the introduction of 
tape recording for formal interview concerning all indictable offences have made to 
the way in which confession evidence is challenged in court, but stated as succinctly 
as possible, the situation is, as Zander and Henderson (29) state in their recent Crown 
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Court study for the 1993 Royal Commission. 
of... when the interview was tape recorded, challenges were 
very rare. " 
The PACE cases on breach of the "verballinLy" Provisions of PACE 
There is a residual problem with non-tape recorded confessions which do still tend to 
attract chaUenges in a number of cases where that kind of evidence is adduced, but 
given that taped confessional evidence is now the norm it is fair to say that tape 
recording has revolutionized the issue of the "authenticity of the confession", from 
being a central issue in many trials to being an issue in only a small minority of cases. 
It was however., changing public perceptions of the veracity of police evidence in this 
area which stimulated this change. Judges, in their enforcement of the 'verballing' 
provisions of the Codes of Practice, are very much aware of this historical 
background to the new recording rules in PACE and the Codes of Practice and 
therefore take breach of these rules extremely seriously by often excluding under S. 76 
2(b) or S. 78 confession evidence which has not been properly "authenticated" by a 
tape or contemporaneous note. In Rv Hunt (1992) Steyn L. J. (now Lord Steyn) 
commented with regard to Code C, 
"T'he background to those provisions was of course a public 
perception and a legislative intention that the evil of police 
officers falsely attributing incriminating statements to 
persons in custody should be stamped out. " 
The legislative intention has, as we shall see, been undermined by the continuing 
admissibility of informal confessions, although as Roger Leng, a critic of the present 
law, admits, 
"A consequence of PACE is that it would now be virtually 
impossible to fabricate a confession in formal interview 
and have it admitted as evidence. " (30) 
This is because the judges have taken a very strict approach to breaches of the 
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recording provisions in PACE and the Codes. An early signal of judicial intentions 
was sent to the police by Hodgson I in Rv Keenan in the spring of 1989. Hodgson J. 
commented, 
" ... in cases where there has been "significant and 
substantial" breaches of the verballing provisions of the 
code, the evidence so obtained will frequently be 
excluded... " (3 1) 
and in emphasis of this important point Hodgson J. continued on the admissibility of 
admissions, 
" ... if the breaches are significant and substantial we think it makes good sense to exclude them. " 
The 'verballing' provisions now include the requirement to tape record any interview 
at a police station 
... with a person who has been cautioned ... in respect of an indictable offence. " (Code E para 3.1 (a) Revised Edition 10/04/95) 
There is also a requirement with regard to interviews at a police station or not, to 
make 
"... an accurate record of each interview with a person 
suspected of an offence" (11.5 (a) Code C and in 11.10. ) 
"Unless it is impracticable the person interviewed shall be 
given the opportunity to read the interview record and to 
sign it as correct or to indicate the respects in which he 
considers it inaccurate. " 
With regard to unsolicited comments by the suspect, 
"A written record shall also be made of any comments made 
by a suspected person, including unsolicited comments which 
are outside the context of an interview but which might be 
relevant to the offence ... Where practicable the person shall be given the opportunity to read that record and to sign it as 
correct or to indicate the respects in which he considers it 
incorrect. " (para. 11.13) 
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'Me change in attitude to these provisions by the judiciary in contrast to their attitude 
to the old requirement in the Judges' Rules to make a contemporaneous record of the 
interview, predates, as Professor Dennis points out, the revelations of the recent 
miscarriage of justice cases. (32) The leading case of Rv Keenan, in this area, was 
decided in the spring of 1989 whereas the Guildford Four were not released until 
October 1989. Ibe Guildford Four was the first case in the series of revelations of 
rniscarriages of justice; which marked the Criminal Justice System between 1989 and 
1992. 
However, those revelations must have strengthened the trend towards exclusion in 
later cases on the authenticity issue such as Rv Scott (33) (August 1990) C. A. which 
was decided in the middle of the miscarriage of justice revelations of the 1989-1992 
period. Professor Dennis claims the origins of the change in judicial attitudes is 
"obscure" (33b), but at least with regard to the verballing provisions of PACE the 
explanation for changed judicial attitudes is fairly straightforward. The explanation is 
the fraught background of the RCCP Report in 1981 on the question of 'police 
verbal-ling' which informed the 'authentication' scheme set up by PACE in the Codes 
of Practice some years later. In Rv Keenan Hodgson J. directly invoked the history 
of concern with the verbaffing issue to justify his decision to exclude the confession 
which was not properly "authenticated" in that case. 
"These Code provisions are designed to make it difficult 
for a detained person to make unfounded allegations against 
the police which might otherwise appear credible. Second, it 
provides safeguards against the police inaccurately recording 
or inventing the words used in questioning a detained person 
the provisions are designed to make it very much more 
difficult for a defendant to make unfounded allegations that 
he has been "verballed" which appear credible. " (34) 
More directly, Hodgson J. commented later in the case, 
"In cases when the rest of the evidence is weak or non existent, 
that is just the situation where the temptation to do what the 
provisions are aimed to prevent is greatest, and the protection 
of the rules most needed. " (35) 
This comment has a strong echo of the remarks of Lawton L. J. in Rv Pattinson 
(1972) and Cave J. in Rv 17hompson (1893), on the temptations and pressures on 
police officers in certain cases to fabricate confessions. 
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Hodgson J. makes it clear that it is not satisfactory for a trial judge to reason that a 
defendant can contest the police version of events by going into the witness box at 
trial and that therefore it is not necessary to exclude the alleged confession which had 
been obtained in breach of the "verballing" provisions. 
If the recording provisions are not complied with and the defendant is forced to 
contest the authenticity issue at trial then he is placed in the pre PACE era when a 
defendant, especially one with a criminal record, was at a serious disadvantage in 
successfully contesting the police version of events. This was because a successful 
denial of the confession could be mounted only if the accused went into the witness 
box, thereby forfeiting his right to silence in court. Judges deprecate attempts to 
discredit police witnesses' version of events by defence counsel when the accused 
does not go into the witness box - see Rv Callaghan (1979) (36) and in any case the 
jury will be suspicious of such a course of conduct by the defence and are likely to 
disbelieve the defence if the accused does not testify himself. Section 35 of the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 formalises and legitimates the adverse 
inference drawing process of the jury in this type of situation. 
If the accused had a criminal record then the consequences of resolving the 
authenticity issue at trial were and are much more dramatic - by virtue of S. 1f(ii) of 
the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 and by virtue of the interpretation given to that 
section by Rv Britzman (1983) 
' 
(37). If an accused with a criminal record suggests 
on oath that the police made up the confession then it is highly likely that his previous 
convictions will be read out to the jury by prosecution counsel. ýMe fact may inhibit 
the defendant from contesting the confession himself in the witness box. It was 
decided in Rv Britzman that if the accused denied having confessed to the police, the 
implication necessarily being that the police officers lied on oath, the prosecution may 
thereupon cross-examine the accused on his previous convictions. Indeed in 
Britzman the appellant and his counsel were very careful in what they said - they 
merely denied that the conversation had taken place with the police, they did not go 
on to allege that the police offices had fabricated the evidence against them. 
Nevertheless as Lawton L. J. held, 
"A defence to a criminal charge which suggests that 
prosecution witnesses have deliberately made up false 
evidence in order to secure a conviction must involve 
imputations on the characters of those witnesses. " 
with the dramatic consequence that 
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"... juries are entitled to know about the characters of those 
making (the imputations). " (38) 
Lawton L. J. did refer to a discretion to disallow such cross-examination even when 
imputations on prosecution witnesses have been made but such discretion was only to 
be exercised if there is nothing more than a denial of what was said in a short 
interview but that the 
... position would be different however, if there was a denial of evidence of a long period or detailed observation 
extending over hours and ... where there were denials of long conversations. " 
'Me type of convictions which can be revealed to the jury can bear a strong 
resemblance to the offence with which the defendant is charged. The convictions 
need not be for dishonesty offences for them to be revealed to the jury. 
It may be thought that only dishonesty convictions were relevant to the issue of the 
credibility of the accused as a witness. However, as was made clear in Rv Powell 
(1986) (39) the fact that the previous convictions are not for offences involving 
dishonesty does not preclude them from being revealed under S. 1 f(ii). If the offences 
are similar to the charge the defendant faces then it is hard to see how the jury can 
prevent themselves from using those convictions to the issue of the guilt of the 
accused directly. This feature of the law on cross examination must act as a powerful 
disincentive on the accused to challenge police evidence in the witness box. 1he 
Royal Commission in 1993 stated that whereas 83% of defendants with no previous 
convictions gave evidence in Crown Court trials, only 71 % of defendants with 
previous convictions gave evidence: (40) this evidence gathered from its own Crown 
Court study. 
One dramatic and prejudicial result for the accused of the police not complying with 
the verballing provisions was that the "confession issue" would have to be resolved at 
the trial by testimony of the police and by testimony of the accused, who by denying 
that the confession was made in opposition to the police claim that the confession was 
made, would thereby be putting his character in issue under the "Britzman" 
interpretation of S. 1f(ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898. If the police had 
complied with the recording provisions then the danger of the accused's character 
being put in issue at the trial would not have arisen: the accused only puts his 
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character in issue and therefore his previous convictions in issue at trial if he chooses 
to do so by conducting his defence in a particular way, e. g. by attacking the veracity 
of prosecution witnesses. However, the police would force him to conduct his 
defence in a particular way if they failed to comply with the recording provisions of 
PACE. 
Hodgson J. outlined a third way in which the accused could be seriously 
disadvantaged by police non-compliance with the anti-verballing provisions: 
"If the defence was to be that the interview was 
inaccurately recorded then it was plainly unfair to admit 
it because it placed the appellant at a substantial dis- 
advantage in that he had been given no contemporaneous 
opportunity to correct any inaccuracies nor would he have 
his own contemporaneous note of what he had said. " 
Hodgson J. made it clear that criminal trials should not, as they tended to in the past, 
become "battles of character" between police witnesses and the accused over the 
authenticity of an alleged confession. The unfortunate consequences of such a battle 
were made clear throughout Hodgson J. 's judgement in Keenan. 
These unfortunate consequences were: unfounded attacks on the integrity of police 
witnesses, the accused being forced to put his character in issue, or to give testimony 
and be cross-examined when he would prefer not to and also the ever present 
possibility that the jury would wrongly convict the accused on police "verballed" 
confession evidence. 
All these problems can be averted by simply insisting that the police record all 
interviews in the police station at least for indictable offences and enforcing this 
stricture by excluding any confession obtained in serious breach of the recording 
requirements. 
Hodgson J. 's strictures in Keenan have been followed in later cases such as Rv Walsh 
(1990) where Saville J. cornmented that if there had been significant and substantial 
breaches of the provisions of the Codes relating to the recording of interviews, 
"T'hen prima facie at least the standards of fairness set 
by Parliament have not been met. " (4 1) 
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The judiciary are no longer prepared to rely upon the integrity of the police version of 
what happened during interrogation but demand that the scheme which was set up by 
PACE and the Codes of Practice to record interviews be respected by the police. That 
scheme represents a publicly agreed upon procedure to resolve the troublesome 
"authenticity" issue. 
If juries become unduly suspicious of police evidence because of bad publicity about 
the integrity of police evidence then there is a real danger that they will disbelieve 
police evidence when in fact that evidence is reliable as proof of guilt. This is hardly 
conducive to the due administration of the criminal law. To the extent that the public 
have grown sceptical about police evidence this represents a serious deterioration in 
the quality of the administration of justice for after all police officers are officers of 
the law. 
There is some encouraging evidence that it is not only formal interviews which are 
being vigorously policed by the judiciary. Informal interviews are also liable to 
attract the exclusionary approach if the recording provisions are breached. In Rv 
Weerdestevn (1994) (42) customs officers had failed to make a note of their informal 
questioning of the suspect and so inevitably there was no opportunity for the accused 
to have approved of the record of the interview or expressed his disagreement in 
accordance with the Code. Hobhouse L. J. excluded the incriminating remarks, noting 
as he did, that 
" ... the vice that arises 
from this disregard of the Code has 
been commented upon by this court on many occasions. 
The purpose is to obtain good and reliable evidence of 
anything that has been said and in fairness to the appellant 
to enable him to comment upon it and/or correct it close to 
time when the matter is fresh in his mind. What happened 
in the present case was that at the very earliest he did not 
know that he had said anything significant during this 
conversation until at least two-and-a-half months later. 
When it came to the trial all that he could say was that he 
had no recollection of the conversation at all; that is not 
surprising, so that was the result which was produced by 
this failure to observe the provisions of the Code. " 
Rv Weerdesteyn follows Rv Cox (1992) and the opinion of Bingham L. J. in Rv 
Absolam (43) that the Codes of Practice may apply even in a case in which it was 
plain that there was not in any sense a formal conventional interview. For the Code to 
apply it sufficed that "there was a series of questions directed by the police to the 
suspect with a view to obtaining admissions on which proceedings could be founded". 
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Indeed in Rv Weerdesteyn there was only one question from the Customs officer 
which produced the incriminating replies from the suspect. The Court of Appeal 
nevertheless held that the situation was such that it was "designed to produce 
unguarded admissions" so that it was one which the Code was intended to prevent. 
Therefore the suspect should have been cautioned before the Customs officer asked 
the single question about the alleged offence and also that a proper record should have 
been made of the short exchange between suspect and Customs officer. In the 1995 
version of Code C in 11.1. A it states, "'An interview is the questioning of a person 
regarding his involvement or suspected involvement in a criminal offence". 
In Ry Chung (1990) (44) the Court of Appeal said a confession should have been 
excluded under S. 76 2(b) or in the alternative S. 78, one of the grounds for the 
decision being the failure to record the alleged admissions immediately and the failure 
when the note of the interview had been made to show it to the appellant. 
To quote R. Leng, 
"Recent cases indicate that the courts will exclude 
alleged informal admissions where no adequate opporturýity, 
to veffy or deny has been given. " (45) 
Given this acknowledgement there is an element of overreaction by Leng when he 
claims in criticism of the RCCJ report that, 
it ... perhaps the most outstanding 
feature of their 
reasoning is that it fails to distinguish between recorded 
and unrecorded confessions and therefore fails to 
address the real risk of fabrication, where the only 
evidence of a confession is a police officer's word. " (46) 
With regard to informal confessions, the Code states that a contemporaneous note 
must be made and signed by the suspect and it is likely that a confession will be 
excluded in the court's discretion under S. 78 or even by law under S. 76 2(b) if no 
good explanation is forthcoming as to why the recording provisions have not been 
complied with. It is therefore somewhat misleading to write of the existence. of cases, 
as Leng does 
11 ... where the only evidence of a confession is a police 
officer's word. " (47) 
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However, exclusion of a confession under S. 78 is a discretionary matter and it is 
possible that some courts will admit confessions even where the recording provisions 
have been breached. Whether this situation is satisfactory will be examined later in 
this chapter. 
The Authenticity of a Confession and the Section 76 2(b) issue 
The authenticity of the confession has not only become an exclusionary question m 
itself under the S. 78 discretion, it also has become part of the exclusionary issue 
under the S. 76 2(b) rule of law. It is important here to point out that a confession is 
more than just a single moment of contrition by a suspect, it is also often a product of 
a process, namely the interaction between police and the suspect. As was made clear 
in the extremely important research study, "The Case for the Prosecution" (1991) by 
McConville, Sanders and Leng, 
"Analysis of police interrogation records confirms that the 
relationship between interrogator and suspect is dynamic 
so that any confession is a product of the process of inter- 
action. " (48) 
However, it is an 'unfair' dynamic given the great power imbalance between the police 
and the suspect; interrogation is designed to "confirm and legitimate a police 
narrative" of events through the obtaining of a confession wl-dch replicates how the 
police viewed the suspect's involvement or alleged involvement in the crime. 
Once this is realised it can be seen that any attempt to record the moment of 
acceptance of guilt by the suspect will also tend to record at least some of that police- 
suspect interaction. 
Ibus, the issue of whether the confession was made as a result of inducements or 
threats of violence can be resolved sometimes by looking at the record of the 
interview process. A Criminal Justice System which places a high premium on 
securing the authenticity of confessions wiH also secure some clear evidence of the 
circumstances in which the confession was made and the judiciary has made it plain 
that they require that independent record in order to satisfactorily adjudicate the S. 76 
2(b) question of law. 'ne judiciary are thus not only not prepared to rely, as they 
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used to, upon the word of the police as to the evidence of a confession but also the 
testimony of the police will not suffice on the crucial question of the surrounding 
circumstances of the confession, e. g. was an inducement made by the police 
preceding the confession? There is however, an important point to be made about 
current practice concerning the use of tapes of interrogation in court. Baldwin (49) 
has shown through research that written tape summaries prepared by police officers 
are often used in court rather than the playing of the tape itself. The tapes are rarely 
checked by defence lawyers. If the police officers make an inaccurate written 
summary of the taped interrogation, and Baldwin suggests such summaries can be 
inaccurate, then the benefits of the regime of the tape recording requirement, i. e. to 
provide the court with an accurate and unassailable record of the interrogation may be 
diminished or lost. 
In, R v Delaney the lack of a contemporaneous record of the interrogation went to the 
admissibility question of S. 76 2(b) of PACE. Lord Chief Justice Lane giving the 
judgement of the Court of Appeal held that while the particular breach, i. e. breach of 
the recording requirements, did not directly affect the confessions which the accused 
made it had the following effect, 
"By failing to make a contemporaneous note, or indeed 
any note as soon as practicable, the officers deprived the 
court of what was, in all likelihood, the most cogent 
evidence as to what did induce the appellant to confess. " (50) 
In Delaney there was an issue that the police had deliberately sought to play down, 
the seriousness of the offence to the suspect who had an LQ. of 80 and who, 
according to the evidence of a psychologist, had a personality which 
if ... was such that when 
being interviewed as a suspect 
he would be subject to quick emotional arousal which 
might lead him to wish to rid himself of the interview by 
bringing it to an end as rapidly as possible. " 
The offence was in fact a serious one, that of indecent assault on a very young girl. 
The Detective Constable admitted at trial that he had defiberately sought to play down 
the seriousness of the assault because he did not want to frighten Delaney from 
confessing his guilt - The conduct of the police towards this particular suspect was 
such that, in the words of Lord Lane, the police might "be encouraging a false 
confession". (51) The appellant may have felt it was easier to get away from the 
unpleasant experience of interrogation by making a confession, particularly in the 
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light of the suggestion that what was required was treatment rather than prison. 
T'herefore., as Lord Lane argued, the breach of the recording provisions 
" ... deprived the court of the knowledge which should have been available to it, nmnely of precisely what was said by 
these officers in the vital interview. " 
Given this, the conviction was quashed as the confession should have been excluded 
under S. 76 2(b) of PACE. 
Under S. 76 2(b) it is the prosecution which bears the burden of proof, proof beyond 
reasonable doubt, that the confession was not obtained by "anything said or done" 
which, "was likely in the circumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable any 
confession which might be made by him in consequence thereof'. The significance of 
the reasoning in Delaney is that the testimony of the police is not sufficient to 
discharge this burden and if the burden is not discharged, then, as a matter of law the 
confession must be excluded under S. 76 2(b). Rv Delaney has been followed in Rv 
Barry (1992) (52). In that case the Court of Appeal held that since "there was a clear 
conflict of evidence between the appellant and the police as to what was said during 
the unrecorded interviews" this was a factor which the trial judge should have given 
more weight to in considering whether to exclude the confession under S. 76 2(b). As 
the Court of Appeal reasoned, 
... if those interviews had been recorded as the. v should have been, the court would have been in a much better 
position to assess the relevant evidence. " 
In this respect there has been a dramatic change from the common law situation 
where the prosecution bore the burden of showing that the confession was 
"voluntary". 71he change from the common law situation is as follows: 
Given that the Judges' Rules on contemporaneous note taking and access to legal 
advice were often disregarded by the police and that the judges were extremely 
reluctant to exclude alleged confessions in their discretion for breaches of the Judges' 
Rules, then the suspect was often at a structural disadvantage in claiming that his 
confession was "involuntary". 'Me judiciary at common law often had no 
independent record of the interrogation nor an independent witness to attest to it in 
order to decide authoritatively on the voluntariness issue. It was often merely the 
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police account of what happened at interrogation against the suspect's account of 
alleged threats or inducements before he made a confession. 
Given the high esteem in which police evidence was held by judges in the pre PACE 
era then the suspect would have a difficult task in arguing that there was a threat or 
inducement if the police were detem-iined to deny that evidence and commit perjury in 
the process. 
There is a strong parallel here with the question of the existence of a confession: 
given the absence of an independent account of the confession a defendant would 
have a difficult task in persuading a jury that he rather than the police should be 
believed. Now, both the issue of the authenticity of the confession (which has 
become an exclusionary issue) and the question of its surrounding circumstances 
cannot be resolved simply by police testimony at trial against that of the defendant. A 
statutory scheme for the recording of interrogations exists and the judges have made it 
clear that the word of the police is not a substitute for that record of an interrogation. 
P. Mirfield in his first monograph on "Confessions" attested to the advantages of an 
accurate record of interrogation, 
"An accurate record of transactions between police and 
accused might in some circumstances assist in the correct 
resolution by the trier of law of any exclusion issue which 
arises ... an accused might allege that his confession 
is 
inadmissible because obtained by threats of violence. " 
"In such a case it is very likely that the sole issue will be 
whether the threats were actually made. If so, the 
admissibility of the confession will turn entirely on 
whether reliance can be placed upon the police record. " (53) 
In Rv Canale (1991) (54) the Lord Chief Justice again stressed that if an allegation of 
an improper inducement or threat is made, then the judge will need the recording 
requirements of PACE to be observed in order to give him evidence on which he can 
properly adjudicate the S. 76 2(a) or S. 76 2(b) questions of law. In Canale there had 
been in the words of Lord Lane "flagrant and cynical" breaches of the requirements 
for the contemporaneous recording of interviews by the police. The accused had 
allegedly confessed in two interviews which had not been recorded. 
However, in two subsequent interviews which were recorded, he repeated his 
admissions. The appellant argued at the trial that he had been induced by certain 
134 
promises on behalf of the police to make the unrecorded admissions which started off 
the whole series of admissions. Up to the first admission at the interview which was 
not contemporaneously recorded he had, in the words of the Court of Appeal, 
11... stoutly denied that he had anything to do with these 
conspiracies or robberies at all. " (55) 
As the Court of Appeal concluded, 
if ... somehow that volte-face, because volte-face it 
was, had to be explained. " (56) 
Yet when the trial judge came to rule on the question of inadmissibility under 
S. 762(b) or S. 78 of PACE the judge was 
"... deprived of the very evidence which would have 
enabled him to come to a more certain conclusion as to 
what he should do with regard to the submissions, because 
he was deprived of that contemporaneous note which 
should have been made. " 
Thus in decidi-ng whether the first admission was properly obtained or not (i. e. 
whether as the result of certain promises by the police) the existence of the 
contemporaneous note was vital to the answering of the S. 76 2(b) question. 
It was no answer for the police to point to the later admissions which were recorded, 
for their admissibility depended on the admissibility of the first unrecorded 
admission, i. e. the defendant argued that those later recorded admissions would not 
have happened without the making of the first unrecorded admission. The Court of 
Appeal in Rv Canale quashed the defendant's convictions holding that all the 
admissions should have been ruled inadmissible under Section 78. 
The reasoning in Canale seems to be along the following lines: if the police by their 
failure to comply with the verballing provisions deny the court the ability to decide 
the admissibility question under S. 76 2(b) properly, by depriving the court of an 
accurate record of what was said or done to the suspect by the police, then S. 78, 
which is concerned with the "fairness of the proceedings" might be used to rule 
inadmissible any disputed confession. On the issue of admissibility under S. 76 2(b) 
the courts are not prepared to rely on the word of the police as to what induced the 
suspect to confess when statutory provision is made in PACE and the Codes of 
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Practice for the creation of contemporaneous documentation of an interrogation which 
the suspect should have had the opportunity to correct, at the time of the interrogation. 
This reasoning also applies to the present requirement to make a tape recording of all 
interviews at police stations concerning indictable offences. To conclude, although 
S-76 2(b) is not directed at the question of whether a confession has been in fact 
made, the failure of the police to record an interview at which a confession is alleged 
to have been made can be a relevant factor under S. 76 2(b). As Birch conunents, 
11 ... while such a breach to record properly cannot by itself justify exclusion under S. 76 2(b) it may be a relevant factor 
to take into account when the court is trying to decide whether 
something has been "said or done" prior to the confession 
which is conducive to untruth. Thus if D says be was offered 
a bribe to confess to the offence, and the interviewing officer 
says that this is a lie, the fact that the officer has failed to 
make a proper record of the interview which might have helped 
the court to decide whom to believe is obviously relevant to the 
S. 76 2(b) question. Given that the burden of proof is on the 
prosecution under S. 76 2(b) it may well be the case that a failure 
to record an interview properly is fatal to a prosecution 
attempt to discharge this burden and hence any confession 
will be excluded from the trial. " 
The Consequences of the Tape-recordini! Reciuirement 
John Baldwin (57) has described the introduction of recorded interviews with suspects 
as 
11 ... maybe the single most important reform of the criminal justice system in recent years. " 
It is not difficult to understand the reasons for this claim. A taped record of an 
interrogation with a suspect helps to resolve the problems posed by confession 
evidence at many levels: it provides clear evidence of the making of a confession; it 
provides, some evidence of the circumstances in which the confession was made 
(always bearing in mind the possibility of off the tape inducements or threats which 
are not disclosed by the tape recording - on this see McConvil-le, (58)). The existence 
of a tape recording of the interrogation may not only make it much easier for a judge 
to determine whether threats of violence or inducements were made by the police but 
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it also may help to prevent miscarriages of justice based on false confessions caused 
in another way. This is the situation where the confession of the accused purportedly 
reveals details of the crime which only the police and the actual offender could know. 
However, as The Confait case (59) reveals, such "special knowledge" may have been 
unwittingly communicated to the suspect during interrogation by the police. Sir 
Henry Fisher in his report (60) on the Confait case was misled by the apparent 
incriminating "knowledge" in the confessions of the boys to the murder of Maxwell 
Confait. This knowledge was in fact communicated to the boys by the police. A tape 
recording of the interrogation makes it easier to evaluate what is said during 
interrogation by the police and may disclose that a seemingly reliable confession 
which discloses "special knowledge" of the crime may not be reliable because that 
"knowledge" may have been unwittingly transmitted to the suspect during the 
interrogation, who then has merely incorporated that information into his false 
confession. Indeed, in Rv Mackenzie Lord Taylor suggested that the "special 
knowledge" Mackenzie displayed in his confession about the murders may have been 
communicated unwittingly by police to him by a non taped interview in the police car 
on the way to the police station. (61) A tape may disclose whether information about 
the offence may have been transmitted in this way from the police to the suspect. A 
tape recording of the interrogation may also confirm whether the suspect was 
cautioned before the questioning and whether he was offered his right to see a 
solicitor. It may be that setting down clear due process protections for the suspect in 
police interrogation may be undern-fined by a failure to also set down a requirement 
that the interrogation process be properly recorded. Procedural protections for 
suspects can be more easily evaded when there is no independent record of the 
interrogation. 
Tape recording also prevents valuable court time being taken up with allegations and 
denials of the practice of "verballing" or the use of violence at interrogation, although 
accusations can still be made about the period before the interrogation. 
Some measure of tape recordings' success in achieving fairness between police and 
suspects is that after years of hostility to the idea the police welcome tape recording as 
a means of preventing unjustified attacks on them. The law reform body JUSTICE, in 
its research of over 3,000 cases where convictions were challenged, found that, 
"Before PACE the main complaints had been physical or 
verbal intimidation and the fabrication of admissions. 
Those problems had virtually been removed in formal 
interviews by the requirement for tape recording. " (62) 
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The police themselves view the tape recording requirements of PACE positively, for 
as one of the Chief Constables interviewed by Reiner in his book on Chief 
Constables., commented, 
"Tape recording has helped us work quite effectively - 
produced straight pleas of guilty, cut out all the nonsense 
of allegations of verbals. " (63) 
The tape recording of interrogations has also significantly aided the work of forensic 
psychiatrists such as Gudjonsson, who are able to make an informed judgement about 
the reliability of a confession and the vulnerabilities of suspects from listening to the 
tape. This aids the defence at the trial in contesting the confession if it is unreliable 
and also helps to secure successful appeals once conviction on a false confession has 
emerged. 
However, what clouds this picture of properly documented interrogations are two 
major problems which continue to trouble commentators. 
Off the record interactions and informal confessions 
Off the record interactions which affect the formal interview record and which 
could include unrecorded inducements or threats or violence. Dixon in his 
study found that officers routinely prepare suspects before recorded 
interviewing: 71 % of police officers reported that they sometimes, often or 
always did this. (64) 
2. 'Infonnal' confessions which do not have to be tape recorded but require only 
a contemporaneous note to be made and "unless it is impracticable the person 
interviewed shaU be given the opportunity to read the interview record and to 
sign it as correct or to indicate the respects in which he considers it inaccurate 
... if the person concerned ... refuses to read the record or sign 
it, the senior 
police officer present shall read it to him and ask him whether he would like to 
sign it as correct ... the police officer shall then certify on the 
interview record 
itself what has occurred. " (11.10) Given this, the scope for abuse in terms of 
"verballing" is stiH a possibility for informal confessions even though that 
particular problem has been eradicated for fonnal interviews. 
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The first problem to consider is the continuing possibility of off the record 
inducements or threats which could influence the content of the fon-nal interview. 
This is seen as a particularly insidious threat, for as McConville, Sanders and Leng 
comment in relation to the official record of interrogation, 
" ... the integrity of the record is compromised 
by the 
fact that it ignores the police/suspect questioning that 
often precedes it. " (65) 
They argue that custody officers who control access to the suspect are often 
complicitous in this process by allowing the investigating officers informal access to 
the suspect without that being recorded on the custody sheet. The possibility of off 
the record inducements and threats are described in the following way by McConvi1le, 
Bridges, Hodgson and Pavlovic, 
"The importance of these low visibility exchanges between 
police and suspect cannot be overestimated. The more 
successful in manipulating the decision making of the suspect, 
the less apparent will be the influence of the police when the 
official interrogation takes place. It is at this covert level that 
the police are able to utilize those strategies which if discovered, 
would or might incur the disapproval of the courts and endanger 
the admissibility of any confession arising therefrom. " (66) 
In the light of this, a cynic may offer an account of why the police have welcomed the 
tape recording of interrogations. A cynic may argue that tape recording offers the 
illusion of a complete record of interrogation whilst allowing the police to manipulate 
the suspect off the tape. As Roger Leng has commented, 
... far 
from restricting the activities of investigators, the 
PACE rule about recording interviews serves the police 
interest in controlling the investigation. By legitimating 
the formal interview the rule elevates that part of the 
total interaction which the police have chosen to emphasize 
whilst obscuring and denying that which is less convenient 
to the police case. Viewed in this light constabulary 
enthusiasm for recording becomes quite understandable. " (67) 
Given this it is important that the recording procedures operate only as a shield for the 
accused by demonstrating for example, that an inducement was offered, the recording 
procedures should not operate as a sword for the prosecution since the tape recording 
or note cannot conclusively prove that a threat or inducement alleged by the suspect 
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had never been made by the police. Unfortunately some judicial opinion has taken 
the evidence of a tape or a contemporaneous note as being the last word on whether 
an inducement or threat was offered to the suspect by the police. In Rv Canale Lord 
Lane made the following remark: 
"The importance of the rules relating to contemporaneous 
noting of interviews can scarcely be over emphasized ... it is a protection for the police, to ensure as far as possible 
that it cannot be suggested that they induced the suspect 
to confess by improper approaches or improper promises ... " (68) 
It is respectfully submitted that Lord Lane could have been more cautious here, for 
whilst one can accept that if a confession is made on tape then that is conclusive of its 
existence, one should not accept that the tape, and much less a written note, is 
conclusive of the question as to whether threats or inducements were made prior to 
the confession. Lord Lane should have been aware that it is a potentially dangerous 
message to send to the police that the record is presumptively the final word on the 
S. 76 2(b) question. Judges should be cautious about accepting at face value the 
claims of the police that since the record discloses no threat or inducement that 
therefore no threat or inducement was made. 
The approach advocated here would be consistent with modem judicial scepticism 
towards the police account of interrogations manifest in such cases as Keenan, Canale 
and Delaney. The judiciary should be equally sceptical of a suspect's claims. The 
judiciary should not be overly ready to accept the allegations of suspects that the 
police made "off the tape" inducements or threats. Suspects often have good reason 
to falsely allege police n-lisbehaviour. It should be remembered that the prosecution 
still have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that a confession was not obtained by 
"oppression" or "anything said or done" which threatens the reliability of a 
confession. The tape or signed note should not be regarded as the final word on that 
subject. It therefore should not be possible for the prosecution to point to the tape and 
argue that since for example, it does not disclose an inducement then they have 
automatically satisfied the burden of proof on the S. 76 2(b) question. 
Informal Confessions 
Infonnal confessions remain a source of concern to commentators since their 
admission tends to undercut the regime of protection against the practice of 
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'verballing' established by PACE T'he existence of informal confessions allows 
police deviance, (in this case "verballing") to be "shifted" rather than eliminated. 
Whereas the possibility of 'verballing' in formal interviews has been eliminated by the 
compulsory tape recording of aU interrogations for indictable offences, 'verballing' 
remains a possibility with regard to informal confessions. This is because tape 
recording is not required, only a contemporaneous note is required which the suspect 
should be given the opportunity to sign, but since provision is made in the Code for 
the situation where the suspect refuses to sign (a note must be made of this) the 
possibility of the concoction of a confession in informal interviews by the police 
remains a possibility. In Rv Scott (1990) the Court of Appeal quashed a conviction 
based on an informal confession which had been obtained in breach of the Code. In 
that case the suspect had made incriminating remarks after a tape recorded interview 
had fmished. 
The police officers made a note of the comment but failed to show it to the suspect or 
ask him to sign it. At trial the defence was that the incriminating comment had not 
been made - the old 'verballing' situation. 'Me Court of Appeal said the trial judge 
had erred in his discretion under S. 78 of PACE in admitting the evidence because of 
"The fact that the incriminating remark came between two interviews denying the 
offence". (69) 
However, S. 78 is a discretionary power to exclude evidence and it should not be 
assumed that every time there has been a breach of the Codes then a confession will 
be excluded. In Rv Scott emphasis was laid on the fact that the alleged incriminating 
remark came between two taped denials of the offence. It still remains a possibility 
that confession evidence will be admitted where the only evidence of such a 
confession is a police officer's testimony although in the light of cases such as Keenan , 
and Scott such evidence is "likely" to be excluded under the S. 78 discretion. It is 
submitted here that this is unsatisfactory in that a discretionary exclusionary approach 
to non authenticated confessions does not go far enough in tackling the continuing 
problem of 'verballed' police evidence of a confession. Moreover, in allowing the 
admissibility of a confession where a contemporaneous note has been made and an 
opportunity offered to the suspect to sign it, the law is allowing scope for abuse. At 
present a police officer can fabricate an alleged informal confession and say that the 
suspect was offered a chance to sign and correct the note of the confession but refused 
to do so: see Code C, paragraph 11.10. It would be then the police officer's word 
against that of the defendant in court that this chain of events in fact occurred. 
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Whereas informal interviews can probably never be eliminated given the 'low 
visibility' of exchanges between police and suspect (e. g. at the scene of the crime or in 
the police car on the way to the station) the products of informal interviews, i. e. 
informal confessions can be eliminated from the criminal trial by the simple expedient 
of an exclusionary rule to the effect that no confession shall be admissible unless 
made on tape and/or made in the presence of an independent third party. 
Such an approach has had the recent support of Lord Templeman. in A. T. and T. Istel 
v Tully 0 992) where his Lordship said, 
"Ill treatment of prisoners and fabrication of confessions 
can only be prevented by better organisation, selection, 
training, supervision and remuneration of the police force 
coupled with stringent rules for access to independent legal 
advice and a bar on confessions obtained in the absence of 
that representation. If fewer convictions result, this is a 
price which must be paid and a price which the police force 
as at present trained are unable to accept. " (70) 
The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice were also not prepared to "pay the price" 
of a bar on non taped confessions or confessions not made in the presence of an 
independent third party. The RCCJ feared that the consequences of such a rule would 
be that too many guilty people would go free since for example "spontaneous 
confessions on arrest are often the most truthful". (71) There is some support for this 
view of the RCCJ about the reliability of confessions made upon arrest in the remarks 
of Lawton L. J. in Rv Turner, 
"It is a matter of hurnan experience which has long been 
recognized, that wrongdoers who are about to be revealed 
for what they are, often find relief from their inner tensions 
by talking about what they have done. In our judgement and 
experience this is a common explanation for oral adm issions 
made at or about the time of arrest and later retracted. " (72) 
However, as Roger Leng points out the RCCJ has missed the main issue9 which is not 
whether informal confessions are truthful but whether they have in fact been made, 
i. e. the 'authenticity' issue rather than the 'creditworthiness' issue. If the suspect does 
not in fact confess upon or shortly after arrest then he is unjustly and unfairly put at 
risk by a rule which allows the possibility of an alleged oral confession to be given in 
evidence. There is also an important public policy dimension to the debate on non 
taped confessions. Professor Dennis had written, 
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"Police evidence of oral admissions is highly damaging to the 
accused and hence prejudicial but experience shows that its 
probative value is doubtful in the absence of corroboration. " (73) 
Recognition that police perjury and fabrication of confessions has played a major role 
in recent miscarriages of justice cases, and that these miscarriage of justice cases have 
produced a public crisis of confidence in the criminal justice system, would justify not 
merely a corroboration requirement for informal confessions but a full exclusionary 
rule. 
The revelation of any miscarriage of justice is likely to have some effect on public 
confidence in the criminal justice system. This is so whether the miscarriage is due to 
unreliable identification evidence or the perjured testimony of an alleged victim for 
example. However, where the cause of the miscarriage is due to police perjury the 
damage to the criminal justice system is of a qualitatively different nature from other 
causes of miscarriage of justice. The damage done by police perjury is likely to be 
great because the police are an integral part of the criminal justice system. The 
investigation of offences by the police tends to be publicly viewed as part of the 
adniifflstration of justice. As Lord Birkett observed many years ago, "a blow struck at 
the integrity of the police is a blow struck at the whole fabric of the State". (74) 
Some convictions of the guilty would be lost by an exclusionary rule for non taped 
confessions but the cost in terms of loss of public confidence in the crin-linal justice 
system of this particular kind of wrongful conviction (i. e. wrongful conviction on 
'verballed' confession evidence) is so great that an exclusionary rule is justified. The 
recommendation of the RCCJ does not go far enough here. The RCCJ commented 
(75) 
"We recommend that admissions allegedly made to the 
police outside the police station, whether tape recorded 
or not should be put to the suspect during the beginning 
of the first tape recorded interview at the station. 
Failure to do this may render the alleged confession 
inadmissible. " 
This recommendation has found its way into the new Code C which requires the 
police to give the defendant an opportunity to verify an alleged oral confession on 
tape: in P. 11 2A Code C. A failure to comply with this requirement might well 
constitute a significant and substantial breach and therefore probably lead to the 
exclusion of the non taped confession under S. 78. The new provision does not 
however, cover an alleged confession made after a formal interview. 
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The RCCJ leave the door open for a conviction on a 1/verballed" confession when they 
argue, 
" ... if however, the suspect on having the confession put to him or her does not confirm the confession on tape, it 
should not automatically be inadmissible. The 
circumstances may still be such as to justify the evidence 
being put before a jury to weigh up. " (76) 
This is unsatisfactory, for only a rule requiring all confessions to be taped will 
eradicate the problem of "verballed" confessions. 
The argument here is not solely based on the avoidance of individual wrongful 
convictions by such a rule on non taped confessions, but is also based on the 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system itself. A major step in restoring public 
confidence in the legitimacy of the system would be a public pronouncement in the 
shape of a statutory provision that no confession is to be admitted in evidence unless 
tape-recorded or made in the presence of an independent third party. The public 
would see that the grave problem of police fabrication of evidence was being tackled 
in a direct, dramatic fashion. Professor Dennis has written, 
"One of the ways in which the law of evidence promotes 
legitimate verdicts in criminal cases is by excluding 
apparently relevant evidence if it carries systemic risks 
of unreliability which renders its probative value uncertain. " (77) 
Of course, there are important exceptions to the principle that evidence which carries 
systemic risks of unreliability is excluded from trial. For example, identification 
evidence though notoriously unreliable and the cause of many wrongful convictions, 
is not subject to a general exclusionary rule. The great importance of such evidence 
in the proof of guilt in certain cases (such as street offences) mentioned by Lord 
Widgery in Rv Turnbull (78) is no doubt the justification for the general admissibility 
of identification evidence. 'Me Crown Court study for the Royal Commission 
illustrated that identification evidence is of some importance in about one-quarter of 
contested cases. Lord Devlin (79) wrote tha4 
"The problem peculiar to evidence of visual identification 
is that this evidence, because of its type and not because 
of its quality, has a latent defect that may not be detected 
by the usual tests. " 
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However, only poor quality identification unsupposed by other evidence is 
withdrawn from the jury. Identification evidence is generally admissible subject to a 
Turnbull warning from the judge to the jury on the dangers inherent in identification 
evidence. 
A rule of inadmissibility for non taped confessions would be declaratory of an official 
position that a potent source of miscarriages of justice in the past, "verbafled 
confessions" by the police is no longer even a possibility. This would have important 
effects in restoring the legitimacy of the system, for as Pattenden has written, 
"The manufacture of evidence by the police, which is 
not confmied to the West Nfidlands Serious Crimes 
Squad, is a matter of grave public concern. " (80) 
On August 14th 1989 the Chief Constable of the West Midlands, Geoffrey Dear 
disbanded his entire Serious Crime Squad. In the preceding year twenty individuals 
charged with serious offences had either been acquitted or had charges dropped 
against them after they alleged that confessions allegedly made in police custody had 
been fabricated by the police. It should be remembered that it was the West Midlands 
C. I. D. who conducted the investigation into the Birmingham pub bombings which led 
to the wrongful conviction of six men. Two of the six alleged that the police 
fabricated oral admissions which were used to convict them. Indeed, the saga of the 
West Midlands Serious Crime Squad continues to reverberate in the criminal courts. 
In 1994 the Court of Appeal quashed the convictions of two men Williams and Smith 
who allegedly confessed to conspiracy to rob to officers of the West Midlands Crime 
Squad in 1985. T'he Court of Appeal commented that, 
"... this court deeply regrets that these two appellants were 
convicted on account of the evidence of police officers whose 
conduct has only been discredited in the later cases to which 
we have referred. " (8 1) 
In considering the authenticity of confessions issue and possible reforms in this area it 
is important to keep in mind the public policy considerations borne out of the 
revelations of miscarriages of justice cases in recent years (82). 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE LEGITIMACY OF CONFESSIONS 
Introduction 
This chapter aims to analyze the legitimacy of confessions issue. The chapter will 
start by examining what is meant by the legitimacy of confessions issue. Then the 
chapter will look at three responses to the legitimacy problem. The chapter will then 
look at the case of Rv Mason (1) as a leading case on the legitimacy of confessions 
issue. The next section will look at Section 58 of PACE; the right to legal advice and 
how the section has been interpreted by the courts. At the beginning of this section 
there will be a discussion of the pre PACE situation with regard to access to legal 
advice and the courts' attitude to police breach of the Judges' Rules. The section 
following will look closely at Section 76 2(a) of PACE and its interpretation by the 
courts. The chapter will close by looking at undercover methods by the police and the 
legitimacy of confessions so obtained. 
The le6timacy of confessions issue 
The problem of the legitimacy of confession evidence is not fundamentally a proof 
problem. The issue of the legitimacy of confession involves extra-probative 
considerations which may result in reliable confession evidence being excluded from 
the criminal trial. Galligan makes the following useful distinction with regard to the 
purposes of the law of evidence: 
"There are two distinct issues: (i) one concerns rules about 
the probative value of evidence, (ii) the other concerns rules 
about the exclusion of evidence for reasons other than 
reasons of evidentiary value. The question in (i) is how to 
deal with evidence the probative value of which contains a 
degree of risk that it will be used improperly. Evidence 
gained from an involuntary confession from hearsay or from 
an accomplice may vary in its reliability and it is difficult 
to know in any event how much weight it should be given ... The guiding objective in these cases is rectitude of outcome, 
the question is, given some such uncertainty or defect, how 
best is rectitude achieved; what is the rational procedure for 
obtaining an accurate outcome. These are issues internal to 
proof In (ii) the issue is whether certain kinds of evidence, 
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which are likely to be of probative value and therefore 
relevant in achieving rectitude should be excluded in order 
to advance other values or policies, such as confidentiality, 
national security or the protection of an accused against the 
police. Ibese are issues external of proof; they are based on 
values which compete with rectitude of decision making. 
The exclusion of evidence in order to uphold those values 
may mean the loss of probative evidence and thus a 
lower level of accuracy. " (2) 
Therefore the issue of the legitimacy of confessions may result in the exclusion from 
the trial of confession evidence which is authentic and otherwise reliable. This is 
justified on certain extra-probative grounds. Identifying these extra-probative 
considerations and the correct evidential response to a case where the police have 
violated principles which are justified on extra-probative grounds is a controversial 
and politically charged process. The possibility of guilty offenders going free because 
of the exclusion of their reliable confessions from trial on legitimacy grounds brings 
into focus the sensitive issues involved in this area of confession law. The case of Rv 
Mason (1987) 
, 
C. A. is a good example of a reliable confession which was excluded on 
'legitimacy' grounds by the Court of Appeal. In that case the defence conceded the 
truthfulness of the confession made but because of the crucial fact that the police had 
lied to the suspect' s solicitor about the state of the evidence against him, the 
confession should have been excluded under S. 78 held the Court of Appeal. 
The issue of the legitimacy of confessions is therefore a more open and controversial 
topic than either the creditworthiness or authenticity issues, where disagreement tends 
to focus purely on the issue as to whether the law does too much or too little to 
ensure that confessions are authentic and reliable. Ibus some commentators have 
argued for a strict exclusionary rule for non taped confessions as a response to the 
authenticity issue. (3) The RCCJ (1993) rejected this proposal as too draconian. (4) 
The fear was too many reliable confessions would be lost by any such rule. On the 
creditworthiness issue some commentators have argued that S. 76 2(b) should be 
reformed so as to require a judge to exclude a confession where he was not satisfied 
as to its reliability. At the moment S. 76 2(b) is limited to unreliable confessions 
caused by "anything said or done"', therefore not all unreliable confessions are 
covered by this test. Ibe RCCJ however commented that, 
"In our view the safeguards under PACE against false 
confessions are comprehensive and while not foolproof 
are substantially sound. (5) 
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The RCCJ also endorsed the principle that it was desirable that if a confession had 
been made it was for the jury to assess its reliability. (6) Disputes over the legitimacy 
of confessions tend to be of a more political nature involving questions as to what 
extra probative considerations should be recognised so as to allow for the exclusion of 
confession evidence which is authentic and creditworthy. 
This is not to say, however, that there is not some consensus of opinion on the 
legitimacy issue. Despite a few historical exceptions (most notably Bentham, 
Wigmore and the minority opinion of three members of the CLRC 1 1th Report) (7) it 
is generally agreed that no confession should be received which has been obtained by 
violence, threats of violence or the use of inhuman, degrading treatment or torture. 
Those few commentators who have disagreed in the past assert that the matter of the 
fact of violence in the obtaining of the confession should be treated as a matter going 
to the weight of the confession before the jury and that the police officers involved in 
the use of violence against suspects should be disciplined by way of the criminal law 
and other punitive mechanisms. Packer provides a useful summary of this 'crime 
control' approach to the admissibility of coerced confessions: (8) 
"The evil of a coerced confession is that it may result in 
the conviction of an innocent man. It is a factual question 
in each case whether the accused's confession is unreliable. 
A defendant against whom a confession is introduced into 
evidence should have to convince the jury that the 
circumstances under which it was elicited were so coercive 
that more probably than not the confession was untrue. In 
reaching a determination on that issue the trier of fact should 
of course be entitled to consider the other evidence in the 
case and if it points toward guilt and tends to corroborate 
the confession, should be entitled to take that into account in 
determining whether more likely than not the confession was 
untrue. To say this is not to say that the unlawful use of 
force by the police against an accused is ever to be condoned. 
The point is simply that the use of force is not in itself 
determinative of the reliability of a confession and should 
therefore not be conclusively against the admissibility of a 
confession. " 
Bentham it seems, would even appear to advocate (9) the use of torture of suspects in 
certain circumstances. Bentham thought that to use torture to obtain confessions was 
self defeating given the great possibility that such confessions would be unreliable. 
Bentham said of confessions obtained by torture: 
proof at all". (10) 
"A confession so obtained is no 
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It is not often asserted by those arguing for the exclusion of a confession obtained by 
violence or torture that the great risk or unreliability is the main justification of the 
prohibition. The focus is rather on the unacceptability of such interrogative methods 
in a civilised democratic society, irrespective of the probative worth of confession 
evidence so obtained. Even if such confessions could be proved true by independent 
evidence, the argument is that exclusion is fully justified on extra probative grounds. 
Indeed S. 76 2(a) of PACE asserts that the issue of whether the confession is true is an 
irrelevant factor in assessing the admissibility of the confession which is challenged 
because of oppression in its obtaining. Moreover S. 76 (5) of PACE also asserts, 
"Evidence that a fact to which this subsection applies was 
discovered as a result of a statement made by an accused 
person shall not be admissible unless evidence of how it 
was discovered is given by him or on his behalf. " 
Therefore if the confession obtained by oppression leads to the discovery of other 
incriminating evidence, such as the murder weapon, then no mention can be made by 
the prosecution that these facts were discovered as a result of the accused's confession 
The reliability of the confession is thus totally negated as having any evidential value 
where there was oppression in its obtaining. 
The only qualification on this proposition is the existence of S. 76 4(b), a minor 
qualification which allows the prosecution, where the confession is relevant as 
showing that the accused speaks, writes or expresses himself in a particular way, to 
use "so much of the confession as is necessary to show that he does so". However, 
perhaps the use of violence to obtain any evidence should lead to its exclusion as a 
matter of law. Indeed there is an even more radical position which is to the effect that 
the use of serious violence in the course of the police investigation should lead to the 
abandonment of the prosecution: on this see Zander's note of dissent to the Royal 
Cornn-iission on Criminal Justice. 
The true disagreement in the area of the legitimacy of confessions is away from the 
issue of the use of violence or inhuman treatment in obtaining confessions. It rather 
concerns other due process values which might demand the exclusion of confession 
evidence because of police violation of those due process norms. Examples of these 
other due process values include the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to 
legal advice and the right not to be held incommunicado. The first of these values is 
the creation of common law, the other two find expression in statutory form in the 
shape of S. 56 and S. 58 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. 
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The question of the extent to which the criminal trial should be prepared to forego the 
admission of reliable confessions because of breach of one of these procedural rights 
is at the heart of the debate surrounding the legitimacy of confession evidence issue. 
It is proposed now to outline a few differing responses to this issue of the recognition 
of due process values, other than the prohibition of violence or the threat of violence 
in the obtaining of confessions. All three responses outlined can be located in the 
modern English debate on this subject. It is not intended to provide an exhaustive 
account of all possible responses to the issue, rather it is intended to outline the major 
positions. 
Three responses to the legitimacy' problem 
One view holds that, save with regard to the use of violence or torture etc. the law 
should not attempt to vindicate procedural rights through the mechanisms of evidence 
from the criminal trial. If procedural rights have been violated by the police then this 
is a matter for controlling mechanisms independent of the law of criminal evidence. 
This view might be based on the premise that, 
it ... since the object of a criminal trial should be to find 
out if the accused is guilty, it follows that ideally all evidence 
should be admissible which is relevant in the sense that it 
tends to render probable the existence or non-existence of 
any fact on which the question of guilt or innocence depends. " 
(CLRC 11 th Report) (11) 
This view argues that some relevant evidence may be needed to be excluded because 
of its potential for substantial unreliability or undue prejudice to the accused. This 
tends to undermine Bentham's claim that to maximize rectitude of decision making all 
relevant evidence should be admitted for assessment by the trier of fact, hence 
Benth, am said, "Evidence is the basis of justice: exclude evidence you exclude 
It may well be that rectitude of decision making is sometimes best served in the long 
run by rules excluding classes of evidence whose probative weight is very difficult to 
assess by the jury and which may be potentially very unreliable. Hence the existence 
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of S. 76 2(b) of PACE and the hearsay rule at common law for example. The 
modified Benthamite view of the CLRC 1 1th Report also argues that with regard to 
confession obtained by violence, regard is needed to the standards of a civilised 
society and that an exclusionary rule on confessions obtained by oppressive methods 
is therefore justifiable as a qualification on the basic principle of the admissibility of 
relevant evidence. However, on this view to vindicate other procedural rights through 
the exclusion of confession evidence is an inappropriate response. By "vindication" is 
meant the possible response of the law to a situation where the police have infringed 
the pre-trial "rights" of the suspect, such as the right to legal advice. The exclusion of 
evidence obtained by police violation of such a right is one method of "vindicating" a 
right that the legal system recognizes as a "right". The modified Benthamite approach 
of the CLRC 1 1th Report rejected a role for criminal evidence in vindicating the 
procedural rights of the suspect through the exclusion of evidence. (12) 
This is especially so given the possibility of vindicating those procedural rights 
through other mechanisms such as civil actions against the police, police internal 
disciplinary action or official complaints procedures. Any breach of the provisions 
regarding the treatment of suspects independent of the prohibition of violence on 
obtaining confessions should, where relevant, be treated as a matter going to the 
weight of the confession but not its admissibility. If the suspect was wrongfully 
denied access to a solicitor then this is a factor solely going to the weight the jury 
should place on the confession in deciding whether to convict the accused. Such was 
the approach also of the RCCP in 198 1, whose report asserted that, 
" ... in general ... we consider that the exclusion of evidence 
is not a satisfactory way of enforcing compliance with rules. " (13) 
The RCCP adopted a much more Benthamite attitude to the admissibility of 
confessions than the PACE scheme eventually adopted. For the RCCP, all 
confessions were to be admitted to the jury except for those confessions obtained by 
violence or torture. (14) 
If there have been breaches of the provisions other than the prohibition on violence 
then this, according to the RCCP, should go to the weight rather than the admissibility 
of the confession, 
of ... since reliability is the primary purpose of the Code of Practice for interviewing suspects. " (15) 
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Consequently, 
" .. the reliability of confessions obtained 
in its breach must 
be open to question; and it would not therefore be right for 
statement evidence obtained in breach of the Code to be 
accepted uncriticafly and without comment by the criminal 
courts. The advocate for any accused who contests the 
truth of a confession alleged to have been made by him win 
have considerable scope for discrediting the evidence of that 
confession if it has been obtained when the provisions of the 
Code have not been observed. " (16) 
However, there is a challengeable assumption at the heart of the position of the RCCP 
here. It assumes that the main justification of a due process value such as the right to 
legal advice is to render confession evidence more reliable. 
However, the right to legal advice can be justified on grounds which are independent 
of a concern to improve the reliability of confession evidence. The main justification 
for the right to legal advice is the importance of the value of informed participation of 
suspects in the process to which they are subjected to. The recognition of this may 
lead us to conclude that treating wrongful denial of the right to legal advice as going 
solely to the weight of a confession is an inadequate response to its violation. It may 
be that in an appropriate case the exclusion of a confession is warranted because of 
police breach of the right to legal advice. An appropriate case might be where the 
police in bad faith deny the suspect access to legal advice. Lord Lane made clear in R 
v Alladice (1988) that a court would have "little difficulty" (17) in excluding a 
confession in those circumstances under Section 78. ) if not under Section 76. 
A second major position takes procedural rights and their violation by the police as 
central to the question of the exclusion of confession evidence from the trial. This 
view proceeds on the assumption that since the criminal justice system sees fit to 
bestow certain rights on suspects in the pre-trial investigative process then the most 
appropriate mechanism to vindicate those rights when they have been violated is to 
exclude the evidence which has been obtained by violation of one or more of those 
rights. An example might be a confession obtained by wrongfully denying the 
suspect his right to legal advice, a statutory right under Section 58 of PACE. If the 
right to legal advice is to be taken seriously then it is arguable that there must be some 
real consequence for its violation by the police. A right which had no remedy or 
consequence for its violation does not, on this theory, deserve the title of "a right". A 
"right" with no remedy would then be merely aspirational or 'a good idea' - this in 
essence what the principle of access to legal advice in the police station meant under 
The JudgesRules under the pre PACE regime. Breach of the principle was treated 
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solely in many cases, as a matter going to the weight of the confession before the jury. 
However, S. 58 of PACE is on a statutory footing and has been described by Hodgson 
J. in the leading case on the section as "one of the most important and fundamental 
rights of citizens". (18) There is no tort (19) of "denying access to legal advice 
wrongfully" so the question remains as to what should be the consequence of a 
finding of a wrongful denial of legal advice? 
The evidential exclusion at trial of a confession obtained by wrongful denial of the 
S. 58 right is one way in which the right to legal advice can be given real meaning - it 
confmns that the right has weight in our legal system and is not just a rhetorical 
claim. It might be argued that this method of vindicating the right has a great social 
cost, namely the exclusion of relevant and potentially reliable evidence of guilt, the 
confession of the accused. However, recognition of a right by society has been 
understood by the leading jurisprudential scholar of the past twenty years, R. A 
Dworkin as precisely involving a social cost. Professor Dworkin comments, 
"There would be no point in the boast that we respect 
individual rights unless that involved some sacrifice and the 
sacrifice in question must be that we give up whatever 
marginal benefits our country would receive from over- 
riding those rights when they proved inconvenient. " (20) 
The loss of some convictions in cases where the police have deliberately breached the 
right to legal advice prior to the making of a confession may be more than a marginal 
loss to society, but if the right is to be given real meaning it may be that the price is 
worth paying. 
Professor Ashworth is the leading proponent of the kind of analysis presented above. 
He has set out the terms of the theory as follows: 
"If a legal system declares certain standards for the conduct 
of criminal investigations ... then it can be argued that citizens have corresponding rights to be accorded certain facilities and 
not to be treated in certain ways. If the legal system is to 
respect those rights then it is arguable that a suspect whose 
rights have been infringed should not thereby be placed at any 
disadvantage ... And the appropriate way of ensuring that the 
suspect does not suffer this disadvantage is for the court at 
trial to have the power to exclude evidence obtained by 
improper means. " (2 1) 
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This theory has a more general application than purely the exclusion of confession 
evidence obtained in breach of procedural rights. It is capable of extension to the 
exclusion of illegally and improperly obtained real evidence such as that obtained 
from an illegal search and also applies to evidence obtained by entrapment or trickery: 
see especially the discussion on the protective principle in Chapter 7. 
This approach to the problem of the legitimacy of confessions and the legitimacy of 
illegally obtained real evidence or evidence obtained by entrapment involves 
extremely difficult choices as to what interests are to be protected as "rights" for the 
purposes of the exclusion of evidence. This is likely to be a controversial process 
because the cost of identifying an interest as a right on this theory is the potential 
exclusion of evidence which results in a patently guilty offender escaping conviction. 
These are all serious questions which any advocate of what is called "the protective 
principle" must face. 
The exclusion of relevant and reliable evidence on this basis has a great social cost - 
the non conviction of offenders, some of them dangerous, on the ground that the 
police violated a "right". Obviously when the right in question is the right not to be 
subject to torture or violence then the protective principle is largely uncontroversial. 
Ashworth however, makes clear that the protective principle has much greater scope 
than the exclusion of confession evidence obtained by violence on the part of the 
investigators. (22) 
The English cases on breach of important provisions of PACE and the Codes of 
Practice in cases of the obtaining of confession evidence can arguably be interpreted 
as disclosing a weak version of the protective principle. In the leading case of Rv 
Walsh (23) Saville J. commented that if there had been significant and substantial 
breaches of S. 58 the right to legal advice or the provisions of Code C relating to the 
recording of interviews, 
... then prirna facie at least the standards of fairness set by Parliament have not been met... " 
and therefore a confession so obtained is likely, though not inevitably, to be excluded 
from trial tmder S. 78 of PACE. Ashworth comments that a strong version of the 
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protective principle would exclude any such qualification that breaches of PACE or 
the Codes need to be "significant or substantial" before a confession is likely to be 
excluded. Ashworth in principle endorses a stronger version of the protective 
principle than is found in cases such as Rv Walsh "if rights are to be respected fully" 
(24) 
However, as Ashworth points out, 
"In terms of practical politics there may be some pressure 
to qualify the principle so as to avoid losing 'good' 
convictions for a procedural departure that really had 
little effect on the defendant's enjoyment of rights. " (25) 
However Ashworth can be criticized here. It may be the case that the "significant and 
substantial" test propounded in Rv Walsh and in Rv Keenan is not a response to 
"practical politics" but is in fact a qualification based on principle. This is to note that 
"fairness" under S. 78 has been interpreted by the Court of Appeal as meaning fairness 
to the Crown as well as fairness to the defendant: see Rv Smurthwaite (1994). (26) 
It may be the case that when the judiciary refer to the need for breaches of PACE and 
the Codes to be "significant and substantial", due weight is being given to the interests 
of the Crown. If evidence was excluded from trial merely because of an 
inconsequential breach of PACE and the Codes, as happened in Rv Fennelley (27) 
then the interests of the Crown would not be given sufficient weight by the judiciary 
and exclusion here would upset the "fairness of the proceedings". 'nerefore the test 
formulated in R, v Walsh represents a principled judicial response to PACE and the 
Codes which was a negotiated settlement between the interests of suspects and 
police/prosecuting agencies. Ashworth misrepresents the situation when he implies 
that the "significant and substantial" test is a result of the pressures of "practical 
politics", rather the judicial test is a principled response to the negotiated settlement of 
PACE. It may be that the PACE Act was the result of practical politics - but this 
criticism should not be levelled at the judiciary in their interpretation of Section 78. 
A third major view on the question of the vindication of due process values through 
the exclusion of evidence argues that the discourse of "rights'-* and their vindication by 
the law of criminal evidence is inappropriate. On this view it is not one of the 
purposes of the law of criminal evidence to vindicate the pre-trial rights of the suspect 
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through the exclusion of evidence at the trial. I. H. Dennis argues, 
" ... that the law of evidence is not overtly concerned to 
enforce individual rights ... Ibe law of evidence is an 
unsatisfactory mechanism for protecting rights. What 
are needed are compensation or punitive remedies which 
are effective and available in all cases. " (28) 
Hence where a defendant pleads guilty at trial there is no opportunity for the court to 
vindicate his pre-trial rights which may have been violated by the police, through the 
exclusion of evidence from the criminal trial. 
The main argument for this claim is that the protective principle (the "rights 
vindication model") sets up an incoherent model. This model of the criminal process 
argues that truth-finding is subject to the need to recognise certain extemal values 
which operate as side constraints as the pursuit of truth-finding. These values are the 
"rights" of the suspect in the pre-trial investigatory phase. Dennis comments, 
Individual rights and the public interest in truth-finding 
do not seem to be commensurable values which can be 
meaningfully 'balanced'. 1be effort to do so simply 
produces an unsatisfactory theory. " (29) 
The protective principle has to address in what circumstances violation of a right will 
lead to the exclusion of relevant evidence from the trial. It also has to identify first of 
all what "rights" there actually are. On the theory put forward by Professor Dennis, 
the important question is not whether a right has been violated by the police in 
obtaining evidence, the issue is rather whether breach of statutory rules governing the 
investigatory process by the police is so grave that the integrity or legitimacy of the 
trial process itself would tend to be undermined by the admission of evidence 
obtained by that breach of the rules. 
Such a view could still acknowledge the concept of "a right not to be sub ect to i 
violence during interrogation" or a "right to legal advice" but the justification for the 
law of criminal evidence to rule inadmissible evidence obtained in breach of those 
norms is not because a right per se had been breached but that a concern for the 
integrity of the trial process dictates the exclusion of the evidence. This is not to 
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downplay the importance of the "'right not to be subject to violence". Indeed, a police 
officer who violated that right would be subjected rightly to the full force of the 
criminal law as well as other punitive/disciplinary mechanisms as well as possible 
civil actions in tort law. However, on the theory put forward by Professor Dennis, 
exclusion of such "tainted" evidence is necessary for reasons which are internal to the 
purposes of the criminal trial and verdict. To argue as Ashworth does that the 
confession should be excluded because of the violation of a "right" is to suggest that 
the law of criminal evidence is responding to a concern or consideration external to 
the non-nal purposes of the law of evidence, i. e. that to vindicate a "right" there must 
be a "side constraint" on the usual purposes of the law of criminal evidence. Those 
usual purposes are securing the accuracy of the fact finding process by regulating the 
admissibility of unreliable or prejudicial evidence. Dennis comments,, 
"Apparently reliable evidence may need to be excluded if it 
carries significant risks of impairing the moral authority 
of the verdict. This is because it is not in the public interest 
that verdicts should be returned which lack moral authority. 
They are not satisfactory either for justifying individual 
punishment or for affirn-ling the values of the criminal law. 
If relevant evidence is excluded here it will be because we 
are giving effect to values which are internal, not external 
to the process of proof. " (30) 
Therefore, although there is a consensus amongst commentators as to the need for 
confessions obtained by violence or inhuman treatment to be automatically excluded 
from trial the account or justification given for such a rule differs among the 
commentators. For Ashworth it is excluded because of violation of an important 
right. For Dennis the confession should be excluded because if it was obtained by 
violence then this will seriously impair the moral authority of any verdict based on 
such evidence. 
With regard to other procedural values it is not immediately clear why there should be 
problems of legitimacy at all: why should a confession be excluded because of 
breach of a procedural right other than the right not to be subject to violence? It is 
therefore important to try to identify what is at stake when an individual is detained 
for interrogation by the police. The following is offered as an attempt to identify the 
central issues: 
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Custodial interrogation concerns the detention of the citizen by a core agency of the 
state for the primary purpose of questioning the citizen in order to produce evidence 
such as a confession for use in later criminal proceedings against the citizen. 
Given this statement, it is important therefore that there are clear rules regulating how 
the citizen should be treated by the police in custody, for the position of the citizen as 
a suspect in custody is part of a wider relationship between the citizen and the state. 
Those writers who advocate due process norin in the criminal justice system 
recognise the crucial feature of the exercise of state coercion when a suspect is 
forcibly detained for interrogation. As Herbert Packer put it, due process is a value 
system which views 
11 ... efficiency in the suppression of crime ... (as) 
subordinate to the protection of the individual in 
his confrontation with the state. " (3 1) 
Packer makes clear that although the model of due process encounters its rival of the 
crime control model, on that model's own ground in respect to the reliability of fact 
finding processes this is not the heart of the difference between the two models. The 
due process model not only argues that its precepts will lead to more accurate fact 
finding than following the precepts of the crime control model, due process is also 
informed by a set of values which are independent of reliability concerns. As Packer 
comments, 
"... in point of historical development the doctrinal 
pressures emanating from the demands of the due process 
model have tended to evolve from an original matrix of 
concern for the maximization of reliability into values 
quite different and more far reaching. Tbese values can 
be expressed in, although not adequately described by, 
the concept of the primacy of the individual and the 
complementary concept of limitation on official power. " 
(32) 
Of course, some due process values such as a right to legal advice can be justified 
both on "reliability" grounds and also on grounds independent of a wish to increase 
the reliability of confession evidence. On the reliability issue advice from a solicitor 
is likely to reduce the coercive pressures of custodial interrogation on a suspect, as the 
RCCP recognised, the presence of a lawyer will., 
11 ... provide protection and support to the suspect during interview. " (33) 
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If the coercive pressures on a suspect are reduced then it is likely that the risk of a 
false confession being produced will also lessen. 
Furthermore, a lawyer present provides independent witness to the interrogation 
process and to the subsequent terms of the confession which is likely to inhibit undue 
pressure being placed on the suspect and also provides the court with independent 
evidence of what was said and done at interrogation. Tape recording of interrogations 
is not a complete panacea, for comments can be made before the tape is switched on 
by the police or during breaks between interrogations. A lawyer may well notice 
what the tape misses. 
Independent of these benefits to the accuracy of the fact finding process of the court 
when assessing confession evidence, which a solicitor who was present at the 
interrogation can provide, a right to legal advice serves interests which are 
independent of the fact finding process at trial. Legal advice on the strength of the 
police case against the suspect and his possible options to co-operate, remain silent or 
offer an innocent explanation for his conduct, serves the important value of informed 
participation of the suspect in the process to which he is subject. The ability of 
persons to participate in an informed way in the process to which they are subject to 
may have important pay-offs in terms of the legitimacy of that process, both to the 
individual suspect and to the community as a whole. (34) 
The decision in Rv Mason 
The first Court of Appeal decision to establish that S. 78 of PACE applied to 
confession evidence was Rv Mason. 
In that case a reliable confession to fire-bombing a car was held wrongly admitted by 
the Court of Appeal on the grounds that the trial judge had not taken into account the 
deceit practised on the accused and his solicitor. The Court of Appeal laid emphasis 
on the vital consideration (35) namely the "deceit practised on the appellanfs 
solicitor" and deprecated the police deceit, 
it ... particularly ... on a solicitor whose duty it is to 
advise (the client) unfettered by false information 
from the police. " (36) 
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It is unclear what the position would have been if the deceit had been practised solely 
on the suspect. The crucial feature in Rv Mason was the deceit practised on the 
solicitor which went to the heart of any objectivity the solicitor could give in advisi g 
his client. If the deceit was practised solely on a suspect then another principle apart 
from the need to preserve the value of unfettered legal advice win have to be 
advanced to have the admission ruled inadmissible under Section 78 of PACE. 
Professor Birch identified the issue in Rv Mason as "the right not to be lied to". This 
principle is capable of extension to the situation where the police practice a deceit 
solely on a suspect. However, it should not be thought that the Court of Appeal in R 
v Mason. decreed that all confessions obtained after lies to a suspect's lawyer should 
henceforth be inadmissible. No such general proposition can be located within the 
judgement. 
Moreover, it is not clear that "the right not to be lied to" can be located in English pre- 
trial criminal investigations. The use of "information bluffs" by the police (i. e. 
pretending to have more evidence against the accused than in fact exists without 
specifying the nature of the evidence) is a familiar police tactic. What made the 
police conduct in Rv Mason so objectionable was that the police interfered with the 
suspect-solicitor relationship by lying about the state of the evidence. The suspect is 
entitled, as a consequence of S. 58 of PACE to unfettered legal advice on what he 
should say (if anything) to the police. As a consequence of the He to the solicitor, the 
solicitor advised his client to explain any involvement the suspect had with the 
offence. Where a lie is told to a suspect only by the police then that might be a 
situation where S. 76 2(b) could operate because of the potential unreliability of a 
confession so obtained. It is too strong to propose as Professor Birch does, "a right 
not to be lied to", for not only is there a question as to whether this right actually 
exists (i. e. can it be located within the legal materials and discourse of the English 
criminal legal system? ) but how would contravention of this alleged right by the 
police "so adversely affect the fairness of the proceedings" that any confession made 
should therefore be excluded under S. 78 of PACE. A "right not to be lied to" seems 
too strong as an unqualified principle as it might extend to ruling inadmissible the 
confession obtained by the sort of tactics used in, R v Bailey and Smith (1994) (37), 
tactics which the Court of Appeal held unobjectionable. In Rv Bailey, the police 
created a 'false' impression so as to lull the suspects into a false sense of security so 
that they made incriminating remarks which were recorded in their police cell. If the 
police had not lied to the suspects in Rv Bailey , 
then they would not have confessed. 
However, there was not an express misrepresentation in Rv Bailey as there was in R 
v Mason. 
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Perhaps a relevant consideration in the context of the decision by the Court of Appeal 
in Rv Mason was the nature of the offence and the type of evidence produced. If in a 
murder case the police lied to a suspect and his solicitor about the state of the 
evidence against the suspect and then the suspect on legal advice, produces the 
murder weapon then perhaps the court would take a different view on the 
admissibility of real evidence than the confession evidence in Rv Mason. 
English law has always drawn a sharp division in its treatment of improperly obtained 
confessions and its treatment of improperly obtained real evidence. The latter has 
rarely been excluded. It is significant in this context that just because a confession 
has been ruled inadmissible under S. 76 this does not affect the admissibility in law of 
any fact discovered as a result of that confession - see S. 76(4). For example, the 
murder weapon with the accused's fingerprints on it would be admissible even if 
found as a result of the accused's inadmissible confession. As a matter of strict 
principle it should not matter for the purposes of S. 78 whether the deceit of the 
solicitor results in a confession or real evidence being produced. In both cases the 
suspect is entitled to have unfettered legal advice on whether to co-operate with the 
police or not. However, it is also true that as a matter of practice, confessions and real 
evidence have traditionally received different treatment from the English courts. As 
Birch comments on the Stagg (38) case, 
"Real difficulty would have arisen had S. produced 
convincing evidence of involvement in the crime: the 
murder weapon perhaps. The unacceptability of the 
strategy would then have had to be weighed against 
the reliability of the outcome, taking into account the 
difficulty of detecting the crime and the fact that more 
conventional enquiries had failed to produce a result. 
Quite possibly the evidence would have been 
admitted. " (39) 
This is so despite the fact that any confession would likely have been excluded under 
S. 76 2(b) or as in the Rv Hall case under S. 78. The point is that the Court of Appeal 
might tolerate a deceit on a solicitor which produced from the client real evidence as 
opposed to a confession. 
Perhaps as a factor influencing judicial decisions to exclude evidence "seriousness of 
offence" is a factor too. In Mason although the offence was arson there was no 
inunediate threat to life in the circumstances of the case. If the defendant in Mason 
had attempted to bum the house down with the occupants in it and he had confessed 
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following the same deceit practised by the police on, him and his solicitor, then it is 
interesting to speculate what the attitude of the Court of Appeal would have been. 
For then not only an offender but a very dangerous offender would have gone free 
following the inadmissibility of the confession. 
Significantly Rv Khan (19941 a non-confession case on S. 78 establishes that 
seriousness of offence (40) is a relevant factor on the exercise of the S. 78 discretion. 
The more serious the offence the less likely it is that the evidence will be excluded 
under S. 78. This is in accord with the exercise of the discretion to exclude the 
evidence of an accomplice mentioned by Lawton L. J. in Rv Turner. (41) Lawton 
L. J. commented that the more serious the offence then the greater demands of justice 
to convict the defendant on the evidence of an accomplice and therefore the discretion 
to exclude should less likely be exercised. 
However, Watkins L. J. did comment emphatically at the end of his judgement in Rv 
Mason that 
... we think we ought to say that we hope never again to hear of deceit such as this being practised on an 
accused person and more particularly possibly on a 
solicitor whose duty it is to advise him unfettered by 
false information upon the police. " 
This comment suggests that whatever the nature of the offence the kind of police 
deceit practised in Rv Mason will not be tolerated by the Court of Appeal and so will 
lead to the exclusion of a confession so obtained. Perhaps a differently constituted 
Court of Appeal might take a different view in the case of a very serious crime such 
as murder. 
If a right such as the right to legal advice can be justified on grounds independent of a 
concern to enhance the reliability of confessions then to argue that breach of the right 
to legal advice by the police should merely go to the weight a confession has before a 
jury (the RCCP proposal) (42) may well be an inadequate response to police violation 
of that right. It is arguable that a deliberate breach of that right should affect the 
admissibility of a subsequent confession. This is the only effective way that the non- 
reliability based values which a right to legal advice represent can be properly 
vindicated. If reliability of confessions was the only justification for the right to legal 
advice then breach of that right might be properly treated as a matter going to the 
weight of the confession before the jury. Yet this approach cannot give effect to say, 
the value of informed participation by a suspect in the legal process he is subject to, 
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this being a value which the right to legal advice represents. The only effective way 
of giving effect and support to this value is to exclude a confession where it was made 
consequent as a deliberate wrongful denial of legal advice. 
Section 58 of PACE and its interl2retation by the courts 
One of the most significant changes in judicial attitudes is in relation to the right to 
legal advice. It is not even clear that this was considered to be "a right" of the suspect 
in the pre PACE era. The situation regarding judicial attitudes to breaches of the 
Judges' Rules reached a low point with the decision in Rv Prager (1972) where the 
discretion to exclude a confession obtained in breach of the Judges' Rules was 
doubted by Edmund-Davies J., who said, 
"'neir non-observance will not necessarily lead to a 
confession being excluded from evidence unless it is 
shown that the confession was not made voluntarily. " (43) 
However, there are cases after Prager in which breach of the Rules did lead to 
exclusion of a confession under the discretion confirmed in Rv Voisin (1918) The 
principle in the Rules relating to access to legal advice seems to have been the basis 
of a number of decisions in the defendant's favour where access had been wrongfully 
denied by the police. 
Rv Allen (1977) (44) a decision of Norwich Crown Court, Rv Trickett (1981) (45) 
and Rv Marsh (1985) (46), two decisions of the Central Criminal Court, all excluded 
confessions on this basis. Rv Elliott and Rv Lemsatef (47) both reported in the same 
year as Rv Allen, were more indicative of the judicial trend. This trend was to admit 
confessions to the trial even though they had been obtained in breach of the 
requirement that the suspect should be allowed access to a solicitor if he wished. In R 
v Elliott Kilner Brown L, refused to exclude a confession where the police had 
wrongly denied access to a solicitor; the judge said, 
"If the impression should be gained that the judges ought 
to punish police officers for breaches of the Judges' Rules, 
that clearly and plainly begs the proper question and is 
not the proper test. " 
rlbe proper test being, according to Kilner Brown J., 
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"... did breach of the Rules render the confession unreliable? " 
This comment of Kilner Brown J. is in line with the comment of Lord Diplock in Rv 
Sang (1979) that it was not part of the functions of the judge to discipline the police 
over the way in which they have obtained evidence. (48) 
In Rv Stephen King (1980) the Court of Appeal held that there was no obligation on 
the police (49) to inform a suspect of his right to speak to a solicitor since the 
Administrative Directions which supplemented the Judges' Rules said only that the 
suspect should be allowed to speak to a solicitor, which presupposed a request from 
him. The Codes of Practice of course, impose a duty now on the police to inforin a 
suspect of his right to legal advice - Code C paragraph 3.1 -a duty which first arises 
when a suspect is under arrest at a police station. A further example of judicial 
attitudes to the principle of access to legal advice pre PACE is provided for by the 
case of Rv Fell (1984) where the defendant was convicted of murder. The police 
ignored his requests for a solicitor and his subsequent confession was the only 
evidence against him. The trial judge acknowledged a breach of the Judges' Rules but 
refused to exclude his confessions. 'Me comments of the trial judge were upheld in 
1985 by the Court of Appeal, 
It was the pursuit of truth, it was what the police officer 
sought, the interests of justice which authorised and required 
him to deny and deprive Peter Fell of the assistance of a 
solicitor ... You will remember that by the time of the 
confession interview ... the defendant had been in custody for more than two days and he had been questioned by 
detectives two at a time for a total of some eight and a half 
hours. " (50) 
It is interesting in the light of developments under PACE that there is little in the pre 
PACE law reports to indicate that the judiciary believed that there is a right to legal 
advice whose denial would very probably lead to exclusion. Exclusion of confession 
evidence under the Judges' Rules remained an idiosyncratic matter depending on the 
attitudes of particular judges. 
After the decision in Rv Swnuel (1988), there can be no serious doubt about the 
importance the judiciary now attach to the right to legal advice. As Professor Zander 
said of this Court of Appeal decision, (5 1) 
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"T'he decision which was given in December 1987 was a 
considerable shock to the police. It showed that the courts 
were prepared to enforce the provisions of S. 58 with an 
unexpected degree of vigour. " 
Reiner and Leigh corroborate the dramatic impact of Rv Samuel 
"Samuel sent shock waves through the police as it 
came to be realized painfully that PACE would be 
interpreted much more stringently than the Judges' 
Rules. " (52) 
The significance of Samuel is that the right to legal advice was described by Hodgson 
J. as, 
11 a ftmdamental right of the citizen... " 
whose wrongful denial by the police will very likely lead to the exclusion of a 
resultant confession as a matter of discretion under Section 78. In the subsequent 
first-instance decision of Rv Williams the trial judge excluded the confession because 
at the time of her arrest in her flat on suspicion of involvement in drug importation 
there was an interview with customs officers in which she was not told of her right to 
legal advice. The suspect then allegedly admitted involvement in drug importation. 
The trial judge took the view that it would be "totally unfair" to include into trial the 
evidence of the interview, applying Rv Samuel (53). 
Access to legal advice is not now understood as something that the police should as 
fair minded individuals grant to a suspect where that is convenient to "the 
administration of justice", rather it is understood as a basic right of the citizen which 
is not in the hands of the police to grant or deny. 
It is important to note that access to legal advice can be delayed for up to 36 hours but 
only after strict criteria have been met: S. 58(8) of PACE on the grounds for delay. 
Research studies on PACE indicate that over two-thirds of suspects detained in police 
stations do not exercise their right to see a solicitor. However, this represents a 
doubling of the proportion who do see a solicitor compared to pre PACE experience. 
(54) 
The police can no longer reason as they could in the era of the Judges' Rules that a 
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request for legal advice by the suspect can be denied without proper justification and 
that any confession obtained will still be admitted into evidence. The obvious reason 
why the police would wish to prevent a suspect from seeing a solicitor is that the 
solicitor might caution silence in the face of police questioning. The Codes of 
Practice specify in Annex B to Code of Practice C that, 
" Access to a solicitor may not be delayed on the grounds 
that he might advise the person not to answer any questions. " 
However, for Sharpe (55) in his treatise on Habeas Corpus, this ability of the police to 
delay access to legal advice in the case of a serious arrestable offence under Section 
58(8) is totally unacceptable in that it may prevent a suspect from applying for the 
writ when his arrest and detention might be unlawful. In Canada in contrast, the 
principle of immediate access to legal advice has constitutional force in the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, S. 1 O(b). 
The later cases of Rv Alladice (1988) and Rv Dunford (1990) can be interpreted as 
providing some "comfort for the police". In these cases it was held that a confession 
obtained after wrongful denial of access to legal advice was not necessarily 
inadmissible under S. 78. If the defendant knew of his rights independently of a legal 
advisor then a resultant confession could still be admitted even if legal advice had 
been wrongfully denied. In Rv Dunford (56) the Court of Appeal followed Rv 
Alladice in holding that, 
" ... the solicitor's advice would not 
have added anything 
to this particular appellant's knowledge of his rights. " 
The Court of Appeal in Dunford pointed out that even where there was a clear breach 
of S. 58 the court must stiH balance all the circumstances and decide whether or not 
there exists such an adverse effect upon the fairness of the proceedings that justice 
requires the evidence to be excluded. To say that a suspect has a right to legal advice 
and that therefore any wrongful denial should lead' to exclusion under S. 78 is no 
argwnent - what has to be shown is that denial would have such an adverse effect on 
the fairness of the proceedings that S. 78 should be invoked. 
However, both Rv Alladice and Rv Dunford can be criticized in the following terms; 
A- - that a suspect may know of his rights in the abstract is not the issue, for this is no 
compensation for legal advice on how to exercise those rights in the context of the 
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actual case the suspect faces. 
Moreover, one of the purposes of a legal advisor is to explain the legal meaning of 
such concepts as dishonesty, intent or recklessness and knowledge of this may wen 
affect what the suspect says or does not say to the police. Indeed, under the terms of 
S-34 of the 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act the suspect faces a further 
difficult choice of giving information to the police about the offence or staying silent 
and risking adverse inferences being drawn at trial from that silence. Legal advice in 
the particular circumstances of the case is therefore made more crucial to the suspect 
by the introduction of S. 34 of the 1994 Act. Indeed by S. 58 (2) of the Youth Justice 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 an adverse inference under Section 34 cannot be 
drawn unless the suspect had been allowed an opportunity to consult a solicitor prior 
to being questioned at an authorised place of detention. 
Although access to legal advice was described in the following tenns in S. 58 of 
PACE, 
"A person ... held in custody in a police station ... shall be entitled if he so requests to consult a solicitor privately 
at any time... " 
it was by no means inevitable that the judiciary should have taken so strict a line on 
the consequences of breach of that provision. Indeed, the PACE Act is silent on what 
the consequences of a breach of S. 58 should be. It is argued here that recognition by 
the judges that PACE represents a new settlement between police and suspect must 
surely have played a part in their attitude to deliberate breaches of S. 58 by the police. 
In this sense there is a parallel with judicial attitudes to breach of the recording 
provisions for interviews at the police station. Where those breaches are substantial 
exclusion almost as a matter of course will follow. The case Rv Walsh (57) is 
significant in this context, in that there had been in that case breaches of both the 
recording provisions and S. 58. In that case Saville J. commented that if there had 
been significant and substantial breaches of S. 58 or the provisions of the Code 
relating to the recording of interviews, 
" ... then prima 
facie at least the standards of fairness set 
by Parliament have not been met. " 
In Rv Walsh the following important statement of principle was made, 
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"Although bad faith may make substantial or significant that 
which might not otherwise be so, the contrary does not follow. 
Breaches which are in themselves significant and substantial 
are not rendered otherwise by the good faith of the officers 
concerned. " 
This is a significant comment given that under the old Judges' Rules the presence or 
otherwise of good or bad faith seems to have been an irrelevant consideration. 
What the comment of Saville J. reveals is that the judiciary fully appreciate that 
PACE and the Codes represent a new settlement between police and suspect, and 
deliberate police breach of that settlement is likely to upset the "fairness of the 
proceedings" for the purposes of S. 78. Inadvertent breach of that settlement is only 
likely to bring S. 78 into operation if the breach is "significant and substantial". 
Breaches of the Codes of Practice which are made in good faith and which are not 
"significant and substantial" should not involve the exercise of the judge's discretion 
under S. 78 to exclude relevant evidence from the trial. The "new settlement" is not so 
fragile as to require the exclusion of evidence solely because the police have breached 
the Codes of Practice. 
As has been pointed out in various cases such as Rv OLoughlin (1987) (58) Rv 
Smurthwaite (1994) "fairness" under S. 78 means "fairness" to the interests of the 
prosecution as well as of the defence. Exclusion of evidence solely because there was 
a breach of the Codes would not be to give sufficient weight to the interests of the 
prosecution. Moreover, under S. 78 the test is whether admission of the evidence 
"would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court 
ought not to admit it"', not merely an effect on the fairness of the proceedings. This 
suggests something of a threshold before a breach of the Codes would dictate 
exclusion of evidence. 
Section 76 2(a) of PACE and its interpretation b-v the courts 
It has to be accepted that some psychological pressure on some suspects is necessary 
to persuade them to confess when in fact they are guilty. This point is fully accepted 
by Gudjonsson, the forensic psychologist who aided the defence in 'Me Guildford 
Four and Birmingham Six appeals, (59) 
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I think it is important to realise that unless there is 
some kind of perceived pressure or that people believe 
that the police have something on them in the majority 
of cases people would not confess ... I do believe that a 
certain amount of pressure is essential in police work. " 
It may also be the case that some interrogative pressure is necessary even for those 
suspects who feel remorse for their offence and wish to confess to relieve their inner 
tension. Gudjonsson and Bownes in a research study into prisoners in Northern 
Ireland being held for sex or property offences, comment (60) 
"... the more remorseful criminals are about their offences 
the more likely they are to experience an urge to confess. 
However, the same blame attribution factors were 
associated with strong inhibitions about confessing. That 
is blaming the offence on internal mental factors (rather 
than on society) still leaves offenders feeling ashamed 
about having committed the offence and in order to 
overcome the resistance caused by the shame, more 
interrogative pressure is required. These findings have 
important implications for police interrogation techniques. 
They indicate that suspects who feel great remorse about 
their offence and those who blame the offence on internal 
mental factors like loss of temporary control, are going 
to be reluctant to confess to their offence, even though 
they have a great need to do so. The reason for this is 
probably related to the shame they experience in 
connection with the offence. In other words., remorseful 
suspects also feel most ashamed about what they have done 
and this inhibits them from confessing. These findings are 
consistent with views of some experienced interrogators. " 
Interestingly, the playing down of the seriousness of the offence is a very effective 
technique in inducing remorseful suspects to confess by offering them "face-saving" 
devices to confess. It will be remembered that in Rv Delaney (1988) the police were 
alleged to have down-played the seriousness of the offence which Delaney was 
suspected of, indecent assault. 71be Court of Appeal did not approve of this technique 
because of Delaney's mental age, which was that of a young child and ruled his 
confession inadmissible under S. 76 2(b) of PACE. If Delaney had been a suspect of 
normal intelligence then it is unlikely that his confession would have fallen foul of 
S. 76 2(b). "Down-playing" the seriousness of the offence is a useful interrogative 
strategy to induce remorseful suspects to overcome their shame and confess 
truthfully. Delaney in contrast, was a very vulnerable suspect who may have been 
induced into a false confession by the police manipulation. 
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However, as Gudjonsson and others have shown through research, the more 
psychological pressure that is applied to suspects, especially vulnerable suspects to 
induce them to confess the more likely it is that false confession will be produced. 
This means that there are cogent reliability based concerns for the police not to 
employ oppressive interrogative questioning for example. Yet there is a legitimacy 
issue independent of this concern for the reliability of confessions. 
At what point does the pressure applied to suspects to obtain a confession become 
"oppressive" so that the trial process should forego any confession obtained by those 
methods? 
Given that a finding of oppression under S. 76 2(a) of PACE leads to the automatic 
exclusion of a confession without any consideration or argument as to its unreliability 
or its potential unreliability it is important to identify what police conduct does fall 
within the operation of this exclusionary rule. If the threshold of 'oppression' is set 
too low then there is a danger that too many guilty offenders will go free. To 
emphasize the point a fmding of oppression leads to the automatic exclusion of a 
confession without any argument as to the effect of the oppressive conduct on the 
reliability or potential reliability of the confession. The Court of Appeal has an 
important role to play in identifying these core prohibited practices for S. 76 (8) of 
PACE is only a partial definition of what police conduct counts as "oppression" (see 
Rv Fulling (1987) (61)). Obviously there are limits to the precision of this 
identifying exercise by the Court of Appeal. Therefore Robert Reiner's plea for a 
clear statement on, 
'I ... how much verbal abuse, how loud a voice, how many 
repeated questions constitute oppression for the purposes 
of S. 76 2(a). " (62) 
is a completely unrealistic demand on the Court of Appeal. Mr. Justice Mitchell said 
in Rv Heron, 
11 ... where the 
line is to be drawn between proper and 
robust persistence and oppressive interrogation can 
only be identified in general tenns. " (63) 
Whilst some interrogative practices such as the use of threat of violence are always 
unacceptable in a civilized society, the use of other practices such as intensive 
interrogative questioning may or may not be oppressive depending on the degree of 
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Mtensity of questioning involved and the personality of the suspect. The degree of 
intensity is likely to depend on a number of factors, the length of questioning, the 
amount of verbal abuse, the tone of voice, the nwnber of accusatory questions and 
the personafity and age of the suspect. 
The decisions in Rv Emmerson (1991) (64) and Rv Miller (1993), the first decision 
holding that a "rude and discourteous" interrogation was not oppressive and the other 
holding that a very intensive interrogation was oppressive, illustrates that with regard 
to questioning it is all a matter of degree on whether the questioning is oppressive or 
not. The Court of Appeal in Rv Heaton (1993) (65) distinguished Rv Miller on the 
ground that although police officers had raised their voices slightly in the interview 
there was no shouting and the interview had only lasted 75 minutes. This is perfectly 
correct for it would tend to seriously frustrate the important aim of convicting the 
guilty through confession evidence if a forceful accusatory attitude by the police in 
interrogating a suspect was held to be in itself "oppressive". 
In parallel with the above point, the term violence in S. 76 (8) must as Tapper notes 
"indicate more than a mere battery" since 
"' ... the requirement of so small a degree of 
force would be 
prone to cause disputes in far too many perfectly reasonable 
and acceptable situations. " (66) 
Again the threshold of oppression must not be set too low for then too many 
acceptable confessions would be ruled out as inadmissible because for example, a 
police officer had put his hand on a suspect's shoulder during questioning. 
The next issue to be considered is to examine exactly why certain police practices are 
considered so objectionable that their use invites an automatic exclusionary rule to 
operate on any confession so produced. 
It is interesting that official reports which have considered the issue of police 
interrogation, for example the CLRC Eleventh Report and the RCCP Report, have 
tended to denounce the use of 'oppressive' methods in very general terms without 
offering a detailed account of why such methods are unacceptable. T"he CLRC in its 
Eleventh Report limited itself to the following comments, 
"We do not think it would be right or acceptable to 
public opinion to make any exception to admissibility 
where there had been oppression. " (67) 
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The RCCP was slightly more expansive in its explanation of the prohibition on 
violence and torture as interrogative methods, 
"In order to mark the seriousness of any breach of the rule 
prohibiting violence, threat of violence, torture or inhuman 
or degrading treatment and society's abhorrence of such 
conduct, non-compliance with this prohibition should 
lead to the automatic exclusion of evidence so obtained. " (68) 
These condemnations of 'oppressive' methods in securing confessions are cast in very 
general terms and do not make any explicit connection between the values that the 
trial process exists to uphold and denial of those values which occurs when the police 
use violence or torture to obtain evidence for use in the criminal trial. 
Recognition of this point would bring out clearly the important issue that the use of 
violence or torture by the police in obtaining evidence is not only publicly 
unacceptable but is not consonant with the values which the criminal trial process 
seeks to uphold. 
Therefore, even if public opinion were to change with regard to the acceptability of 
police violence against certain suspects (e. g. terrorist suspects involved in a 
determined and widespread campaign of violence against society, public opinion may 
well sanction the use of violence by the police here) the important point of principle 
would retain its force to rule out such methods. A conviction based on confession 
evidence obtained through violence or torture by the police would still be 
unacceptable as being a contradiction of the purposes of the trial process and verdict 
in a liberal democratic society. As Professor 1. H. Dennis has written, 
"At one level the verdict represents a conclusion that the 
factual demonstration has or has not been made out. 
But this is not the only message that the verdict carries. 
A verdict of guilty also conveys moral condemnation of 
the defendant. It is an expression of moral blame. At 
a deeper level the verdict is additionally an expression 
of the norms of the criminal law and of the consequences 
of breach of such norms -" (69) 
To understand the legitimacy of the verdict theory it is important to grasp the fact that 
the crn=al trial and verdict communicates more than merely the fact that a particular 
defendant is guilty or innocent. 
176 
Criminal trials perform valuable symbolic and educational functions which 
communicate messages about the importance of the rule of law and the deterrence of 
criminality which are independent of truth finding. 
This perhaps slightly overstates the point since without a perceived general accuracy 
of verdict the criminal trial could not command the moral authority to communicate 
those "valuable symbolic and educational functions" but the main point is a valid one 
that the criminal trial has a significance beyond the conclusion that the defendant is 
guilty or innocent. Police impropriety in the investigative stage can diminish the 
moral integrity of the criminal trial which passes judgement on a defendant on the 
basis of evidence gathered by the police. A good example is the case of torture to 
obtain a confession. The use of torture to obtain a confession, according to Professor 
Dennis, 
11 ... amounts to a gross violation of the fundamental 
principle of according all citizens respect and dignity. " (70) 
Consequently, 
"A verdict derived from such a violation is self-contradictory. 
It cannot fulfil its integral functions of making a morally 
justified statement of the defendant's blameworthiness and 
fitness for pw-iishment and of conveying an expressive 
message that the criminal law incorporates values which it 
is necessary to uphold by punishment. " (7 1) 
This arguanent of principle must be clearly distinguished from a separate 
consequentialist argument used to bolster the prohibition on confessions obtained by 
torture or violence. As Dennis has written, 
"Furthermore, ) to uphold a conviction in this case would 
carry great risks of a loss of public confidence in the 
integrity of the criminal process and of the criminal 
law itself. Ibe state should not therefore be able to 
rely upon evidence obtained by such methods. " (72) 
Appeals to the acceptability of certain methods of police interrogation with public 
opinion must surely only be a subsidiary argument in favour of a ban on confessions 
obtained by torture or violence. 
The main argument against the use of violence or torture should be based on strong 
moral considerations, namely that, as the Home Office memorandum to the Royal 
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Commission on Criminal Justice in December 1992 stated, 
"Oppressive behaviour is offensive to the very values of 
Crfininal Justice. " (73) 
Interestingly from 1973 the law in Northern Ireland rendered a confession to a 
scheduled terrorist offence inadmissible if obtained by subjecting the suspect 
"... to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment in order 
to induce him to make it. " 
(Northern Ireland kEmergency Provisions) Act 1978, s. 8(2 1)) 
This provision was introduced as a response to the excesses of some members of 
these security services and police in interrogating suspects in the fraught atmosphere 
of early 1970s in Northern Ireland. However, it was also designed to make more 
confessions admissible than under the common law voluntariness test which it 
replaced. With the abandonment of internment the obtaining of convictions upon 
confession evidence became vital in the fight against terrorism. The brutal 
interrogation of suspects in Northern Ireland in the 1970s attracted international 
concern, see the Amnesty International Report in 1978 as an example. Certain 
interrogation techniques of the security services led to major embarrassment for the 
British Government when the case of Ireland v UK (1978) , 
(74) was decided against 
Britain in the European Court of Human Rights. The Court held that Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights was breached due to the use by the security 
forces in Northern Ireland of five specific techniques of interrogation. These five 
techniques were, forcing suspects to stand right up to a wall for hours, being hooded 
for hours, subjection to persistent noise, deprivation of sleep and deprivation of food. 
The deprivation of sleep is especially likely to produce a highly suggestible state in 
even the most hardened of suspects. It has been commented by Peter Suedfeld in 
"Psychology and Torture" (75) that, 
it... of the methods enumerated, the sustained disruption 
of sleep patterns - either by complete sleep deprivation or 
by violently altering the accustomed diurnal cycle - has 
been singled out as leading not only to dread and dis- 
orientation, but eventually to an internalized belief in 
false confessions. It has been called probably the most 
potent of all the debilitating elements of softening up 
prisoners. " 
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The techniques of the UK security services were held by the European Court of 
Human Rights to amount to treatment that was inhuman and degrading but not to 
torture. 
The provision quoted above in Northern Ireland law was drawn from Article 3 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights. It was later incorporated into the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act in England and Wales by S. 76 (8) of PACE, as a partial 
definition of "oppression". Interrogation practices in England, although not generally 
of the brutality experienced by suspects in Northern Ireland in the 1970s, seem to 
have left a lot to be desired. A study into English practice by Walkley (76) in 1983 
showed that over half the detectives he interviewed were prepared to use force or the 
threat of force when questioning suspects. 32% of those questioned were prepared to 
use force. A further 34% of detectives were prepared to countenance the use or threat 
of force. The Walkley study is quoted without objection in a recent paper by Tom 
Williamson, who is a Detective Chief Superintendent in the Metropolitan Police 
Service. Although Williamson (77) does stress that there has been a discernible move 
towards non oppressive interrogation techniques in the post PACE era, "the transition 
from coercive questioning practice is only just beginning". There is some evidence to 
suggest that a heavy handed approach to the interrogation of suspects may have been 
somewhat encouraged by a C. I. D. culture which accorded status to those detectives 
who could secure a confession from a suspect quickly. 
In his autobiography, Jack Slipper, a Detective Chief Superintendent in the Flying 
Squad in the 1970s recounts an interrogation of a woman who was "so nervous she 
was literally vomiting in the wastebasket in the C. I. D. office". Detective Chief 
Superintendent Slipper's account of his approach is interesting for the light it casts on 
C. I. D. culture at the time. (78) 
"When a woman does that (vomiting) it's natural to be 
tempted to ease off but in those circumstances a good 
policeman cannot afford to say, Well never mind love, 
we will talk about it again in the morning ... It is still 
your duty to carry on. That's what the ratepayers pay 
you for and, I have to admit, pride comes in to it also. 
if you ease off a suspect and a colleague comes in half 
an hour later and gets a full confession, your own good 
name can come unstuck in one evening. You may get 
all kinds of sympathy and your excuses may be accepted, 
but in the bar in the Yard where all the police gossip 
circulates the word soon goes out that 'Jack is losing his 
I it grip ... 
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This illustrates that legal changes to the recording of interrogations and the provision 
of legal advice, whilst important, must be accompanied by a change in C. I. D. culture 
which has often accorded social and professional status to the detective who can 
'obtain' confessions from suspects without a corresponding concern for the reliability 
of those confessions. The police now claim that there is much greater pre- 
interrogation preparation so as to make sure that the interrogation proceeds on the 
basis of reliable information. John Smith (79) the Deputy Commissioner of the 
Metropolitan Police, comments that the quashing of the convictions of the Tottenham 
71bree caused the police "a hell of a lot of anguish". As a result he claims the 
emphasis is now on investigations before anyone was arrested with "a minimal 
reliance on confession evidence". Interestingly research studies do bear out this 
change in police attitudes to interrogation. David Dixon (80) from his own research 
published in 1990 has commented recently, 
11... crucially there has been a shift in evaluations of 
investigative methods: the tradition of arresting m 
hunches, interrogating and giving weak cases "a run" 
has been challenged by according status to officers 
who investigate more carefully before arrest and who 
find ways of working within the rules. " 
Given the importance of custodial interrogation of suspects to the aims of criminal 
justice and the danger that the police in seeking to fulfil those aims will overstep the 
mark of propriety, it is vital that the Criminal Justice System has an unambiguous 
statement on what police methods in obtaining confession it will not even begin to 
countenance. This is the function of S. 76 2(a), a declaration of the core prohibited 
interrogative practices that will not be tolerated by the system, irrespective of the 
reliability issue. 
Any inquiry by the judge under S. 76 2(b) begins by asking whether the police 
methods used tended to affect the reliability "of any confession which the suspect may 
have made in consequence thereof'. With regard to "oppressive" tactics by the police, 
the consequences of this inquiry by the judge will virtually always be that the 
confession is ruled inadmissible if S. 76 2(b) is applied correctly. 
However, with regard to tactics such as violence or threats of violence, it would be 
inappropriate and inconsistent with the values of criminal justice to treat the 
admissibility of a confession obtained by such methods as going to the reliability 
question under S. 76 2(b). As Professor Birch has written, the intention of S. 76 2(a) is 
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to armotmce that, 
it ... some basic minimw-n standards are not negotiable 
and courts cannot entertain arguments based on the 
reliability of evidence obtained in an oppressive way 
without descending to the level of the oppressor. " (8 1) 
Thus S. 76 (8) has a list of absolutely prohibited police practices which if used will 
bring in the operation of S. 76 2(a) automatically. The question then becomes, since 
S. 76 (8) is only a partial definition of "oppression" what other practices can constitute 
"oppression" for the purposes of S. 76 2(a)? Rv Miller (1992) decided that aggressive 
interrogation questioning can constitute "oppression". The question then becomes 
whether "oppression"' in this case is a variable concept depending on the personality 
of the suspect and his vulnerabilities. It may be argued that a lower level of intensity 
of questioning may become "oppressive" for a juvenile or an old lady but not for an 
experienced hardened criminal. 
It could be argued that S. 76 2(b) is available to cover those cases which require a 
detem-iination of the individual vulnerabilities of suspects before a confession is ruled 
inadmissible. 
Intensive questioning of certain vulnerable suspects could be viewed as "somedling 
said or done" which was likely to affect the reliability of any confession made. In R v, 
Fulling (82) Lord Lane said that S. 76 2(b) is. ) 
it... wide enough to cover some of the circumstances which 
under the earlier rule were embraced by what seems to 
us to be the artificially wide definition of oppression 
approved in Rv Prager (1972). " 
Ibe common law concept of oppressive questioning was defined in Rv Prager 
approving Lord MacDermott's address to the Bentham Club, as 
... questioning which 
by its nature, duration or other 
attendant circumstances ... so affects the mind of the 
suspect that his will crumbles and he speaks when other- 
wise he would have remained silent. " 
As Dennis has recently observed, 
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... taken literally, this principle made questioning of 
suspects in police custody virtually impossible. " (83) 
It might be argued that S. 76 2(a) only covers those cases of intensive interrogative 
questioning which are clearly "oppressive" for all suspects. For confessions produced 
from less intensive questioning, but still intensive questioning, S. 76 2(b) is available 
to deal with any problem, if it is felt given the vulnerabilities of a certain suspect that 
intensive questioning (as opposed to mere questioning) is likely to lead to an 
unreliable confession. However, it is proposed not to agree with this viewpoint. 
If the police engage in an intensive interrogation of a 12 year old boy or a mentally 
handicapped person, for example, it might well be the case that the interrogation is 
rightly stigmatized as "oppressive" whereas it would not necessarily be oppressive if 
the same interrogation was of an experienced career criminal. This was recognised by 
the common law concept of oppression, see Rv Hudson (1980) (84). If one of the 
main reasons for the existence of S. 76 2(a) is to declare certain police interrogation 
methods publicly unacceptable regardless of their actual impact on the reliability of 
confessions (contrast S. 76 2(b) here) then S. 76 2(a) is properly invoked where the 
police subject extremely vulnerable members of society to the kind of interrogative 
questioning which should be reserved only for the most hardened of criminals. This 
is of course, not to advocate intensive interrogation for any suspect. Indeed all 
suspects are vulnerable to a lesser or greater degree in police custody. It is merely to 
recognise that certain suspects will not talk to the police unless some verbal pressure 
is placed upon them. However, where police interrogative questioning reaches a 
certain level of intensity it becomes "oppressive" for all suspects, and any confession 
made as a result should be ruled inadmissible under S. 76 2(a). 
Rv Miller provides a good example of when interrogative questioning becomes 
"oppressive" regardless of the vulnerabilities of a particular suspect. However, in Rv 
NEller the Court of Appeal did make reference to the fact that Stephen Miller had a 
mental age of eleven so it would appear that under S. 76 2(a) the vulnerabilities of a 
particular suspect is one factor in deciding whether police tactics used were 
"oppressive". 
? Me first major case on S. 76 2(a) was Rv Fulling (1987). It was at the time PACE 
was passed an open question whether the common law definition of "oppression" 
survived given that S. 76 (8) represented only a partial definition of "oppression". The 
common law concept of "oppression" was a relative and flexible concept. It could 
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take accotmt of the suspeces personality and the effect of the interrogation on him. 
The test which the common law arrived at was first stated in Rv Priestley (1965) by 
Sachs J. Oppressive questioning was held to be, 
"... that which tends to sap and has sapped that free wifl 
which must exist before a confession is volimtary. " 
In Rv Fulling, the Court of Appeal rejected the "artificially wide definition" of 
oppression approved of in such cases as , 
Prager and Hudson. The court said that 
PACE was a codifying act and that therefore the court should not reassert the old law 
on oppression. The Lord Chief Justice defined oppression by its "ordinary dictionary 
meaning". This was the, 
11... exercise of authority or power in a burdensome, harsh 
or wrongful manner: mjust or cruel treatment of subjects, 
inferiors etc., the imposition of unreasonable or unjust 
burdens. " 
Lord Lane continued, quoting from the Oxford English Dictionary, 
"There is not a word in our language which expresses 
more detestable wickedness than oppression. " 
The emotional cruelty practiced by the police in this case, telling the suspect that in 
the police cell next to her was her boyfriend's lover, is probably insufficient to classify 
as "oppressive" conduct. The suspect claimed that she confessed in order to escape 
what was to her an intolerable situation of being in a cell next to her rival. The police 
officer's statement in Rv Fulling seems to have been a truthful one and whilst it was 
callous and tactless it was in the opinion of the court, below the threshold of 
"oppressive" conduct although others may reasonably disagree with this fmding. This 
illustrates a crucial feature about the concept of "oppression", namely that it is an 
essentially contestable concept. This means that although oppression has a core of 
settled meaning about which everyone can agree, e.. g. the use of serious violence is 
clearly "oppressive", in pentunbral cases such as Ry Fulling there can be reasonable 
disagreement about whether conduct is oppressive or not. 
A. A. S. Zuckerman criticized the judgement in Rv Fulling as follows, 
"A perftmctory reference to a dictionary entry can hardly 
provide the police with guidelines for the conduct of 
interrogation. " (85) 
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Ile reference to "wickedness" does however import a strong notion of 'bad faith' and 
it would have to be fairly extreme police behaviour which could properly be described 
as "detestable wickedness". An example of police conduct not involving the use of 
violence or the threat of it nor the use of overly prolonged questioning which 
nevertheless would be stigmatized as "oppressive" is that mentioned in the 1986 case 
of Rv Miller (86), a case decided under the old common law concept of "oppression". 
The Court of Appeal commented that police questions deliberately asked with the 
intention of producing a disordered state of mind in a mentally ill suspect would 
amount to oppression by the police. Watkins L. J. commented that "questions skilfully 
and deliberately asked so as to produce a disordered mind" was "such obviously 
wicked conduct". This phrase echoes Lord Lane's definition of oppression as 
"detestable wickedness". Since Fulling, further clarification has been forthcoming 
from the Court of Appeal on what interrogation practices can be classified as 
"oppressive". In Rv Miller (1992) interrogative questioning of a very intensive 
nature was held to be "oppressive". 
In Rv Miller, also known as "The Cardiff Three" case (87) upon hearing the tapes of 
the interrogation of one of the suspects in that murder case the Lord Chief Justice had 
no doubt that the police had behaved "oppressively" by forceful repeated accusations 
by the police that the suspect was guilty in the face of the suspecfs repeated denials of 
guilt. However, the intensity of the questioning disclosed by the tapes of that case 
was extreme: the suspect had denied involvement in the offence over 300 times 
before he confessed to murder. It should not be assumed that forceful accusatory 
questioning per se is to be regarded as "oppressive" under S. 76 2(a). It was various 
factors such as the duration of the questioning, the number of the same accusatory 
questions as well as the force and menace of the delivery which influenced the 
judgement of the Court of Appeal to quash the conviction. 
It is perfectly right that this level of intensity in questioning is classified as 
"oppressive". A person under arrest in police detention cannot simply walk away 
from the abuse and this is why, as Zuckerman points out, the use of verbal abuse in 
police interrogation, 
" ... is offensive to our sense of 
justice. " (88) 
This is a strong reason for refusing to treat all cases of intensive interrogative 
questioning as going solely to the S. 76 2(b) question although S. 76 2(b) would no 
doubt operate to exclude confessions obtained by the more extreme forms of 
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interrogative questioning as unreliable or potentially unreliable; the more extreme 
forms of interrogative questioning are also offensive to our sense of decency and 
hence S. 76 2(a) is the appropriate provision to be properly invoked so as to exclude 
any confession so obtained. 
It is to be hoped that the courts will pay even closer attention to the possibility of 
questioning becoming "oppressive" in the light of the change to the law affected by 
S. 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. 
Under the old law a suspect in the face of verbal insults or unduly repetitive 
questioning by the police had always the "risk free" option to remain silent, and 
maintain his dignity. However, under the provisions of the new Act the suspect will 
be told at the outset of questioning that if he does not reveal certain facts then this 
could be used to ground inferences at trial. Given that silence is no longer a "risk 
free" option for the suspect it is likely that he will be more vulnerable to the 
distressing psychological effects of verbal abuse in the context of police interrogation. 
A suspect can, of course, still remain silent without fear of direct sanction but the 
possible indirect sanction of adverse inferences at trial makes silence less of a refuge 
for the suspect than it was previously. Any confession which results ftom this 
scenario should be scrutinized carefully for signs that it may have been obtained by 
undue psychological pressure. It is the submission of this thesis that due to S. 34, 
police questioning has the potential to become "oppressive" at a lower level of 
intensity than under the old law where silence was always a risk free option for the 
suspect. P. Mirfield has commented on S. 34 (89), 
"These provisions do seem to change the climate - as 
they were certainly intended to - such that in law the 
suspect is recruited as an active part of the investigation 
process. " 
No longer can a passive silent attitude to police questioning be a 'risk free' option for 
the suspect. Not having this option at his disposal the suspect is likely to experience 
the disagreeable effects of custodial interrogation even more intensely than before the 
introduction of S-34. The possibility of interrogative questioning becoming 
"oppressive" is something the courts should be even more aware of than before the 
introduction of the new provision. There has been an argument canvassed that by 
allowing the court to draw inferences from a suspect's silence in the police station that 
this will decrease police reliance on improper tactics in interrogation. An American 
academic Professor Mark Berger, in a recent article on developments in England and 
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the right to silence, comments (90) 
"It is arguable that permitting adverse inferences from silence 
would remove the pressure police now feel to secure incriminating 
admissions because they would also gain evidentiary benefit 
from a suspect's refusal to answer ... Existing rules place police 
under great pressure to secure statements from a criminal 
suspect. If they fail to do so not only are they deprived of 
potentially valuable evidence but also they may not make use 
of the fact that the suspect remained silent. The legislation 
would change this balance. Under the new law a suspect' s 
answers to official questions can be used as evidence against 
but so can his refusal to respond. Arguably this will lessen 
the likelihood that police will engage in improper tactics 
because they can secure some evidentiary benefit even if a 
suspect remains mute when questioned. " 
However, in criticism of this viewpoint it may be the case that the police will not 
decrease their use of improper tactics to obtain confessions since a confession if 
admissible in evidence has much greater weight than inferences which may be drawn 
from silence in the face of police questioning. The criminal court under S. 34 is not 
obliged to draw inferences but may do so. The incentive to obtain confessions has not 
in the author's opinion been substantially lessened by the introduction of S. 34 of the 
1994 Act. Moreover, S. 34 increases the risk of a false confession by placing more 
pressure on suspects to speak. The vulnerable suspect may well make a false 
admission under the increased coercive atmosphere of the new regime. Also there is 
the danger that at trial the jury may well draw a mistaken inference of guilt from 
silence in the police station, increasing the risk of a miscarriage of justice. In 
conclusion S. 34 increases the dangers to innocent suspects rather than decreasing 
them. 
In Rv Heron (1993) at Leeds Crown Court Mr. Justice Mitchell ruled inadmissible a 
confession to the horrific murder of a small girl. Listening to the tapes of the 
interrogation the judge held that (91) 
I have no hesitation in concluding that there comes a time 
in that interview when the police began to act oppressively. " 
Ibe police had conducted, 
it ... an exercise 
in brealdng the defendant's resolve to make 
no admissions. " 
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Various factors seemed to have influenced the judge in finding that the interrogation 
became "oppressive". The repetitive nature of allegations by the police that Mr. 
Heron had committed the murder in the face of his repeated denials recalled the police 
tactics in Rv Miller 
"It was wrong in the teeth of his constant denials to pound 
him with consistent allegations of him being the killer and 
pound him with sexual allegations. " 
Mr. Heron denied the killing more than 120 times. 
The judge also criticized the police for misrepresenting evidence to Mr. Heron by 
falsely claiming they had two witnesses who had identified him at the place where the 
victim was last seen alive. Lies to a suspect and his solicitor in Rv Mason about 
police possession of incriminating evidence led to a confession being excluded under 
S. 78. 
It might be thought from the Miller and Heron cases that the courts will not tolerate 
the traditional loud-mouthed heavy questioning approach of the pre PACE era. 
However, this is probably overstating the point. Police questioning in both the Miller 
and Heron cases was extreme in its intensity and because the line separating 
"oppressive" questioning from "non oppressive" questioning was clearly crossed in 
those cases it does not follow that shouting at suspects or making accusations to 
suspects will necessarily bring S. 76 2(a) into play. Indeed in Rv Emmerson (1991) 
(92) the C. A. held that where a police officer swore and spoke in a raised voice at 
times during an interrogation of a suspect who later confessed, this conduct although 
described as "impatient and rude" was not oppressive. According to Lloyd L. J. the 
police officer, 
11 ... was saying 
in effect that it was plain that the appellant 
had committed the offence and why was he wasting their 
time. Tbe impression given is one of impatience and 
irritation. The judge found it rude and discourteous. " 
However, the judge also said on the voire dire 
"... that to exclude this evidence would be to give oppression 
a 'completely false meaning'. " 
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ýffie Court of Appeal said, 
it... we agree with the judge. In our view the evidence was 
rightly admitted. " 
Not all bullying interrogations deserve to be stigmatized as "oppressive" and if there 
is a problem with those interrogations not classed as "oppressive" then S-76 2(b) 
provides a further test for admissibility in an appropriate case. 
However, there is a line to hold against "oppressive" interrogation and the judges have 
a vital role here in using S. 76 2(a) in emotive cases such as Heron where there must 
be a strong temptation on the police to use methods which begin to border on the 
"oppressive". 
Indeed,, attempts were made by some, including a senior police officer, after the 
Heron case to justify the tactics used in that case. This prompted the Lord Chief 
Justice to comment extra judicially in November 1993 (93), 
"T'hat when judges exclude confessions obtained in breach of 
the 1984 Act by oppressive interviewing, attempts are made 
in some quarters - not all - to justify the conduct of the interviews and to criticise the judges. " 
Some police officers seem to view S. 76 2(a) as a fetter on their legitimate action; 
after the Heron case a Northumbria detective Chief Superintendent is reported to have 
said that the local community had been "let down by the Criminal Justice System". 
On the point of oppressive questioning he said, 
"It would be entirely wrong to be pussyfooting about - 
we have a responsibility to search for the truth. If we 
are talking about oppressive behaviour it occurs every 
day in the courts, not just in the police station. " (94) 
The elementary criticism on this comment is the difference between a cross- 
examination in open court and a police interrogation in private for the purpose of 
obtaining a confession. The two contexts are significantly different, and therefore 
oppressive questioning has a totally different import in the police station from 
questioning in Open court, where the trial judge has the power to stop intimidatory 
questioning of the witnesses by counsel. T'he judge is master of proceedings in his 
own court. 
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After the release of the Cardiff Three the Chief Constable of South Wales police 
called for, 
a full debate on what constitutes oppressive questioning. " 
(95) 
One interesting feature of the Heron and Miller cases was the existence of a taped 
record of the interrogation process. The Court of Appeal in the Miller case was 
shocked by the menace of the delivery as well as the number of repetitive questions 
asked. It may be that the existence of taped evidence of interrogations rather than 
reliance on police accounts of interrogation as in the pre PACE era has made the issue 
of "oppressive" questioning a live one in criminal trials. 'Ibe old common law 
concept of oppression was deficient as a protection for suspects because of a lack of 
an independent account of the conduct of the interrogation leading up to a confession. 
The courts tended to rely on police versions of events with all their potential for bias 
and doctoring of the record of the interrogation. The police could, pre PACE, simply 
deny the 'oppressive' behaviour alleged, and the police would often have been 
believed by judges, juries and magistrates. 
Also it may be that the experience of listening to tapes of interrogation has made the 
judiciary more vigilant to the possibility of oppression in questioning. The Lord 
Chief Justice, Lord Taylor was clearly 'horrified' by listening to the interrogations of 
Stephen Miller. 
The much increased visibility of the interrogation process in England, post PACE, 
may result in the important due process value of the protection of suspects from 
"oppressive questioning" being realised in many cases. The police know that in 
formal interviews at least, bullying tactics are likely to be detected by the courts, 
through the tape recording requirements of the Codes of Practice; a similar point is 
made by McConville et al in "Standing Accused". They comment that in the pre 
PACE era, 
"Records of interrogation as unilateral police products, 
depicted the police asking polite questions of suspects 
whilst suspects tried to secure favours from the police 
as by offering an admission in return for bail. Of their 
nature therefore they anticipated possible objections to 
questionable practices and were constructed in such a 
way that the reported interrogations conformed to any 
demands that could be legitimately made of the police. " 
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However, in the post PACE era, the police are required to tape record interrogations, 
"This significant change in the rules of accounting is beginning 
to draw the judiciary into examining the nature of "interviews" 
and the propriety of certain lines of questioning. " (96) 
It is not possible to ascertain with any certainty how frequently violence or the threat 
of it was employed in the pre PACE era to obtain confessions. The facts of 
Treadaway v Chief Constable of West Midlands (1994) (97) disclose police 
behaviour towards a suspect in interrogation in 1982 which in the words of Mr. 
Justice McKinnon "amounted to nothing less than torture". Substantial damages were 
awarded against West Midland police. The plaintiff alleged that he signed the 
confession only after he had been handcuffed behind his back, and a succession of 
plastic bags had been placed over his head with the ends bunched up behind his neck 
causing him to struggle and pass out at one point. After the fourth plastic bag was 
held over his head he signed the confession. 
There is an important caveat to the proposition that oppressive interrogation methods 
are more likely to be detected by the courts than in the pre PACE era because of the 
tape recording requirements. This caveat is that since most suspects who following 
interrogation make confessions plead guilty, then the nature of those interrogations 
will not be scrutinized by the criminal courts. It may be that some police officers will 
be tempted still to use oppressive methods in the hope that those methods will never 
be examined by the courts because of a guilty plea made by the defendant following 
his confession. 
Section 76 2(a) as a rule of admissibility can only operate to protect defendants from 
coerced confessions where there is a contested trial. It has serious limitations as a 
protection for all defendants from coerced confessions because of the great number of 
guilty pleas. 
A case has thankfully yet to be reported in England since the introduction of the 
PACE regime where the police have actually used or threatened violence to obtain a 
confession but a recent Privy Council case Burut v Public Prosecutor (1995) (98) 
from Brunei illustrates that in some common law jurisdictions the use of violence or 
inhuman treatment to obtain confessions is a continuing problem of some magnitude. 
In Burut the accused were suspected by the police of being involved with firearms 
offences and as such were subject to "a special procedure" carried out in Brunei in 
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cases invo ving suspected firearms offences. The procedure involved interrogating 
suspects whilst they were manacled and hooded. Lord Steyn giving the opinion of the 
Privy Council held that this conduct was "oppressive" under Brunei law which had 
adopted the common law concept of "voluntariness" as a bar on the admissibility of 
confessions. The interest of the case is in the interpretation given the phrase 
// confession obtained by oppression". The trial judge and the Court of Appeal of 
Brunei held the confessions of the accused admissible despite the use of the "special 
procedure" prior to the making of the confessions. The reasoning was that the 
confessions were made at interviews with the police when the special procedure had 
not been used, the special procedure had been used at earlier interviews with the 
suspects a few days earlier. 
Lord Steyn criticized this reasoning of the Brunei courts, 
it ... although the appellants' written statements had not been obtained during interviews in which they were 
subjected to such treatment, nothing had occurred between 
their interrogation in accordance with the special procedure 
and the making of the statements to dispel the implied threat 
of further interrogation at which such procedure would be 
applied to them. " 
Consequently the confessions were obtained by oppression and were hence 
inadmissible. The convictions were quashed. 
There is another issue with regard to confessions obtained by oppression. This is 
where the police use oppression to obtain a confession and then at subsequent 
interviews behave in complete accord with PACE and the Codes of Practice and 
obtain further confessions. It has been asserted by the courts that the fact that an 
earlier confession has been ruled inadmissible does not necessarily mean that 
subsequent confessions are inadmissible. Ibis is likely to be an important issue for, 
as Heydon notes (99) 
"There can be no doubt that an accused who makes one 
confession is likely to make others. " 
Once one confession is made the psychological and practical disadvantages of having 
confessed have already been incurred, and so this makes subsequent confessions 
easier to make. 
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At common law the inadmissibility of an earlier confession as involuntary did not 
preclude the possibility of the admissibility of a later confession if it could be shown 
that any inducement had dissipated in its effect on the defendant when he made his 
subsequent confession and that therefore it can be said that the later confession is 
voluntary: see Rv Smith (1959) (100) which is the leading common law case on 
successive confessions and their admissibility. 
As stated in Rv Glaves (101) and Rv Wood there is no general rule that the 
inadmissibility of the original confession "must inevitably be a continuing blight upon 
any subsequent confessions". The Crown might be able, for example, to persuade the 
court that the inducement had not continued with regard to the subsequent confessions 
although the original confession was ruled inadmissible because made as a result of 
an inducement. '17his is in line with the approach taken at common law where 
confessions subsequent to an involuntary one could be admitted if the improper 
inducement had become ineffective due to some interviewing cause such as lapse of 
time. However, where the original confession is ruled inadmissible because of 
oppression in its obtaining, then the courts should be careful about allowing the 
admissibility of subsequent confessions which were obtained by the use of further 
oppression. It may be that as in Burut v Public Prosecutor the use of oppression at the 
outset taints the whole series of later interviews where the police behave with 
complete propriety. The suspect may greatly fear a return of the violence or threats. It 
is submitted that once oppression is used to obtain a confession then unless 
circumstances are very unusual, all subsequent confessions should be ruled 
inadmissible under S. 76 2(a) even if those subsequent confessions were made at 
interviews where the police complied perfectly with the Codes of Practice. 
Undercover methods and the lep-itimacy of confessions so obtained 
It is proposed to complete this analysis of the question of the legitimacy of confession 
evidence by focusing on a new problem which has arisen since the enactment of 
PACE: what should the response of the courts be to attempts by the police to secure 
a confession from a suspect by the use of "undercover methods" which are not 
controlled by that legislative regime? 
It may be tempting for the police to use such methods especially after an attempt to 
secure a confession in formal interview under the Codes has failed as it had failed in 
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the Hall case. The suspect would be "off guard" in such a situation, not aware he is 
dealing with the police and also he will not have the benefit of legal advice on the 
possibly incriminating nature of his replies. There is some evidence to suggest that 
the rigours of PACE on the detention and interrogation of suspects and the control of 
access to a suspect by the "custody officer" has led to an increase of autonomous 
C. I. D. activity away from the police station (on this see D. Hobbs in his book "Doing 
the Business") (102). This activity may involve questioning of suspects without the 
constraints of the Codes of Practice. 
It is therefore important that the courts attempt to fill in the gaps left by PACE and the 
Code on undercover methods to obtain confessions. The protections for suspects 
provided by the 1984 Act could easily be circumvented by the expedient of engaging 
in such operations. It would be unsatisfactory that measures to strengthen due process 
protections for suspects in the police station resulted in an increase of undercover 
attempts to secure confessions from suspects outside the police station. There must 
be a temptation for some police officers to avoid the rigours, of PACE and the Codes 
in formal interviews by attempting to question suspects unhampered by the rigours of 
the statutory regime. 
Such undercover methods to secure confessions must be clearly distinguished from 
other undercover methods which have come to the fore in recent years. Ibus attempts 
to entrap suspects to commit further offences or tactics designed to provide 
incriminating evidence about the commission of an offence which do not involve 
questioning about an offence must be distinguished from the situation under 
consideration, which concerns attempts to question suspects about their involvement 
in offences uninhibited by the requirements of the Codes of Practice. 
In Christou and Wright (C. A. ) a -police trap designed to secure evidence of the 
commission of crimes in the form of a 'shady' jewellery shop under the control of the 
police which 'accepted' stolen goods was held to be a legitimate operation and 
evidence of the transactions was said to have been rightly admitted at the trial. In 
giving judgement (103) Lord Taylor emphasized that the police were not involved in 
the questioning of suspects about their involvement in criminal offences. 
"The appellants were not being questioned by police officers 
acting as such, conversation was on equal terms. There would 
be no question of pressure or intimidation by the police officers 
as persons actually in authority or believed to be so. We 
agreed with the learned judge that the Code simply was not 
intended to apply in such a context. " 
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However, Lord Taylor administered the following caution to the police, a caution 
which played a significant part in the decisions of the judges in the later cases of Rv 
Bryce and Rv Hall. Lord Taylor commented. in Clristoipý 
"It would be wrong for police officers to adopt or use an 
undercover pose or disguise to enable themselves to ask 
questions about an offence uninhibited by the requirements 
of the Code and with the effect of circumventing it. Were 
they to do so, it would be open to the judges to exclude 
the questions and answers under S. 78 of the 1984 Act. " (104) 
The questions asked by the police in Christ 
11... were for the most part simply those necessary to conduct 
the bartering and maintain their cover. They were not 
questions about the offence. " 
Such a situation cautioned against by Lord Taylor arose in the case of Rv Bryce 
(105). In that case an undercover police officer had contacted the appellant by 
telephone and agreed to buy a car which had býen stolen shortly before. They 
arranged to meet and at the meeting at a market the police officer had a conversation 
with the appellant by the officer including a query as to whether the car was stolen. 
The appellant said it was and he was arrested. The Court of Appeal held that the 
questioning was, 
" ... blatantly an interrogation with the effect if not the design of using an undercover pose to circwnvent the Code. " 
As such, under the Codes of Practice, a caution should have been given and the 
suspect should have been notified of his right to legal advice. The confession should 
have been excluded under the S. 78 discretion. This principle was confirmed by the 
Court of Appeal in Rv Lin. Hung, and Tsu (1995) (106) where it was emphasized 
that, 
"... in a case where a judge concluded that the use of undercover 
officers was purely in order to get round the requirements of the 
Code that would be a strong reason for holding the evidence 
inadmissible. " 
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In Rv PaH Lord Justice GlideweU commented, 
"In our view the absence of a caution in most circumstances 
is bound to be significant for the purposes of the exercise 
of S. 78. " (107) 
In Rv Hall an admission by the defendant to murdering his wife was ruled 
inadmissible on the voir dire under S. 78 and in the alternative S. 76 2(b) of PACE. 
The suspect had been interrogated formally on a number of occasions but had 
remained silent in all of those interrogations. The police established an elaborate 
charade by which an undercover policewoman pretended to become emotionally 
involved with the suspect. The purpose behind the charade was to try to use the 
suspect's emotional involvement with the undercover policewoman as a lever by 
which the suspect could be persuaded to talk about his possible involvement in the 
disappearance of his wife. Arguably this police tactic was likely to render unreliable 
any confession made, as Hall might have said anything including a confession to 
murder to keep the relationship with the undercover policewoman going. Moreover, 
he was denied the protection of PACE and the Codes of Practice by not being 
cautioned nor offered the right to see a solicitor in what was in effect a series of police 
questions designed to elicit self incriminating answers from Hall about his role in the 
disappearance of his wife. The operation used in Rv Hall was similar to that used in 
Rv Stag (108) where another undercover policewoman offered sexual and emotional 
involvement with the suspect in exchange for information concerning the suspect's 
possible involvement in the murder of a young woman. Ognall J. denounced the 
police operation in Stagg as, 
11 ... a 
blatant attempt to incriminate a suspect by positive and 
deceptive conduct of the grossest kind. " 
This is in line with dicta in Rv Sang that attempt to unfairly induce a suspect to 
incriminate himself is a basis for excluding evidence in the discretion of the trial 
judge. Lord Diplock commented in Rv Saul that a discretion existed to exclude, 
it ... evidence tantamount to a self-incriminatory admission 
which was obtained from the defendant after the offence had 
been committed by means which would justify a judge in 
excluding an actual confession which had the like self- 
incriminating effect. " 
The comments of Ognall J. in Rv Stagg clearly illustrate that this important principle 
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for the discretionary exclusion of unfairly obtained evidence has survived the passage 
of S. 78 of PACE and indeed is a basis for excluding evidence under that provision. 
Ognall J. commented, 
"It seems to me that there can be no difference in principle 
between on the one hand evidence of fantasies expressed by 
a suspect said to go to the issue of identity or on the other 
hand evidence, for example of fingerprints or a blood sample. 
It is not the nature of the material obtained that matters., it is 
the purpose for which the prosecution seek to use it. 'Ibus 
when Lord Scarman spoke of an accused being tricked into 
providing evidence that would plainly in my judgement 
include evidence of this character... I am quite satisfied that 
the evidence obtained in this undercover operation falls 
directly within the class of material of which disapproval 
was expressed albeit obiter in Rv Sang, -" 
Ognall J. cmcluded, 
"Although the court's powers at common law are preserved by 
sub-section 82(3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
in the context of the facts of this particular case it does not 
matter whether the conclusion I have arrived at is seen in the 
light of the principles relating to self-incrimination at common 
law or under the statutory discretion invested in me by sectioti, 
78 of the Act: on either basis I am satisfied that the conduct 
of a fair trial demands the exclusion of the evidence obtained 
in this fashion. " 
However, Rv Hall is the stronger case because a confession was made in that case 
whereas in Rv Stagg the prosecution evidence solely consisted of inadaiissible 
evidence of disposition to comnlit the offence without any admission by Stagg to 
involvement in the offence. 
Mr. Justice Waterhouse held that., 
"It is clear that throughout those later relevant conversations 
the undercover officer has engaged in continuous questioning 
of the defendant whenever the conversation could be steered 
approximately in that direction about the circumstances of the 
death or disappearance of his wife. Tbat was a questioning of' 
a person who was still suspected of having committed the 
offence of murder. " 
Denial of the requirements of the Codes of Practice led the judge to hold the 
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confession inadmissible under S. 78. S. 76 2(b) was obviously applicable as well 
given that the undercover policewoman promised the suspect emotional commitment 
if he revealed that he had killed his wife. A more manipulative inducement is hard to 
imagine, threatening the reliability of any confession made as a result of it. 
What is permissible as a tactic to obtain a confession from a suspect who has 
remained silent in formal interview is to 'bug' the suspect's conversations with others. 
Whether this extends to the bugging of a suspect's conversations with his solicitor is 
obviously a different matter. Legal advice is unlikely to be "unfettered" (see Rv 
Mason if solicitor or client suspect the police are bugging their confidential 
conversations. However, in Rv Bailey and Smith (109) a confession was held rightly 
admitted after a bug was placed in the suspect's police cell and his conversations with 
an associate were listened to. 'Me Court of Appeal held that the police were under no 
duty to protect suspects from having the opportunity to speak incriminatingly to each 
other if they chose to do so. There was nothing to prohibit the police from bugging a 
cell where self-incrindnating speech might be made even after an accused person had 
been charged and had exercised his right to silence in interview with the police. 
The distinction with Bryce is that no questioning by the police took place. If suspects 
are so careless to talk to each other in an incriminating way in a police station then the 
police cannot be censured for taking advantage of that. 
Counsel for the defence in Bailey sought to argue that deceitful conduct of the kind 
practised by the police in Bailey 
"... drives a coach and horses through the Code to the point 
where the police will in future not bother even to interview 
suspects. " 
The Court of Appeal rightly rejected this argument. The strategem. employed in 
Baile could manifestly not be used with any frequency, 
to ... nothing would 
be more obviously self-defeating: it 
should be used only in grave cases. " (110) 
However, what would tend to subvert the protections of the Codes of Practice was the 
Idnd of undercover activity manifested in cases such as Bryce and Hall. If the police 
thought that they could avoid the rigours of the Codes by interviewing suspects in 
undercover guise and then produce incriminating remarks at trial then the potential for 
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undercutting PACE and the Codes would be substantial. The decisions in Bryce and 
Hall, are to be welcomed. Ibey are another sign of the seriousness of the courts in 
attempting to ensure that the "new settlement" on the thorny problem of achieving 
fairness in the interrogation of suspects established by PACE is respected by the 
police. (111) These are also indicative of a new judicial scepticism towards police 
accounts of contested investigative events and a greater willingness to exclude police 
evidence than in the pre PACE era: see Chapter 1. 
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CHAPTER 6 
'REFORM OF THE LAW OF CONFESSIONS 
The Issue 
False confessions have been a primary cause of many of the miscarriages of justice 
cases which have traumatized the criminal justice system in England since 1989. It is 
therefore not surprising that the law of confessions should have attracted attention 
from those who wish to avoid similar miscarriages of justice cases in the future. Sir 
John May in his Report of the Inquiry into the convictions arising out of the Guildford 
and Woolwich bomb attacks commented, (1) 
I think that the next important lessons which can be drawn 
from the case of the Guildford Four derive from the fact 
they were convicted solely on the evidence of their own 
confessions. Ibere was no other evidence against them. 
Further., these confessions were mutually inconsistent in 
many important respects and each of the Four retracted 
their admissions before or at trial. They contended that 
the confessions were in no way voluntary and that each 
had been induced by oppression. This they said comprised 
assaults, threats of violence against members of their 
fan-lilies. Y; Ifflst being questioned at excessive length 
they had been deprived of sleep, food and drink. " 
May commented that "at this length of time I am in no position to make findings on 
these questions". At the very least the Guildford Four case propelled the issue of 
convictions based on false confession evidence to the centre of public attention. 
However, it is important that genuine weU informed concern is distinguished from 
overreaction. Unfortunately comment in some academic writings on the subject of 
false confessions tend towards overreaction. Greer has written, (2) 
"Enough is now known about the nature of police 
interviews, the psychology of those in custody and the 
role of confession evidence in contested cases for it to 
be presurned inherently unreliable unless its credibility 
is rehabilitated by strict tests. " 
One of those tests according to Greer is the proposal that, 
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"No confession ought to be admitted in evidence unless 
there is independent evidence capable of supporting 
its contents. " 
The problem with this analysis is that by overstressing the dangers of false 
confessions it proposes reforms which may frustrate one of the fundamental aims of 
the criminal justice system, namely the conviction of offenders. Of course, advocates 
of serious reform to the law of confessions would assert that the protection of the 
innocent from conviction may require measures which would inhibit the conviction of 
some guilty defendants. However, given that there is a great social cost for further 
legal hurdles against the admissibility of confessions it is vital that the law strikes an 
acceptable balance between the protection of the innocent and the conviction of the 
guilty. A balanced perspective of the risks of false confessions and the current 
legislative and common law regime against them is needed before an assessment of 
various reform proposals to the law of confessions can be made. 
Moreover, it has to be acknowledged that the old assumption that a suspect, in the 
absence of police impropiiety, would not falsely confess cannot be sustained in the 
light of modem psychological research. As the RCCJ Report acknowledged, (3) 
"T'he legal system has always allowed in evidence statements 
that are made against the interests of the maker in the 
belief that individuals will not make false statements against 
themselves. This belief can no longer be sustained. Research 
has conclusively demonstrated that under certain circumstances 
individuals may confess to crimes they have not committed 
and that it is more likely that they will do in interviews 
conducted in police custody even when proper safeguards 
apply. " 
An example of the common law attitude to the value of confession evidence is the old 
case of Rv Lambe (1791) (4) where it was stated in the opinion of twelve judges that 
confessions, 
it... are at common law admissible in evidence as the 
highest and most satisfactory proof of guilt, because 
it is fairly presumed that no man would make such a 
confession against himself if the facts confessed were 
not true. " 
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Yet the RCCP also endorsed the principle that, (5) 
"Where a suspect has made a confession ... it must normally constitute a persuasive indication of guilt and it must in 
principle be desirable that if a not guilty plea is entered in 
spite of it, the jury are given the opportunity of assessing 
its probative value for themselves. " 
It must generally be the case that in the absence of undue police pressure a person of 
normal intelligence and maturity would not confess to a crime he did not commit. 
That there are and have been exceptions to this general statement does not justify 
wholescale scepticism about the probative worth of confessions. As the Court of 
Appeal recently commented in Rv Ward, (6) 
"In our experience cases in which it is accepted that a 
confession was made and was made voluntarily but 
nevertheless it is asserted that the confession was wholly 
untrue, are rare in the extreme. This of course is such a 
case. // 
There are particular risks of unreliability associated with juveniles, the mentally ill 
and the mentally handicapped but not only are there special statutory and common 
law duties on a judge in dealing with such cases it also cannot be assumed that a 
confession made by such a person is inherently unreliable. S. Uglow's comment in 
"Criminal Justice" (1995) (7) " ... that in practice reliance on confessions is very 
dangerous" is a misleading overreaction to the miscarriage of justice cases. In the 
context of retracted confession Gudjonsson (8) has written, 
"It is true that a number of people retract their 
confessions and possibly the majority of these are 
doing it because they do not want to be convicted for 
an offence that they did commit. " 
Even with regard to retracted confessions then it cannot be assumed that this type of 
evidence is systematically unreliable, although certain categories of retracted 
confessions such as those challenged under Section 76 2(b) of PACE may be 
systematically unreliable. Legitimate concem about the role of confessions in 
wrongful convictions should not lead to an overestimation of the danger of the 
unreliability of confessions as a class of evidence, especially if the confession has 
been obtained in compliance with the terms of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984 and The Codes of Practice. This is a legislative structure designed to reduce the 
risks of an unreliable confession whilst not unduly hampering the police in obtaining 
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a confession from the suspect. 
Moreover, an unduly cautious approach to confessions and their general probative 
worth by commentators which influences the media may have the undesirable effect 
of influencing juries to reject reliable confessions and allow guilty offenders to be 
acquitted. As has been noted before, overreaction to the dangers of confession 
evidence may lead to reform proposals which are too stringent and which will run the 
risk of allowing too many guilty offenders to escape conviction. As has been 
recognised by commentators, confessions as evidence are vital to various proof issues 
in many serious cases. Evidence of 'intention' or 'recklessness' may in certain cases 
only be provided by a confession. As Devlin notes of the Bodkin Adams trial, 
"... there was no hope of a conviction unless the police could 
obtain admissions. " (9a) 
Confessions may be the only realistic source of proof in certain serious cases; proof 
of child sexual abuse may be in some cases dependent on a perpetrator confession 
given the difficulties associated with the testimony of very young children. A recent 
case where the Court of Appeal commented that only a confession could have led to 
conviction was the serious case of Rv Payne (1994) (9b). The appellant, a care 
worker at a home for physically handicapped adults, admitted buggery of a patient in 
the home, who was severely handicapped and who had great difficulty in 
communicating. The trial judge Rougier J. had commented at trial, 
I very much doubt whether the matter could have been 
proved against you if you had chosen to continue to 
lie innocence. " 
In the Court of Appeal, McCowan L. J. commented on the confession, 
"The case could not have been brought without his 
admissions and co-operation. " 
It is therefore odd to find G. Robertson Q. C. commenting in "Freedom, The 
Individual and The Law", that, 
a strict rule against conviction on the strength of an 
uncorroborated confession would require police to find 
the independent evidence which will always exist if a 
confession is true. " (9c) 
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Independent evidence might not always exist as Rv Payne shows. 
The Reform Proposals 
The starting point of the discussion on PACE is that it is generafly recognised that it 
has decreased the possibility of miscarriages of justice based on false confessions. 
Thus, rules on recording of confessions, access to legal advice and their stringent 
enforcement by the judiciary have had the result that the interrogation process has 
been opened up to public scrutiny. The old problem of 'verballing' is now one which 
has been eliminated in formal interviews by the requirement of tape-recording 
although it remains a problem with regard to informal confessions. One of the major 
aims of PACE was to reduce the likelihood of false confessions emerging from the 
interrogation process and S. 76 and S. 78 have been vigorously employed by the judges 
to work to that end. Reference should also be made to S. 77 of PACE which places a 
duty on the trial judge to tell the jury of the 'special need for caution' ( see Rv 
Campbell (1994) (10) on the importance of this duty) where the prosecution case rests 
wholly or substantially on a confession made by a mentally handicapped person and 
where that confession was not made in the presence of an independent person. 
In Rv Bailey (1994) (11) the Court of Appeal quashed a conviction for manslaughter 
and arson and ordered a retrial where the trial judge had failed to give the warning 
required by S. 77 since the appellant suffered from a significant mental handicap; the 
confession was made to the police not in the presence of an independent adult and the 
prosecution case depended substantially on the confession. However, there is no 
good reason why S. 77 should be limited to the mentally handicapped only. 
It also has to be accepted that miscarriages of justice cases based on false confessions 
have occurred since the introduction of PACE. 
However, in one of the most notorious cases, R v Miller (1992) (12) the Lord Chief 
Justice was careful to stress that the miscarriage of justice was due to a combination 
of human errors and not due to any inherent defects of the PACE regime itself. 
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"Before parting with this case we should comment on the 
apparent failure of the provisions in the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 to prevent evidence obtained by 
oppression and impropriety from being admitted. In our 
judgement, the circumstances of this case do not indicate 
flaws in those provisions. They do indicate a combination 
of human error. " 
These hinnan errors included the oppressive behaviour of the police, the passivity of 
the solicitor present and the fact that the worst example of the police excesses was not 
played to the trial judge. 
However, the PACE structure has been criticized by some conunentators for failing to 
do enough against the admission of false confessions. Although S. 76 2(a) and its 
interpretation by the courts has been criticized by some commentators for not being 
specific enough on what police conduct counts as "oppression", it is S. 76 2(b) and its 
interpretation in cases such as Rv Goldenberg and Rv Crampton which has come 
under a greater amount of criticism. Professor Jackson has critically commented on 
S. 76 2(b) and the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Report, 
"A thorough review of the admissibility test, however, might 
have prompted the Commission to consider whether the 
trial judge should himself be satisfied that the confession is 
reliable before admitting it. " (13) 
It is important to stress that the section was never intended to cover all possible cases 
of unreliability in confessions. Instead S. 76 2(b) isolates a particular recurrent threat 
to the reliability of confessions, namely "anything said or done" by the interrogator 
which affects the reliability of confessions. 
As Parliamentary debates reported in Hansard make clear, S. 76 2(b) was never 
intended to cover cases such as Rv Stewart (1972) where the threat to confession 
reliability lay in a defect within the suspect and not in any undue police pressure or 
impropriety. Lord Elystan Morgan and Lord Deming in the House of Lords both 
made this important point about the scope of section 76 2(b). (14) 
Tbe Lord Chancellor, Lord Hailsham made clear in the debates in the House of Lords 
on the PACE Bill, that S. 76 2(b) must be understood against the background of the 
traditional approach of the law of evidence to issues of fact and law, 
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" (the clause) ... is an attempt to modify two principles of law which, in one form or another have been part of the 
criminal law of England for centuries - that is to say in 
the ordinary course of events questions of fact are for 
the jury and questions of law for the judge. But when we 
are dealing with confessions there is one important 
exception. Ilere is a class of confession -a class 
containing two sub-clauses - where the judge becomes a judge of fact. He has to decide on what is called the 
voir dire - whether the prosecution have proved beyond 
reasonable doubt that the confession was not obtained 
by in effect either unlawful pressures or unlawful 
inducements ... But it is an extremely exceptional case because it is not desirable to take away from juries the 
right to decide the facts. Nor is it desirable to give 
judges the right to decide the facts. It is normally the 
function of the jury - and ought to be so - to find the facts and to say in relation to evidence which is logically 
probative first whether they believe it at all and secondly 
how far they regard it as reliable, relevant or carrying 
weight. That is part of the duty of a tribunal of fact. 
Clause 77 of the Bill seeks to codify and slightly remodel 
what has always been the law of England in this field of 
evidence. " (15) 
The question then becomes whether English law should be altered so as to impose 
upon the judge a duty to assess the reliability of a confession and be satisfied that it is 
reliable before admitting it to the trial. This is in essence what Jackson has proposed. 
(As has Professor Choo (16)) although Choo admits the proposal would upset 
"traditionalists" i. e. those who view the jury as the proper assessors of the reliability 
of evidence. ) Such a step would be a major one in English criminal evidence, making 
the admissibility issue a question of fact for the first time - is the confession true or 
not? Rather than the question posed by S. 76 2(b) or the old voluntariness test. 'Me 
question must then be faced - are confessions so inherently unreliable as a class of 
evidence compared to, for example, identification evidence, that the judge should pre- 
empt the deliberation of the jury and rule out a confession on the ground that the 
judge is not satisfied as to its reliability? 
The ability of the jury to assess the probative worth of evidence accurately has been 
recently reaffirmed by the House of Lords in the "similar fact" case of RvH (1995) 
(17). As Lord Griffiths said, 
"Tbe basic reason why criminal cases are heard by juries 
rather than by a judge alone is that our society prefers to 
trust the collective judgement of twelve men and women 
drawn from different backgrounds to decide the facts of 
212 
a case rather than accept the view of a single professional 
judge. Deciding the facts requires the jury in all cases to 
decide whose evidence they find credible and what inferences 
they are prepared to draw from the facts as they find. I would 
therefore resist any attempt to remove this essential role from 
the jury for to do so seems to be to strike root and branch at 
the very reason we have jury trials. " (18) 
A rule requiring the judge to be satisfied as to the reliability of a confession before 
admitting it would be a radical departure for the law and contrary to the general 
principle that assessment of the credibility of evidence is for the jury and not the 
judge. Other forms of evidence such as identification evidence, the evidence of 
accomplices and infon-ners may also be potentially unreliable yet that is not 
considered to justify a rule by which the judge should be satisfied of the reliability of 
the evidence before admitting it to the trial. 
Where there is a possibility of reasonable disagreement about the reliability of a 
confession it would seem unduly protective towards the accused and an impediment 
to important aims of the criminal justice system to require the judge to be satisfied 
himself as to the reliability of a confession before admitting it. A reference was made 
earlier to accomplice evidence as a form of evidence which is inherently unreliable 
although some accomplices may be capable of giving reliable testimony. Accomplice 
evidence is not subject to any exclusionary rule. Accomplice evidence non-nally goes 
before the jury subject to no mandatory corroboration requirement and indeed after 
S. 32 of The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 subject to no corroboration 
warning either. It would be anomalous if, having abolished the corroboration warning 
for accomplice evidence, Parliament introduced a corroboration rule for confession 
evidence. The trend of the law has been to leave the treatment of different types of 
unreliable evidence to the discretion of the judge, a corroboration rule for confessions 
would be against this trend. (19) 
Of course, where a confession is on its face very unconvincing the judges should have 
and do have a discretion to exclude the evidence as being more prejudicial than 
probative. This discretion to exclude was recognised in Rv Stewart (1972) although 
the facts of the case were described as "very exceptional" by the trial judge. In Rv 
Isequilla (1974) (20) the Lord Chief Justice said, 
213 
"If one of the reasons for excluding confessions is the 
danger that they may be untrustworthy, it would be in 
accordance with principle to exclude a confession made 
by someone whose mental state was such as to render 
his utterances completely unreliable. It is however difficult 
to formulate a governing principle and it is possible that, 
in England the matter will be treated as one of judicial 
discretion. " 
The Lord Chief Justice went on to say that the mental state of the appellant at the time 
of the confession which amounted to no more than the fact that he was sobbing and 
frightened, did not come anywhere near the class for the exercise of the discretion. 
Yet, 
"Of course in an extreme case where a man is a mental 
defective it would be no doubt absolutely right to rule out 
evidence of his confession as being wholly unreliable. " 
Tbe trial judge in Rv Kilner (1976) (2 1) excluded a confession made by a mentally ill 
suspect on the authority of Rv Isequilla. In Rv Davies (1979) a confession was 
excluded in the trial judge's discretion on the grounds that the confession was 
probably unreliable given that the suspect made the confession while heavily under 
the influence of a drug. (22) In Rv Powell (1979) (23) also a first instance decision, 
a confession was excluded under the probative value/prejudicial effect discretion 
because of the poor mental state of the suspect when he made his confession. 
However in Rv Miller (1986) (24) the Court of Appeal approved the decision of the 
trial judge to admit a confession made by a defendant whilst in an irrational state of 
mind during police interrogation, i. e. when the suspect was beset with delusions and 
hallucinations because the judge held that the jury were capable of distinguishing 
between apparently rational and irrational parts of the defendanfs so called confession 
and selecting which part or parts of the confession they could safely rely and act on to 
convict the defendant. This case illustrates that the prejudicial effect/probative value 
discretion to exclude a confession will only be used in an extreme case of potential 
unreliabi-lity of the confession, as for example where multiple confessions by a 
mentally unstable defendant show mutual inconsistencies to a large degree. In Rv 
Effik and Mitchell (25) the Court of Appeal did not differ from the opinion of the trial 
judge that if it had been found that the defendant made his confessions whilst 
suffering from severe withdrawal symptoms then the trial judge would have used his 
discretion to exclude the confession from evidence. The trial judge had commented, 
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"If I were to fmd that he was suffering from those acute 
withdrawal symptoms at the time of the interview then I 
make it quite plain that I would have exercised my discretion 
to exclude evidence of the interviews. " 
It has been suggested by commentators that the confession in the Rv Ward case was 
an example of where the judicial discretion to exclude should have been exercised. 
As Professor Dennis has written, 
"Had the full story of Ward's numerous statements to the 
police with their inconsistencies and inaccuracies, been 
revealed at trial, one wonders whether any judge worth his 
salt would have let the confessions go to the jury. They 
might well have been excluded on the voir dire on the grounds 
that no probative value could safely be attached to them and 
that they were capable of causing great prejudice particularly 
given the horrific nature of the offences charged. " (26) 
It is implicit in the above comment of Dennis that he accepts that where there is the 
possibility of reasonable disagreement about the reliability of a confession it should 
be admitted to the jury for consideration assuming that the confession is not 
inadmissible under S. 76 2(a) or S. 76 2(b) of PACE and that the confession's 
admission "does not have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings 
that it ought to be excluded" under S. 78 of PACE. 
However, the mentally ill and juveniles also ought to receive special treatment with 
regard to their confessions and therefore S. 77 of PACE should be amended 
accordingly. (27) The RCCJ (1993) supported this reform, see paragraph 40 of that 
Report. It is important to point out that where the police are interviewing a mentally 
handicapped or mentally ill person or a juvenile then they should only do so when 
there is an "appropriate adult" present. Paragraph 11.14 Code C states, 
"A juvenile or a person who is mentally disordered or mentally 
handicapped, whether suspected or not, must not be interviewed 
or asked to provide or sign a written statement in the absence of 
the appropriate adult unless paragraph 11.1 applies. " 
If the police fail to comply with this provision then a confession runs the risk of being 
excluded under S. 76 2(b) of PACE. Tbe "appropriate adult" requirement is there to 
ensure that the especially vulnerable suspect is not manipulated into giving unreliable 
information and also that he can be given guidance on what the police are saying to 
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him. Cases where S. 76 2(b) has been used to exclude a confession because of breach 
of the "appropriate adult" requirement include Rv Everett (1988) (28), Rv Moss 
(1990). Rv Cox (1991), Rv Glaves (1993): in this last case the confession was 
excluded even though a solicitor though not the "appropriate adult" was present; 
under the Code Ca solicitor cannot perform as 'an appropriate adult'. Failure of the 
police to comply with the "appropriate adult" requirement is likely to lead to the 
exclusion of a confession under S. 76 2(b). However, this is not inevitable and so 
S. 77 provides a ftn-ther level of protection at trial in the case of the mentally 
handicapped confessor. 
In addition to the common law discretion to exclude a confession whose prejudicial 
effect outweighs its probative worth there is also the duty imposed by Rv Mackenzie 
(1992) (29) on trial judges to withdraw a case from the jury where: 
(a) the prosecution case depended wholly on confessions, 
(b) the defendant suffered from a significant degree of mental handicap, 
and 
(c) the confessions were unconvincing to the point where a jury properly 
directed would not properly convict upon them. 
Then the trial judge should in the interests of justice take the initiative and withdraw 
the case from the jury. S. 76 and S. 78 of PACE do not cover all possible cases of false 
confessions. The PACE regime for confessions in section 76 does not cover the 
situation where the unreliability of the confession is due to a factor inherent in the 
suspect. However, section 78 and the common law discretion and the common law 
duty imposed by Mackenzie would seem to be sufficient for those cases where there 
is a danger of miscarriage of justice due to a false confession by a mentally disordered 
or mentally handicapped individual. 
Those commentators who advocate stricter controls on the admissibility of confession 
evidence in the form of a corroboration requirement or a requirement that a 
confession has to be made in the presence of a legal advisor can also be criticized for 
hampering unduly the conviction of the guilty on confession evidence. Public 
concerns about the criminal justice system failing to convict the guilty has been 
almost as intense in recent years as the concern expressed at the beginning of the 
1990s about wrongful convictions on false confessions, as Reiner has noted (30) a 
rule requiring confessions to be corroborated is likely to increase public anxiety about 
the ability of the criminal justice system to protect them from criminals. 
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The crucial and obvious difference between measures such as judicial warnings on 
confession evidence and more rules regulating the admissibility of confession 
evidence is that the latter will have the effect of removing some confessions from the 
consideration of the jury. 
Pattenden concluded in her study of the corroboration issue, as follows, 
"A solution is needed which will reduce public concern about 
wrongful convictions without simultaneously allowing the 
patently guilty to go free ... " (3 1) 
Pattenden favours a judicial warning to juries on the dangers of confession evidence. 
Various reforms which are aimed at improving the ability of juries to correctly assess 
confession evidence should on the whole be welcomed. 'Me relaxation of the rules on 
expert evidence with regard to the reliability of confession evidence from those with a 
severe personality disorder manifest in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Rv 
Ward (32) is one such measure. Moreover, if more expert evidence on the 
vulnerabilities of particular suspects in interrogation is allowed into trial then trial 
judges will be more able to identify those potentially very unreliable confessions 
which should be excluded in the trial judge's discretion to exclude evidence which is 
more prejudicial than probative. The increased ability of the defence to cross 
examine a police officer on previous cases where his evidence of an alleged 
confession has led to an acquittal, established in Rv Edwards (33) is likewise to be 
welcomed. Consideration should also be given to refon-n of S. 1 f(ii) of the Criminal 
Evidence Act 1898 which tends to inhibit those defendants with previous convictions 
from challenging confession evidence where that challenge involves imputations on 
the character of police officers. For a challenge to the integrity of the police by the 
defendant in the witness box will most probably lead to the disclosure of his 
convictions before the court. Geoffrey Robertson Q. C. has written that the S. 1 f(ii) 
rule is one of the most frequent causes of the wrongful conviction of defendants with 
previous convictions. (34) 
John Sprack (35) in the context of confessions, succinctly sw-ns up the problems of 
the operation of S. 1 f(ii), 
01 ... one 
difficulty in rooting out false confessions is that there 
is a powerful disincentive to prevent the accused from 
alleging that the officers have fabricated the confession or 
behaved in any seriously improper way. This disincentive 
is known as the 'tit for tat' rule ... Hence where they 
have a 
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suspect with previous convictions the police can attribute a 
false confession knowing that they are in a strong position. 
It would appear that Winston Silcott was deterred in the Blakelock murder trial from 
challenging police evidence by going into the witness box because of the operation of 
the S. 1 f(ii) rule. Silcott had a previous conviction for murder and his Q. C. Barbara 
Mills believed that there would be a great risk that the jury would learn that he was 
already a murderer if Silcott challenged the authenticity of his alleged confession to 
the police in the witness box. (36) 
This danger has been reduced since the introduction of a tape recording requirement 
for an indictable offence. It would be virtually impossible now to fabricate a 
confession in formal interviews and have it admitted in evidence. However,, for 
informal interviews there is no tape recording equipment. 'Me potential for 
'verbalhng' remains and hence so does the inhibitory effect of Section 1 f(ii) on the 
accused in successfully mounting a defence that the confession allegedly made 
'informally' or 'spontaneously' was in fact never made at all. Section 1 f(ii) win also 
operate if the defendant alleges police brutality, for example, before he made a 
confession. It may well be as Sprack concludes, that if the criminal justice system 
really wants to expose police malpractice then the 'tit for tat' rule should be abolished 
where in order to mount an effective defence an accused wishes to challenge police 
confession evidence. The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (37) proposed a 
partial reform of this rule in line with the reform proposal of the CLRC, 
" ... this rule should not apply where the judge is satisfied that imputations, made by the defendant against the 
prosecution evidence are central to the defence. " 
However, all these measures are concerned with improving the ability of the trier of 
fact to correctly assess the weight of confession evidence. A clear distinction should 
be made between these reforms and those reforms to the law of confessions which 
would erect ftu-ther hurdles to the admissibility of confession evidence. One possible 
exception to this is a rule requiring all confession evidence to be taped before it is 
admitted to trial. It is anomalous and unsatisfactory that alongside the authentication 
procedures for confessions in formal interviews there should exist a parallel system 
for the admissibility of non recorded confession in informal interviews. This reform 
can be defended on the ground that it more fully realises the purposes behind the 
PACE reforms, one of which was to eliminate the 'verballing' issue once and for all. 
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However, a corroboration requirement or a rule requiring all confessions to be made 
in front of a legal advisor can be criticized for reopening the settlement between 
police and suspect that PACE represents. The PACE Act was debated long and hard 
in Parliament and the entire context of police powers and interrogation was 
considered not solely the corroboration of confessions issue. It would be wrong to 
legislate on the corroboration issue without considering the wider picture of police 
powers and interrogation. The rules relating to the admissibility of confessions, S. 76 
and the discretion to exclude S. 78 were part of that political settlement between the 
rights of suspects and the interests of the police and the community. It was therefore 
accepted at the time PACE was passed that a confession, if it satisfied the PACE tests, 
was in itself admissible evidence of guilt. This reflects the old common law position 
that English law allows a conviction to be based on nothing more than an unequivocal 
confession - see Rv Wheeling (1789) (38) and Rv Sullivan (1887) (39). (Indeed, a 
confession is potentially enough to ensure conviction even in the absence of corpus 
deficti of the crime - see Porter v Court (1962) (40) where there was no evidence 
apart from the confession that a crime had been committed. The Divisional Court 
upheld the conviction. ) The suspect was given enhanced protection by the statutory 
scheme for interrogations in PACE and the courts have taken the lead in enforcing 
this aspect of PACE. However, one of the assumptions around which PACE was 
built was that a confession obtained in the absence of legal advice (as opposed to the 
right to legal advice being offered by the police) was in itself admissible evidence of 
guilt, even in the absence of corroboration. This position reflects the community 
interest in facilitating the conviction of guilty offenders on the evidence of their 
unequivocal confessions to crime. It is important to note that PACE not only seeks to 
protect the trial process from unreliable confessions, it also seeks to protect the 
admissibility of a reliable non oppressively obtained confession as evidence of guilt. 
(4 1) PACE legitimated detention for questioning for up to thirty-six hours on police 
authorization and up to ninety-six hours on the authorization of a magistrate. 
Assuming the police comply fully with PACE, any confession obtained during that 
period of detention is likely to be admissible. It will not usually be possible for an 
argument to be made that prolonged detention beyond a few hours in a police station 
is inherently 'oppressive' and that therefore any confession made in that period is 
inadmissible under S. 76 2(a). For PACE to be internally consistent S. 76 2(a) cannot 
be invoked against confessions obtained from a suspect who has been held in police 
custody for thirV-six. or even ninety-six hours so long as the police have complied 
with PACE and not engaged in unfair or oppressive questioning. In this way PACE 
safeguards the general admissibility of confessions obtained through police 
interrogation. Arguments of the Rv Hudson (1980) (42) type that prolonged 
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detention and questioning is inherently oppressive are therefore disarmed. The 
Principles which govern the admissibility of confessions reflect the Janus faced 
position of protecting defendants from wrongful conviction on unreliable confessions 
but also serve the community interest in the general admissibility of confessions 
obtained through police interrogation as proof of guilt. In considering admissibility 
standards for confessions then it is wise to consider not only what types of 
confessions are inadmissible under the regime but also what types of confessions are 
admissible under that regime. Confession law is often influenced not only by a desire 
to protect the trial from certain kinds of confessions but also to guarantee the 
admissibility of other confessions. The voluntariness rule at common law was 
abandoned partly because too many reliable confessions were being excluded because 
of inducements made prior to their making, which mild inducements often had no real 
effect on the reliability of the confession made (on this point - see the Criminal Law 
Revision Committee Eleventh Report at page 37, paragraph 57). The attitude the 
observer has to interrogation, confessions and their value to the criminal process will 
therefore have normative consequences in terms of the confession evidence standards 
adopted. A hostile attitude to pre-trial interrogation may lead to stricter criteria of 
admissibility than a positive view of the value of police interrogation would. 
One of the debated topics in Parliament during the PACE BiH was the corroboration 
issue for confessions but this was rejected as a measure even for especially vulnerable 
suspects such as the mentally handicapped. Of course S. 34 of the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act can be criticized in these terms as well. It upsets the balance 
between suspect and police established by PACE by giving the police even more 
pressure to exert upon a suspect to confess. The right to silence in the police station 
was part of the package proposed by the RCCP (198 1) and was accepted as a part of 
the political settlement between police and suspects that was achieved in the PACE 
Act after long consultation and political debate. 
The response to S. 34 should not be to advocate any stricter controls on the 
admissibility of confession evidence, rather the balance between police and suspects 
should be re-established by the repeal of S. 34. Of course if this is not politically 
feasible then alternative strategies to restore the balance between police and suspect 
should be considered and perhaps a rule requiring the presence of a legal advisor 
before a confession is admitted into evidence would be an appropriate response to the 
increased pressures placed on suspects by S. 34. (43) Ihe significance of the 1998 
Human Rights Act should not be overlooked in this context; as Dennis notes (44), 
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11 1- - 
... Lae provisions permitting adverse inferences from silence, 
particularly pre-trial silence in the face of police questioning, 
are likely to be tested at an early stage under Article 6 of the 
Convention. " 
The corroboration reguirement in Scotland 
The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice considered in its Report whe&er there 
should be introduced into English law a corroboration requirement for confessions 
similar to that found in Scottish law. It is not proposed to rehearse all the arguments 
for and against the various corroboration requirements proposed as these uguments, 
can be found in the RCCJ Report itself at pp. 62-68 and in "Confession Evidence" by 
D. Wolchover and A. Heaton Armstrong at pp. 23-33. (45) Howeve2r, some 
observations will be made on the corroboration requirement as it presently stands in 
Scotland. 
The corroboration requirement for confessional evidence in Scotland flows frum the 
general rule of evidence there that the guilt of the accused cannot be established by 
the evidence of only one witness. 'Ibere must be evidence from two sources to justify 
a conviction. It follows that in theory an accused who has made a confession, to the 
police cannot be convicted on evidence of the confession alone; however as will be 
seen, Scottish law does allow for the conviction of a person on his confessim alone. 
In Gilmour v H. M. A. (1982) (46) the High Court in Scotland stated that where the 
confession is freely made and unequivocal in its terms then very little corroboration 
is required. Indeed, the confession itself may provide sufficient corroboration if it 
contains "special knowledge" - see Wilson and Murray v H. A Advoeats,.. J 1987) 
(47). The "special knowledge" confession is one where the confession (: ontains 
references to facts which the maker could not reasonably have known about had he 
not been involved in the crime. However, Scottish law has not limited this 
requirement to "knowledge" that is not publicly known - see Wilson above. The 
current efficacy of the corroboration requirement in Scotland as a protection against 
miscarriage of justice must be doubted. Even a rule which stated that the 'special 
knowledge" evinced in the confession was only known to the police would be a 
potentially dangerous one for as the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice 
commented, special knowledge can be passed to suspects, whether wittingly or 
unwittingly, by the officers conducting the interview. (48) If a corroboration 
requirement for confessions was to be imported into English law from Scotland then it 
is imperative that statute makes it clear that a confession can only provide 
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corroboration from itself when it contains "special knowledge" of the crime that is not 
in the public domain and also is not known to the police at the time the confession 
was made. (49) 
Moreover, given that in Scottish law where the confession is itself unequivocal little 
is required by way of corroboration, then this cannot be considered to be a situation 
providing a panacea for dealing with false confessions. As Mirfield points out, 
" ... the confession may be entirely unequivocal, may have been obtained without any unfair treatment of the accused 
and yet be wholly unreliable, whether because a coerced- 
compliant or a coerced-internalized one or whatever. 
Logically it would seem, the corroboration requirement 
should be addressing concerns not foreclosed by unequivocality 
and admissibility. " (50) 
The current Scottish law on the corroboration of confessions cannot be considered a 
satisfactory candidate for transplant to cure the problems of unreliable confessions. 
222 
Footnotes to Chavter 6 
Reform of the Law of Confessions 
Sir John May, "A Report of the Inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the 
convictions arising out of the Bomb Attacks in Guildford and Woolwich in 
1974", 30 June 1994 at p. 305. 
(2) Steven Greer., "The Right to Silence, Defence Disclosure and Confession 
Evidence", p. 102 at p. 114 in "Justice and Efficiency? The Royal Commission 
on Criminal Justice". Edited by Stewart Field and Philip A. Ihomas 1994. 
See also J. Griffiths in "The Politics of the Judiciary" 1997, at p. 212: 
"Confessions are notoriously unreliable partly because they may be extracted 
by duress and partly because some people are highly suggestible. " 
(3) T'he Royal Conmission on Crfininal Justice Report, July 1993, p. 64, 
paragraph 66. 
Rv Lambe (1791) 2 Leach C. C. 552. 
(5) RCCJ (1993) Report page 5 7, paragraph 3 1. 
(6) Rv Ward (1993) 96 Cr. App. R. I at p. 58. 
(7) S. Uglow, "Criminal Justice" 1995 at p. 83. 
(8) G. Gudjonsson, "'Me Psychology of False Confessions" (1989) The Medico 
Legal Journal, p. 94. 
(9) a) P. Devlin "Easing the Passing" 1985 at p. 213. 
As Devlin notes "The detective needed proof of the motive which only the 
doctor could supply" at p. 20. 
b) Rv Payne (1994) 15 Cr. App. R. 395. 
c) Robertson, "Freedom, the Individual and the Law" at p. 39. 
(10) Rv Campbefl (1995) 2 Cr. App. R. 262. 
(11) Rv Bailey (1995) 2 Cr. App. R. 262. 
(12) Reported as Anthony Paris and others (1993) 97 Cr. App. R. 99 at p. 109. 
(13) J. D. Jackson, "The Evidence Recommendations" [ 19931 Criminal Law 
Review at pp. 827-828. 
(14) House of Lords debates, 31 July 1984, Hansard pp. 692-693. 
(15) Lord Hailsham in The House of Lords Debates 19th October 1984, Hansard 
p. 1202. 
(16) A. Choo, "Confessions and Corroboration: a comparative perspective" [19911 
Criminal Law Review 867 at 876. Choo comments: "What is required is that 
the trial judge be accorded an expanded role. Where the reliability of 
confessional evidence is disputed, the trial judge should have a duty to make a 
determination him or herself as to the reliability of the evidence". 
(17) RvH [1995] 2 AU ER 865. Lord Griffiths at p. 878. 
223 
(18) ibid at p. 884. 
(19) see 1988 Criminal Justice Act s-34 
1994 Criminal Justice Act s. 32. 
(20) Rv Isequilla [1975] 1 W. L. R. 716. 
(2 1) Rv Kilner ( 1976] Criminal Law Review 740. 
(22) Rv Davies [ 1979] Criminal Law Review 167. 
(23) Rv Powell [1980] Crimiml Law Review 39. 
(24) Rv Miller (1986] 2 All ER 119. 
(25) Rv Effik and MitcheH (1992) 95 Cr. App. R. 427 at p-433. 
(26) 1. H. Dennis, "Miscarriages of Justice and the Law of Confessions: 
Evidentiary Issues and Solutions" [1993] Public Law, p. 291. 
(27) On the origins of s. 77 Professor Leigh has written: "Opposition arguments 
that confessions by mentally handicapped persons ought not to be admitted 
unless corroborated were met in part by a later amendment providing for a 
special warning to the jury in such cases". See L. LeigI-4 "Some Observations 
on the Parliamentary History of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984" 
in "Public Law and Politics", edited by Carol Harlow, 1986 at p. 112. 
S. 77 states that "Without prejudice to the general duty of the court at a trial or 
indictment to direct the jury on any matter on which it appears to the court 
appropriate to do so, where at such a trial: (a) the case against the accused 
depends wholly or substantially on a confession by him.; and (b) the court is 
satisfied - (i) that he is mentally handicapped; and (ii) that the confession was 
not made in the presence of an independent person, the court shall warn. the 
jury that there is special need for caution before convicting the accused in 
reliance on the confession, and shall explain that the need arises because of the 
circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) and (b) above. " 
(28) Rv Everett [1988] Crim. L. R. 826 C. A. 
Rv Moss (1990) 91 Cr. App. R. 37. 
Rv Cox [1991] Crim L. R. 276 C. A. 
Rv Glaves [1993] Crim L. R. 685 C. A. 
(29) R. v Mackenzie (1993) 96 Cr. App. R. 98. 
As A. Choo has pointed out it would be better if the Mackenzie, power should 
be exercisable whenever the prosecution case depends wholly on confessions 
which are so unconvincing that no properly directed jury could properly 
convict on them, regardless of whether the unreliability of the confession is 
attributable to mental handicap or to some other factor. A. Choo, "Evidence, 
Text and Materials" 1998, p. 407. 
(30) R. Reiner, "Investigative Powers and Safeguards for Suspects" [1993] 
Criminal Law Review, p. 808. "By the time the Report of the Royal 
Commission was published in July 1993 there had been a distinct shift in the 
public debate about law and order even though anxiety on the issue had 
intensified rather than abated ... Although lack of confidence in the integrity of 
criminal justice remained evidentý the popular and the political mood seemed 
to have shifted to an even greater concern with the system's effectiveness in 
tackling crime. " 
224 
(31) R. Pattenden, "Should Confessions be Corroborated? " [19911107 LQR 317. 
In Australia judicial warnings in relation to the maldng of disputed and 
uncorroborated confessions are required, McKinney and Judge v. R. (1991), 
171 CLR 468. The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 1993, also came 
down in favour of a judicial warning to juries about the dangers of false 
confessions: see RCCJ Report Chapter 4, paragraph 4.77. As Dennis 
comments: "There remains a good case for the introduction of such a warning 
requirement, but to date no legislation has implemented this recommendation 
and the courts have shown no inclination to give effect to it I% at p. 486 "The 
Law of Evidence" 1999 by I. H. Dennis. 
(32) Rv Ward (1993) 98 Cr. App. Rep. 337 held that expert evidence was 
admissible to show the likely unreliability of her confession as she was 
suffering at the time of her interrogation a personality disorder, which whilst 
not a mental illness was of the nature of a mental disorder: see also Rv 
Raghip, (1991) for another case where expert evidence was allowed on the 
question of the reliability of a confession by a defendant with a personality 
disorder. However for a normal defendant it will not be possible to adduce 
psychological evidence that he is unduly suggestible and therefore likely to 
make an unreliable confession under police interrogation. The decision in Rv 
Turner [ 19751 1 All ER 70, stands as a bar to the admissibility of expert 
evidence here. Lawton L. J. commented that: "An expert's opinion is 
admissible to furnish the court with scientific information which is likely to be 
outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury. If on the proven 
facts a judge or jury can form their own conclusions without help, then the 
opinion of an expert is unnecessary. " More particularly Lawton L. J. went on 
to comment that the jurors do not need a psychiatrist to tell them how ordinary 
people who are not suffering from mental illness are likely to react to the 
stresses and strains of life. Perhaps the time has now come to partially 
abandon the position stated in Rv Turner and recognize that concepts such as 
interrogative suggestibility and compliance may well be beyond the 
knowledge of the average juror who may not therefore appreciate how an 
otherwise normal person could make a false confession under normal 
interrogation by the police. Expert evidence of a personýs suggestibility under 
interrogation should be more readily admitted than at present. For a more 
sceptical view of the value of expert evidence about the concept of 
interrogative suggestibility in the normal criminal case see Dennis: "The Law 
of Confessions and Miscarriages of Justice: Evidentiary Issues and Solutions" 
(1993) Public Law at p. 112. 
(33) Rv Edwards (1991) 93 Cr. App. R. 48. 
(34) G. Robertson Q. C. "Freedom, the Individual and the Law" 1993, at p. 378. 
(35) John Sprack, "The Trial Process" p. 83 in "Criminal Justice under Stress" 1992, 
edited by Stockdale and Casale. 
(36) Quoted in David Rose "A Climate of Fear: The Case of the Tottenham Three" 
1992, p. 15 6. 
(37) The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (1993) paragraph 33, p. 127. 
See also, Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 141, "Evidence in 
Criminal Proceedings: Previous Misconduct of a Defendant" at p. 234, where 
the Law Commission proposed "that imputations should result in the loss of 
the shield only if they do not relate to the witness's conduct in the incident or 
investigation in question". 
(38) Rv Wheeling [1789] 1 Leach C. C. 311n. 
225 
(39) Rv Sullivan [1887] 16 Cox C. C. 347. See also Rv Kersey (1908) 1 Cr. 
App. R. 260 for Court of Appeal authority for the proposition that a confession 
alone can sustain a conviction. 
(40) Porter v Court [19631 Criminal Law Review 39. And see on this issue 
"Convicting on Confessional Evidence in the Complete Absence of a Corpus 
Delicti", Roderick Munday (1993) 157 Justice of the Peace and Local 
Government Law at p. 275. 
(41) In "Interrogation and Confession: A Study of Progress, Process and Practice" 
by Ian Bryan 1997 he comments, at p. 307: "In protecting the confession as an 
admissible and pritna facie reliable specie of evidence the law has had 
recourse to a variety of legitimating forms ... The PACE legislation may be 
seen as making the revival of statutory control and the restoration of 
regulation consistent with the rule of law. " 
(42) Rv Hudson (1980) 72 Cr. App. R. 163. 
(43) Section 34 states that: "Where, in any proceedings against a person for an 
offence evidence is given that the accused: (a) at any time before he was 
charged with the offence, on being questioned under caution by a constable 
trying to discover whether or by whom the offence had been committed, failed 
to mention any fact relied on in his defence in those proceedings, or (b) on 
being charged with the offence or officially informed that he might be 
prosecuted for it, failed to mention any such fact, being a fact which in the 
circumstances existing at the time the accused could reasonably have been 
expected to mention when so questioned, charged or informed ... " then the 
court or jury "may draw such inferences from the failure as appear proper". 
(44) 1. H. Dennis, "The Law of Evidence" 1999 at p. 33. 
(45) ne Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (1993) "Confession Evidence" by 
D. Wolchover and A. Heaton Arnistrong. Criminal Law Library 1996. 
(46) Gilmour v H. M. Advocate (1982) SCCR 590. 
(47) Wilson and Murray v H. M. Advocate (1987) SCCR 217. 
(48) The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (1993) at p. 63 paragraph 60. 
In the Inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the convictions arising out 
of the Bomb Attacks in Guildford and Woolwich in 1974 one of the wrongly 
convicted people, Carole Richardson, is quoted as saying that, "much of the 
information in her confessions came from overhearing informal conversations 
between police officers". At p. 59 of "A Report of the Inquiry into the 
circumstances surrounding the convictions arising out of the Bomb Attacks in 
Guildford and Woolwich in 1974" by Sir John May, 30 June 1994. 
(49) Lord Bingham when Master of the Rolls gave a useful summary of some 
reform proposals to counteract the dangers of false confessions, when he 
wrote: "A growing body of evidence shows that certain people will for 
psychological and other reasons in the absence of any improper pressure, 
threats, inducements, fraud or violence, confess to crimes they have not 
committed. The most constructive proposals for remedying this problem are 
that interrogations should be video-taped so that the manner in which a 
confession made may be assessed; that defendants should have an early 
opportunity of disavowing a confession before a judicial officer; that the 
226 
truthfulness of a confession should require to be corroborated by independent 
evidence; and perhaps that a defendant's suggestibility should be accepted as 
a proper subject for expert evidence. " from "The English Criminal Trial: The 
Credits and Debits" in The Clifford Chance Lectures L edited by B. 
Markesinis 1996, p. 91 at p. 102. 
Although beyond the scope of this thesis the problem of the current 
inadmissibility of "third party" confessions needs to be addressed by law 
reformers. The rule in Rv Turner (1975) 61 Cr. App. R. 67 which prevents an 
accused from introducing into trial, evidence that another person not on trial 
had allegedly confessed to the crime is a potential cause of miscarriages of 
justice. Whilst confessions to crime by accused persons are admissible in 
evidence by way of exception to the hearsay rule, the hearsay rule applies in 
full to confessions not made by an accused at trial. For an argument that third 
party confessions should become admissible in law under certain strict 
conditions: see Andrew LT. Choo "Hearsay and Confrontation inCriminal 
Trials". Clarendon Press 1996 at pp. 61-65. 
(50) P. Mirfield, "Silence, Confessions and hnproperly Obtained Evidence", 1997 
at p. 350. 
227 
CHAPTER 7 
ILLEGALLYAMPROPERLY OBTAIN-ED EVIDENCE 
Introduction 
This chapter proposes to examine the English law and theory behind the issue of the 
exclusion of illegally or improperly obtained evidence. The first section will involve 
an historical overview of the issue as it has been dealt with by English courts. Then 
there will be a discussion of the changes Section 78 of The Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act has brought to this topic. Then there wil-I be an in depth discussion of 
the theoretical justifications for excluding illegally or improperly obtained evidence. 
The next section wiH focus on improperly obtained evidence and covert police 
operations. The final section will deal with the cases under Section 78 of PACE. 
An Historical Overview of the Issue 
ýFhe governing principle in this area of criminal evidence in England, is that stated by 
Lord Goddard in Kuruma vR in 1955. (1) 
"The test to be applied in considering whether evidence is 
admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. 
If it is, it is admissible and the court is not concerned with 
how it was obtained. " 
As a matter of law illegally or improperly obtained evidence is admissible. This 
principle which has never been doubted in the cases has been recently reaffmned by 
the Court of Appeal in Rv Khan (1994) (2). As was stated in that recent case, 
evidence obtained by illegal means is prima facie admissible if it is relevant to the 
issue of the accused's guilt In this way English law still differs from the law in 
Scotland and the law in the U. S. A. In Scottish law illegally obtained evidence is 
prim facie inadmissible unless the illegality can be excused in some way (see Lawrie 
v Muir (19 0) ) (3). In the U. S. A. evidence obtained from an illegal search and 
seizure in violation of the fourth amendment to the U. S. Constitution has been subject 
to a strict exclusionary rule since the ruling in Mapp v Ohio (1961) (4). Only 
comparatively recently have exceptions been made by the courts to the strict 
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operation of the rule (e. g. see U. S. v Leon (1984) (5). "Ibe inclusionary principle 
which govems English law on illegally obtained evidence was first formulated in the 
middle of the nineteenth century in cases such as Rv Leathm (1861) (6) and Jones v 
Owen (1870) (7). However, it is possible to point to the much earlier case of Rv 
Warickshall (1783) (8) as some authority for the proposition that improperly obtained 
evidence is admissible as a matter of law. In Warickshall a confession was ruled 
inadmissible on the basis that it was involuntary. However, incriminating facts that 
were discovered as a result of the inadmissible confession were held to be admissible 
in evidence, 
of ... although confessions improperly obtained cannot be 
received in evidence yet that any acts done afterwards might 
be given in evidence notwithstanding that they were done in 
consequence of such confession. " 
This old principle has been embodied in S. 76 (4) of PACE. 
"The fact that a confession is wholly or partly excluded in 
pursuance of this section shall not affect the admissibility 
in evidence, (a) of any facts discovered as a result of the 
confession... " 
This does not mean to say that those facts should always be admitted to trial. S. 76 (4) 
merely allows those facts to be admitted, it does not say they should be admitted. In 
an appropriate case S. 78 might be used to rule those facts inadmissible under the 
discretion. Robertson comments that, 
"If a policeman points a revolver at a suspected terrorist 
and threatens to shoot him unless he confesses the where- 
abouts of an unexploded time bomb, the court should on 
principle exclude not only the ensuing confession and the 
fact that the bomb was found as a result of it but also (under 
section 78) any forensic evidence connecting the bomb with 
the defendant. " (9) 
Any conviction based on evidence which was secured by such police methods is 
unlikely to command moral authority and hence S. 78 should be invoked to exclude 
the forensic science evidence. Robertson's position here is similar to the position 
advocated by Zander in his note of dissent to the RCCJ that any serious violence in 
the course of a criminal investigation against the suspect should lead to a collapse of 
the prosecution case by the exclusion of all evidence. 
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The real development in the English law on illegally obtained evidence has been, it 
will be argued, in the scope and rationale of the discretion to exclude illegally or 
improperly obtained evidence from the criminal trial. This discretion was only first 
recognised in 1955 in Lord Goddard's dictum in Kurum and was limited in its scope 
applying, according to Rv Sang , only 
to evidence obtained from the accused after the 
commission of the offence and by analogy to the privilege against self-incrimination 
which the accused enjoyed pre-trial. The passage of S. 78 of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 represents a noticeable shift in the scope (see Rv Cooke (1995) 
(10) Court of Appeal for confmination of the fact that S. 78 is a substantially wider 
discretion than the common law discretion) and rationale of the discretion to exclude 
illegally obtained evidence. But see Rv Chalkley (I 99L (11) discussed in Chapter I 
for a judicial opinion rejecting a wide application of Section 78. 
It is proposed now to examine the common law rule of admissibility in law for 
illegally obtained evidence and to suggest that the conditions in which it was adopted 
have changed to the extent that departure from the rule in terms of the exercise of the 
discretion to exclude illegally obtained evidence is much more warranted in the late 
twentieth century than in the mýid nineteenth century. The common law as developed 
in Rv Leatham. and Jones v Owen reflected a fundamental principle of English 
evidence law: all relevant evidence is admissible unless it is subject to an 
exclusionary rule or discretion. In deciding whether there should be an exclusionary 
rule or discretion the judges at common law in the nineteenth century would 
obviously have considered whether there was a sound reason for excluding such 
evidence. With regard to the problem of the creditworthiness of confessions there 
was obviously good sense in formulating a rule which excluded a confession obtained 
by a threat or an inducement on the ground that such confessions are likely to be 
unreliable (see Ry Warickshall (1783) , however with regard to evidence obtained 
illegally it is arguable that there was no such sound reason for exclusion. Indeed all 
the considerations pointed towards inclusion of the evidence, as Mellor J. commented 
in Jones v Owen 0 870), 
I think it would be a dangerous obstacle to the administration 
of justice if we were to hold that, because evidence was 
obtained by illegal means it would not be used against a party 
charged with an offence. " 
A. Ashworth (12) has criticized this comment of Mellor J. for its use of the concept of 
justice in a 'questionable way, by which Ashworth means that the 'administration of 
justice' sometimes requires the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. However, 
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against Ashworth, is the point that Mellor J. 's conunent was not "questionable" in the 
context of the 1870s. The production of iflegally obtained evidence by the police for 
the use in court, although it formed the background of the facts in Jones v Owen (an 
illegal search by a constable which produced salmon caught by poaching) did not 
have the modem implications of the "misuse of state power in the collection of 
evidence for the purposes of criminal trial". (13) This phrase was used by Lord 
Scarman in the House of Lords debates on the PACE Bill to identify the modem 
issues with regard to the problem of illegally obtained evidence. 
For most of the nineteenth century there was not the perceived modem institutional 
reliance on the police by the criminal court system. The idea of a powerful state 
apparatus for the detection and investigation of offenders and the collection of 
evidence against them for use in court was not fully developed in the nineteenth 
century: on this point see Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
However, by the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century the police were 
the main agency for the gathering of evidence and the prosecution of offenders. The 
Judges' Rules of 1912 which attempted to regulate part of the investigatory side of 
police work, namely the questioning of suspects, was some evidence of this core role 
of the police and its official recognition. The criminal courts became dependent on 
the police for the construction of cases and the production of evidence for use in court 
against offenders. However, this fact did not mean that in this period judicial 
attitudes to evidence obtained improperly or illegally by the police changed. A 
discretion to exclude a confession obtained in violation of the Judges' Rules was 
recognised in Rv Voisin (1918) but no such discretion was recognised for the 
exclusion of improperly obtained non confession evidence until 1955. The orthodox 
view as repeated by Lord Diplock as late as 1979 in Rv Sang was that, (14) 
"The function of judge at a criminal trial as respects 
the admission of evidence is to ensure that the accused 
has a fair trial according to law. It is no part of the 
judge's function to exercise disciplinary powers over the 
police or prosecution as respects the way in which 
evidence to be used at the trial is obtained by them ... 
what the judge at a trial is concerned with is not how 
the evidence adduced by the prosecution has been 
obtained but with how it is used by the prosecution 
at the trial. " 
An extremely limited discretion to exclude non confession evidence obtained in an 
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improper way by the police was recognised in Kuruma as late as 1955 but most cases 
of illegally or unfairly obtained evidence fell outside the operation of this discretion 
and were therefore subject to Lord Diplock! s statement of the unyielding inclusionary 
principle. Evidence from an illegal search and evidence from entrapment are two 
examples mentioned by Lord Diplock as falling outside the Kuruma discretion. 
Lord Diplock commented that the discretion was limited to 
"evidence tantamount to a self-incriminatory admission 
which was obtained from the defendant after the offence 
had been committed. " 
As Lord Taylor pointed out in Rv Christou, 
"... in view of the tenns of those dicta, the paucity of 
cases in which the discretion has been exercised so as 
to exclude legally admissible evidence is not surprising. " (15) 
Despite the increasing reliance by the criminal courts on police evidence by the 
beginning of the twentieth century there was still perceived to be a clear distinction 
between the investigatory process conducted by the police and the fact finding 
process at trial, hence Diplock's comment as late as 1979 that the judge is solely 
concerned with the use of evidence at trial not with how it was obtained by the police 
or anybody else. 
If particular police behaviour in the obtaining of evidence was considered to be 
offensive and in need of checking then the judges had the mechanism of a judicial 
rebuke in open court to make their feelings known to the police. Indeed this device of 
the judicial rebuke whilst admitting the improperly obtained evidence became the 
normal judicial response to police breaches of the Judges' Rules on obtaining 
confessions as well as being the usual judicial response to other instances of police 
impropriety. A discretion to exclude a confession may have been recognised in Rv 
Voisin (1918) but breach of the rules rarely led to exclusion. Judicial rebuke seems to 
have been the most the police could have feared from their breach of the rules in 
obtaining a confession, e. g. Rv Mills and Lemon (1947) per Lord Goddard and Rv 
Mackintosh (1982), per Lawton L. J. (16) 
If in a more cynical age, the notion of a few sharp words from the bench to the police 
seems an inadequate response to police impropriety in the obtaining of evidence it is 
appropriate to remember that thirty years ago a judicial rebuke would have carried a 
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lot more weight with police and public than at the present time when the public 
reputation of the judiciary has declined so much. In support Of this claim on declining 
confidence in the judiciary, see the following remark by Lord Taylor of Gosforth. (17) 
In 1936 the Lord Chief Justice Lord Hewart said "Her Majesty's judges are satisfied 
with the almost universal admiration in which they are held". In 1992 his successor, 
Lord Taylor of Gosforth, acknowledged that no judge today would express such 
sentiments: "If he did he would be lambasted by the press, and rightly so! ". Even as 
late as 1975 Devlin (18) could write "The English judiciary is popularly treated as a 
national institution, like the navy and tends to be admired to excess". A judicial 
rebuke at one time was likely to carry some weight in police culture because of the 
very high status of the English judiciary. 
As Cross pointed out using the 1947 case of Rv Mills and Lemon (19) as an 
iflustration, 
"Is it to be supposed that when the Lord Cl-fief Justice 
said The sooner the Bristol Police study, learn and abide 
by the Judges' Rules the better' the conduct of the police 
of Bristol was unaffected because his Lordship admitted 
a confession obtained in consequence of a breach of those 
rules? " 
Therefore judicial rebuke was viewed as a way of checking police impropriety 
without the social cost of the exclusion of relevant evidence. 
Roskill L. J. in Rv Sang (20) commented that, 
"Experience shows that expressions of judicial disapproval 
when justified are not without their effect as a deterrent 
to reprehensible or arbitrary police behaviour. " 
The Law Commission in 1977 had a similar faith in the notion of the judicial rebuke 
when they commented that the criminal courts could exert "substantial influence" 
over police conduct by an occasional" strong expression of judicial disapproval". (21) 
G. Robertson (1994) comments that this view of the Law Commission" is sanguine in 
the extreme". (22) However, in the context of English society at least pre- 1970s, a 
judicial rebuke was likely to have had some influence on the police even in the 
absence of action to exclude improperly obtained evidence because of the great status 
of English judges at that time. 
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The same approach was taken to evidence obtained by the use of entrapment by the 
police, a judicial rebuke if necessary, followed by the admission of the evidence. An 
example of this approach is the entrapment case of Rv Birtles (1969) (23), where the 
Lord Chief Justice Lord Parker rebuked the police for acting as agent provocateurs 
but held that the evidence of the police officer was rightly admitted. The only legal 
consequence of the fact of entrapment by the police was that the sentence imposed on 
the appellant was reduced by Lord Parker. 
However, once a discretion to exclude improperly obtained evidence was recognised 
in Kuruma vR then the way was open for progressively minded judges who thought 
that the judges should be more willing to exclude illegally or improperly obtained 
evidence tendered by the police. In the 1970s trial judges in the cases of Rv Foulder 
(1973) (24), Rv Burnett (1973) and Rv Ameer (1977) excluded evidence obtained by 
the entrapment of the defendant into committing a criminal offence by the police. Rv 
Sang (1979) H. L. can be understood as an attempt to halt this tendency of some trial 
judges to exclude evidence because of dislike at the way it was obtained, hence Lord 
Diplocles comment, 
"However much the judge may dislike the way in which a 
particular piece of evidence was obtained before proceedings 
were commenced, if it is admissible evidence probative of 
the accused's guilt it is no part of his judicial function to 
exclude it for this reason. " (25) 
Rv Sang re-established the old principle that all relevant evidence is admissible 
irrespective of how it was obtained and that any discretion to exclude is very narrow 
in scope and certainly does not encompass evidence obtained from entrapment. 
Only five years later S. 78 of PACE was legislated which was based on a view that the 
judiciary should be concerned with how evidence is obtained. Lord Diplock had 
famously said in Sang 
"It is no part of a judge's function to exercise disciplinary 
powers over the police or prosecution as respects the way 
in which evidence to be used at trial is obtained by them... "' 
However, during the debates on the PACE Bill Leon Brittan, the Home Secretary, 
commented, 
234 
"In our view it can indeed be a proper part of the judge's function 
to have regard to the way in which evidence has been obtained 
and to refuse to admit it if those circumstances bear upon the 
fairness of the proceedings. That is a principle which we are 
prepared to see enacted for the first, time in statute. " (26) 
Lord Scarman whose own amendment was rejected in favour of the amendment 
drafted by the Lord Chancellor, made the important point that his amendment 
extending the power of a judge to exclude evidence obtained unlawfully should be 
viewed in the context of the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill as a whole. In 
explaining the difference between the common law discretion known to Lord 
Goddard, Lord Parker and Lord Widgery and his own amendment for a discretion to 
exclude illegally obtained evidence, Lord Scarman said, 
"One small si . ficant answer tells the whole story. It is 
because there was no Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
in their day and we are discussing this amendment in the 
light of a codification known for the moment as the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Bill. " (27) 
This comment is significant for understanding the rationale of exclusion under S. 78 of 
PACE. The PACE Act represented a negotiated political settlement between the 
interests of the police and the suspect. It was recognised that the police have the duty 
to investigate crime on behalf of the community and for this socially important 
purpose enhanced powers were given to the police to gather evidence for use in the 
prosecution of offenders. 
However, as Lord Scarman commented, the PACE Bill also recognised the principle 
of, 
"Safeguarding citizens against the misuse of police power in 
the collection of evidence for purposes of criminal 
proceedings. " 
Although Parliament rejected Lord Scarman's 'reversed onus' rule on illegally 
obtained evidence (prima facie inadmissible unless the illegality could be excused) 
and adopted S. 78 (drafted by Lord Hailsham, the Lord Chancellor) instead, Lord 
ScarmaiYs comment quoted above is a useful insight into how Parliament understood 
the ideological rationale of the creation of a statutory discretion to exclude illegally or 
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improperly obtained evidence. The focus of the old common law discretion (still 
retained by S. 82 (3)) was on 'fairness to the accused', i. e. the* discretion was seen as 
protecting one vital interest of the accused pre-trial, namely his privilege against self- 
incrimination. Given that the defendant enjoyed a privilege against self-incrimination 
at trial then it might have seemed sensible to extend protection to the pre-trial 
privilege against self-incrimination through use of an exclusionary discretion. The 
point is that if a suspect was unfairly induced to incriminate himself in the police 
station then the damage would already have been done when the trial begins and his 
privilege against self-incrimination at trial would have lost its bite if the defendant 
had been tricked or unfairly induced to incriminate himself in the police station. This 
analysis perhaps explains why the House of Lords in Rv Sang stated that the 
exclusionary discretion only extended to protecting the privilege against self- 
incrimination of the suspect pre-trial. It would have been hypocritical to assert that 
the defendant enjoyed a right not to testify at trial whilst allowing the police pre-trial 
to unfairly induce the suspect to incriminate himself. 
The impact of Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act on this topic 
The focus of the new discretion in S. 78 is, it is submitted, on the lack of state probity 
in the gathering of evidence which if it reaches a certain level of impropriety or 
involved the breach of important rules for the conduct of investigations could so 
adversely affect the fairness of the proceedings that the evidence ought to be 
excluded. 
That the S. 78 discretion is wider than the common law discretion has been recognised 
by the Court of Appeal in Rv Cooke, July 22nd 1994 - the Court of Appeal 
commented obiter, 
"Ibe discretion of the court not to admit evidence which was 
improperly obtained was previously strictly circumscribed, 
Rv Sang (1980) A. C. 402. Despite some expressions of 
opinion to the contrary it is clear that Section 78 has given 
the courts a substantially wider discretion. " 
Reference by the Court of Appeal in Rv Cooke to "some expressions of opinion to 
236 
the contrary" can be taken as a comment on Rv Mason (1987), where Watkins L. J. 
said that S. 78 merely re-states the common law discretion. 
In Rv Christou and Wright (1992) Lord Taylor commented that the "criteria of 
fairness" (28) are the same under the common law as under S. 78. Rv Cooke makes it 
clear that S. 78 is a different discretion from the common law discretion. In line with 
the approach taken earlier in this thesis it is to be argued that this change in the law of 
evidence which is now recognised by the Court of Appeal is due to a changed view of 
the role of the police in relation to the community and the criminal justice system. A 
recognition that reliance on evidence obtained illegally or improperly by the police 
can weaken the moral and expressive authority of the verdict, so that illegally or 
improperly obtained evidence is sometimes rightly excluded by the use of S. 78. 
PACE represents a politically negotiated attempt to balance the community interest in 
granting the police extra powers to detect and investigate crime and the community 
interest in controlling misuse of those powers. Tbe "fairness of the proceedings" 
could be upset by breach, particularly deliberate breach of proper procedures 
statutorily laid down for the investigation of crime. A useful and interesting summary 
of the uses of the S. 78 discretion was provided by Lord Lane in Rv Quinn (1990). 
Lord Lane said, 
"'The function of the judge is therefore to protect the fairness 
of the proceedings and normally proceedings are fair if a 
jury hears all relevant evidence which either side wishes to 
place before it, but proceedings may become unfair if for 
example, one side is allowed to produce relevant evidence 
which for one reason or another the other side cannot 
properly challenge or meet or where there has been an abuse 
of process, e. g. because evidence has been obtained by 
deliberate breach of procedures laid down in an official Code 
of Practice. " (29) 
The reference in Lord Lane's judgement to the unfairness caused by one side adducing 
evidence that the other side cannot properly challenge or meet is relevant to cases 
such as Rv Keenan and Rv Weerdesteyn where the police have not complied with 
the recording provisions for interviews and as a result the defendant is put at a 
substantial disadvantage in challenging police evidence of an alleged confession in 
court: see Chapter 4 of this thesis. This is so whether or not the police acted in bad 
faith. S. 78 is relevant to exclude a confession in that context. However, the reference 
to an 'abuse of process' and the relevance of S. 78 is interesting for the potential 
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. As Professor Birch has commented, 
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"There is the quite distinct unfairness generated by letting 
one side get away with breaking the rules of the game, 
which Lord Lane C. J. terms an abuse of the process of 
the court and which is about as close as we have come to 
acknowledging the need to preserve the respect for and 
legitimacy of the verdict. " (30) 
The comment of Lord Lane in Quinn is consistent with viewing the S-78 discretion in 
the context of illegally or improperly obtained evidence as being concerned with the 
misuse of state power and bad faith non compliance with the procedures statutorily 
laid down for investigation. Lord Lane in Rv Quinn 
, also commented of 
S. 78 that 
"the section gave the courts power to express disapproval of objectionable police 
methods by excluding the fruit of such misconduct". Judicial comment which is very 
different from the sentiments expressed in Rv Sang by the House of Lords. 
The common law basis for the discretion to exclude illegally or improperly obtained 
evidence, namely to protect the suspect's 'privilege against self-incrimination' is 
therefore no longer at the heart of the rationale for the exercise of the discretion. 
It is generally unwise to extrapolate firm conclusions from a comparison of a few 
cases only but an indication of the change in judicial attitudes to illegally obtained 
evidence can be gathered from a comparison of the treatment of tile issue in the pre- 
PACE case of Rv Apicella (19851 (31) C. A. with the post-PACE case of Rv 
Nathaniel (1995) (32) C. A. Both cases concerned the admission of scientific 
evidence of high probative worth in a serious criminal case. In Rv AiDicella the 
accused was charged with raping three girls. The strongest evidence against him 
consisted in the fact that each of the girls as a result of the sexual attack had 
contracted an unusual strain of gonorrhea. The accused was found to have the same 
strain of gonorrhea. The sample in issue was initially obtained by the prison doctor 
for therapeutic purposes. 'nie accused submitted to giving the body fluids sample 
because he had been told, wrongly, by a prison officer, that as a prisoner he had no 
choice but to give it. The sample was used by the prosecution to prove he was the 
rapist. Lawton L. J. on appeal held that the evidence was rightly admitted. Rv Payne 
(1963) (33) was distinguished but it was not clear on what grounds it was 
distinguished. Rv Payne represents (with Rv gourt (1962) on very similar facts) the 
only time an appeal court said evidence should have been excluded under the Kuruma 
discretion. In Rv Payne the appellant was asked when he went to the police station 
whether he was wifling to be examined by a doctor, and it was made clear to him that 
the purpose of that was that the doctor should see whether the appellant was suffering 
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from any iHness or disability. The appellant was told that it was no part of the 
doctor' s duty to examine him in order to give an opinion as to his unfitness to drive. 
In fact the doctor was called as a witness for the prosecution and gave strong evidence 
in regard to the extent to which the appellant was under the influence of drink. 
ýffie appellant was convicted of the drink driving charge. Ibe Court of Criminal 
Appeal quashed the conviction. It was stated that the magistrate, 
"In the exercise of his discretion ought to have refused 
to allow that evidence to be given on the basis that if the 
accused realised that the doctor would give evidence on 
that matter he might refuse to subject himself to examination. " 
(Per Lord Parker C. J. ) 
In the light of Lord Parker's comment it is hard to see how Rv Apicella can be 
distinguished, for the defendant in that case might have refused to consent to supply 
the sample if he thought that the evidence would have been used against him. It 
should be remembered that in Callis v Gunn (34) which was a case of unfairly 
obtained real evidence, Lord Parker C. J. said, 
"There is no suggestion here that they conveyed to him that 
he had to accede to the request. If that had been done there 
might be a clear case for excluding the evidence. " 
In Apicella the impression conveyed to the defendant was that he had to accede to the 
request. It may be, as R. Pattenden observed, that given the nature of the offence in R 
v Apicefla, 
"Would the law not have looked an ass if this highly 
relevant evidence had been excluded? " (35) 
In Rv Payne the improperly obtained evidence in issue was only in a case concerning 
the relatively minor offence of driving under the influence of drink. 
Writing in 1990, A Gelowitz (36) argued that S. 78 does not ftmdamentally alter the 
common law position on illegally obtained evidence. He commented, 
"The strildng. fact is that the Court of Appeal has not yet been 
called upon to exclude probative real evidence in the 
exercise of discretion under Section 78. " 
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Indeed, Gelowitz believes that S. 78 should not be used to exclude illegally obtained 
real evidence since it is "pure proof' and therefore its admission cannot upset the 
fairness of the proceedings: real evidence Gelowitz claims is 'neutral' as between 
prosecution and defence; what Gelowitz means by this is that how real evidence is 
obtained does not affect its probative worth in any way. In contrast, denial of access 
to legal advice can affect the chances of the police obtaining a confession; so in 
consequence where that denial of legal advice has been wrongful the confession 
might justifiably be excluded under Section 78. However, Gelowitz should consider 
the point that if the police had followed proper procedures for obtaining real evidence 
then they might not have obtained that evidence at all and that it is only due to police 
non-observance of proper procedure (as in Rv Nathaniel and the duty to destroy 
samples under S. 64) that the real evidence is obtained at all. Therefore in an 
important way the real evidence comes before the court affected by the manner of its 
obtaining and that therefore in an appropriate case S. 78 should be used to exclude the 
evidence in order to safeguard the 'fairness of the proceedings' - the proceedings 
including pre-trial events in the criminal investigation. 
However, in the case of Rv Nathaniel (1995) the Court of Appeal quashed a 
conviction on the ground that real evidence of high probative value in a case of great 
seriousness involving charges of rape and robbery had been wrongly admitted. In 
Nathaniel the prosecution relied on DNA evidence which had been obtained from the 
accused in connection with another charge of rape from which he had been acquitted. 
In breach of S. 64 of PACE the police did not destroy that sample but it was kept on 
the Metropolitan Police computer index. Section 64 states, 
"If (a) fingerprints or samples are taken from a person in 
connection with the investigation of an offence; and 
(b) he is cleared of that offence, they must be destroyed 
as soon as practicable after the conclusion of 
proceedings. " 
When the appellant was investigated for the rape and robbery for which he was 
convicted it was discovered that his DNA profile was found to match that of the 
victims' assailant. This evidence, which the trial judge found to be of "a high 
probative value" was admitted in evidence and he was convicted. 
The Court of Appeal quashed his conviction with the Lord Chief Justice Lord Taylor 
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giving judgement. Lord Taylor placed emphasis on the police breach of the statutory 
duty under S. 64 to destroy the DNA sample when the appellant was acquitted on the 
other rapes. Bad faith was not alleged by the defence but the police still had breached 
the statutory duty and the appellant in the words of Lord Taylor 
"... had in effect been misled in consenting to give the 
blood sample by statements and promises which were 
not honoured. " 
The appellant had been told before he consented to giving the original sample that it 
would be destroyed if he was prosecuted in relation to the offence and acquitted. 
Before this decision in Rv Nathaniel, Professor Birch had commented on the case of 
Rv Cooke that, (37) 
"It would seem that whatever the theoretical potential of 
S. 78 the courts are as reluctant as they were at common 
law to exclude scientific evidence which clearly shows 
that an accused person has committed a serious offence 
such as rape. " 
Rv Nathaniel is significant in this respect. Consistent with other decisions 
concerning important provisions of PACE such as S. 58 (see Rv Samuel) or the 
recording provisions (see Rv Keenan, Rv Canale the Court of Appeal is insisting 
that the scheme for fair investigation of offences established by PACE should be 
respected by the police. S. 64 of PACE required samples to be destroyed if an 
acquittal follows their use in criminal proceedings. This provision has an obvious 
civil liberties dimension, the state should not be allowed to build a sample database on 
citizens who have been acquitted at trial of crime. S. 64 is part of the scheme of 
fairness between police and suspects. The police are given powers to obtain samples 
from suspects to investigate and detect crime effectively but the quid pro quo of this is 
that such samples must be destroyed if an acquittal results following a prosecution 
involving samples taken from the accused. The absence of bad faith as a requirement 
for exclusion in ' 
Nathaniel is also noteworthy. In Matto v DPP (1987) (38) the crucial 
factor which led to highly probative real evidence (a breathalyzer test) being excluded 
under S. 78 was the finding of bad faith on the part of the police in the exercise of their 
powers. Nathaniel suggests that highly probative real evidence can be excluded under 
S. 78 even in the absence of bad faith. 
The comparison between Apicella and Nathaniel is a striking illustration of the effect 
of the passage of S. 78 of PACE and its underlying rationale on judicial attitudes to 
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evidence obtained by the police in a way which violates fair standards in the conduct 
of criminal investigations. 
Real evidence obtained bv an unlawful search 
A further Mustration of how Section 78 has affected the law with regard to illegally or 
improperly obtained evidence is provided by the case of Rv Khan (1997) (38b). Lord 
Diplock in Rv Sang famously said that there was no discretion to exclude evidence 
obtained by an fflegal search. However in Rv Khan the Court of Appeal commented 
that if the second search of the accused had been illegal then the judge would have 
had a discretion, not an obligation, to exclude it. The Court of Appeal refused to 
interfere with a judge's decision to admit the evidence of drug-smuggling by a 
diplomat. However, as Dennis points out, (38c) 
"It may well be that exclusion of the fruit of unlawful 
searches will be rare, but this does not detract from the 
significance of recognising that Section 78 confers a 
discretion to exclude such evidence. This case would 
not be covered by Lord DiplocWs statement in Sang 
of the discretion. " 
The theoretical justifications for excluding illegally or improperiv obtained 
evidence 
It is proposed now to examine the different rationales which have been propounded 
for the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence from the criminal trial and to examine 
the extent to which they have been recognised in English criminal evidence. 
The debate over illegally obtained evidence is primarily a political one rather than a 
purely evidential one. At a basic level the question of the admissibility of relevant 
and reliable evidence of guilt unfairly or illegally obtained pits crime control concerns 
against civil liberties concerns. The political nature of the debate will become clear in 
the discussion of the various rationales for the exclusion of illegally obtained 
evidence. 
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However, before consideration is given to the various rationales that have been 
propounded for the exclusion of such evidence, it is proposed to consider a view of 
the problem which in effect denies that there is an issue at all with regard to the 
admissibility of impoperly obtained evidence. Ashworth terms the view "the 
reliability principle". This principle is justified on the basis of a controversial view 
of the proper purposes of the criminal trial and the rules of evidence which control the 
admission of evidence to it. Wigniore is a leading example of a proponent of this 
view. Polyviou gives a useful summary of the position, (39) 
"To begin with, rules of evidence are or should be only 
designed to enable courts to place correct determinations 
of specifically defined disputed issues; illegally 
obtained evidence is as reliable and as probative as 
evidence lawfully obtained; and since the courts need 
all reliable evidence material to the only issue before it 
which is the guilt or innocence of the particular accused, 
the way in which probative evidence currently before the 
court was obtained is immaterial to this issue and such 
evidence should therefore be considered. " 
It is important to note that when commentators talk of illegally obtained evidence they 
usually mean illegally obtained real evidence, such as the murder weapon, ifficit 
drugs, stolen goods etc. The point is that the reliability of real evidence is unaffected 
by how it was acquired - the evidence speaks for itself. An exception to this principle 
is where the accused alleges the real evidence was 'planted' upon him. In this way 
police illegality in planting the evidence affects the probative value of the real 
evidence. 
As Ashworth (40) conunents, the 'reliability principle' is based on, 
11 -a clear separation of 
functions between the criminal 
court whose purpose is to determine the truth of the 
charges against the accused, and other agencies such as 
police disciplinary tribunals which deal with improprieties 
by law enforcement officers. " 
Tbe 'reliability principle' can also be bolstered by the observation that what is fair and 
what is not in police investigations for the purposes of the exercise of an exclusionary 
discretion will lead to uncertainty in practice. As Roskill L. J. commented in Rv 
Sang 
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"Subjective judicial views of what is morally permissible 
or reprehensible are an unsafe guide to the administration 
of the criminal law and to the proper exercise of judicial 
discretion. " 
Roskill went on to say that a trial judge should not undertake 
passing a necessarily subjective judgement on the 
ethics of the police ... a judgement from which the prosecution has no right of appeal. " (4 1) 
The reliability principle could' of course accommodate exclusionary rules or 
discretions against certain types of unreliable evidence, for example, hearsay 
evidence, but the theory would deny any cogent reason for evidence law to exclude as 
a matter of law or discretion evidence which is both relevant and reliable. Apart from 
confessions obtained by violence, the issues surrounding illegally obtained evidence 
rarely involves concerns about the probative worth of evidence. 
The issues behind the exclusion of illegally or improperly obtained evidence are not 
probative concerns, rather they are of a 'political' nature involving such considerations 
as checking the abuse of police power, safeguarding the integrity of the criminal court 
or vindicating the 'rights' of the accused through the exclusion of evidence. 
Some of the dicta of the House of Lords in Rv Sang, approach the Wigmore view of 
the purposes of the rules of evidence (see especially Lord Diplock). The extremely 
limited discretion to exclude evidence on the basis of the 'nemo debet" principle is one 
point of distinction between the Diplock approach in Sang and the Wigmorean 
approach to illegal or unfairly obtained evidence. Both views are based on a clear 
distinction between the investigatory stage and the trial stage. As was said in Sang a 
trial judge should only be concerned with the fairness of the trial and not with how 
evidence is obtained by the police. As Lord Diplock commented, 
"However much the judge may dislike the way in which a 
particular piece of evidence was obtained before proceedings 
were commenced if it is admissible evidence probative of 
the accused's guilt it is no part of his judicial function to 
exclude it for this reason. " 
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The Deterrence Principle 
The idea behind this theory is that the exclusion of evidence from the criminal court is 
a way of disciplining the police for the impropriety in the obtaining of that evidence. 
If the police do not wish to risk 'losing' the conviction of a guilty offender through the 
exclusion of evidence they should not engage in impropriety in the obtaining of 
evidence. The courts can 'discipline' the police by excluding evidence from the 
criminal trial and although an acquittal is not always inevitable, the exclusion of 
evidence, especially confession evidence, can sometimes undermine the prosecution 
case to a degree where a conviction is not sustainable. 
However, there is a great cost for achieving this aim by excluding evidence: the non 
conviction of guilty offenders because of the exclusion of reliable relevant evidence 
on deterrence grounds. Wigmore brought out what he considered to be the essential 
absurdity of the disciplinary principle. Wigmore commented, (42) 
it our way of upholding the constitution is not to 
strike at the man who breaks it, but to let off somebody 
else who broke something else. " 
This is the point that it is the public not the police who are punished by the exclusion 
of illegally or improperly obtained evidence, for an offender may go free. 
However, the police have a professional interest in the conviction of offenders, an 
important point which Wigmore overlooked. Therefore the police may be punished 
by the exclusion of evidence from the criminal trial. The point remains however, that 
the public are also punished by the non conviction of a guilty offender. 
Further arguments against the law of evidence perforn-iing a deterrence function might 
focus on the lack of efficiency of such an approach at a great social cost - the acquittal 
of the guilty. Research conducted by Oaks twenty-five years ago in the USA cast 
doubt on the efficiency of the exclusionary rule for the products of illegal search and 
seizure in terms of the deterrence of police misconducts. One reason suggested by 
Oaks for the weak effect of deteffence was that in many search and seizure cases the 
searches were not carried out with a prosecution in mind but merely to confiscate 
illegal material or harass known criminals, therefore the police knew that their actions 
were not likely to be reviewed by the criminal courts. Interestingly, Oaks insisted that 
it would be a mistake to extrapolate from his conclusions on the weak deterrent effect 
of an exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases to the deterrent effect of an 
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exclusionary rule in confession cases: (43) 
"The variety of reasons for an improper search and seizure 
is in marked contrast to the limited number of reasons why 
police could engage in the type of illegal conduct that causes 
the exclusion of a coerced confession ... the predominant incentive for interrogation is to obtain evidence for use in 
court. Consequently police conduct in this area is likely to be 
responsive to judicial rules governing the admissibility of 
that evidence. " 
This is interesting in the light of the purposes of S. 76 2(b) of PACE which can be 
interpreted as seeking to deter unreliability inducing methods of police interrogation 
through the exclusion of confession evidence: on this see Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
It may be argued that given the lack of clear evidence that exclusionary rules actually 
significantly deter the police then it follows that highly probative evidence of guilt 
should not be excluded for the sake of deterring police m isconduct. This is especially 
so where other controlling and disciplinary mechanisms exist and could be developed 
to control police misconduct in the obtaining of evidence. 
For example, civil actions against the police have increased significantly in recent 
years. Ibey have become a useful way of publicising and exposing police 
misconduct as well as being a route to the vindication of the particular plaintiffs 
rights. One of the beneficial consequences of the Police Act 1964 (see s. 48) was to 
make Chief Constables liable for torts committed by constables in their forces. Civil 
actions against the Metropolitan Police for example, have cost that force over a 
mil=1ion pounds a year in recent years. The embarrassing nature of such actions for the 
police is attested to by Geoffrey Robertson Q. C., who comments (44) 
"Cases of this kind present such an unedifying picture of 
police conduct that considerable effort is expended in 
keeping them out of court and out of the public eye 
through a negotiated settlement. " 
A main reason why deterrence of police behaviour through the exclusion of evidence 
is unlikely to be very successful is the competing norms of police behaviour and 
public pressure on the police to secure evidence of guilt. 
Moreover, the trial would probably not be uppermost in the policemans mind when 
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he committed the illegality in obtaining the evidence as it would be some months into 
the future. However, caution is needed with regard to the argument from the power of 
peer pressure as a factor militating against the success of the deterrence principle. 
The deterrence hypothesis might be defended by pointing out that mechanisms such 
as the exclusion of evidence are needed precisely because of the strength of police 
culture pushing police officers towards illegality where that is necessary to secure 
evidence of guilt. The deterrence hypothesis could be supported by claiming that 
every available means to deter police misconduct should be utilised given the strength 
of police culture pushing the other way. 
Militating against the deterrence approach to illegaffy obtained evidence is the fact the 
approach of the English judiciary has been to disclaim any deterrent function for the 
judge. Lord Diplock in Rv Sang commented, 
"It is no part of a judge's function to exercise disciplinary 
powers over the police or prosecution as respects the way 
in which evidence to be used at the trial is obtained 
by them. " 
Similar sentiments were expressed after the introduction of PACE by Watkins L. J. in 
Rv Maso Hodgson J. in Rv Keenan and by Lord Lane in Rv Delaney (45) who 
held, 
"It is no part of the duty of the court to rule a statement 
inadmissible simply in order to punish the police for 
failure to observe the Codes of Practice. " 
However, remarks of Lord Lane in the later case of Rv Canale (1991) do have a 
disciplinary edge to them, when holding that a non-recorded confession should have 
been excluded, he comments in the following terms, that the pohce officers had, 
" ... demonstrated a 
lamentable attitude towards the 1984 
Act and the Rules" 
and " ... a cynical 
disregard for the rules". (46) 
Lord Lane also commented that it was Iiigh time" that police officers understood the 
importance of the rules relating to the recording of interviews. These comments in 
the context of the exclusion of confessions from the criminal trial do contain a hint of 
judicial discipline towards police misconduct. 
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If a justification is to be found for the exclusion of illegally or improperly obtained 
evidence under the PACE regime (S. 78) then deterrence is unlikely to be a 
satisfactory explanation on both normative and descriptive grounds. 
It provides an unattractive theory for exclusion given that it is very uncertain that the 
theory significantly deters the police and it can be strongly argued that highly 
probative evidence should not be excluded on such a speculative basis. On the 
descriptive side of the theory it is positively contradicted by many statements of the 
English judiciary disclaiming a "deterrent function" over the police. 
The Protective Principle 
A. Ashworth, a leading proponent of this theory for exclusion, sets out its terms thus: 
(47) 
"If a legal system declared certain standards for the conduct 
of the criminal investigations ... then it can be argued that 
citizens have corresponding rights to be accorded certain 
facilities and not to be treated in certain ways. " 
If the legal system is to respect these rights then it is arguable that a suspect whose 
rights have been infringed should not thereby be placed at any disadvantage, and the 
appropriate way of ensuring that the suspect does not suffer this disadvantage is for 
the court of trial to have the power to exclude evidence obtained by improper means. 
However, there are certain practical and theoretical difficulties with this approach. 
The first difficulty for the protective principle is - what exactly count as "Rights"'. " 
PACE and the Codes of Practice contain numerous provisions governing many 
aspects of investigation and interrogation. Are all these provisions to be taken to 
generate "rights" and if not, on what criteria is it decided which provisions generate 
rights and which do not? Do other principles for ethical investigation of crime 
generate rights? Ashworth, for example, puts forward "a right not to be entrapped" 
as a right which the criminal justice system should recognise (by means of a 
substantive defence according to Ashworth rather than by means of evidential 
exclusion). However, this alleged right is likely to be controversial in England at 
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least where entrapment is viewed by the criminal courts as being in certain 
circumstances a legitimate police investigative tool - see Smurthwaite (1994) where it 
was asserted by Lord Taylor, 
" ... the fact that the evidence has been obtained by entrapment 
or by agent provocateur or by a trick does not of itself require 
the judge to exclude it. " (48) 
An implicit recognition perhaps of the legitimacy of entrapment as an investigative 
and detection tool in certain circumstances. Also see the opinion of the Divisional 
Court in DPP v Marshall (1988) per Woolf L. J. for judicial acceptance of the 
legitimacy of entrapment in certain situations, notably where the police employ 
entrapment to obtain evidence of ongoing criminal activity. The refusal of Roskill 
L. J. to mitigate the sentence of the entrapped drug dealer Underhill is also a reflection 
of this judicial acceptance of the use of entrapment against those engaged in a course 
of continuing illegal activity. (49) Ashworth himself recognises the difficulties 
inherent in the protective principle, 
"What should be the test of the existence and extent of 
particular rights? There can be no prior assertion of 
what rights should or should not be recognised. " (50) 
Another objection to the protective principle would argue that it is not the purpose of 
the law of criminal evidence to vindicate the rights of the suspect, that this is a matter 
which is extraneous to the proper purpose of the law of evidence. The law of criminal 
evidence seeks to promote the purposes of the trial and verdict in criminal cases. The 
vindication of the pre-trial rights of the suspect solely because they are the rights of 
the suspect is not therefore a value which the law of criminal evidence should be 
necessarily concerned with. Of course, violation of certain rights of the suspect pre- 
trial could affect the fairness of the trial itself -a confession obtained by torture in 
violation of the "right not to be tortured" should for various reasons by excluded from 
the criminal trial. However, to argue that the law of criminal evidence should 
vindicate a suspect's rights through the exclusion of evidence is to introduce an 
extremely wide and probably unmanageable principle. A ftirther important question 
for the protective principle is - does the deliberateness of police violation of a right 
add to the gravity of the breach and hence make exclusion of evidence more likely? 
Ashworth comments that the deliberateness of police violation of a right is 
249 
"irrelevant". What matters according to Ashworth, is whether prejudice followed any 
actual infringement of a right. 
If prejudice such as a confession or the obtaining of real evidence follows breach of 
the right then it is arguable that to vindicate the right the evidence should be excluded 
irrespective of the presence of bad faith on the part of the police. 
However, it is arguable that deliberateness of police violation of a suspect's rights is a 
significant feature of the moral cotitext, i. e. it makes the rights violation worse and 
therefore the decision to exclude easier. 
There are other questions for the protective principle which fail to be answered: 
should the protective principle be protected by a rule or a discretion? Do the interests 
of crime control sometimes override rights? How is this line to be drawn? Professor 
Ashworth argues that the law, 
it ... may occasionally 
be justified in not protecting a declared 
right, in limited circumstances the law might accord to the 
value of crime control priority over the value of a particular 
right. " 
Ashworth gives the example of an item of real evidence which would almost certainly 
be destroyed if it were not immediately seized and the court might then hold that the 
urgency justified the violation of the right against unlawful searches. However, as 
Ashworth himself notes, 
"If the concept of urgency were readily applied to excuse 
unlawful action then the declared rights would stand for 
less and less. " (51) 
It can be argued that once we concede that rights can be traded against social goals 
such as the preservation of reliable evidence then we lose the notion of a right in its 
proper sense. The idea of a "right" carries with it the idea that it should be respected 
even when this is inconvenient in terms of wider social goals such as crime control. If 
crime control can override the protection of rights in some cases, as Ashworth 
suggests, can the line be held against the abrogation of rights whenever it is necessary 
to do so in the interests of crime control? 
Public opinion and political interests will often be pushing for that line to be crossed 
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and therefore the "political feasibility" of the adoption of a full blown "protective 
principle" in the law of criminal evidence must be seriously questioned. 
The Judicial Inteority Principle 
This principle was argued for in the context of the exclusionary rule in the U. S. A. (see 
Mapp v Ohio (1961) to protect the Fourth Amendment. 71be principle suggests that if 
improperly obtained evidence is adduced at trial then this admission could bring the 
trial process into disrepute. The investigative process and trial process are linked not 
only in fact but also in the public perception, so the theory goes, and to command the 
respect of the public the court must be seen to distance itself in appropriate 
circumstances from pre-trial improprieties which are serious enough to threaten the 
integrity of the court. 
To achieve this distancing from police impropriety in the obtaining of evidence the 
court should consider excluding the evidence. Ibe judicial integrity principle found a 
clear exposition in the words of Traynor J. in the U. S. case of People v Cahan (1955) 
California Supreme Court, (52) 
"When ... the very purpose of an illegal search and seizure is to get evidence to introduce at a trial, the success of the 
lawless venture depends entirely on the courts lending its 
aid by allowing the evidence to be introduced. It is no 
answer to say that a distinction should be drawn between 
the government acting as law enforcer and the gatherer of 
evidence and the government acting as a judge ... Out of 
regard for its own dignity as an agency of justice and custodian 
of liberty the court should not have a hand in such 'dirty 
business' ... it is morally incongruous for the state to flout 
constitutional rights and at the same time demand that its 
citizens observe the law. " 
Yet this principle behind the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence has not gone un- 
challenged in the U. S. A. A recent example of criticism of the judicial integrity 
principle is provided by W. Stuntz, who commented, 
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"As an independent basis for the rule the judicial 
integrity argument deserves (and has recently received) 
little attention. Our law has long permitted the adm ission of 
evidence obtained through fraud or even force by private 
parties without any discernible effect on the integrity of 
the court system. There is no obvious reason why evidence 
obtained illegally by the police should have any greater 
impact on courts' integrity. Judges can without hypocrisy 
or inconsistency both admit the evidence and condemn 
(and punish) the police officer for his misconduct in obtaining it'/. 
(53) 
The above view of W. Stuntz, that there is no discernible difference between evidence 
obtained illegally by the police and evidence obtained by the illegality of private 
parties is not shared by the author of this thesis. It is possible to quote Zuckerman's 
point to repudiate StuntZ view. Zuckerman comments, (54), 
"Generally speaking it is practical to dissociate the 
admissibility of evidence from its legality where 
incidents of illegality ... emanate from individuals 
whose actions do not reflect on the judicial institution 
as a whole. It is thus possible to justify the admissibility 
of illegally obtained evidence in civil litigation where the 
transgressors are private citizens. However, today the 
investigative process is seen as part of the administration 
of justice which is why the debate regarding illegally 
obtained evidence has assumed such importance. " 
Stuntz is at least right when he asserts that illegality by a private citizen in obtaining 
evidence is no bar to its free admissibility in civil proceedings: see Calcraft v Guest 
, 
(1898) per Lindley M. R. (55) 
"Suppose the instrument were even stolen and a correct copy 
taken would it not be reasonable to admit it? " 
However, when the situation is the illegality of a police officer in the obtaining of 
evidence for use in criminal proceedings the situation is very different from the 
Calcraft v Guest scenario. The criminal courts are reliant on the police to obtain 
evidence for use in prosecution of offenders. The police perform a vital public 
function achieving that. The civil courts merely provide a forum by which private 
parties can settle their disputes. There is no dependence by the civil courts on private 
parties nor an urgent public interest that their disputes are taken to court rather than 
settled out of court. It has been argued earlier that criminal verdicts are justificatory 
and expressive (56) and hence are sensitive to the way in which evidence has been 
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obtained. Civil judgements merely settle disputes between private parties and hence 
are not as sensitive to how evidence used at trial is obtained. For all these complex 
reasons it is absurd to argue that since evidence obtained by the illegality of citizens is 
not thought to impugn the integrity of the civil courts then illegality by police officers 
in obtaining evidence cannot impugn the integrity of the criminal courts. 
However, Stuntz does reflect a trend in American jurisdictions to give the judicial 
integrity principle less weight than in the past. Arval A. Morris (57) comments that 
the judicial integrity principle has fallen out of favour with the American Courts since 
Mapp v Ohio and that deterrence of police misconduct is now the primary 
justification for the exclusionary rule. Morris quotes Justice Powell in United States v 
, 
Calandra (1974) who ruled that, 
"... in sum the rule is a judicially created remedy 
designed to safeguard fourth amendment rights 
generally through its deterrent effect. " 
Morris regrets the decline of the judicial integrity rationale which he regards as the 
"most important" rationale for the exclusionary rule. He in fact, sees the decline of 
the judicial integrity rationale in a conspiratorial light, for 
it... once the exclusionary rule's opponents have given it 
an exclusively empirical foundation they can attack it. 
They erroneously claim the exclusionary rule extracts 
an unusually 'high price' from society - 'the release of 
countless guilty criminals'. Then ignoring the 
constitutional dimension (the integrity principle) they 
seek to shift the burden by demanding that in fight of 
such a Ugh price' the rule's proponents must produce 
some clear demonstration of the benefits and effective- 
ness of the exclusionary rule. Finally the rule's opponents 
rise up and triumphantly declare that there is no empirical 
evidence to support the claim that the rule actually deters 
illegal conduct of law enforcement officials. " (58) 
Therefore, according to Morris, ignoring the judicial integrity principle is part of a 
strategy by the exclusionary rule's opponents to have the rule removed as a bar to the 
admission of evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure by the police. The 
judicial integrity' principle is not even secure where it was first propounded, namely 
in the U. S. jurisdiction. 
In response to claims that the admission of unfairly or illegally obtained evidence 
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would tend to undermine the integrity of the criminal court and hence the fairness or 
acceptability of a guilty verdict and that therefore to preserve its integrity the criminal 
court should consider excluding the evidence, Wiginore argued that, 
" 
... the illegality is by no means condoned. It is 
merely ignored in this litigation. " (59) 
The Wigmorean argument here proceeds on the assumption that there is no sufficient 
connection between the trial process and the investigatory stage of the criminal justice 
system to warrant the view that the actions of the police could impugn on the integrity 
of the court itself. The trial process, on this view, is concerned with the guilt or 
innocence of the accused not with how evidence has been obtained. 
Moreover, the 'judicial integrity' concept, although it has gained some support in the 
American jurisdiction, has found very little echo in English reported judgements until 
very recently. Pattenden has remarked, 
11 - there is no suggestion in the cases that the English judiciary think that receiving improperly obtained 
evidence will harm their prestige. " (60) 
1. H. Dennis claims to find some support for the "legitimacy of the verdict" theory of 
exclusion in judicial remarks in the recent cases of Williams v DPP Rv Bailey and 
Smith, where judgements used the word "legitimate" in connection with certain police 
covert procedures for the obtaining of evidence. Dennis conunents, 
" ... this tends to support the theory advanced ... as to the basis of the discretion to exclude under Section 78 of PACE. " 
(61) 
However, the word 'legitimate' could merely be a reference to those covert police 
methods the judiciary can stomach as opposed to those methods which border on the 
'oppressive' or 'unfair'. It is too strained an interpretation of both Williams v DPP and 
Bailey and Smith to see those cases as providing some support for either the judicial 
integrity or the similar theory 'the legitimacy of the verdict' as a justification for the 
exclusion of illegally or improperly obtained evidence. There is also the case of Rv 
Horseferry Road Magistrates Court ex parte Bennett [19931, House of Lords per Lord 
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Lowry whose judgement contains ideas very similar to those of the 'legitimacy 
theory'. Lord Lowry comments, 
"The court in order to protect its own process from being 
degraded and misused, must have the power to stay 
proceedings which have come before it and have only 
been made possible by acts which offend the courts 
conscience as being contrary to the rule of the law. 
Those acts by providing a morally unacceptable 
foundation for the exercise of jurisdiction over the 
suspect taint the proposed trial and if tolerated will 
mean that the courCs process has been abused. " (62) 
However, Lord Lowry emphasized that this concern to stay proceedings arose from 
"... wrongful conduct by the executive in an international 
context ... the court must jealously protect its own 
process from misuse by the executive. " 
The Bennett case involved the deliberate abuse of extradition procedures to bring a 
suspected offender into the English jurisdiction. It is therefore not a case on police 
impropriety in the obtaining of evidence for use in criminal proceedings. A stronger 
case to support the 'legitimacy theory' is the recent House of Lords case of Rv Latif 
and Shahzad (1996). 17he case involved the possible use of entrapment by an English 
customs officer in aiding the defendants to import heroin into England where they 
were arrested. Lord Steyn in dismissing the appeals commented that entrapment, 
It - posed the perennial dilemma. If the courts always 
refused to stay such proceedings the perception would be 
that the court condoned criminal conduct and malpractice by 
law enforcement agencies. That would undermine public 
confidence in the criminal justice system and bring it into 
disrepute. On the other hand, if the courts were always to 
stay such proceedings, it would incur the reproach that it was 
failing to protect the public from serious crime. The weak- 
nesses of both extreme positions left only one principled 
solution. The court had a discretion. " 
Lord Steyn went on to comment, (63) 
"In this case the issue was whether despite the fact that 
a fair trial was possible the judge ought to have stayed 
the criminal proceedings on the broader considerations 
of integrity of the criminal justice system. Proceedings 
might be stayed not only where a fair trial was 
impossible but also where it would be contrary to the 
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public interest in the integrity of the criminal justice 
system that a trial should take place. In a case such as 
the present, the judge must weigh in the balance the 
public interest in ensuring that those charged with 
grave crimes should be tried and the competing public 
interest in not conveying the impression that the 
court would adopt the approach that the end justified 
the means. In the present case the judge did not err in 
refusing to stay the proceedings. " 
There are strong echoes of the legitimcy theory for the exclusion of evidence 
illegally or improperly obtained in this judgement. 
Pattenden is right to assert that traditionally a concem that receiving illegally or 
improperly obtained evidence would taint judicial integrity or the integrity of the 
process has not been a feature of judicial pronouncements in England. 
Although it has been argued that S. 78 is a wider discretion than the common law 
discretion this should not carry the implication that the criminal courts have since 
1986 adopted the judicial integrity or legitimacy theories as rationales for exclusion. 
There is certainly no evidence pre PACE that this is so and very little since to 
convince that the judges have implicitly adopted the judicial integrity or the 
legitimacy theories as the basis of their decisions to exclude evidence. 
However, the Wigmorean view that in admitting illegally or improperly obtained 
evidence the court is not condoning the police malpractice did not go unchallenged 
even in England in the pre PACE era. The leading evidence scholar of the post war 
years, Sir Rupert Cross made the following observation in 1979, (the year of Rv 
San-g) 
I am unable to agree with those who maintain that by 
accepting illegally or improperly obtained evidence the 
court is not condoning the illegality or impropriety. I 
think that this is just what it is doing but even if I am 
wrong I have no doubt that such sophisticated arguments 
as there are in the contrary would be lost on the public. 
Up to a point the condemnation can be justified. Sometimes 
the impropriety is considerable but the act of condoning 
or appearing to condone it is outweighed by that of allowing 
a serious crime to go unpunished, but surely the crunch 
must come at some point? I suggest that it is reached when 
the judge is forced to the conclusion that in all the 
circumstances the method of obtaining the evidence cannot 
be condoned. nese are occasions on which the public 
interest in the conviction of criminals is outweighed by the 
public interest in the due observance of the law by the 
police. (64) 
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There has been no explicit indication in the cases that the judicial integrity principle 
has ever been active in the minds of English judges when they have excluded illegally 
or unfairly obtained evidence either at Common Law or under S. 78 of PACE. 
Certainly pre PACE English judges have tended to adopt the view that improperly 
obtained evidence could be admitted without compromising the integrity of the 
judicial institution or the criminal court. Hence Mirfield's comment that (65) 
"Another reason why nothing has been heard of the 
(judicial integrity) principle in England may well be 
that English judges are likely to assume that they can 
satisfactorily avoid condoning unlawful police behaviour 
without invoking their power to exclude evidence. 
A firm rebuke to the errant policeman may be thought 
sufficient to dissociate the court from the unlawful 
conduct especially where the rule breached does not 
clearly have the status of a legal rule, as was the case 
with the Judges' Rules and administrative directions. 
A rule of a written constitution is of an altogether 
different order. " 
What might be argued since the passage of S. 78 is that admitting the evidence which 
has been obtained by illegal means and delivering merely a rebuke to the police will 
not always be satisfactory to safeguard "the fairness of the proceedings" as required 
under S. 78 of PACE. It may be that changing perceptions of the police role in the 
criminal justice system since the introduction of PACE mean that a judicial rebuke to 
the police will not always be enough to secure public confidence in the administration 
of justice. The view may be taken that if the judicial rebuke is not accompanied by 
action to exclude illegally obtained evidence in some circumstances then the rebuke is 
unlikely to carry much weight with the public nor in police culture. This is especially 
so given that S. 78 gives the judiciary a power to express moral objection to 
improperly obtained evidence through the exclusion of evidence - see Lord Lane's 
comment in Rv Quinn, on this point. (66) 
An important factor which militates against the attraction of the "judicial integrity" 
principle is the consideration that public respect for the trial process (which the 
principle tries to maintain) can be seriously undermined by the sight of patently guilty 
men escaping conviction because of the exclusion of reliable, relevant though 
illegally obtained evidence. 'Judicial integrity' is arguably adversely affected when 
the law over-regularly excludes probative evidence of guilt (because illegally 
obtained) and fails to protect the public from criminals. 
theory similar in certain respects to the judicial integrity principle has been 
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developed in EnglancL particularly by Professor 1. H. Dennis, a theory which would 
lead to the discretionary exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in certain 
circumstances. It differs from the judicial integrity principle in at least two important 
ways. First of all the judicial integrity principle seems to be linked to the context of 
illegally obtained real evidence. More particularly the judicial integrity principle is 
limited to evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U. S. 
Constitution. The theory developed by 1. H. Dennis, the 'legitimacy of the verdict' 
theory, is not so limited and has a much wider potential application extending to 
confessions, hearsay evidence and other doctrines of the law of criminal evidence. 
Secondly, it is not clear that the judicial integrity principle does take into account the 
public interest in the conviction of guilty offenders. This is a factor which militates 
strongly in favour of the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence which is often 
reliable and cogent to the proof of guilt. The judicial integrity principle is a principle 
for the exclusion of evidence, it primarily tends to provide a justification for why 
otherwise probative evidence should be excluded from the criminal trial. It is not 
clear therefore that it can successfully accommodate the important inclusionary 
consideration of securing the conviction of guilty and perhaps dangerous offenders. 
Therefore criticism of the judicial integrity principle to the effect that 'judicial 
integrity' is also affected by the overready exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is 
an effective critique of the judicial integrity principle. 
However, the theory propounded by 1. H. Dennis is not as prone to such a criticism. 
Dennis has argued that "the theory of the legitimacy of the verdict" can take into 
account the public interest in the conviction of guilty offenders. This leads to a more 
subtle theory of exclusion than the judicial integrity principle. A failure to notice this 
crucial difference between "the legitimacy theory" and the 'Judicial integrity" 
principle could lead to unjustified criticism of the legitimacy theory. A. Ashworth 
seems to make this mistake in his recent work "The Criminal Process". Ashworth 
asks of Dennis' theory, (67) 
"There remains questions as to whether every departure from 
the rules at the investigative stage can be said to compromise 
the integrity of the courts ... " 
and Ashworth also asks, 
of ... one question ... 
is whether the concept of integrity 
incorporates the social value placed on the conviction of 
the guilty? " 
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Yet Dennis has made it clear that, 
"Recognising that the verdict serves a number of important 
public fimcdons, the law is constructed so as to ensure that 
the verdict will be able to discharge those functions. This 
means that it will be concerned both with trial accuracy 
and hence with reliability of evidence and with the integrity 
of the judgement. These concerns mean that in principle 
all relevant evidence should be admitted because this will 
promote factually accurate judgements... " (68) 
Of course, derogations from this basic principle of admissibility are needed for 
various reasons, e. g. if relevant evidence carries significant risks of unreliability it 
may not be safe to give the fact finder a free hand in its evaluation. A confession 
obtained by unreliability inducing methods of police interrogation is a class of 
evidence correctly subject to an exclusionary rule. With regard to illegally obtained 
real evidence there is no risk of systematic unreliability with that class of evidence. 
The public interest in the conviction of the guilty which the legitimacy theory 
recognises would therefore lead to a position where illegally obtained evidence is 
prima facie admissible. Ibis in fact coincides with the actual English law in this area. 
However, on the legitimacy theory there may be circumstances where the exclusion of 
illegally obtained evidence is necessary to secure the legitimacy of the verdict. As 
Dennis has written, 
"In a case where the illegality was flagrant and deliberate 
the judge may well decide that such evidence should be 
excluded. A guilty verdict might be seriously undermined 
by the lack of state probity and respect for process norms 
in the way the evidence was obtained. " (69) 
However, it is not certain that any English judge has reasoned on these lines in any 
reported cases. Evidence has been excluded in circumstances very similar to those 
described by Professor Dennis, where the illegality was flagrant and deliberate, e. g. 
see Matto v DPP (1987). However, this does not mean necessarily that the judge 
excluded the evidence because of the reasons advocated by Professor Dennis. 
The protective principle may equally have been present in the minds of judges when 
they excluded illegally obtained evidence. An interesting research survey was done of 
the reasons why Crown Court judges exclude evidence under S. 78 of PACE. 71be 
conclusion reached after an admittedly very small sample of judges at Leeds Crown 
Court was that, (70) 
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"Ibe judges were unanimous in rejecting the idea of 
considering the principles when deciding whether to 
exclude disputed evidence in the exercise of their 
discretion. " (Ibe ' principles' were the disciplinary, 
protective and reliability principles. ) 
This research finding is a cautionary note for any theorist who seeks to find his own 
preferred theory of exclusion as the explanation for decisions under S. 78. As a 
starting point it would be unwise to discuss the case law in England since 1986 
without close reference to the tenns, and purposes of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984. That Act provides the important historical and ideological context for the 
exercise of the S. 78 discretion. This Act represented a major watershed in the history 
of English policing, changing the ideological rationale on which policing is accepted 
in England. This, it is submitted, has substantially affected the willingness of the 
English judiciary to exclude illegally or improperly obtained evidence under S. 78, as 
well as substantially affecting the willingness of the judiciary to exclude confession 
evidence under the same provision. This must be considered before any abstract 
theorising about the rationale for the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in 
England can begin. 
Improperly obtained evidence and covert police operations 
In S. 78 the criminal courts have a wide ranging provision for the exclusion of 
evidence which has been obtained by illegal, improper or unfair means. I'he 
challenge to the criminal courts of dealing with the issue of illegally or unfairly 
obtained evidence has rarely been greater at present as the traditional problems, 
evidence from an illegal search (see Kuruma v R) evidence from entrapment, (see R 
v Birtles, Rv Ameer , evidence obtained 
by trickery in the police station (see Rv 
Court, Rv Payne) have been added to in recent years by an increase in the use of 
covert investigatory methods which may involve illegality or impropriety or result in 
unfairness if evidence gathered by those covert methods is admitted into evidence. 
(71) 
The desirability of a statutory code governing undercover police operations such as 
surveillance was adverted to as long ago as 1981 in the RCCP Report. (72) The 
political settlement between police powers and the rights of suspects that PACE 
represents is incomplete to the extent that covert police operations were left outside 
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the ambit of the statutory scheme established in PACE for the conduct of Police 
operations. In 1981 the focus of public concern was mainly the interrogation process 
and the use of "traditional" police powers such as arrest, stop and search and the entry 
of premises. 71be growth in the use of covert operations by the police in the years 
subsequent to 1981 have shown the need for Parliament to urgently consider the limits 
of permissible police conduct in covert operations in order that the fair settlement 
between police and public should be as complete and comprehensive as possible. 
Indeed the House of Lords in Rv Khan repeatedly called upon Parliament to 
introduce statutory control over the use of surveillance devices by the police. Lord 
Nolan in Rv Khan commented, (73) 
"The sole cause of the case coming to the House of Lords 
was the lack of a statutory system regulating the use of 
surveillance devices by the police. The absence of such 
a system seemed astonishing, the more so in view of the 
statutory framework which had governed the use of such 
devices by the security service since 1989 and the 
interception of communications by the police as well as 
by other agencies since 1985. Counsel for the Crown 
had indicated on instructions that the government 
planned to introduce legislation covering the matter in 
the next session of Parliament. " 
A statutory system for authorisation of the use of surveillance devices by the police 
was introduced by The Police Act 1997, sections 91-108, although the system of 
authorization is undercut by S. 97(3): "This Section does not apply to an authorisation 
where the person who gives it believes that the case is one of urgency. " Yet this 
statute only covers a small part of police conduct outside the police station designed 
to gather evidence; there is still need for a statutory code for covert investigatory 
practices generally. 
However, even if there was a statutory code for covert investigative practices the 
judiciary would still have the problem of deciding what the consequences of a breach 
of the Code by the police would be. If the offence investigated was of a less serious 
nature then it would be relatively easy to rule the evidence inadmissible if there was a 
"significant and substantial" breach of the Code by the police. If however the offence 
was of a very grave nature then it is likely that some judges would be tempted to 
adn-dt the evidence if it was reliable despite the breach of the Code. Moreover a Code 
for covert investigative practices is unlikely to be comprehensive for innovations in 
undercover techniques are always a possibility. 
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However, a statutory code would prevent the law in this area from being "police led", 
that is the judiciary merely legitimating through the admission of evidence innovative 
covert investigative practices by the police. A statutory code would stake out in 
advance what is and what is not acceptable police conduct in covert investigations, at 
least as a matter of principle if not precise detail. 
It is not proposed to offer a comprehensive account of why there has been an increase 
in the use of covert methods of investigation recently, methods which may involve 
illegality (trespass and damage to property as in Rv Kh4n) or impropriety (as in Rv 
Hall, Rv Stagg but some observations will be made in an attempt to put the use of 
S. 78 in its context. The first point to make is that PACE and the Codes of Practice 
have made the obtaining of confessions through interrogation a more difficult process 
than under the old regime governed by the Judges' Rules. Not only has the obtai ig 
of a confession become harder (e. g. because the percentage of suspects who see a 
solicitor has risen dramatically from the situation under the Judges' Rules - from a 
mere fraction of suspects to about 25% of suspects under the PACE regime) and there 
is a strong link between receiving legal advice and not making a confession (74) but 
the courts are more willing to exclude a confession where there is impropriety in the 
obtaining of a confession. Moreover, the chances of impropriety being detected have 
improved because of the recording provisions and the presence of legal advisors. 
It may be that covert investigative techniques are being used because formal 
interrogation has failed to produce evidence or because it is anticipated that formal 
interrogation is likely to be unsuccessful in producing incriminating evidence. In Rv 
Khan, formal interrogation under PACE had failed to elicit a confession from a 
suspect suspected of importing heroin into the UK. It was at that stage that a listening 
device was fitted to a private house which the suspect frequented. The suspecfs 
damaging admissions in the house were recorded by the device and the Court of 
Appeal and the House of Lords held the evidence rightly admitted. In Rv Hall (as 
also in Rv Stagg) formal interrogation had failed to produce a confession to murder 
so the police set up a covert operation to obtain an incriminating statement, the 
operation was stigmatized as "unfair" by the trial judge. 
Empirical support for the claim that PACE has made obtaining a confession harder for 
the police than under the Judges' Rules regime is provided by a Home Office 
Research Study by David Brown in 1991, Chapter 7 "Detectives' views of PACE" 
(75) 
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"T'he view was generally held that interrogation was not 
as important a part of criminal investigation as before 
PACE and that fewer confessions were obtained owing 
to increased constraints. " 
However, according to Brown, 
"The data clearly show that interrogation still occupies an 
important place in the detectives' armoury. " 
However, the police have come in for widespread informed criticism because of an 
over reliance on interrogation in the past. As the RCCJ recognised, (76) 
"It is now generally accepted that confessions have 
hitherto taken too central a role in police investigations. " 
The move towards covert techniques may be due in part to a reaction by the police 
towards such criticism of an overdependence, on confession evidence. 
'Me second point explaining the increase in the use of covert operations is that such 
methods can make sense from an efficiency "crime control" point of view. The Audit 
Commission ("Helping with Enquiries") in 1993 recommended in a highly influential 
report that the police target 'prolific' offenders in the community and seek to collect 
evidence and apprehend them there rather than relying on "old style 1970s" detective 
work to receive a tip off about a suspect, arrest him and then take the suspect to the 
police station for interrogation. There might not be enough evidence to charge the 
suspect even after interrogation and in any case the police may not actually arrest the 
most prolific offenders. If the small number of prolific offenders (who with regard to 
certain crimes such as burglary or street robbery commit most of the recorded 
offences) can be 'targeted' in the community then this may make a significant 
difference to the detection and prevention of certain crimes. The operation which 
resulted in the case of Williams v DPP (77) can be viewed as an attempt to trap 
prolific offenders "in the community" rather than relying on interrogation of a suspect 
as a way to obtain evidence about the commission of offences. In Williams a van was 
left unlocked with dummy cartons of cigarettes in the back in an area of a town with a 
reputation for a high prevalence of theft from vehicles. 'Targeting' includes 
identifying areas of high crime rates for particular offences. Two individuals who 
succumbed to temptation were prosecuted. The Court of Appeal held that the police 
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tactic was "legitimate" and the evidence was held to be rightly admitted. If the two 
individuals caught had been 'prolific' thieves no doubt the police tactics would not 
have received the level of criticism from commentators that the case attracted (for 
example of such criticism see G. Robertson (78)). Ibe use of proactive methods may 
be a response to press criticism in recent years about the prevalence of low clear-up 
rates. 
The third point to make explaft-fing the increase in the use of covert investigatory 
methods is the influence of successful American covert investigatory techniques. The 
methods employed in Rv Christou G 992) (a "shady" jewellers shop which received 
stolen goods - actually a police trap) and Williams v DPP were copied from similar 
operations used by the police in the U. S. A. It is also the case as Lustgarten (79) 
points out, that certain proactive police techniques may be a direct product of the 
content of the substantive criminal law: "Certain offences require measures of 
enforcement that are inherently and unavoidably oppressive". The central example 
Lustgarten uses is the prohibition on the possession of drugs (80) 
it... criminalisation of drugs use has certain inevitable 
enforcement corollaries; a society which chose to 
decriminalise drugs would have a very different sort 
of police force. " 
Whilst this may be overstated, Lustgarten has a valuable point. The crucial proof 
issue with regard to drugs offences is showing possession of or distribution of the 
prohibited drugs. However, the usual method of crime detection, information 
received from the victim of crime, is lacking in drugs cases because drugs offences 
tend to be in a sense "victimless". Therefore, the police have to obtain evidence that 
the defendant was either caught in possession of the drugs or secretly observed taking 
possession of them. Lustgarten points out that the only effective means of 
establishing this is by use of one or more of the following methods: 
& wiretapping or other f6mis of surveillance 
0 participation of undercover agents in illegal transactions which can readily 
shade into entrapment 
use of informers whose own criminality if kept in bounds may be tacitly 
condoned 
0 search of persons or property which involves serious invasion of privacy. 
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Lustgarten concludes that police methods "oppressive of civil liberties ... is the 
inevitable price society pays for the creation of such offences; they cannot be 
enforced otherwise". If drug abuse has increased in society in recent years so might 
police use of proactive methods to counter that increased level of criminality. 
The increase and variety of these operations are giving the criminal courts a new 
challenge in the field of illegally or improperly obtained evidence beyond the usual 
types of case involving illegal searches, entrapment and police tricks in the police 
station. Police trickery outside the police station which was formerly limited mainly 
to entrapment has expanded into various "'manna from heaven" and "sting" operations. 
J. Morton (8 1) comments on one aspect of this, 
"Nowadays police surveillance and infiltration has become an 
industry in itself with high technology gadgetry employed 
for electronic eavesdropping. " 
There is an irony here for if the police are using these techniques as a partial 
replacement for dependence on interrogation in response to public concerns about an 
over reliance on confession evidence then some of these proactive techniques, 
especially surveillance and bugging devices, are potentially more intrusive to 
individual liberty than interrogation in the police station. It is the case that evidence 
obtained by surveillance and the use of electronic bugs does not present a danger of 
unreliability and is in this sense a superior source of evidence than confessions. 
However, proactive police investigatory techniques can raise acute civil liberties 
problems concerning privacy especially when as in Rv Khan, listening devices are 
fixed to private residences. 
The cases post PACE 
An early indication that S. 78 is wider than the common law discretion was provided 
by the Divisional Court judgement in Matto v DPP (1987) (82). In this case a 
conviction for driving with excess alcohol was quashed where the relevant breath test 
was administered by the police when acting in excess of their powers in bad faith. 
The defendant, who drove his car from a road on to private property was followed by 
police officers in a police vehicle. Tbey informed him that because of the manner in 
which he had been driving on the road and because he had exceeded the speed limit 
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he was required to take a breath test and if he failed the test or refused to take it he 
might be arrested. The defendant then said that the property was private and that the 
police could not act. By that time the police officers knew that their implied licence 
to enter the property had been terniinated. 
Tberefore they acted in bad faith, and stated that they knew what they were doing and 
if the suspect was wrongfully arrested he could sue the police. The appellant went to 
the police car where he underwent a breath test which proved positive. He underwent 
a further breath test at the police station which also proved positive. Woolf L. J. held 
that, 
"The language of S. 78 (1) directs the court to have regard 
to the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained. 
Therefore it is certainly implicit in the subsection that 
there can be circumstances in which the evidence was 
obtained which makes it have such an adverse effect on 
the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to 
admit it. " 
Woolf L. J. continued, 
I am satisfied that in this case exceptionally there could be 
circumstances where if the Crown Court had properly 
directed themselves they could or might have exercised a 
discretion to refuse to admit the breath-alcohol analysis in 
evidence. I emphasize that I come to that conclusion because 
of the finding which they came to of inala Fides. " 
It is not clear that the evidence in Matto v DPP could have been excluded under the 
common law discretion as interpreted by the House of Lords in Rv Sang. In Rv 
, 
Payne (1963), one of the few instances of appellate court use of the Kuruma 
discretion, real evidence of a high probative value as in Matto v DPP was held to have 
been wrongly admitted. In Rv Payne in the police station the accused had been 
tricked into providing a sample by a misrepresentation by the police. 
Bad faith on the part of the police was not alleged but the Court of Appeal held that 
'fairness' required the exclusion of the evidence. Payne was explained in Rv Sang as 
a case involving an unfair infringement of the suspect's privilege against self- 
incrimination (the nemo debet prodere se ipsum principle). In Matto no reference was 
made to the suspect's privilege against self-incrimination, rather the emphasis of 
Woolf L. J. 's judgement was on the bad faith exercise of police power. This suggests a 
shift of emphasis in the justification for the discretion to exclude improperly obtained 
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evidence from a concern focused on the suspect's privilege against self-incrimination 
to a concem focused on the abuse, particularly deliberate abuse of police power in the 
gathering of evidence (Lord Lane's dictum in Rv Quinn (1990) should be 
remembered here - see below). The abuse of police power in the gathering of 
evidence was not suggested at common law as a reason to exclude evidence obtained 
improperly. 
The emphasis given to deliberate misuse of police power in Matto perhaps reflects 
judicial acknowledgement that in the post PACE era the criminal courts cannot 
remain indifferent to the deliberate abuse of state power in the gathering of evidence 
for use in court. Lord Lane commented in Rv Ouinn (1990) that proceedings may 
become unfair, if amongst other factors, 
" ... there has been an abuse of process, e. g. because 
evidence has been obtained in deliberate breach of 
procedures laid down in an official Code of Practice. " 
This reference to deliberate breach of procedures which can lead to proceedings 
becoming unfair if the evidence so obtained is admitted suggests that the focus of the 
exclusionary discretion is not, as at common law on whether the suspect had been 
unfairly tricked out of his privilege against self-incrimination to produce evidence 
against himself, but rather the focus is on the abuse of police power and particularly 
on bad faith violation of procedures for the fair conduct of criminal investigations. It 
will be remembered that in Rv Alladice Lord Lane commented that if the police 
breached S. 58 of PACE in bad faith then it would be 'easy' to exclude a confession so 
obtained under S. 78. Again this suggests that the rationale and purpose of S. 78 is 
different to that of the common. law discretion to exclude a confession under the 
Judges' Rules. It is the submission of this thesis that one important reason for this 
change, recognised by the judiciary in their use of S. 78, is the ideological shift in 
official attitudes to the police role in the criminal justice system which PACE 
represents. 
Matto v DPP has been followed in Sharpe v DPP (1992) (83) which similarly 
concerned a positive breath test and in that case possible bad faith use of police 
power. However, Buckley J. in that case denied that because of a finding of bad faith 
on the part of the police in obtaining evidence that the discretion of S. 78 could only 
be exercised one way, i. e. to exclude the evidence. This is perfectly in line with 
principle. S. 78 confers a discretion on the judge and whilst bad faith may be a potent 
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factor in favour of excluding evidence and a factor which the trial judge or 
magistrates must consider (see Matto bad faith does not dictate exclusion of 
evidence. 
It has been often asserted by the courts that 'fairness of the proceedings' in S. 78 
includes 'fairness to the Crown. Crown interest in the prosecution of offenders on 
reliable probative evidence is a consideration which must also be considered under 
S. 78. If it was accepted that a finding of bad faith on the part of the police always led 
to exclusion of evidence then it is arguable that this leaves no place for the interests of 
the Crown in those cases involving bad faith by the police. If the police breached a 
relatively insignificant provision of PACE in bad faith and obtained reliable evidence 
of guilt in a serious offence then perhaps a trial judge would be correct if he decided 
to admit the evidence rather than exclude it. 
However, it should not be thought that the existence of bad faith is required before a 
judge can exclude evidence under S. 78. Rv Samuel (1988) and DPP v McGladrigan 
(1991) (84) establish that a finding of mala fides is not required before evidence can 
be excluded under S. 78. 
In McGladri-Ran it was stated by the Divisional Court that with regard to evidence of a 
positive breath test that, 
it ... albeit there was no finding of mala fides on behalf 
of the police the case would not on that ground alone 
be remitted with a direction to convict. " 
However, a direction to convict was ordered on other grounds. 
The cases discussed above, Matto v DPP Sharpe v DPP, McGladrigan v DPP are all 
cases involving road traffic offences and hence relatively less serious offences. R. 
Pattenden's remark on the exercise of the common law discretion is worth noting here, 
"It is surely no accident that the reported instances of the 
discretionary exclusion of non confession evidence have 
involved road traffic offences. Where the accused was 
charged with rape the evidence was admitted" (a reference to 
Rv Apicella (1985)) (85) 
As a matter of record non confessional evidence was excluded in the 
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drugs/entrapment cases of Rv Ameer and Rv Burnett and in the counterfeit 
currency/entrapment case of Rv Foulder. (86) However, these were first instance 
decisions only. As a matter of appellate exclusion of illegally or improperly obtained 
evidence at common law the "Road Traffic Offence" cases were the only ones where 
the Divisional Court said evidence should have been excluded. In this context the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Rv Nathaniel (1995) is of great significance. 
If as a matter of unstated policy, seriousness of the offence was taken into account in 
deciding whether to exclude evidence obtained improperly, at common law then this 
factor has received explicit recognition since the passage of S. 78. 
In Rv Latif and Shahzad (1994) (87), Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Staughton giving 
the judgement of the court, made the f6flowing remark on the S. 78 issue, 
"The Parliament that enacted S. 78 of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 for the purpose of protecting the innocent 
might have been surprised to hear it invoked on behalf of an 
importer of heroin worth X3.2 million into this country in 
order to exclude the evidence against him on the ground that 
he was encouraged by an agent of the British government. " 
The Court of Appeal went on to consider the S. 78 question but in the light of this 
opening comment on the issue it is not surprising that the evidence was held to have 
been rightly admitted. Professor J. C. Smith comments that the above comment of 
Lord Justice Staughton, 
" ... is difficult to reconcile with many of the decisions on Section 78 which treat it as protecting everyone guilty or 
innocent from conviction upon an "unfair" trial. 71he 
alleged unfairness may cast no doubt whatever upon the 
guilt of the accused but require the exclusion of the 
evidence or the quashing of a conviction if it has been 
admitted. Importers of heroin are very wicked but so are 
many murders, rapists and robbers. " (8 8) 
It is unfortunate that the Court of Appeal in Latif refers to the purpose of S. 78 as 
/I protecting the innocent". It is true that S. 78 does have that purpose and has been 
used to exclude police evidence which is not up to the standard of reliability required 
by the courts, e. g. see Rv Na-gah (1991) where identification evidence was excluded 
by the Court of Appeal because the police had substituted their own procedure for an 
identification parade over the requirements of Code of Practice D on identification 
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evidence. Also see the cases requiring confession evidence to be properly 
authenticated, e. g. Rv Keen Rv Canale. Section 78 has been used by the courts 
in that context to protect the court and defendant from fabricated police evidence of a 
confession. 
However, S. 78 has a role independent of protecting the innocent. S. 78 has been used 
to exclude very reliable evidence of guilt as in Matto v DPP or Rv Nathaniel if the 
adn-dssion of the evidence threatens the "fairness of the proceedings" because of abuse 
of police power in the obtaining of the evidence. 
However, the Court of Appeal in Latif is right to make reference to the gravity of the 
offence - importation of a class A drug. 'Fairness of the proceedings' under S. 78 
refers to fairness to the Crown as well as the accused. 
Given that S. 78 takes into account the interest of the Crown as well as the defence it 
is arguable that the more serious the offence the heavier is the weight of Crown 
interests in favour of inclusion of the evidence. 
There is a greater public interest in the conviction of persons guilty of serious crimes 
than the public interest in the conviction of those guilty of less serious crimes. 
However, merely because the offence is a very serious one this does not mean that 
evidence will automatically be admitted, as the Court of Appeal commented in Latif. 
" ... the question remains in terms of S. 78 whether 
having 
regard to all the circumstances including the circumstances 
in which the evidence was obtained the admission of the 
evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness 
of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. " 
The case of Rv Stagg (89) (a case concerning an horrific and much publicized 
murder) is significant in this respect for it suggests that whatever the nature of the 
offence there are certain police methods which remain unacceptable to the judiciary 
and invite the use of the exclusionary discretion under S. 78. The prosecution argued 
that the undercover operation was the only route available in order to test the 
accused's capacity to fantasize in a way that was consistent with a psychological 
profile that had been compiled on the murderer. Nevertheless the trial judge Ognall I 
held that if that route led the police into the area of impropriety the evidence was 
inadniissible. 
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The seriousness of the offence as a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether 
to admit unfairly or illegally obtained evidence under S. 78 received even more 
implicit recognition in Rv Khan where it was held by the Lord Chief Justice Lord 
Taylor (90), 
11 ... on the facts the invasion of privacy with the attendant trespass and damage was outweighed by other considerations 
such as the fact that the police had acted in accordance with 
the relevant Home Office guidelines and that the criminal 
conduct under investigation was of a serious nature. " 
From the judgement of the Court of Appeal in Khan emphasis was again laid on the 
fact that, 
it ... what was under investigation was a type of criminal 
conduct of great gravity,, " 
and that this is a factor favouring the admission of iflegaRy or unlawfuRY obtained 
evidence. 'Me House of Lords has upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal in Rv 
Khan. Lord Nolan commented, 
"It would be a strange reflection on our law if a man who 
had admitted his participation in the illegal importation 
of a large quantity of heroin should have his conviction 
set aside on the ground that his privacy had been invaded. " (9 1) 
Again a recognition that the gravity of the offence was a relevant factor under the 
S. 78 discretion. 
It could be suggested that the more serious the offence the less likely should the 
courts be to overlook any police impropriety in obtaining evidence of it and therefore 
exclusion should be more likely than the same police impropriety to gather evidence 
about a less serious offence. 
The argument is that the conviction and puni-4anent of persons accused of serious 
crimes requires greater justification than the conviction of persons of less serious 
crimes. 1herefore the criminal trial should be less willing to accept 'tainted' evidence 
to prove serious offences than to prove less serious offences. However, this view has 
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not been adopted in Australia, see Bunning v Cross (1978)1(92) nor now in England. 
It is surely common sense that there is a greater public interest in the conviction of 
offenders in serious crimes than. in less serious crimes and that public faith in the 
criminal justice system is likely to be shaken if highly probative real evidence was 
readily excluded in, for example a murder case or a rape case. 
However, there are circumstances where even highly probative real evidence in a 
serious case is held to be rightly excluded because of police breach of procedures in 
obtaining that evidence: see Rv Nathaniel. 
A lack of probity by the police in the collection of evidence for use at trial can so 
upset the fairness of the proceedings that the evidence should be excluded from trial 
even where that evidence is highly probative of the guilt of the defendant with regard 
to a serious offence. 
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CHAPTER 8 
ENTRAPMENT 
Definition 
Before an analysis is conducted of the topic, a brief summary will be given defining 
entrapment and seeking to distinguish that concept from the concept of a trap. 
Entrapment in the strict sense of the word describes circumstances where a person has 
been induced to commit an offence which he would not have committed but for the 
inducement. 'I'he 1929 Report of the Royal Commission on Police Powers describes 
an agent provocateur as, 
it ... a person who entices another to commit an express breach of the law which he would not otherwise have 
committed and then proceeds to inform against him in 
respect of such an offence. " (1) 
However, the term /entrapment' can, as Dennis points out (2) be used with varying 
shades of meaning. 
The distinction between entrapment and trap is well illustrated by the following 
quotation from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for East Africa in Waniiko v 
Reginam (3). Entrapment induces the commission of an offence that would not 
otherwise have been conunitted; a trap seeks to obtain evidence of an offence that has 
already been "laid on" or even been conunitted. The Court of Appeal of East Africa 
said, 
"It is clear that to act as an agent provocateur is never 
justifiable: but this situation arises in its true form only 
if the accused would never have committed or attempted 
to commit the crime in question but for the encouragement 
of the agent. Apart from mere detection of crime already 
committed there may be two other types of case; first 
where the police have infonnation that a crime is likely 
to be committed and conceal themselves with a view to 
obtaining evidence of its commission, and secondly where 
it appears that the offence would in any event be committed 
when opportunity arose and the police provided an 
arranged opportunity. These are both, as it seems to us, 
cases in which the use of a trap may be legitimate. " 
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However, in the foHowing discussion 'entrapment' wiU be used in a wider sense to 
include not only the situation where a police officer or his agent induces the 
commission of an offence that would not otherwise have been committed, but also 
includes the situation where the police or their agents induce a suspect to commit a 
fresh offence in a situation where the suspect is engaged in continuing or ongoing 
criminal activities. 
Introduction 
The issues surrounding the law on entrapment merit a separate discussion from the 
law on illegally or improperly obtained evidence for the basic reason that whereas 
other forms of impropriety by the police in the pre-trial phase can be viewed as 
merely methods of collecting evidence about an offence that has already been 
committed, entrapment in contrast causes the commission of the crime by the 
accused. The relationship between the police impropriety, namely entrapment and 
any conviction of the accused is therefore a more direct and dramatic one than in the 
case of other forms of police impropriety such as an unlawful search or undue 
pressure on the suspect to obtain a confession. The crucial point about entrapment in 
its narrowest sense is that the accused would not face the possibility of criminal 
proceedings against him if the police had not encouraged the commission of an 
offence which he would not otherwise have committed. Other forms of police 
impropriety such as unlawful search or oppressive interrogation leave untouched the 
fact that the accused has committed a criminal offence of his own volition. 
Indeed this crucial distinction between entrapment and other forms of police 
impropriety has led to some commentators, notably Professor Choo, to argue that the 
response of the law should be different with regard to proof of entrapment from proof 
of other forms of police impropriety in gathering evidence. Choo argues (4) that to 
exclude the evidence of agents provocateurs is an inadequate judicial response to the 
problems of entrapment since such exclusion is not directed at the central 
consideration for in a case of entrapment the actual commission. of the crime and not 
merely an item of evidence can be regarded as having been a fruit of the police 
impropriety. 
As a consequence Choo, argues (5), 
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/I *" what is required is that proof of entrapment must 
lead 
automatically to a stay of the proceedings as an abuse of 
the process of the court. " 
This as an unqualified statementý is too strong since as we shall observe, entrapment 
can sometimes be justified as a legitimate investigatory tool and indeed has been 
recognised as such by the English courts. Significantly Choo has more recently 
written that (6) 
"... it is strongly arguable that improper entrapment should lead 
automatically to a stay of the proceedings. " 
This is a clear recognition that entrapment is sometimes legitimate as a police method 
of investigation. 
The Historical Back2round 
The use of entrapment to obtain convictions is not solely a modem phenomenon 
although the use of entrapment as a law enforcement technique has come to the fore 
recently in England given the increased use of covert investigative techniques 
generally by the police in recent years. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
the fact that most prosecutions were private prosecutions made the criminal courts 
open to private uses and abuses. One group of private individuals who benefited from 
the system of private prosecution was the class of men known as thief-takers; these 
thief-takers were private individuals who made a profession out of seeking and C- 
securing convictions of thieves. By the mid to late nineteenth century this task of 
convicting thieves would have been undertaken by the professional police but in an 
earlier age "thief-takers" prospered. However, as Hay and Snyder comment, (7) 
" ... thief-takers also enticed beginners into crime in order to betray them or secured convictions of innocent men and 
women through wholly perjured testimony. " 
The rewards offered by private individuals or Associations for the Prosecution of 
Felons made the creation of criminals through entrapment an attractive possibility for 
thief-takers. This vice has a modem counterpart in the form of police informers who 
might encourage others to commit crime so that they can be informed upon to the 
police by the informer who wishes to obtain financial reward or credit from the police 
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and prosecuting authorities. In discussing the acceptability of entrapment as a police 
technique it is important to remember that its use allows scope for the unscrupulous 
informer or police officer to advance their own personal interests. It may then be 
wise to be cautious about too strong an endorsement of the use of entrapment by the 
police. In contrast it is unlikely that interrogation under the PACE regime allows 
much scope for the advantage of unscrupulous personal interests on the part of the 
interrogators, especially given the increased visibility of the process. Covert 
operations are by definition of low visibility and are therefore prone to encourage 
corruption by police officers. 
In the nineteenth century in England the fear of police use of entrapment amongst 
other factors inhibited the development of a properly established detective branch of 
the police until 1877. As T. Critchley in his history of the police in England observes, 
(8) 
"The extreme sensitivity of public opinion towards anything 
that savoured of 'continental' methods in using police for 
espionage purposes or to trap people no doubt discouraged 
the formation of a detective department at Scotland Yard. " 
Indeed, only a few years after the formation of the CID the police engaged in 
entrapment as a means of detecting and securing evidence against a suspected 
offender, much to the distaste and anger of The Times newspaper, which can be 
viewed at that time as a barometer of respectable opinion. in England (see the 
reference at note 16 of this chapter). 
This hostile reaction to the police method in the Titley case is testimony to an English 
distaste at entrapment as a detection and investigatory tool of the police. This 
hostility to entrapment which manifested itself at official as well as popular level 
continued wel-I into the twentieth century, e. g. see the remarks of Lord Goddard C. J. 
in Brannan v Peek (1947) (9). Only fairly recently, perhaps since the 1970s, does the 
propriety of entrapment as a useful investigatory technique in certain circumstances 
seem to have been unequivocally accepted; see for example the comments of Roskill 
L. J. in Rv Underhill (1979) (10) and Woolf L. J. in DPP y Marshall (1988) (11). 
However, it is important to note that official hostility towards police use of 
entrapment did not have implications for the admissibility of evidence from that 
entrapment. From the case of Rv Titley (1880) to Rv Sang (1979) it was generally 
accepted by the judges that the fact of entrapment by the police was irrelevant to the 
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question of the admissibility of the evidence of an agent provocateur. There were a 
few cases of first instance exclusion of entrapment evidence in the 1970s but these 
decisions were criticised by both the Court of Appeal and House of Lords as wrong 
headed decisions. 
In Rv Titley (1880) the police suspected the accused of being concerned with the 
illegal procuring of abortions. However, hard evidence was difficult for the police to 
secure since as the trial judge commented, (12) 
11... persons who committed crime were persons who concealed 
crime. " 
The police therefore decided to lay a trap for Mr. Titley who was a chemist. The 
police arranged for a policeman and his wife to pose as parties interested in the iflegal 
services of the accused. They made contact with the accused at the chemist's shop. 
The accused feR into the trap and not only wrote highly incriminating correspondence 
with the policeman whom he thought was an ordinary civilian, but he also supplied 
the undercover policeman with the necessary chemicals for the offence when the 
policeman called at his shop. At that point Titley was arrested. The evidence so 
gathered was admitted at the trial and not surprisingly Titley was convicted of 
unlawfully supplying with intent to procure the miscarriage of a woman. The interest 
of Titley's case resides partly in the reaction to the case after Titley had been 
convicted. In the House of Commons on January 11 th 188 1, a few weeks after the 
trial, Sir Herbert Maxwell asked the Home Secretary whether (13), 
" ... it is the intention of the Crown to prosecute Inspector O'Callaghan and Sergeant Stroud for conspiring to incite 
Titley to commit an indictable offence? " 
In reply Sir William Harcourt, the Home Secretary, connnented, 
I regret that the police should have decided upon the course 
to which they resorted without advising the Home Office 
on the subject. I only became acquainted with it on the eve 
of the trial. Like other people I was startled when I was 
informed of it and I asked for a report on the matter. " 
This suggests that such police methods were considered prima facie objectionable 
even where Harcourt noted, 
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... Lae evidence left no doubt in the minds of the police that Titley had been in the habit of practicing these crimes 
on an extensive scale for a long time past. " 
In the present day when the police suspect ongoing illegal activity and therefore set a 
trap to secure evidence of that activity by procuring the commission of an example of 
that continuing criminal conduct as in DPP v Marshall (1988) then such police 
methods are considered unobjectionable. However, in late nineteenth century 
England the fear of the police "spy" was still strong being almost a cultural aversion 
to such techniques of policing. The influence of this cultural aversion lasted well into 
the twentieth century, for example in Rv Mealey (1974) (14), Lord Chief Justice 
Widgery referring to Brannan v Peek (1947) commented, 
"No one who read Lord Goddard C. J. 's words about the 
dislike for such agents in this country should think that 
the attitude of the courts toward agents provocateurs 
is different in principle from what it was then. " 
In that case, Brannan v Pee a constable placed bets with the reluctant defendant in 
an attempt to secure evidence for a prosecution under the street betting legislation 
then in force. Lord Goddard Lord Chief Justice commented, 
"The court observes with concern and disapproval the fact 
that the police authority at Derby thought it right to send 
police officers into a public house to commit an offence. 
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that unless an Act of 
Parliament does so provide - it is wholly wrong for a police 
officer or any other person to be sent to commit an offence 
in order that an offence by another person may be detected. " 
In the same vein Lord Goddard continued, 
I hope the day is far distant when it will become a common 
practice in this country for police officers to be told to 
commit an offence themselves for the purpose of getting 
evidence against someone. " 
This is no doubt a reflection of the old view that the English police are somehow 
unique and distinct from pohce forces in the rest of the world and that the En&h 
police should be above such trickery as entrapment. In Brownin_g v J. W. M. Watson 
(1953) (15) Lord Goddard made a blanket condemnation of entrapment as a method 
of the police, 
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"No court in England has ever liked action by what are 
generally called agents provocateurs resulting in 
imposing criminal liability. " 
Criminal liability was often imposed, though, because entrapment evidence was not 
excluded from trial until a few first instance decisions in the 1970s. 
It is important then to distinguish between cultural objections to entrapment which 
characterized much official discourse in England until fairly recently and the 
objections of straightforward principle to improper forms of entrapment. The cultural 
objections to entrapment in England sought to distinguish the English police whose 
power was based on public consent (e. g. the constable as "citizen in uniform") from 
the continental police agent who would employ tricks and traps against the citizenry 
in the interests of a ruling political elite. An example of an objection of principle to 
entrapment is the argument that it is not a proper state function to test the virtue of a 
citizen not reasonably suspected of involvement in ongoing criminal activity. 
However, in late nineteenth century England arguments against entrapment tended to 
be based on cultural terms, i. e. that it was somehow 'un-English' for the police to avail 
themselves of entrapment. In the House of Commons in January 1881 Sir William 
Harcourt had laid down the principle that, 
"As a rule the police ought not to set traps for people. " 
However, Harcourt accepted the difficulties of obtaining evidence in certain cases 
when he conunented, 
"If there is to be a departure from this rule under 
extraordinary circumstances the matter is one of such 
difficulty that the discretion ought not to rest with the 
police authorities. I have accordingly directed that no 
such methods shall be resorted to for the future without 
direct communication or authority from the Home 
Office. " 
Harcourt had, in his House of Commons reply to Maxwell, set out the difficulties 
with entrapment as a means of detection, 
"In the first place there is a danger that while the police 
may be in possession of information that crimes most 
mischievous to society are being committed, these 
crimes may be difficult if not impossible of detection 
by ordinary means. " 
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However, outweighing this argument in favour of entrapment is the followi g 
important consideration noted by Harcourt, 
" ... there is the other danger that the confidence of the 
public may be shaken in the good faith of the police; 
and of all the evils that could occur that would be the 
greatest. " 
Given this risk Harcourt commented, 
"'The cases in which it is necessary or justifiable for 
the police to resort to the artifice of the description 
practiced in this case must be rare indeed. " 
Public confidence in the good faith of the police does seem to have been upset if the 
editorial in "'Me Tirnes" can be taken as a reflection of the opinion of the property- 
owning classes. ne Times was convinced that the police had behaved badly in the 
Tilley case (16), 
"Whether the phantom charge against Thomas Titley 
can be sustained or not is a matter which concerns 
himself The charge against the police is of much more 
general consequence ... In Thomas Titley's case the 
whole crime from one end to the other is the mere 
concoction of the police. He is found engaged in his 
lawful occupation as a chemist and he is urged to an 
unlawful course outside his regular business. There is 
more here than the detection of crime. The initiative 
is with the police and not with the offender; each 
subsequent step is the result of a distinct suggestion 
on the part of the police ... If the police have really done what the Recorder's charge implies the proceedings 
is described none too strongly as very greatly to be 
reprobated in itself and for the abuses to which it 
obviously lends itself. " 
This editorial, apart from being a useful critique of the practice of entrapment, 
illustrates that such methods were unacceptable to respectable public opinion in late 
nineteenth century England. The possibility that use of entrapment by the police has a 
tendency to upset public confidence in the good faith of the police is noted by the 
modem commentator J. D. Heydon, who comments, (17) 
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"Public fears of entrapment create suspicion and insecurity. 
Trappers are undemocratic in being a secret police force. " 
An indiscriminate use of entrapment by the police is likely to have consequences for 
public faith in the fairness of the whole criminal justice process: on this see Chapter 
9. 
Cultural objections to entrapment as a legitimate police method of investigation in 
England continued into the twentieth century, for example, the Royal Commission on 
Police Powers and Procedure 1929 commented on the term "agent provocateur", (18) 
" ... the use of a foreign phrase for which there is no exact English equivalent indicates that the practice is regarded 
as alien to our habits and traditions. " 
However, the 1929 Royal Commission, like Harcourt in 1880 were prepared to 
tolerate entrapment as an exceptional measure. The 1929 Commission started its 
discussions however, with a clear denunciation of police tactics designed to entrap 
citizens into crime. Indeed, the Royal Commission commented that in those 
circumstances, (19) 
"We do not believe that a prosecution would ever be 
instituted on evidence obtained in such circumstances 
or that a prosecution thus instituted would result in a 
conviction. " 
This comment that no prosecution would ever be instituted where the police had 
initiated offences "with a view to enticing or entrapping members of the public into 
conu-nitting breaches of the law" is interesting in the light of Choo's (20) proposal that 
proof of entrapment should lead to a stay of the proceedings as an abuse of the 
process of the court, that the pre-trial police impropriety is so grave that mere 
exclusion of evidence is an inadequate remedy. 
'Me Royal Commission of 1929 obviously regarded criminal proceedings based on 
evidence obtained by entrapment as so fundamentafly flawed that the proceedings 
should not be instituted against the entrapped citizen. However, the argument of the 
1929 Commission was more subtle than merely arguing that entrapment is always 
objectionable. The Commission started with the basic proposition that since, (2 1) 
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... it is the primary 
duty of the constable to prevent the 
commission of crimes and offences any conduct on his part 
leading to the commission of offences would be highly 
reprehensible. " 
However, the Commission recognises that it is also the duty of the police to enforce 
the law and to secure evidence in pursuit of this aim. Yet for certain types of offences 
the obtaining of evidence in the usual ways is difficult if not impossible. (22) 
"The offences in regard to which such difficulties most 
frequently arise are drftiking in licensed premises or clubs 
during prohibited hours, betting in unlicensed premises, 
street betting, offences against The Shop Hours Act and 
cases of clairvoyants or fortune tellers. " 
However, these situations throw up another problem: should the police merely 
observe in the hope of gathering evidence that way or can they legitimately take part 
in criminal activity in order to entrap the suspected offender into an example of his 
ongoing criminal conduct so that evidence can therefore be gathered to prosecute him 
for that ongoing criminal activity? The 1929 Commission recommended that, (23) 
it ... as a general rule the police should observe only without 
participating in the offence. " 
This echoes Sir William Harcourt's comment that, 
"As a rule the police ought not to set traps for people. 11 
However, the 1929 Conunission like Harcourt, were prepared to make exceptions to 
the general rule, for the 1929 Commission this was where, 
"Observation without participation is from the nature of the 
case impossible. " 
The Commission was also prepared to tolerate as an exceptional measure police traps 
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protection is to be afforded to the public". (24) 
Entrapment in every circumstance has never been officially disapproved of although 
the technique has only been tolerated as an extreme measure to be used very 
sparingly. As was stated by Nolan J. in Rv Governor of Pentonville Prison ex part 
Chinoy (1990) (25) 
"Our law has always acknowledged the fact, unpalatable as 
it may be, that the detection and proof of certain types of 
criminal activity may necessitate the employment of 
underhand and even unlawful means. " 
Even when police entrapment activity went beyond the narrow limits of legitimacy set 
out by the 1929 Royal Commission (e. g. in Rv Birtles (26) the police encouraged a 
known criminal to rob a post office and even provided him with a car to stake out the 
premises and gave him an imitation gun to perform the robbery after which he was 
arrested, this is clearly beyond what the 1929 Commission established as legitimate 
use of entrapment) the law implicitly sanctioned the entrapment by admitting the 
evidence of the agent provocateur into trial. The only legal consequence of proof of 
entrapment was a sentence reduction because of the element of entrapment. Before 
the 1970s the sentence reduction and a judicial rebuke to the police were the only 
responses of the criminal court to even the more offensive forms of entrapment. 
Indeed there were some very strong statements of judicial disapproval of the practice 
of entrapment, e. g. Lord Goddard in Brannan v Pee and Lord Parker in Rv Birtles, 
but prosecutions were still brought against the entrapped citizen despite the claims of 
the 1929 Royal Commission that prosecutions would not be brought where the police 
had initiated offences, "with a view to enticing or entrapping members of the public 
into committing breaches of the law". Not only were prosecutions brought, but the 
courts would not until the 1970s countenance the possibility that evidence obtained by 
entrapment should be excluded from the trial. It is doubtful whether the terms of the 
discretion conferred in Kuruma vR (1955) allowed trial judges to properly exclude 
entrapment evidence even if they wanted to, see Rv Sangl per Lord Diplock on the 
limits of the Kuruma discretion. 1be admissibility of entrapment evidence in law and 
the unwillingness of the judiciary to exclude it as a matter of discretion is in line with 
the pre PACE judicial approach to other forms of police impropriety such as illegal 
searches of persons and property which result in the obtaining of evidence: there is 
no reported case where evidence obtained from an illegal search was excluded in the 
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trial judge's discretion. 
The sentence reduction continued as the only significant judicial response to the fact 
of police entrapment into the 1980s and early 1990s, see Rv Underhill (1979) Rv 
Mackey and Shaw (1992) (27). However, the picture is slightly more complicated 
than the above statement implies. In the 1970s before the case of Rv San-g (1979) 
and after Rv Birtles (1969) and Rv McCann (1971) (28) which are all high authority 
for the proposition that there is no judicial discretion to exclude entrapment evidence 
there were some interesting developments at first instance level. G. Robertson Q. C. 
points out, (29) 
"T'he debate over whether and if so upon what occasions 
the courts should exclude evidence obtained by tricks 
and traps was the liveliest of issues throughout the 
seventies, as trial judges and academic commentators 
wrestled with the extent to which the judicial discretion 
at common law could be exercised against receiving 
evidence of police provocation of unwilling and at 
first unwitting offenders. " 
In Rv Foulder, Foulkes and Johns (1973) (30) the accused were charged with 
unlawfully possessing controlled drugs. An undercover police officer had approached 
Foulkes and persistently requested the drugs. As a result the three accused later met 
the policeman, produced the drugs and were then arrested by the policeman. The 
evidence of the policeman was rejected by the court after defence arguments that the 
discretion to exclude should be exercised since the police had encouraged the accused 
to commit the offence. The three accused were acquitted. 
In Rv Burnett and Lee (1973) (3 1) Lee was introduced to a police informer who told 
him that she was the agent of a foreign government and was interested in finding the 
source of forged currency and travellers cheques and obtaining them in large 
quantities. She also told Lee that in view of her diplomatic status "he would have 
nothing to worry about". The informer persistently phoned Lee's home asldng 
whether he had discovered the source. After the two accused delivered forged US 
dollar bills to the informer they were arrested by the police. The trial judge held the 
evidence inadmissible since there was a strong suspicion that the conduct of the 
informer tempted and encouraged the accused to conunit crime. 
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However, the Court of Appeal in Rv McEvilly (1973), (32) commented that the 
evidence of the entrapment in both Rv Foulder and Rv Burnett had been wrongly 
excluded and should have been admitted in both trials. 
In Rv Ameer (1977) (33) another first instance judge, Judge Gillis Q. C. did not heed 
the Court of Appeal's strictures in Rv McEvilly , and excluded 
the evidence of an 
agent provocateur. The correctness of the decision in Ameer was strongly doubted by 
the House of Lords in San-R (1979) It is an interesting observation that before the 
enactment of S. 78 of PACE no Court of Appeal or House of Lords decision ever 
sanctioned the use of judicial discretion to exclude evidence of an agent provocateur. 
It is therefore slightly misleading for G. Robertson Q. C. to comment, 
"What the House of Lords took away in Sang in 1979 - 
effectively this very power at Common Law to exclude 
unfairly obtained evidence - Parliament gave back albeit in confusing terms in 1984 through Section 78 of PACE. " (34) 
The common law discretion, the Kuruma discretion was never approved of by the 
Court of Appeal so as to act on the evidence of an agent provocateur. The recent case 
of Rv Smurthwaite (1994) C. A. is therefore a major landmark in English criminal 
evidence since the case gives Court of Appeal approval for the first time to trial 
judges to exclude in their discretion the evidence of an agent provocateur where 
appropriate to safeguard "the fairness of the proceeding" under S. 78 of PACE. This 
suggests that the Section 78 discretion, far from returning us to the "pre Sang" 
position as Robertson implies, is actually a wider discretion than the common law 
discretion (see Rv Cooke (1994) C. A. ) and is based on a different ideological 
rationale, that police misuse of power in the collection of evidence or non observance 
of proper procedures can affect the fairness of the proceedings. 
The Home Office Circular to the Police on Informants who take part in crime 
(35) 
There exist certain Home Office instructions to the police on the use of informers and 
entrapment. As Leigh points out they faithfully reflect the law (36) in stating 
categorically that no member of a police force and no public informant should 
counsel, incite or procure the commission of a crime. This is in accord with judicial 
pronotmcements in such cases as Brannan v Peek and Rv Birtles, (37). As Leigh 
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points out, the Circular to the police on the use of informers and entrapment, 
"Scrupulously accords with the legal rules evolved by the 
courts. It reflects a denial of any special position of 
sanctity to the police who may not, with impunity break 
the law in order to enforce the law. " (38) 
The Circular goes on to state that, (39) 
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... where an informant gives the police information about the intention of others to commit a crime in which they 
intend that they shall play a part, his participation should 
be allowed to continue only where: 
i) he does not actively engage in planning and committing 
the crime, 
(ii) he is intended to play only a minor role; and 
(iii) his participation is essential to enable the police to 
frustrate the principal criminals and to arrest them 
before injury is done to any person or serious damage to 
property. 
The informant should always be instructed that he must on no 
account act as agent provocateur, whether by suggesting to 
others that they should commit offences or encouraging them 
to do so, and that if he is found to have done so he will 
himself be liable to prosecution. " 
Infiltration of a criminal conspiracy is allowed by the Circular but the informant must 
never allow himself to cross the boundary into becoming an agent provocateur. 
Neither the police nor their agents should counsel, incite or procure the commission 
of a crime. 
Rv Sang and Entrapment Evidence 
In Rv Sane the House of Lords held that since there was no substantive defence of 
entrapment in English law that therefore there should be no discretion to exclude 
evidence of entrapment. As Lord Diplock commented, (40) 
"If (the judge) exercised the discretion in favour of the 
accused he would then have to direct the jury to acquit. 
How does this differ from recognising entrapment as a 
defence but a defence for which the necessary factual 
foundation is to be found not by the jury but by the judge 
and even where the factual foundation is so found the 
defence is available only in the judge's discretion. " 
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J. D. Heydon (4 1) has pointed out that Lord Diplock is not strictly correct in his 
Lordship's analysis of the situation, 
"Those who advocate the discretion to exclude evidence 
obtained by entrapment do not advocate that if entrapment 
exists the court should have a discretion to exclude all 
otherwise admissible evidence. The discretion advocated 
is simply to exclude evidence which proceeds directly from 
the entrapment. " 
Therefore, on this analysis evidence of an independent witness to the crime caused by 
the police entrapment or a confession made by the entrapped suspect would be 
admissible and hence go to prove guilt independent of the evidence of an agent 
provocateur. Recognition of this is inconsistent with the argument that the existence 
of a discretion to exclude evidence of an agent provocateur is tantamount to 
recognising a defence of entrapment. However, in argument against Heydon's 
analysis are the following observations. First of all., in Rv Ameer all evidence from 
the commission of the crime was excluded by Judge Gillis Q. C. It would remain 
theoretically possible for a trial judge not only to exclude the evidence of an agent 
provocateur but also any confession or other evidence which exists to prove the 
offence under S. 78 of PACE. If trial judges excluded other evidence as well as the 
evidence of the agent provocateur in a case of entrapment in order to safeguard "the 
fairness of the proceedings" under S. 78 then the situation would look very similar to a 
'defence' of entrapment. However there is still a crucial distinction. Section 78 is a 
discretion which may or may not be used to exclude the evidence of an agent 
provocateur or indeed other evidence of the crime such as a confession, however if a 
defence of entrapment is made out it is not dependent on the exercise of a judicial 
discretion. Moreover in Rv Smurthwaite the leading case on S. 78 and entrapment., 
Lord Taylor only sanctions the discretionary exclusion of the evidence of the agent 
provocateur in the judge's discretion under S. 78. Lord Taylor is silent on the effect of 
the S. 78 discretion on other evidence of a crime committed because of entrapment. 
Can a confession of an entrapped citizen be excluded under S. 78? If only the evidence 
of an agent provocateur can be excluded under S. 78 and not the confession of the 
entrapped citizen then this would not be similar to the operation of a defence of 
entrapment and Heydon would be right in his analysis. There is no good reason 
however why a confession following an improper entrapment operation cannot be 
excluded under S. 78. It is clear from the authorities that S. 78 can be used to exclude 
a confession otherwise admissible under S. 76: see Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
293 
However, Heydon can be criticized from a standpoint of principle. Heydon 
commented that those who advocate the discretion to exclude evidence obtained by 
entrapment mean a discretion simply to exclude evidence which proceeds directly 
from the entrapment: see note 41 of this chapter. 
However, this would lead to inconsistent results and hence injustice by not treating 
similar cases alike. If the prosecution evidence consists solely of the testimony of the 
agent provocateur then an acquittal would follow exclusion of that evidence but if the 
police had obtained a confession from the entrapped citizen then a conviction may 
still result even if the evidence of the agent provocateur was excluded by the trial 
judge. The arbitrary nature of the remedy of discretionary exclusion where 
entrapment exists is an argument in favour of a more drastic remedy of a stay of 
proceedings where there has been improper entrapment (allowing the fact that 
entrapment is sometimes not improper if it is used on those involved in ongoing 
criminal activity). A stay of proceedings would achieve consistency between similar 
cases of improper entrapment by precluding the possibility of any conviction at all of 
the improperly entrapped citizen. 
However, whatever the merits of the argument in favour of a stay of the proceedings 
over discretionary exclusion, Rv Sang had the unquestionable effect of precluding the 
possibility of trial judges from even considering the fact of entrapment as a relevant 
factor in the exercise of their judicial discretion to exclude evidence. Rv 
Smurthwaite in its interpretation of S. 78 makes Rv Sang, redundant as an authority 
that entrapment is irrelevant to the exercise of any judicial discretion to exclude 
evidence. Even before Rv Smurthwaite dicta suggested S. 78 applied to the 
evidence of an agent provocateur. In Rv Gill (1989) (42) reservations were made 
about dicta in Rv Harwood (1989) which suggested that S. 78 should be interpreted so 
as to give effect to Rv Sang on the entrapment point and the discretion to exclude. In 
Governor of Pentonville Prison ex varte Chinoy (1992) (43) it was stated by Nolan J. 
that the fact of entrapment may be taken into account under S. 78. 
The Modern Judicial View of Entrapment and Discretionarv Exclusion 
The judicial trend to see entrapment as a relevant factor to the exercise of the S. 78 
discretion was confirmed authoritatively by Lord Taylor, Lord Chief Justice in Rv 
Smurthwaite (1994). However, the judgement in Rv Smurthwaite, like the 
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judgement of Nolan J. in Chinov recognised that sometimes entrapment can be a 
legitimate police practice. In Rv Smurthwaite Lord Taylor commented, 
"... the fact that the evidence has been obtained by 
entrapment or by an agent provocateur or by a trick 
does not of itself require the judge to exclude it. " (44) 
If discretionary exclusion under S. 78 is to mark the limits of acceptable and 
unacceptable police conduct (e. g. see Rv Mason for a police tactic that was 
'unacceptable') then by stating that the fact of entrapment does not of itself require the 
judge to exclude evidence seems to be implying that entrapment may be a legitimate 
police tactic in certain circumstances and evidence should not be excluded from trial 
in those circumstances. This reflects a decisive shift in the acceptability of 
entrapment to official opinion from the position maintained by Lord Goddard in 
Brannan v Peek (1947). 
It is interesting to compare Lord Goddard's denunciation of entrapment in Brannan v, 
Peek with the cautious approval given by Woolf L. J. to entrapment tactics used by the 
police, in DPP v Marshall. The official distaste with entrapment activity manifest in 
the opinions of Lord Goddard was a cultural legacy from the nineteenth century and 
the fears of that time of 'continental' police methods such as entrapment. The 
nineteenth century legacy had a continued hold in 1947 but by 1988 the fact that 
entrapment can be a useful investigatory tool seems fully accepted by the Divisional 
Court in DPP v Marshall,. The English police are not to be distinguished from their 
Canadian, American or continental counterparts, all of whom employ entrapment as a 
law enforcement tool to the lesser or greater degree. The only limits of principle on 
entrapment activity by the English. police are the same arguments of principle which 
apply to police forces in other liberal democratic societies. The old arguments that 
the use of entrapment by the police is un-English, or in the words of the 1929 Royal 
Commission "alien to our traditions and habits" can no longer be plausibly used to 
criticize police use of entrapment. The police in England and Wales are now 
understood after the enactment of PACE as a core state agency given special powers 
and duties to investigate crime who are similar in status and role to police forces in 
other liberal democratic societies. The argument manifest in Lord Goddard's 
judgements that entrapment is inconsistent with the traditions and role of the English 
police cannot be maintained in the light of the changed ideological understandings of 
the police role in England manifest in particular in the RCCP Report of 1981 and the 
PACE Act 1984, the entire structure of which treats the uniformed officer as having 
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powers and duties peculiar to the office of policeman in a liberal democratic state. 
Judicial attitudes to the use of entrapment by the English police should be consistent 
with the view of the police embodied in PACE as a state agency charged with 
detecting and investigating criminal offences and given special powers to that effect. 
There should be., and indeed there is, a more relaxed judicial attitude to the use of 
entrapment by the police. 
In DPP v Marshall (1988) police officers in plain clothes purchased four cans of lager 
and a bottle of wine from a shop which was licensed to sell liquor by the case but not 
to sell individual cans or bottles of liquor. The respondents were charged with having 
sold the lager and the wine without having the requisite justices' licence contrary to 
S. 160 of ne Licensing Act 1964. The respondents argued that the police officers' 
evidence should have been excluded under S. 78 (1) of PACE since the evidence had 
been unfairly obtained because the officers had not at the time of the purchase 
revealed the fact that they were police officers. The magistrates accepted that claim. 
On appeal by the Director of Public Prosecutions Woolf L. J. held that the evidence of 
the police officers had been wrongly excluded by the magistrates. The case was 
remitted to the magistrates with a direction to proceed with the hearing of the 
information. 
Woolf L. J. made the following important observations, (45) 
"If the justices are entitled to exclude evidence on the basis 
which the justices in this case decided to exclude the evidence, 
that could have wide-reaching implications on the methods 
adopted of obtaining evidence in a large range of criminal 
offences of this sort. In regard to the particular offences which 
are alleged in this information one can conceive that by keeping 
the premises under observation the police could have obtained 
the evidence without adopting the strategem which was adopted 
in this case. Clearly while that could have been done it would 
have been much more time-consuming and difficult than 
adopting the simple procedure which was adopted in this case 
of trying to make a purchase which would contravene the law 
in the way alleged in the information. " 
There are still important problems of principle with entrapment as a law enforcement 
technique, hence Lord Taylor's decision in Rv Smurthwaite that the fact the evidence 
was obtained by an agent provocateur is relevant to the exercise of the judge's 
discretion to exclude evidence under S. 78. The important argument of principle is 
that it is not generally an appropriate state function to encourage citizens into crime 
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for the purposes of securing convictions against those citizens. If S. 78 is concerned 
partly with safeguarding the moral integrity of criminal proceedings then proceedings 
which are instituted against a citizen where the citizen was encouraged to commit the 
crime by agents of the state are morally undermined. However, entrapment is a 
legitimate technique where there is ongoing criminal activity for which it is difficult 
to obtain evidence in the normal way. Entrapment in this situation becomes a 
legitimate investigatory tool alongside 'manna from heaven' operations (as in Dawes v 
DPP (1994) (46), where a car door is deliberately left open to catch a habitual car 
thief; the door locks automatically from the outside when the thief is on the inside of 
the car) or 'trickery' operations (as in Rv Christou and Wright (1992) (47) a shady 
jewellers, in fact a police trap, recorded criminals offering stolen goods for sale) to 
detect and secure evidence against suspected offenders. Where entrapment is used 
against suspected offenders then it is no more objectionable than the use of 'manna 
from heaven' operations or 'trickery' to obtain evidence against other suspected 
offenders. Entrapment can be viewed as an evidence gathering technique to secure 
the conviction of people already (pre the entrapment) suspected of involvement in 
criminal activity. However, the type of 'trickery' used in Rv Christou and Wright 
would seem to be only a danger to the guilty offender because if the offence had not 
been committed then any trick to secure evidence of it will by definition not work. 
Tricks can only be effective against those engaging in criminal activity: for example, 
in Rv Ramen (1988) the appellant worked for the Post Office; his duties included 
dealing with remittances received by a Head Post Office from branch offices. As a 
result of suspicions investigating officers sent him a bundle of letters, one of which 
contained X100 in cash which was not listed as part of its contents. The appellant was 
found in possession of the X100 and duly convicted. The Court of Appeal on his 
appeal against sentence commented that, 
"This case is a world away from the agent provocateur type 
of case. This is a case in which as a result of suspicion 
unproven a test of the appellant's honesty was put into effect, 
as indeed in the experience of this court it must regularly be 
in these Post Office cases where suspicion falls upon an 
employee in a position of trust. There was no question here of 
applying such a principle as might have applied if the court 
thought right in the agent provocateur cases or in the true 
entrapment cases. This is not such a case. This is a case where 
a man in a position of trust is caught out and thoroughly 
deserved the sentence which was passed on him. " (48) 
To restate an important point, tricks such as employed against Ramen are only 
effective against the criminal, an innocent man would not have fallen for the bait. 
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However, entrapment is a different matter. The commission of the crime can be 
actively encouraged and indeed suggested by undercover police and the innocent 
citizen is vulnerable to such tactics as is the professional criminal. Even the virtuous 
citizen is suggestible to the incitement of others to a certain degree. 'Mere is an 
important distinction between verbal persuasion to criminality by police officers and 
merely offering the opportunity to criminality as in Rv Ramen. It is because of the 
danger of 'innocent' citizens becoming corrupted that entrapment raises such 
important issues of principle. However, those with previous criminal records need to 
be protected from undue police pressure to commit crime also. It should not be 
thought that merely because someone has a criminal record that he is 'fair game' for 
the use of entrapment. Entrapment should only be used on those suspected of 
ongoing criminal activity and of course not all previous offenders fall into that 
category. "Manna from heaven operations" share a disturbing feature with 
entrapment in that they may not only tempt the habitual criminal but also may tempt 
'innocent' citizens into crime. 1be police tactics disclosed by Williams v DPP (1994) 
have drawn much adverse academic criticism (49) because of the danger that innocent 
citizens could be tempted into crime and that there was no specific individual target of 
the operation. However, verbal persuasion to criminality is a much more insidious 
corrupter of personality than merely offering the temptation to criminality by, for 
example, leaving an unlocked van door with valuable goods inside. This is why 
entrapment raises such acute problems of principle. It should also be remembered 
that police officers may be particularly skilful in the verbal manipulation of others, a 
factor which adds to the acuteness of the entrapment problem. An interesting 
development in Rv Smurthwaite is in Lord Taylor's list of factors favouring the 
inclusion or exclusion of the evidence of an agent provocateur. One of these factors 
was whether a 'reliable record' of the event exists: a record as to what was actually 
said by the undercover police and what was actually said by the accused during the 
undercover entrapment operation. (50) 
There is an interesting and significant parallel here with the judicial decisions on the 
consequence of police breach of the recording provisions of PACE for interviews of 
suspects: see Rv Keenan, Rv Scott where significant breach of the recording 
provisions was held to result in the likely exclusion of confession evidence. There is 
no Code of Practice or statutory scheme for covert investigatory techniques such as 
entrapment but Lord Taylor in Rv Smurthwaite and in the earlier 'covert' cases of Rv 
Christou and Rv Bryce applies to undercover operations similar principles on the 
importance of recording the encounter between police and suspect in the covert 
operations that apply to the obtaining of confessions under Code C of the Codes of 
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Practice under PACE. The importance of an independent record of the covert 
operation (preferably a tape recording) of what was said by the police and what was 
said by the suspect is similar to the confessions cases, the tape recording is needed to 
help the judge to adjudicate on what was said by the suspect and the exact role of the 
police in the operation. The role of the police in the operation can have important 
consequences for the admissibility of any evidence so obtained; if the police role was 
too active then the trial judge may decide to exclude the evidence under section 78 of 
PACE. 
Under the old common law the word of the police, their oral testimony at trial was 
taken by the judge and often the jury as proof of the making of the confession. There 
were exceptions, e. g. see Rv Pattinson (1973) ' 
C. A. (5 1) per Lawton L. J. but in the 
vast majority of cases the testimony of the police satisfied the court as to the making 
of a confession. The word of the police was similarly accepted as strong evidence 
that the entrapped or tricked citizen had actually committed the criminal offence 
alleged. If the entrapment or trick produced real evidence as in Rv Payne or as in Rv 
Sang then the testimony of the police was less crucial to prove guilt. However, in 
some cases of entrapment or trickery as in Brannan v Pee the only evidence that a 
crime had been conunitted as a result of the entrapment or trick was the testimony of 
police officers. 
'nie testimony of the police that the words and conduct of the accused were as alleged 
seems to have been accepted without question by the courts in the case. The same 
operation today, following Lord Taylor's comments in Rv Christou (1992) and in Rv 
Smurthwaite (1994) may be required to be tape recorded covertly before the evidence 
of the alleged crime can be admitted into evidence. However, in Williams v DPP 
(1994) the testimony of the police officers as to the appellants' behaviour in taking out 
cartons of cigarettes from the back of the van (actually a 'police trap) was accepted in 
the absence of any recording of the incident. However, in Williams the two 
appellants had made full admissions to the offences so the evidence of what the police 
observed was not the only evidence in the case. In any case it should not be thought 
that the absence of a record of the trick or entrapment is necessarily fatal to the 
admissibility of the evidence. It is merely a factor, though an important factor for the 
judge in deciding to exclude evidence in his discretion under S. 78 (1). However pre 
PACE, generally speaking the word of the police as to the success of their undercover 
operations was accepted as the authoritative word on the issue by the courts in the 
face of any denial of the evidence by the defendant. However, as noted earlier in this 
thesis, police evidence, especially evidence that the accused made oral confessions to 
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the police, became increasingly suspect in the 1970s after decades of uncritical 
acceptance. This distrust of course led to the recording regime for interrogations. 
Lord Taylor in Rv Smurthwaite likewise insists upon a taped record for undercover 
operations. As was stated by Lord Taylor, applying his own principles to the facts of 
Rv Smurthwaite (52), 
"The two tapes were an accurate and unchallenged record. 
They record not admissions about some previous offence 
but the actual offence being committed of soliciting 
Webster (the undercover police officer) to murder. 
The appellant was making the running throughout. 
In these circumstances we can find no ground for 
criticizing the exercise of the learned judge of his 
discretion under S. 78. " 
Lord Taylor makes clear that a recording may be vital not only to establish that in fact 
the accused succumbed to the trick or entrapment but also to establish the precise role 
of the undercover policeman, i. e. was he an agent provocateur or not? In Smurthwaite 
the tapes disclosed that it was the accused who made the running throughout therefore 
it was a case similar to whether the police merely provided an opportunity for the 
commission of offences which would otherwise have been committed. In the absence 
of a tape it may be in the interests of the police to down-play their role in the 
entrapment or trick and seek to minimize the pressure they applied to the suspect to 
commit the alleged offence. Given that the precise role of the undercover police is a 
crucial factor in deciding whether to exclude their evidence under S. 78 (e. g. was he an 
agent provocateur or did he do no more than merely "play along" with the suggestion 
of the accused, or did he ask questions about previous offences which should have 
been governed by Code C of PACE as in Rv Bryce (1992) , then a tape recording of 
the event is of vital importance. There is an interesting comparison with the operation 
of S. 76 2(b) of PACE here. One of the crucial questions under S. 76 2(b) is what did 
the police really say or do to the suspect in interrogation before the confession? In R 
v Delaney (53) the Court of Appeal asserted that a failure to properly record the 
interrogations where there is a doubt as to what the police did say or do to the suspect 
could be fatal to the admissibility of a confession under S. 76 2(b). The Court of 
Appeal in Rv Smurthwaite implies that a failure to record a covert police operation 
involving an elemen of entrapment may be fatal to the admissibility of the evidence 
if there is a conflict at trial about whether the police acted as agent provocateurs or 
not. The word of the police is not an adequate substitute for an independent record of 
either interrogations or entrapment operations. A tape is required not only to 
adequately prove that a confession was made but also to help the trial judge determine 
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whether an inducement or threat was made prior to the confession. Simýlarly a tape 
recording is a crucial factor not only in establishing that the accused did implicate 
himself in criminal activity but also to establish the precise role of the police in the 
operation, i. e. how proactive were they? Also if there is a prohibition on the asking of 
questions about an offence in an undercover pose by the police then a tape may be 
required to persuade the court that any incriminating replies made by a suspect were 
not induced by a prohibited question from the undercover police officer about the 
suspect's involvement in criminal activity. The existence of an independent record of 
what really was said or done under undercover operation is a crucial point of 
distinction between Rv Christou (1992) and Rv Bryce (1992). (54) In the latter case 
the lack of a tape of the undercover interview with the suspect on his alleged 
involvement in car theft was held by the Court of Appeal to be a powerful reason to 
exclude evidence under S. 78 of his alleged self-incriminating remarks. In Rv 
Lawrence and Nash (1994) (55) a case decided by the Court of Appeal three months 
after Rv Smurthwaite the Court quashed convictions for conspiracy to supply 
cannabis to an undercover police officer posing as a customer for the drug. The court 
found that, 
" ... the officer's role could hardly have been more active 
since he not merely offered to buy cannabis resin but 
persistently and vigorously pressed the appellants to 
supply it. f, 
The court stressed that this fact in itself would not necessarily have led to the 
exclusion of the evidence. However., the police had not tape recorded the agent's 
telephone calls and meetings, a failure the court found "inexplicable and scarcely 
credible". There is an implicit judicial recognition that if the police set up an 
undercover operation which can involve a considerable investment of valuable police 
resources in time and finance then there may be a strong temptation on the police to 
distort or embellish the evidence as to their role in the operation, i. e. that they were 
not aggent pTovocateurs and also to lie about the result of the undercover operation. 
There is a parallel here with interrogation. A prolonged interrogation may fail to 
elicit incriminating replies from the suspect and the police may then be tempted to 
fabricate an "oral confession" if they are convinced of the guflt of the suspect and 
there is little other evidence: such a scenario was recognised by Hodgson J. in Rv 
Keenan. Similar pressures on the police to engage in concoction or distortion of 
evidence may arise during or after covert operations as well. Judicial strictures on the 
need for the police to tape record undercover operations is perhaps an implicit 
recognition of this possibility. It can also be pointed out that judicial insistence on 
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tape recording of undercover operations is a protection for the police and prosecution 
since police evidence from undercover operations has been successfully challenged in 
the past where there is a hint of entrapment: see Rv Ameer. A tape of the covert 
operations prevents unfounded allegations of "entrapment" being made by ciefendants 
who in reality did all the running with the police merely playing a passive -fole, as in 
Rv Smurthwaite where the defence tried to allege that the defendant had been 
entrapped into the offence by the police officer but the tape recording discIosed that 
the appellant did all the prompting, the undercover officer being largely p2wdve- 
It is important that Lord Chief Justice Taylor has provided in recent deciskyns, some 
guidance to the police on the fair conduct of covert police operations. h would be 
anomalous if alongside the detailed legislative scheme for interrogations, stop and 
search powers, the obtaining of samples etc. there was little in the way of guidance to 
the police on the proper conduct of covert operations to gather evidence. (Iffie Police 
Act 1997 provides guidance for the use of surveillance devices on private p; remises. ) 
Moreover, such guidance from the Court of Appeal is especially important imi the light 
of the increase in the number of such covert operations launched by the police. J. 
Morton in a recent work on the history of undercover police work refers toý a recent 
successful undercover operation, (56) 
"Operation Motion hailed as the way ahead in British 
policing and launched in October 1994 by West London 
Drugs Squad, involved three women police officers 
going undercover and posing as prostitutes in a brothel 
in Queensway. " 
The result of the police operation was that flArty-five dealers in hard drugs who called 
at the flat offering drugs were filmed on video secretly, pleaded guilty and received 
sentences of between four and six years. The success of such operations will no 
doubt encourage their spread in police forces throughout the country. 
The European Convention on Human Rights and Entrapment 
The significance of the European Convention on Human Rights and the issue of 
methods of evidence gathering for use in criminal prosecutions has assumed a new 
dimension of importance in recent years with the incorporation of the Convention into 
U. K. law under the Human Rights Act 1998. It is expected at the time of writing that 
the Act will come into force as a whole in October 2000. As JUSTICE point out in 
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their reportUnder Surveillance: Covert policing and Hwnan Rights Standards'(57) 
"The issue of exclusion of evidence is an area likely to be 
highlighted once the European Convention is incorporated 
into U. K. law under the Human Rights Act 1998. This will 
be particularly at issue in relation to proactive policing 
methods. " 
It is important then to look at how the European Convention on Human Rights has 
been interpreted in the area of illegally obtained evidence and entrapment for these 
cases may well have a bearing on how the Human Rights Act 1998 is interpreted by 
English judges. 
With regard to evidence obtained by illegal or improper means, case law under 
Article 6 of the E. C. H. R., the fair trial provision, shows a similar interpretation to 
English law. The leading case of Schenk v Switzerland (58) holds that Article 6 does 
not require the automatic exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of unlawful 
conduct by law enforcement agencies. In this case the prosecution had relied on 
evidence of telephone conversations, which as the Swiss government conceded had 
been obtained unlawfully. The decision in the case confirms that there is no 
automatic rule of exclusion to be derived from Article 6.1. Also the Convention has 
been interpreted so as to allow into evidence material obtained by a trick: see Smith v 
United Kingdom (59), where a security service agent disguising his identity, taped an 
incriminating telephone conversation with the applicant. The Commission declaring 
the complaint inadmissible, stated that the evidence had not been obtained unlawfully. 
The operation had to be regarded as a "ruse in the public interest". 
However, in the area of entrapment the European Court has adopted a more 
interventionist approach, but also an approach that is not inconsistent with decisions 
decided in English domestic law. In the case of , 
Lfidi v Switzerland (60) the Court 
held that there had been no violation of Article 8. the right to privacy, because by 
dealing in drugs the applicant "must have known that he was engaging in a criminal 
activity" and therefore that he might encounter an undercover officer. In this case 
undercover police officers had made a sample purchase of drugs from the applicant 
who had then supplied a quantity of drugs. 
However in the recent decision of Teixeira de Castro v Portugal (61) the Court did 
find a breach of Article 6 of the Convention. In this case an undercover police officer 
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had approached the applicant and had asked whether he could obtain some drugs. 
The applicant, who had no previous record of drug dealing, did supply some drugs 
and was then charged and convicted. The Court held that this "buy and bust" 
operation amounted to a breach of the right to a fair trial, recognising that this case 
was not one in which the applicant had been "predisposed" to this type of offence and 
therefore distinguishing its previous decision in Lfidi v Switzerland. The Court 
declared that the use of the evidence "in the impugned criminal proceedings means 
that, right from the outset, the applicant was defmitely deprived of a fair trial". ýIbe 
Court found that the police officers had instigated the offence and went on to stress 
two matters in particular. First, controls and safeguards must be in place for 
authorising and supervising such operations if they are to be fair: this obviously has 
implications for the proper supervision of undercover operations in the U. K. 
Secondly, the Court stressed that the public interest cannot justify the use of evidence 
obtained as a result of police incitement. If Lildi v Switzerland and Teixeira de 
Castro v Portugal were decided under present English law using the Rv Smurthwaite 
guidelines it is likely that the evidence would have been admitted in Lildi but ruled 
inadmissible in Teixeira de Castro. However, A. Ashworth at least believes that the 
strength of the Teixeira de Castro judgement suggests that English law ought to 
provide for even a defence of entrapment in this type of case rather than mere 
discretionary exclusion of evidence, (62) 
"This strong pronouncement suggests that the admissibility 
of evidence where there has been entrapment of a person 
not 'pre-disposed' to this kind of offence will not be left to 
regulation by national law. 'I'lie court will exclude it 
because it undermines the fairness of trials. This suggests 
that English law ought to provide for automatic exclusion 
of evidence, or even a defence of entrapment, in this type 
of case. " 
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CHAPTER 9 
ENTRAPMENT - THE THEORETICAL OBJECTIONS 
Introduction 
The main theoretical problem over the use of entrapment is that unlike for example, 
the use of violence to obtain confessions or the use of force to take intimate body 
samples, as a police method it is not per se objectionable but can be extremely 
objectionable depending on the circumstances in which the method is used. (1) 
Identifying those circumstances which made entrapment acceptable and those 
circumstances which make entrapment an oppressive tool of law enforcement is the 
central concern to be explored in this chapter. 
An important initial point is to distinguish between a criminal act that is encouraged 
by an ordinary citizen and one that is encouraged by the police or by an agent acting 
on the instructions of the police. The law rightly expects control from citizens in 
resisting the encouragement to criminal activity from their fellow citizens. Lord 
Diplock in Rv Sang, commented that, 
... many crimes are committed by one person at the 
instigation of others. " (2) 
There is not and never has been an issue with regard to the admissibility of evidence 
in the case where a defendant alleges that he would not have committed the offence 
but for the pressure of another citizen not acting on. behalf of the police or other 
authorities. At the sentencing stage due regard may be had to the malign influence of 
another stronger or older personality on the defendant. However, where the police or 
their agents have encouraged the crime a crucial dimension is added which may call 
for judicial action to exclude evidence or even to stay the proceedings as an abuse of 
the process of the courts and prevent the prosecution on the entrapment evidence from 
continuing. As McHugh J. commented in the Australian case Rid-geway vR (3) 
"Ibe courts of justice cannot countenance the use of their 
processes to prosecute offences that in substance have 
been artificially created by the misconduct of those whose 
duty it is to uphold the law. " 
308 
There are important points of principle to explore here but there are also important 
consequential considerations as well. In a Canadian monograph on entrapment Stober 
has written, (4) 
"The police are on the 'front-line' and are usually the 
initial point of contact between an individual and the 
criminal law. Police conduct and accomplishments 
are therefore highly consequential as they greatly 
affect public attitudes towards the law and the 
criminal justice system as a whole. " 
The manner in which the police carry out their duties creates as Stober notes, "an 
impression which has profound effects". The excessive use of another proactive 
technique, stop and search of suspects on the street provoked the most serious civil 
disorder in England for a century in Brixton in London in 1981. Moreover, it is 
widely accepted that the police cannot carry out their duties to enforce the law and 
investigate offences without the co-operation of the public and that this co-operation 
depends on public faith and trust in the police. Reiner and Spencer have commented, 
(5) 
"The primary determinant of police effectiveness in dealing 
with crime is not management efficiency or technical powers 
but flow of information. Ibe lifeblood of policing is public 
support. If sections of society are alienated from the police 
this is not only regrettable in itself but a serious barrier to 
the investigation of crime. " 
It has been recognised that indiscriminate or misplaced police use of entrapment can 
cause a loss of public confidence in the police as both Sir William Harcourt in the last 
century and J. Heydon (6), who wrote the modem classic article on entrapment, 
pointed out. 
However, apart from these important consequential considerations which should 
caution against indiscriminate use by the police of the technique of entrapment there 
remain vital issues of principle to consider. 
The basic point of objection to entrapment is well put by Robertson, who comments, 
(7) 
"It is a contradiction in terms for officials charged with 
maintaining the law to arrange for it to be broken. " 
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The focus here is on the misuse of state power - that it is inappropriate for law 
enforcement officers to engage their resources in the creation of crime rather than its 
detection or prevention. 'Me misuse of state power is qualitatively different from a 
failure to observe proper procedures in the investigation of crime such as a wrongful 
denial of legal advice or even the use of violence to obtain a confession. The point is 
that police entrapment creates the commission of a crime that would not otherwise 
have been committed. 
It is this creation of a criminal offence by agents of the state which would not 
otherwise have been committed by the citizen which leads commentators such as 
Professor Ashworth (8) to argue that entrapment creates a potential contradiction in 
criminal justice. It is conceptually incoherent for the citizen to be invited to do that 
which the law forbids him to do by those charged with upholding the law. 
The police are given special powers and resources to investigate and detect clime and 
it is arguably a serious misuse of the conditions on which the police are granted those 
powers (i. e. the legitimacy on which exercise of those powers rest) when police or 
their agents encourage the commission of criminal offences in order to trap innocent 
citizens. Those police powers and resources are arguably not being employed for the 
purposes for which they were granted by Parliament. S. Uglow in a critique of the 
growth of proactive policing, "Policing Liberal Society", has commented that, (9) 
"Proactive policing raises the problem of the boundaries of 
legitimate police action. From the standpoint of liberal 
analysis only the commission of an offence (or its immediate 
threat) should justify active intervention ... 
fairness suggests 
that policing should be reactive, that is that intervention 
should occur only in response to the committing of a 
criminal offence or breach of the peace or the immediate 
apprehension of one of these. It is a yardstick which 
reduces the possibility of arbitrary and discriminatory 
policing and emphasizes two salient characteristics - that 
policing should be minimal and that it is a public service. " 
The indiscriminate and excessive use of entrapment as a particular proactive 
technique may endanger the legitimacy on which police power and powers rest. 
Despite the approving views of the Divisional Court the relatively mild proactive 
technique used in Williams v DPP did incur a large measure of academic criticism: 
see Chapter 7 of this thesis. Given that entrapment (involving verbal persuasion) is a 
much more potent proactive technique than the Wiffiams v DPP 'manna from heaven' 
operation, then public concern can be expected to increase proportionately when the 
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entrapment technique is not cautiously used. The creation of crime by the police is 
Potentially an obvious contradiction of the social terms on which police legitimacy 
rests. However, there is a serious complication at this point in the discussion on the 
acceptability of entrapment for the police are charged with the duty of securing 
evidence of serious criminality. 
It may be the case that successful detection and the procuring of evidence for use in 
court to convict the guilty may be dependent on some form of police participation in 
the activities of criminal gangs and associations. This activity may involve 
encouraging the commission of offences with a view to securing evidence of the 
gang's criminal activities. The use of entrapment in this context, far from 
undermining the mandate on which police power and powers rests, may actually be 
required by that mandate. Roskill L. J. commented in Rv Underhill (1979) (10) 
"There can be no doubt that in these days of serious 
criminal offences, whether of a terrorist character or of 
widespread trading in drugs whether hard or soft, the 
task of the forces of law enforcement are difficult 
indeed ... we have had cases in this court where gangs dealing in hard and soft drugs have had to be infiltrated. 
It is a recognized and legitimate means of detecting crime 
and bringing the guilty people to justice that infiltration 
shall take place. That has long been recognized by the 
courts and it would be wrong for anything to be done or 
said by this court which hampered proper means being 
used for infiltration and detection of serious crime. 
That cannot be too strongly emphasized. " 
At times of grave public concern about the activities of organised criminality in the 
area of drug trading and smuggling, terrorism or forms of criminal fraud, police 
reliance on entrapment may be driven as much by public demands as by, as Uglow 
(11) suggests, specialist police squads defining their own objectives. Indeed far from 
introducing a contradiction into criminal justice, as Ashworth suggests, entrapment 
may, when used appropriately, serve the aims of criminal justice. Lustgarten in an 
article entitled "The Police and The Substantive Criminal Law" (12) comments, that 
use of certain oppressive proactive police methods including entrapment to combat 
the illegal drugs trade, 
" ... is the inevitable price society pays 
for the creation of 
such offences; they cannot be enforced otherwise. The 
police are simply adopting rational techniques given the 
job the legislative have imposed upon them. " 
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Lustgartenýs point is that in obtaining evidence, for example, about illegal drug supply 
the police cannot rely on the usual sources of information for there is usually no 
victim to complain of the crime nor to identify the offender. Proof of drug supply 
normally demands that the suspect be identified in possession of substantial amounts 
of drugs. Proof of this requires active surveillance and/or use of entrapment to 
establish the elements of the offence under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 Section 4; 
the criminal prohibition on the supply of controlled drugs. Lustgarten comments that 
if society does not wish the police to rely on proactive methods of enforcement such 
as entrapment and which are "inherently and unavoidably oppressive", then society 
should not criminalise drug abuse and therefore remove the incentive on the police to 
resort to proactive methods of detection. However, this is a contentious conclusion. 
First of all it is by no means clear that the illicit drugs trade does not have genuine 
victims whom society may wish to protect. Indeed, the extremely severe sentences 
applicable to drug importers established by the guideline Court of Appeal judgements 
in Aramah (1982) (13) and Bilinski (1988), (14) are only explicable on the basis that 
drug supply is a victimising crime. As Ashworth comments, 
"The only way of placing heroin importation high on the 
scale of relative gravity is to adopt a strong paternalism 
and to regard it at least indirectly as a victimising crime. " (15) 
These victims may not be willing to report their suppliers to the police but they can be 
viewed as victims nonetheless. Secondly, even if drug use was decriminalised there 
would remain other forms of criminality which would require police surveillance and 
infiltration including the use of entrapment to successfully detect. 'Me ongoing 
terrorist threat from various sources, domestic and foreign, is an obvious example of a 
form. of criminality which may require police measures which are "inherently and 
unavoidably oppressive". Organised criminal fraud may be another form of 
criminality which requires proactive policing as a successful response to its threat. 
Organized football hooliganism has been combated by police use of surveillance and 
infiltration. Therefore Lustgarten is probably overstating his case when he comments, 
(16) 
it -a society which chose to 
decriminalise drugs would have 
a very different sort of police force. " 
The point can also be made that the use of proactive methods may be actually 
demanded by the concern of citizens in certain areas or urban centres. In these urban 
areas where specific crimes such as burglary or street robbery or sexual assault in a 
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public place has reached certain alarming levels then the police in response to public 
demand for action may have to adopt tactics such as surveillance and entrapment of 
the prolific offender or offenders. Indeed, the selective and targeted use of 
surveillance and trickery/entrapment as a means of combating street robbery and drug 
dealing may be adopted as an alternative to heavy reliance on stop and search powers 
given the disastrous consequences of Operation Swamp'81 in Brixton. 
However, police entrapment of the unwary innocent or even police entrapment of the 
former offender or those suspected of having certain 'criminal' tendencies crosses the 
line into what is improper and oppressive police behaviour. This not only does an 
injustice to an individual but is a serious misuse of police power; as Robertson 
comments, it is (17) 
" ... unjust to expose an individual to the ordeal of trial and 
punishment for actions the like of which he or she would not 
have undertaken without calculated and persistent temptation 
and persuasion by Government agents. " 
This reflects the heart of the entrapment definition formulated by the 1929 Royal 
Conunission on the Police. The focus is on whether the individual would have 
committed the offence in question without the pressure or encouragement of the 
police or their agents. A crucial factor in determining whether entrapment is 
acceptable or not acceptable is whether the entrapment is aimed at ongoing 
criminality or intended criminal activity or merely at those suspected of having 
certain 'inclinations' or indeed not so suspected at all. It is submitted that efforts in 
the US Courts (18) to distinguish for the purposes of their entrapment defence 
between those without predisposition to commit the offence and those who can be 
determined to have had the predisposition to commit the offence is to miss the main 
point and is an irrelevant distinction. The point is that having a predisposition to 
conunit a particular offence is not in itself criminal nor in itself socially dangerous. 
The criminal law is aimed at criminal acts or intentions which have manifested 
themselves in certain preparatory acts to criminal acts, the law is not concerned with 
thoughts or dispositions. Therefore to limit an entrapment doctrine to those without a 
predisposition to commit the offence is for the police to become testers of virtue 
rather than an agency concerned with the detection and prevention of crime. The 
subjective defence of entrapment offers virtually no protection to anyone with a 
crff=al record. The situation is arrived at that a person least able to resist temptation 
is lawfully subjected to the greatest temptation. On this view only those not 
predisposed to commit the offence will be excused. 
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As Gerald Dworkin has commented critically on the U. S. position: 
"... because the dominant opinion in the Supreme Court has 
favoured the subjective test of entrapment and most 
defendants have a criminal record which makes it difficult 
to demonstrate lack of predisposition, the entrapment 
defence remains limited in scope and rarely used and even 
less rarely successful. " (19) 
The correct distinction it is submitted is between entrapment aimed at those already 
engaged in or intending to engage in activity of a similar criminal nature to the 
entrapment, and those who there is no reasonable suspicion to believe are engaging in 
or are about to engage in criminal activity. The first situation here is permissible 
entrapment, the latter situation involves the use of oppressive and therefore 
illegitimate entrapment. Evidence of predisposition to commit the offence is only 
relevant then to reasonable suspicions of ongoing criminal activity. 
The EnOish Cases 
This crucial distinction is one which in fact English law has already recognised in the 
sentencing stage where the question has arisen whether a defendant who has been 
convicted as a result of some form of police entrapment is entitled to a reduction of 
his sentence. After Rv Smurthwaite (1994) this issue now goes to the adn-iissibility 
of evidence. Lord Taylor commented that a factor in the exercise of the S. 78 
discretion is, 
it ... was the officer acting as an agent provocateur in the 
sense that he was enticing the defendant to commit an 
offence he would not otherwise have committed? " 
Another fact mentioned by Lord Taylor is "how active or passive was the officer's 
role in obtaining the evidence? " This might involve consideration of whether the 
entrapment was aimed at encouraging an unwilling citizen to conurdt crime or 
whether the entrapment was aimed at ongoing criminal activity, e. g. a police request 
for drugs undercover involving no other pressure than the request itself. A good 
example of entirely legitimate entrapment was the police behaviour in Rv Underhill 
(1979). The accused was suspected of heavy involvement in cocaine importation and 
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supply. He was approached by an undercover police officer and asked to supply 
drugs. 'Me accused supplied a quantity of drugs in return for a large payment of 
money by the undercover officer. He was then arrested. Roskill L. J. in the Court of 
Appeal refused to mitigate his sentence because of the alleged entrapment. Roskill L. 
J. conimented, (20) 
"We have a picture taldng the evidence as a whole 
including these statements of a man who was deeply 
involved in trafficIdng in hard drugs ... he was ready to sell drugs to anybody who would pay large sums of 
money. " 
This clearly was not a case where the accused would not have committed the offence 
bad the undercover officer not acted as he did. The police method was more a method 
of obtaining evidence of continuing criminality and was therefore entirely 
permissible, indeed desirable. 
Roskill L. J. commented though that the dividing line between police behaviour which 
is proper and improper was "a line which unhappily in practice is sometimes not very 
easy to draw". An example of this kind of difficulty can be illustrated by reference to 
the case of Rv Perrin (2 1) Court of Appeal 199 1. Perrin the accused and his brother 
had approached an undercover police officer in a bar and asked the police officer to 
supply a lorry in order to import cannabis in large quantities into the United Kingdom. 
The police officer and a colleague met the accused in Spain and supplied a lorry into 
which the accused deposited the cannabis. The lorry was driven by the police into the 
UK where at a meeting point on the motorway the accused arrived and unloaded the 
cannabis into his car. At this point the police sprang their trap and the accused was 
arrested. The Court of Appeal mitigated his sentence for being concerned in evading 
the prohibition on the importation of cannabis resin from six years to four years. This 
was because of the element of entrapment which the Court of Appeal "was satisfied 
occurred in the present case". Hence, 
it A- - 
*** the court should recognise that 
fact by reducing to 
some extent the sentence which would otherwise be 
appropriate. " 
In so doing the Court of Appeal was following earlier decisions of that court in Rv 
Birtles (1969) and Rv McCann (1972) in reducing sentences where defendants had 
been encouraged to commit offences that they might not have committed. In Rv 
Perrin it is a possibility that had not the undercover police officer agreed to supply a 
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lorry in Spain and turned up with the lorry to smuggle the drugs into the UK from 
there therein the offence might not have been committed. However, Perrin seems to 
have had ready access to a supply of cannabis in Spain and might have been able to 
smuggle the drugs into the UK of his own accord. A clearer example of permissible 
police behaviour is the case of Rv Smurthwaite. It was clear that the undercover 
officer was merely a passive listener to a plan conceived by the appellant to kill his 
wife. There was no real encouragement at all by the police, they only provided the 
opportunity for the suspect to incriminate himself. The suspect had made inquiries 
about arranging the death of his wife, it was at that point that the police intervened 
with the undercover operation. For the charge of soliciting to murder Smurthwaite 
had gone beyond mere disposition to commit the offence to actually seeking someone 
to carry out the plan before the police intervened. There was no element of 
entrapment in the sense of the police officer encouraging the appellant to conunit an 
offence he would not otherwise have committed. At one extreme of the spectrum 
there are cases such as Underhill and Smurthwaite in which ongoing criminal activity 
or intended criminal activity is detected by police trickery which might be classed 
inaccurately as "entrapment" for the offence would probably still have been 
committed without the involvement of a police officer. At the other end of the 
spectrum there are clear cases of totally unacceptable use of entrapment such as was 
outlined by Lord Salmon in Rv Sang where (22) 
it ... a dishonest policeman anxious to improve his detection 
record tries very hard with the help of an agent provocateur 
to induce a young man with no criminal tendencies to 
commit a serious crime and ultimately the young man 
reluctantly succumbs to the inducement. " 
Although at the time there was no discretion to exclude evidence in this case Lord 
Salmon suggested such a case may be disposed of with "an absolute or conditional 
discharge". Of course following Rv Smurthwaite such a case may well involve an 
exercise of the judge's discretion to exclude evidence under S. 78. Indeed following 
the recent House of Lords decision, Rv Latif such a case as outlined by Lord Salmon 
may well be a suitable case for a stay of the proceedings as an abuse of process. Lord 
Steyn commented that in deciding whether to stay the proceedings because of an 
unfair use of entrapment, (23) 
it 11- - 
... the judge must weigh 
in the balance the public interest in 
ensuring that those charged with grave crime should be 
tried and the competing public interest in not conveying 
the impression that the court would adopt the approach that 
the end justified the means. " 
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What is also objectionable is the situation where the police do target someone known 
to have certain criminal tendencies, but not actually involved in criminal activity of 
any sort. A good example from the US jurisdiction is the targeting of Jacobson (24), 
the suspected paedophile. The law enforcement agencies encouraged him in an 
undercover operation to order unlawful paedophile magazines invoking his 
constitutional rights to encourage him. This is a more debatable case than the 
example outlined by Lord Salmon but it is submitted that the police should not be 
"testers of virtue" and should only target those suspected of involvement in criminal 
activity or at least those who are preparing to comn-dt crime. Lord Parker commented 
in Rv Birtles that it was permissible law enforcement. 
" ... for the police to make use of information concerning an 
offence that is already laid on. In such a case the police are 
clearly entitled, indeed it is their duty to mitigate the 
consequences of the proposed offence, for example to protect 
the proposed victim and to that end it may be perfectly proper 
for them to encourage the infon-ner to take part in the offence 
or indeed for the police officer himself to do so. " (25) 
However, there is a large grey area where entrapment may or may not be acceptable 
and where there can be reasonable disagreement about this question. An important 
issue here is where the police learn of a plan by an accused perhaps with a criminal 
record, to carry out an offence, e. g. a robbery or drug smuggling. The accused may 
have made only very preparatory measures to effect the plan when the police in an 
undercover operation offer to facilitate the offence by providing logistical support. In 
Rv Birtles the police learnt that Birtles while still in prison became minded on his 
release to carry out some raid on a post office. Tlie police approached Birtles after his 
release in an undercover operation. A police officer was introduced to Birtles as "a 
top criminal from London". This undercover officer supplied his car for the robbery 
and either he or an infon-ner working on his behalf supplied Birtles with an imitation 
firearm. The accused was arrested whilst he attempted to rob a post office. The 
Court of Appeal felt that there 
11 ... was a real possibility that the appellant was encouraged by the informer and indeed by the police officer concerned 
to carry out his raid on the post office. Whether or not he 
would have done it without that again no one can say, but 
there is, as it seems to this court, a real likelihood that he 
was encouraged to commit an offence which otherwise he 
would not have committed. " (26) 
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The problem with the police intervening once they become aware of a plan is that by 
providing the means to carry out the plan the police may in fact be encouraging an 
offence which might not have been committed. The point is that there is a gap 
between a plan and the actual commission of that plan. The degree of facilitation and 
encouragement is a vital issue then. 
Another difficult and related issue here is where the police target a known user of 
illicit drugs and tempt him by means of entrapment to become a supplier of illicit 
drugs; there is a large disparity in offence seriousness between illegal drug use and 
illegal drug supply. 
It may be the case that it is illegitimate for the police to try to convert a relatively 
minor offender into a dangerous criminal and that in an appropriate case S. 78 should 
be used to exclude evidence from the entrapment here. In Rv Chapman (1989) (27) 
the defendant who was known to the police as a user of amphetamines, was in prison 
in connection with some other matter. A detective from the drug squad was 
introduced into his cell as a fellow prisoner. The detective posed as a drug dealer 
from another part of the country. In the course of the conversation, as the detective 
had hoped, the defendant spoke of the availability of large quantities of amphetamine 
sulphate in his home area. Eventually Chapman set up a drug deal and was arrested 
for conspiracy to supply amphetamine sulphate. The Court of Appeal commented 
that, 
"... there was no evidence at all that he was a dealer in 
as opposed to a consumer of amphetamines except upon 
this particular occasion. Entrapment plainly carries 
considerable weight in the assessment of sentence 
on that basis. " 
Ibe sentence was reduced on appeal. Similarly in Rv Shaw (199Q (28) the police 
targeted Shaw, a known heroin user. An undercover police officer posing as a 
possible heroin purchaser met Shaw in a public house. The two of them agreed that 
Shaw would make enquiries about obtaining a supply of heroin and then contact the 
undercover officer. Shaw was charged after the trap was sprung with supplying 
heroin. The Court of Appeal commented, 
... on behalf of Shaw it was urged upon us that Shaw 
indeed is highly unlikely to have committed the offence 
had he not been persuaded not be it we interpose to say, 
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by any threat of violence or indeed threat of any sort, but 
by straight persuasion by way of a request for assistance. 
If that had not taken place it said, it is highly unlikely 
that this offence would ever have been committed 
particularly in the light of the fact that Shaw who had 
been and still was to some extent a heroin addict had 
taken steps to wean himself off drugs and indeed had 
taken amongst other things the form of getting very 
useful and well paid employment. " 
The court reduced his sentence from six to five years because of the fact of 
entrapment. It is submitted that it is improper for the police to test the virtue of users 
of iRicit drugs where there is no reasonable suspicion that they are involved also in 
the supply of illicit drugs. 
However, in cases such as Underhill and Sang the police merely offer money to 
obtain drugs or counterfeit currency. As Lord Salmon observed of , 
Sang that there 
was "little doubt that he would have tried to sell forged notes to anyone else whom he 
considered safe". (29) The police trap here is little more than an evidence-gathering 
device in the process of detection of criminality. Even where the police can 
legitimately become involved in an undercover operation to prevent the commission 
of an offence they should be careful not to allow the criminal scheme to run longer 
than necessary to secure evidence of the offence. In the case of Rv Adamthwaite 
(30) the police leamt of a husband's plot to have his unfaithful wife killed by a 
contract killer. The potential assassin chosen was in fact an undercover police officer 
who recorded the conversations with the appellant which ensued. There were in fact 
three separate meetings between the appellant and the undercover officer before he 
was arrested. The Court of Appeal whilst upholding the conviction of soliciting to 
murder, commented critically on the police operation, per Hirst L. J., 
11... while we understand the problem that the police faced 
we should add that it does seem to us that perhaps the 
matter could have been nipped in the bud rather earlier 
by them once they became involved, which might have 
resulted in the scheme going less to the extremes than it 
eventually did. " 
Even for those suspects set on a criminal course of conduct, constraints of ethical 
police investigation must prevent the police from encouraging the scheme beyond that 
which is necessary to secure evidence of the crime. The police should not 
unnecessarily encourage a person to deepen their involvement in criminal activity 
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even if that person is already set on that path. There are degrees of corruption of 
personality by virtue of involvement in serious criminality depending on the degree of 
involvement in criminal activity; therefore as a matter of ethical practice the police 
should not encourage a person to become more deeply involved in criminal activity if 
that is not required to secure vital evidence of the crime. 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSION 
Police Interrogation under PACE Defended 
This thesis has adopted a position of the cautious endorsement of the practice of 
detaining for questioning of suspects under the PACE scheme, on the assumption that 
the scheme is given full force by the introduction of a mandatory tape recording 
requirement for confessions to the police and other investigative agencies, and 
continued judicial willingness to exclude confession evidence where breach of 
important provisions of PACE has been significant and substantial. Interrogation 
under PACE is a method of obtaining generally reliable evidence which tends to have 
a high evidential value and the method is also reasonably efficient from a police 
resources perspective, and is also efficient from a process perspective given that a 
confession made to the police is often followed by a guilty plea. Of course it is 
possible to start from the premise as some commentators do, that custodial 
interrogation is inconsistent with the presumption of innocence and is therefore 
illegitimate. It could be asked why should the citizen be forced to undergo an 
inherently coercive experience which may be of quite lengthy duration when there is 
not even a prima facie case that he has committed a criminal offence? Section 37 (2) 
of PACE only requires that the custody officer have "reasonable grounds" for 
believing that the detention of an arrested person is 
If necessary to secure or preserve evidence relating 
to an offence for which he is under arrest or to 
obtain such evidence by questioning him. " 
For Sanders and Young this principle in PACE is ftmdamentally wrong, (1) 
"From the due process perspective it is the power to 
interrogate which should be questioned. Sub ection to j 
involuntary interrogation during involuntary, lengthy 
and partially indeterminate detention is inconsistent 
with the presumption of innocence, in the real sense that 
the innocent can be made to appear to be guilty. " 
However, the presumption of innocence may be understood as Sir Rupert Cross 
understood it purely as a statement about where the burden of proof fies in a criminal 
case. (2) 
William Twining (3) has disagreed with this limiting of the presumption of innocence 
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to the criminal trial process since it is an important general principle of our political 
morality. However, even if the presumption of innocence is somewhat compromised 
by the institution of detention for questioning, that compromise is accepted in this 
thesis. Our society accepts that citizens may have to bear certain unpleasant 
experiences in order to further important societal goals such as detecting crime. The 
important point is whether those practices that may impinge on citizens are operated 
in a fair and non-discriminatory manner by officials. The Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act allows for the detention of a citizen for questioning subject to important 
safeguards of "reasonable suspicion", the custody officer concept as a buffer against 
the automatic detention of those under arrest and the plethora of protections once 
detention for interrogation is authorised. It is also possible to point to the practice of 
the remand system as a far more serious interference with liberty than custodial 
interrogation that society seems to accept as a burden that the innocent citizen may 
have to bear. 
Although custodial interrogation is 'inherently coercive' its coercive effect can be 
substantially mitigated by effective protection for the suspect in the police station 
such as time limited and reviewable detention, ready access to properly qualified legal 
advisers, the overseeing of a 'custody officer', properly recorded interrogations and the 
right to inform relatives of the fact of detention and the place of detention. The 
problem with the old pre PACE regime was not that it allowed for lengthy custodial 
interrogation but that there was very little in the way of effective checks on the misuse 
of police power. The suspect was by and large often at the mercy of the police. This 
system may have produced results that would be unobtainable under the much stricter 
PACE regime; as Rose comments (4), 
"Despite its pitfalls the rigorous interrogation which 
characterized criminal investigation under the old regime 
was capable of producing valuable results; safe convictions 
in cases which aroused great public concern. " 
As Rose comments, quoting Judge Laughland, some of those convictions would be 
lost today since the tactics would be considered "oppressive" (5) and hence any 
confession obtained by such methods would be excluded under Section 76 (2) (a). 
However, not only is oppressive interrogation in itself offensive whatever the 
seriousness of the offence investigated but the consequences of a regime of 
unregulated interrogation can be horrific not only in terms of individual wrongful 
convictions on coerced or fabricated confessions but also in terms of the repute of the 
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criminal justice system itself when those miscarriages of justice are exposed. There 
may then be sound reasons for the criminal process to protect its own repute and 
hence its proper functioning to insist upon a closely regulated and enforced scheme 
for criminal investigations including interrogations. If the quality of police evidence 
in the investigative stage can be enhanced, even if it cannot be guaranteed, by strict 
procedures which are enforced through the exclusion of evidence then it may not be 
necessary to impose strict quality control at trial for police evidence in the form of a 
corroboration rule for confessions or a corroboration rule for identification evidence. 
If the system can help to control the conditions in which police evidence is gathered 
so as to produce an acceptable level of reliability in the long run of cases, then the 
system may be able to resist law reform calls for corroboration rules or other strict 
admissibility tests such as a straightforward 'reliability' test for confessions. 
Those who oppose the principle of police custodial interrogation or at least argue for a 
much reduced role for it have to answer how is this to be achieved without serious 
consequences for the detection and proof of criminality? Given the centrality of 
custodial interrogation to the criminal process, alternatives suggested to fill the gap if 
interrogation is to decline in use can appear rather strained and even unacceptable. 
Sanders has written that me way of significantly reducing recourse to custodial 
interrogation is his proposal that, 
"Consideration should be given to putting the onus in 
relation to intent on the defendant. Thus the police would 
only need to interrogate to secure evidence of intent to 
commit the crime in question if the circumstances created 
signdficant doubt about the presence of intent. Although 
this might place pressure on suspects to talk to the police 
in police stations it would change the emphasis from the 
police trying to construct their case as now to the suspect 
constructing theirs, returning some control to suspects. " (6) 
This proposal to reverse the onus of proof in relation to the element of intent of 
criminal offences, so as to decrease police reliance on interrogation to secure evidence 
of intent through a confession, would of course be contrary to the fundamental 
principle of the adversarial system as stated by Viscount Sankey in Woolmington v 
DPP. (7) 
"Where intent is an ingredient of a crime there is no onus 
on the defendant to prove that the act alleged was 
accidental. Throughout the web of the English Criminal 
law one golden thread is always to be seen that it is the 
duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt... " 
326 
There is no valid reason why a confession obtained with full compliance with PACE 
should not legitimately function so as to discharge the prosecution's burden in relation 
to the intent element in criminal offences. There is evidence to suggest that custodial 
police interrogation is peculiarly suited to the eliciting of confessional statements 
given that the making of a confession under police interrogation can provide 
immediate psychological benefits to a suspect. Gudjonsson comments on this point, 
(7b) 
if 
... people who are faced with police officers interviewing them about a crime and uncertain about what is going on, 
once they confess the situation is a little clearer for them. 
They know that the police are going to stop asking questions. " 
It is plausible to argue that confessions reduce anxiety because they create an 
acceptable level of certainty about the future. 
This is not to say that confessions are a universal panacea to the problem of the proof 
of criminality. The obvious point is that some suspects who are in fact guilty do not 
confess under interrogation especially if that interrogation is closely regulated and 
controlled as is interrogation under the PACE regime. Moreover, this group of guilty 
suspects who do not confess under interrogation include some very dangerous 
criminals such as terrorist leaders or professional criminals who are hardened to 
interrogative questioning, and in the case of terrorists often trained in counter 
interrogation methods. The degree of threat these groups represent to society might 
entail a response in the criminal justice system in terms of developing an alternative 
systematic way of successful prosecution of these kinds of offenders given that the 
usual systematic approach to suspects, namely interrogation does not usually produce 
confessions. The approach adopted in various jurisdictions has been to rely on 
(indeed an overreliance in some jurisdictions) the testimony of accomplices more 
popularly known as 'supergrasses. A reliance on this kind of evidence to obtain 
convictions of organised criminals or terrorists is not surprising. The evidence of 
accomplices is the next best source of information about a defendant's involvement in 
an offence apart from a confession. The accomplice is often an observer or indeed a 
participant in the same or similar offences that the defendant is charged with. The 
leaders of organised crime often do not participate directly in criminal offences so 
there is often no eyewitness identification evidence nor forensic evidence that the 
prosecution can rely upon. Accomplice evidence may be the only viable source of 
proof here if interrogation fails to elicit a confession. The method of the supergrass 
has been used in the USA to deal with organised crime leaders, in Northern Ireland 
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between 1982-1986 to obtain the conviction of harden terrorist suspects and in 
England principally'in London, to deal with gangs of organised professional criminals 
who specialised in armed robbery in the 1970s and early 1980s. In all three contexts 
the need for supergrass evidence stemmed from a failure of interrogation to produce 
confessional evidence against certain suspects. Of the English context Greer has 
written, (8) 
"The evidence suggests that the appearance of the English 
Supergrass process was connected with a rise in the incidence 
of serious organised crime, principally in the London area and 
on official perception that existing methods of dealing with it 
were ineffective. Reflecting this mood the Criminal Law 
Revision Committee stated in its eleventh report in 1972, 
'There is now a large and increasing class of sophisticated 
professional criminals who are not only sldffw in organising 
their crimes and in the steps they take to avoid detection 
but are well aware of their legal rights and use every possible 
means to avoid conviction if caught'. " 
One of the methods used by professional criminals to escape conviction if caught was 
a persistence in refusing to answer police questions. Hence the CLRC argued for 
appropriate adverse inferences to be allowed to be drawn at trial from a refusal to 
answer police questions. It took twenty-two years before this proposal was legislated 
by S. 34 of the Crin-dnal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. This is not the place to 
discuss the merits or otherwise of this deeply controversial change to the old common 
law position stated in Hall vRG 97 1) per Lord Diplock. (9) 
However, an overreliance on accomplice testimony can bring as much if not more 
disrepute on a legal system than overreliance on confession evidence. This is what 
happened in Northern Ireland after the experience of supergrasses in the Diplock court 
system; as Jackson and Doran have commented, (10) 
"The supergrass phenomenon attracted particular odium to the 
Diplock system as the sheer number of defendants involved in 
the process seemed to convert ordinary trial procedures into 
extraordinary spectacles. " 
In England the repute of the criminal justice system itself may not have been affected 
by the use of supergrass testimony but heavy reliance on that form of evidence 
prevalent in the 1970s to secure the conviction of professional criminals declined as 
juries became more suspicious of supergrass testimony and judges took the view that 
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such evidence poisoned the well of justice. Criminal trials in England based mainly 
m the testimony of supergrasses are now rare events. 
If a confession cannot be obtained from a suspect and accomplice testimony against 
the suspect in particular types of criminal cases becomes discredited in the courts as a 
reliable source of evidence there may be recourse to covert operations to infiltrate 
drug gangs and terrorist organisations to provide evidence. Rose (11) in his recent 
book "In the name of the Law", has commented on this phenomenon of covert 
operations arising out of a distrust with accomplice evidence, 
"A tip-off from an informant may be by far the most common 
way of making the first detection of a professional organised 
crime but the reluctance displayed by the courts in accepting 
the evidence of supergrasses means hard evidence has to be 
provided by other means. 7111e solution which has been widely 
adopted by the Regional Crime Squads lies with the growing 
use of undercover police officers. Acting on informants' 
intelligence the undercover teams pose as criminals trying to 
arrange a "buy" for the drugs or counterfeit notes. The 
undercover agent secretly tapes whatever transpires and 
arrests swiftly foflow. " 
J. Morton corroborates this point that there is an increasing number of undercover 
operations involving police officers because of the difficulties with inforrners. He 
quotes an undercover officer, (12) 
"Courts seem to be much more comfortable with undercover 
officers than with infon-ners. " 
Potentially this covert taped evidence by a police officer is the best evidence of all; a 
taped conversation with a criminal in which the criminal discloses details of his 
criminal activity or criminal conspiracy (e. g. see the tape in Rv Smurthwaite (1994) 
is not tainted by claims of unreliability as the evidence of an accomplice often is; 
indeed, confessions as well are often refuted by the defence as unreliable. Moreover, 
a taped covert conversation is potentially more secure from legal challenge than a 
confession which has to surmount the S. 76 as well as S. 78 hurdles before it is 
admitted into evidence. The taped conversations made during a covert operation are 
only likely to be excluded under S. 78 if (i) the police officer working undercover 
attempted to ask questions about the suspect's involvement in a criminal activity 
unencumbered by Code C on the questioning of suspects; or (ii) entrapped the 
suspect in a significant way. Rv BryceR v Christou are the authorities on point (i) 
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and Rv Smurthwaite is the authority on point (ii). 
However, apart from these points of potential inadmissibility covert operations cannot 
be considered to be a serious replacement for interrogation as an investigative strategy 
of the police. Covert operations tend to be very costly and time consuming 
potentially involving months of surveillance and covert contact with the suspect. 
Obviously these are major constraints on the number of operations which each 
regional squad can mount. Far more importantly, covert operations are potentially 
dangerous to individual police officers involved in them especially if the police have 
infiltrated dangerous criminal gangs or terrorists when the consequences of discovery 
may be fatal to the officer concerned. Of course in contrast, police interrogation of 
suspects in the police station presents a negligible risk to police officers and is also 
cost efficient in terms of achieving results; covert operations in contrast do not have 
the same guarantee of success in the majority of cases. Tberefore covert operations as 
a way of gathering evidence whatever their usefulness in particular cases (which can 
include some very serious cases) cannot operate as an antidote to the criminal justice 
system's reliance on confession evidence. Moreover, many forms of criminality are 
not susceptible to the use of undercover operations which require mainly to be 
directed at criminal conspiracies or ongoing forms of criminality to achieve success. 
Despite all the controversy about the role of confessional statements in miscarriages 
of justice a confession obtained under the full protections of PACE from a normal 
suspect is one of the least problematic of all sources of evidence. TIle reliability 
defects of identification evidence and accomplice evidence hardly need further 
elaboration. Moreover, the morality of reliance on accomplice testimony has attracted 
concern from commentators. Sean Doran has pointed out that the old mandatory 
corroboration warning for accomplice evidence (abolished by S. 32 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1994) reflects arguably a moral concern about accomplice evidence, (13) 
"... the warning is more than just a safeguard against 
potentially unreliable evidence, it is also an expression 
of moral concern about accomplices' evidence. This moral 
element is perhaps stronger where the accomplice has 
bought immunity or struck some kind of deal but even in 
other circumstances we do not feel particularly 'easy about 
convicting somebody on this basis. " 
Jackson and Doran (14) in their study of the Diplock courts comment, 
"Ibe moral concerns derive from justifying the conviction 
of some by the grant of immunity to others who may have 
committed crimes which are just as heinous. " 
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There is no comparable moral concern about convicting a person on their own non- 
coerced confession of guilt. Confession evidence is also a more important source of 
evidence to the criminal process than forensic evidence which is only available in a 
small number of cases. ) whereas as noted 
before, confession evidence is a systematic 
source of proof of guilt. However, although overall forensic evidence is only 
available in about 2% of cases it may have a dramatic impact in certain classes of 
cases; the role of DNA as a relatively new forensic tool should not be overlooked 
here; as Walker and Cram comment, (15) 
"In qualitative terms DNA profiling has already generated a 
considerable impact upon the investigation of particular 
offences especially murder and serious sexual assaults. 
This usage is likely to increase as it has been estimated that 
DNA material is recoverable from the victim in 60 per cent 
of these cases. Thus while the technique is not about to boost 
crime detection rates across the board, it may help to obtain 
convictions in the relatively rare but nonetheless serious 
category of offences against the person. " 
The strict rules of the law of criminal evidence render virtually worthless as items of 
proof certain kinds of information which the police and prosecuting authorities may 
take into account in investigating offences and deciding whether to prosecute or not. 
This material may not however, be usable as evidence in a criminal trial because of 
the strict exclusionary rules. Confession evidence obtained through interrogation may 
be the only way to close the gulf between what is known about an offender and what 
is admissible as proof of guilt. The relevant exclusionary rules here are primarily the 
hearsay rule which would prohibit the courts' assessment of much information from 
informers, ) upon which much of the 
detectim of crime is based, but which is 
inadmissible as proof of guilt unless the informer himself testifies in court; a 
relatively unlikely scenario. The other exclusionary rule relevant here is the similar 
fact evidence rule; the police may feel sure that they have arrested the right 
individual for a crime because of similarities in the commission of the offence with 
the previous convictions of that individual, yet those previous convictions are subject 
to a high evidential hurdle in the form of the probative value/prejudicial effect test 
and therefore their admission will only be 'exceptional' (DPP v Boardman 1974 (16). 
The decision of the House of Lords in RvP (17) has improved the chances of 
previous convictions being admitted into evidence. Decisions after RvP have indeed 
shown that the decision has produced a more liberal admissibility test for previous 
convictions and other similar facts. (18) 
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However, even the admissibility of previous convictions which do bear a similarity 
with the charge the defendant is facing is by no means certain or even likely. Again a 
confession obtained through interrogation may close the gap between what the police 
know and what is admissible in evidence. Obtaining confessions can also alleviate 
demands that previous convictions be readily admitted into guilt, which opens the 
great risk of prejudice and hence wrongful conviction of considerable numbers of 
defendants. If it is thought that it is interrogation by the police which is the more 
objectionable feature then radical reform could be made to the hearsay rule or the rule 
against adduction of previous convictions. However, this would entail serious 
dangers; the evidence of informers not in court to testify would pose obvious dangers 
of unreliability which may not be satisfactorily met as a question of weight of the 
evidence before the jury; a rule of inadmissibility save in exceptional circumstances 
may well be justified here. It would also produce problems under Article 6 of the 
E. C. H. R. because of the lack of opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against 
the accused. The great risks of prejudice to defendants caused by any further 
relaxation of the similar fact rule has already been referred to. It is proposed 
therefore to disagree respectfully with the opinions of Sir Frederick Lawton who has 
argued for the greater use of previous convictions in court to counter the problem of 
police fabrication of evidence; the former Lord Justice of Appeal connnents, 
"There would be much less temptation for police officers 
to fabricate evidence if more use could be made of previous 
convictions during a trial. " (19) 
This it is respectfully submitted is a wrongheaded argument. It is no doubt the case 
that the police are frustrated when they are certain a suspect is guilty but have little 
admissible evidence against him because of the operation of the hearsay rule or 
similar fact evidence rule. However, the key to stamping out police fabrication of 
evidence is a strict regime on the taping of all confessional statements and for the 
other fabrication problems, fighting it with both training of the police and close 
supervision of criminal investigations by senior officers at least in serious criminal 
cases. 
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The Importance of Judicial Decisions upholding the PACE regim 
This thesis has illustrated how official attitudes to police interrogation have moved 
from outright hostility in the nineteenth century to official tolerance in the twentieth 
century pre 1964 and connivance by the judiciary in admitting often the fruit of 
interrogation, to a situation of legal authorization of interrogation from 1964 with 
Rule I of the revised Judges' Rules, to positive encouragement to the police to utilize 
interrogation in the 1984 Act with the establishment of an institutionalised system of 
detention for questioning. One major impetus to this change in official attitudes has 
possibly been the great increase in the amount of crime since the late 1950s but 
especially since the early 1970s and the still growing phenomenon of organised and 
professional criminals. Custodial interrogation in tandem with relatively new 
techniques of the targeting of prolific offenders through covert operations is a 
relatively efficient way of obtaining evidence in the face of this tidal wave of crime. 
It is important then that the legitimacy of detention for custodial interrogation is 
maintained and that the main fruit of that process, namely confessional statements 
continue to be admissible as proof of guilt in themselves without the encw-nbrance of 
a corroboration requirement. The Court of Appeal has an important role to play in 
this regard in upholding PACE and the Codes of Practice through decisions which 
emphasize that breaches of important provisions of PACE particularly deliberate 
breach are likely to lead to the exclusion of evidence from the criminal trial. 
Decisions such as Rv Keenan, Rv Samuel, Rv Canale can be viewed solely from a 
"due process" Perspective ensuring procedural fairness for defendants but it is 
submitted that these decisions have also useful long term "crime control" benefits. 
These decisions excluding evidence because of important breaches of PACE by the 
police help to maintain the legitimacy of custodial interrogation from attack by critics 
who would seek to remove the interrogation role completely from the police or 
substantially limit the ability of the police to detain for interrogation. For example, 
the Haldane Society of Socialist Lawyers proposed in 1982 (20) that the police must 
bring a charge or release the suspect after a maximum of 12 hours from the time of 
arrest. The Haldane Society made it clear that this period was not to be considered a 
period of detention for questioning but merely time to allow the police to obtain 
confirmation of the suspect's identity and the collection of evidence. T"his proposal 
would have seriously limited current police powers which include the power to detain 
suspects for questioning for up to four days. 
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A system of detention for interrogation which is open to outside scrutiny and which 
allows the suspect various due process protections is much less vulnerable to criticism 
than a closed secret system of interrogation. The Haldane Society proposals were 
made in 1982 at a time when the old regime of interrogation governed by the Judges' 
Rules had been thoroughly discredited as completely open to police abuse. 
The second major benefit to crime control concerns that Court of Appeal decisions 
upholding PACE through the exclusion of evidence confers is to safeguard the 
admissibility of confessions in themselves and stave off calls for a corroboration 
requirement or stricter criteria of admissibility than S. 76 2(b) requires. A parallel of a 
kind may be drawn with the issue of identification evidence and its treatment by the 
law of evidence which was a major source of concern in the 1970s as wrongful 
identification led to notorious cases of miscarriages of justice. Tbe Devlin 
Committee (21) which looked at the issue in 1976 proposed quite a radical reforrn of 
the law of evidence on identification evidence, recommending that identification 
evidence would only exceptionally in itself be able to found a conviction. The Lord 
Chief Justice and four other judges of the Court of Appeal in Rv Turnbull (22) a case 
shortly after the Devlin Report forestalled the Devlin Committee proposals and any 
statutory limitation on identification evidence by laying down guidelines for trial 
judges on how to treat identification evidence and how they should warn juries how to 
weigh this inherently unreliable evidence. 1be Court of Appeal made it clear that non 
observance by trial judges of the Turnbull guidelines would lead probably to the 
quashing of convictions. However, what the decision in Turnbull also achieved was 
to guarantee the continued admissibility of such identification evidence as proof of 
guilt in itself. Even poor quality identification could be put before the jury if there 
was other supporting evidence. Crucially this supporting evidence could fall far short 
of 'corroboration' in the strict sense; 'odd coincidences' could, according to the Court 
of Appeal, provide the necessary 'supporting' evidence. Rv Turnbull is a good 
example of how strict judicial adherence to limited principles for the treatment of 
certain kinds of evidence can disarm calls for more radical reform. There are those 
commentators, e. g. Robertson (23) in "Freedom, the Individual and The Law", who 
call for a strict corroboration requirement for the admissibility of all identification 
evidence but this does not appear at the present time a likely nor acceptable 
possibility; one reason why such reform calls can be legitimately ignored is 
continued Court of Appeal insistence on judicial adherence to the Turnbull guidelines. 
The Court of Appeal in Rv Tumbull said that any law that said no person could be 
convicted on visual evidence alone would lead to affronts to justice and to serious 
consequences for the maintenance of law and order. (24) It is arguable that just as a 
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corroborative requirement for identification evidence would lead to affronts to justice 
so would a corroboration requirement for confessions, indeed more so, since 
confessions are a much more regular source of evidence to the proof of guilt than 
identification evidence, although identification evidence has an important role to play 
in the proof of 'street offences' such as robbery, pickpocketing, disorderly conduct, 
assaults etc. Another important way of shoring up public confidence in the reliability 
of identification evidence is judicial insistence that the way that evidence is gathered 
follows the statutory procedures established in Code D of PACE. There has been 
something of a judicial sea-change here from the pre PACE era when police breach of 
the Home Office circulars on identification parades would only occasionally lead to 
the discretionary exclusion of identification evidence. Nowadays significant police 
breach of Code D is likely to lead to the exclusion of the evidence under S. 78 of 
PACE; as the Court of Appeal recently commented in Rv Hickin and others 
"Identification evidence could give rise to problems with 
which everyone was now familiar. It has a unique potential 
for injustice and identification procedures, formal or informal, 
must be conducted in the knowledge that should an 
identification be challenged the court would wish to scrutinize 
the procedure with very considerable care and caution. " (25) 
If the Court of Appeal can make it clear that the current regime of interrogation is 
being upheld then a potentially large contribution is made to uphold the legitimacy of 
the current system an important element of which is the possibility of conviction 
purely on confessional evidence. Indeed to allow for conviction on confessions alone 
has been a concern for the courts since 1789 with Lord Kenyon's judgement in Rv 
Wheeling. (26) In contrast, the Judges' Rules were habitually ignored by the police 
and this led very rarely to the exclusion of confessional evidence. The consequence 
of this poor police practice was the miscarriages of justice in the Confait case (1974) 
(27) which led to contemporary calls for a corroboration requirement for confessions. 
'Me Fisher Report (1977) recommended a corroboration requirement for certain 
categories of vulnerable suspects such as juveniles. Poor police practice in the 
investigation of offences led to the series of serious miscarriages of justice revealed 
after the freeing of the Guildford Four. Many of these miscarriages, such as The 
Guildford Four, Birmingham Six, Stefan Kiszko, Judith Ward, Maguire cases, dated 
from the early to mid 1970s when the police generally were much less professional in 
the investigation of criminal offences than they are now. The police are paying now 
in terms of public repute for the fall-out from the 1970s era which was an 
exceptionally bad period in terms of police behaviour and integrity in the conduct of 
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criminal investigations. Ibe revelation of these miscarriages from 1989 led to calls 
from many quarters for a corroboration requirement for confessions. Roger Leng has 
commented, (28) 
"Following the exposure of wrongful conviction based on 
confession evidence alone a substantial body of opinion 
has favoured the introduction of a rule barring conviction 
on confession evidence unless corroborated. " 
It would therefore be extremely naYve to argue that since confession evidence is so 
important to the conviction of the guilty that therefore more confessions should be 
admitted to trial than at present by reversing the judicial trend towards the exclusion 
of confessions upon proof of police breaches of PACE which are 'significant and 
substantial'. In the long term this would be a dangerous route for the courts to take 
because of the dangers of increasing the risk of wrongful convictions on unreliable 
police evidence. However, there is a hint in the Court of Appeal decision in Rv 
McGovern that perhaps the requirements of PACE are too stringent in their effects on 
the admissibility of confessions. Lord Justice Farquharson, after quashing the 
conviction commented, 
"Whether it is a satisfactory consequence that a confession 
which was admitted to be a true account of the appellant's 
participation in this wicked and terrible killing should be 
excluded because of the breaches of the Act and perhaps 
the Code of Conduct is no doubt a matter for debate, but we 
are satisfied that is the effect in law. " (29) 
Moreover judicial willingness to exclude confession evidence has the beneficial effect 
of securing jury trust in confessions that are admitted into evidence and therefore 
facilitating the conviction of the guilty. This n-dght also have a beneficial effect on 
jury trust in the veracity of other police evidence such as police eyewitness testimony. 
'Me point is that public doubt and suspicion about the interrogation process and 
confessions so obtained is likely to have an effect on jury trust in other police 
evidence such as police evidence that they found illegal drugs on the accused or in his 
home. In the 1970s the problem of 'verbaUing' was a problem which had reached 
public notice. It would not be surprising if jury disbelief in alleged oral admissions 
lent credence to other defence claims that the police had for example, "planted drugs" 
or made up their eyewitness testimony implicating the defendant. If the police were 
planting drugs and fabricating evidence then increased jury scepticism about police 
evidence in the 1970s and early 1980s may have served a useft: d function in protecting 
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the innocent. However, if police professionalism has greatly improved in the post 
PACE era and therefore police fabrication of evidence is now a marginal problem, 
then jury suspicion of police evidence could lead to unJustified acquittals of the 
guilty. Judicial willingness to exclude non authenticated confession evidence could 
have an important effect in shoring up jury confidence in other police evidence. 
Reiner in his work on Chief Constables, reports the remarks of one of his sample of 
Chief Constables that because of PACE, 
"Policing by plan had to replace policing by hunch. A related 
benefit was that police evidence would be more trusted as 
it had been gathered within the constraints of a rational set 
of procedures. " (30) 
Deliberate breach of procedures by police which constitutes 'oppression' as in Matto v 
DPP has a tendency to undermine public respect for the police and also the criminal 
justice system. Although a reliable conviction was lost in Matto v DPP arguably 
crime control was in the long run served for the legitimacy of the system was upheld 
and public co-operation thereby not alienated -a crucial fact given the dependence by 
the police in detecting crime on public co-operation. A discretionary approach using 
S. 78 is best suited to this purpose of maintaining legitimacy and therefore public 
support in the criminal process. Automatic exclusionary rules here are not only 
inimical to legitimate crime control concerns but threatens public confidence in 
another way - too many guilty individuals being acquitted because of police breach of 
a rule whatever the seriousness of the offence. Unfortunately, the decision of the 
Court of Appeal in Rv Nathaniel although decided using the discretionary power of 
S. 78, comes close to illustrating how over ready exclusion of highly probative though 
improperly obtained evidence can produce results which might be offensive to the 
public. In Nathaniel a very dangerous criminal was acquitted because of police 
breach (not even in bad faith) of a provision of PACE which cannot be described as 
central to that scheme. Discretionary exclusion of improperly obtained evidence 
should be reserved for those cases of flagrant police breach of important due process 
norm. s. The concern here is to uphold public faith in the legitimacy of the criminal 
process; over ready exclusion of reliable evidence threatens public confidence, at a 
time of great public concern about crime, in the legitimacy of the system. Public faith 
in the legitimacy of the process is partly dependent on the ability of the process to 
protect them from criminals especially dangerous criminals. Rv Nathaniel (3 1) is an 
odd decision in this regarcL but whatever the merits of the decision it is a noteworthy 
symbol of how judicial attitudes to police evidence overall have changed since the 
introduction of PACE. 
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In the face of increasing and increasingly organised crime the police have negotiated 
for themselves a considerable array of powers. What were even until fairly recently 
considered to be unacceptable invasions of personal liberty have now become routine 
and virtually unarguable police practices. The obvious examples here are the power 
to detain for questioning, the permitted length of that detention which can amount to 
days rather than hours and the permissibility of entrapment as a detection device and 
evidence gathering method in certain circumstances. Even in 1929 at the time of the 
Royal Commission on Police Powers neither police use of traps nor interrogation nor 
police detention for lengthy periods before charge, was beyond fierce debate and 
widespread opposition. 
Summary 
In the era of PACE detention for questioning and non oppressive entrapment are 
considered widely to be vital police tools in the fight against crime. The great 
increase in crime from the late 1950s but especially from the 1970s must have 
contributed to an atmosphere in which interrogation and entrapment became more 
acceptable. However, both custodial interrogation and covert operations are now 
subject to constraining principles which the police must pay attention to so as not to 
jeopardise the admissibility of any evidence so gathered. Custodial interrogation is 
subject to a legislative scheme for interrogations and the judicial guidelines for covert 
operations as to the importance of an accurate record of the police investigative 
method is symptomatic of a loss of near automatic confidence in the integrity of 
police evidence. This loss of confidence began in the early 1970s and gathered 
momentum in subsequent years. In the light of declined public confidence in the 
integrity of the police the transparency of police investigations becomes desirable. If 
the police are more professional now than they ever have been and it would therefore 
be reasonably safe to rely in most cases on police evidence even in the absence of 
independent records, then the police are paying for their past vices in having to 
comply with constraining principles for the conduct of criminal investigations. It has 
recently been pointed out that "The police are now in a healthier state than before but 
look worse" (32) than in the pre PACE era. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act in 
fostering a more professional attitude in the police may have prevented even further 
erosion of public confidence in the police in recent years. An Act which was seen by 
the police service in its early years as a constraint on effective criminal investigations 
may actually have furthered police interests by shoring up public confidence in the 
police at a time of great crisis in the criminal justice system. The Police and Criminal 
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Evidence Act, although a jolt to the police when introduced, has had an important 
pay-off in aiding rising levels of public confidence in the police after the dark years of 
1989-1992 when public confidence in the police fell dramatically as the police paid 
the price for poor ethical criminal investigations in the 1970s. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 10 
Conclusion 
(1a) A. Sanders and R. Young, "Criminal Justice " 1994 at p. 203. 
(1b) In "Policing As Social Discipline" 1998 by Satnam Choongh there is also a 
call for an end to police interrogation at p. 237: I suggest that it is important 
to abolish the right of the police to question suspects ... such powers serve as 
an enabling device through which the police discipline particular segments of 
the population", and at p. 13 9, "The importance which the police attach to their 
power of interrogation is at least partly explicable by the police desire to 
control obnoxious individuals and communities. " A can for an end to reliance 
on confession -evidence has been made by The Honourable J. Bruce 
Robertson, Judge of the High Court of New Zealand. Judge Robertson 
proposes a ban on the reception of confession evidence made out of court and 
a reliance on a new duty to testify in court on the accused: "Any survey of 
injustices alleged to have occurred both here and overseas indicates that a 
personýs alleged out of court statements have been of pivotal importance in the 
obtaining of convictions which are subsequently found to be unjustified. 
General exclusion would lessen the possibility of injustice arising. Such 
material is essential under the present system but that would be averted if 
explanation was required in court with the potential for distortion removed. 
When persons actually face their judges of fact to explain themselves the 
chance of inappropriately avoiding responsibility would be lessened. " 
Honourable J. Bruce Robertson, "Rights and Responsibilities in the Criminal 
Justice System", F. W. Guest Memorial Lecture, 1992, Vol. 17 Otago Law 
Review, p. 501 at p. 516. 
(2) Sir Rupert Cross quoted at p. 207 of W. Twining "Rethffildng Evidence" 1990. 
(3) ibid at p. 208. 
D. Rose, "In the Name of the Law: The CoRapse of Crinfinal Justice" 1996 at 
p. 20. 
ibid. 
(6) A. Sanders, "Controlling the Discretion of the Individual Officer" in R. Reiner 
and S. Spencer, editors, "Accountable Policing: Effectiveness, Empowerment 
and Equity" 1993 at p. 106. 
As Dixon comments, "If interrogation were to be severely restricted or 
abandoned the implications for change in substantial criminal law and in the 
development of other possibly more reliable but much more intrusive 
investigative methods need to be squarely faced. " "Law in Policing: Legal 
Regulation and Police Practices" 1997 at p. 176. 
(7) Woolmington v D. P. P. (1935) AC 462. 
(7b) G. Gudjonsson "The Psychology of False Confessions" (1989) Vol. 57-58 
Medico-Legal Journal, p. 93 at p. 98. 
S. Greer, "Supergrasses" 1994 at p. 214. 
(9) Hall vRf 197 111 All ER 322 at p. 324. 
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J. Jackson, S. Doran "Diplock Courts: Trial Without Jury" 1995 at p. 54. 
D. Rose, "In the Name of the Law: The Collapse of Criminal Justice" 1996 at 
p. 174. 
(12) J. Morton, "Supergrasses and Infortners" 1995 at p. 322. 
(13) S. Doran, "The Symbolic Function of the Summing up in the Criminal Trial" 
Vol. 42, (Winter 199 1) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, p. 365 at p. 37 1. 
(14) J. Jackson, S. Doran, "Diplock Courts: Trial Without Jury" 1995 at p. 45. 
(15) C. Walker, 1. Cram, "D. N. A. Profiling and Police Powers" [1990] Crim. L. R. 
p. 479 at p. 480. 
(16) DPP v Boarchnan [1974] 2 W. L. R. 673. 
(17) RvP[1991]2AIIER859. 
(18) e. g. Rv Channing [1994] Crim. L. R. 924C. A. 
(19) Sir Frederick Lawton "Tarnished Police Evidence", the Law Society's Gazette, 
Vol. 88, Wednesday 8 May 1991 at p. 2. Another distinguished ex judge, Lord 
Devlin makes a similar recommendation to Sir Frederick Lawton when Devlin 
writes in "Easing the Passing": " ... 
for my part I should like to see reliance 
upon police interrogation reduced almost to vanishing point. I should be 
prepared to pay for that by admitting into trial much that is excluded from it as 
supposedly unfair to the accused. Let the court of trial and not the police 
station be the place at which guilt is determined but let the court be less 
inhibited about what it listens to. " p. 213. Easing the Passing: The Trial of Dr. 
Bodkin Adams, 1985. 
(20) See "Tbe Police, the Law and the People", A Haldane Society Publication, 2nd 
Edition, 1982, by Nick Blake. 
(21) Lord Devlin, "Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department of the 
Departmental Committee on Evidence of Identification in Criminal Cases" 
1976 (The Devlin Report). There is now a considerable body of literature on 
the psychology of mistaken identifications. Two accessible accounts of the 
main issues are J. Jackson, "The Insufficiency of Identification Evidence 
Based on Personal Impression" [1986] Crim. L. R. p. 203 and G. Davies: 
"Mistaken Identification: Where Law meets Psychology head on" (1996) The 
Howard Journal. ) Vol. 35, p. 232. 
(22) Rv Turnbull [19771 Q. B. 224 [197612 ABER 549. 
(23) G. Robertson, Treedorn, The Individual and the Law", 1993, p. 376. 
(24) RvTumbull[197612AIIER549atp. 552. 
(25) Rv Hickin and others [1996] Criminal Law Review 584 at p. 585. Jackson 
had gloomily predicted back in the 1986 Criminal Law Review that "there is 
no guarantee that judges and justices acting within their discretion will be any 
more inclined to exclude identification evidence where the procedures have 
not been complied with than they have been in the past" at p. 21 1. As in other 
areas such as confessions and improperly obtained evidence the judicial sea 
change on the discretionary exclusion of improperly collected identification 
evidence has proved commentators wrong. 
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(26) Rv Wheeling (1789) 1 Leach C. C. 
(27) The Confait Case is reported as Rv Lattimore (1975) 62 Cr. App. Rep. 53. 
(28) R Leng "A Recipe for Miscarriage: The Royal Commission and Informal 
Interviews" in "Criminal Justice in Crisis" 1994, edited by M. McConville and 
L. Bridges, at p. 18 1. 
(29) Rv McGovem (199 1) Cr. App. R. 228 at p. 235. 
(30) R. Reiner, "Chief Constables" 1992 at p. 149. 
(31) For an argument that Rv Nathaniel was wrongly decided by the Court of 
Appeal see I. H. Dennis "Ibe Law of Evidence" at pp. 246-247: "It is 
suggested that, in the absence of any finding that the police had deliberately 
set out to manipulate the defendant and abuse their powers under PACE, the 
trial judge was right to admit the evidence and the Court of Appeal wrong to 
allow the appeal ... where the police have not acted in bad faith, evidence 
should be excluded only if the defendant has been significantly disadvantaged 
by the breach and the breach violated a fundamental norm of the criminal 
justice process. Only some breaches will have this quality". 
(32) D. Downes and R. Morgan "The Politics of Law and Order in Post-war 
Britain" in "'nie Oxford Book of Criminology" 1994, edited by M. Maguire, 
R. Morgan and R. Reiner, at p. 220. 
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